Skip to main content

Full text of "Korea: the Mongol invasions"

See other formats



















Preface // J / //< v 

Introduction 1 

Part I. The Mongol Invasion 14 

Chapter 1. The Initial Phase 14 

Chapter 2. The Invasions of Sartaq 61 

Chapter 3. The Invasions of Tanqut-batur and Prince Yekii 102 

Chapter 4. The Invasions of Jfalairtai-qorci 127 

Chapter 5. Submission and Alliance 150 

Chapter 6. The Rebellion of the Three Patrols, SampyOlch'o 173 

Part II. Mongols Demands Upon Koryo 194 

1. The Instructions for Surrendering States 194 

2. Mongol Military -Administration in KoryO 19 5 

3. Tribute, Levies, and Gifts 201 

4. Mongol Military Colonies in Koryo 206 

5. Ship Construction 208 

6. Post-Stations 210 

7. Military Support 210 

8. Hostages 211 

Appendix: Patrols, pyolch^o 226 

Reference Table of Rulers of Kory6 236 

Symbols, Abbreviations, and Bibliography 237 

Index 248 



Events of the past decade have once again placed the Korean peninsula in 
the position of a buffer state where the wars of greater powers are focused. 
Historians will recall that Korea has had this role thrust upon her many times 
before. In recent times the peninsula was the battleground for the Sino -Japa- 
nese War of 1894-1895 while the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905, a naval action, took place off the present port of Inch'6n. As a 
result, a number of studies of the various aspects of modern Korean society, 
particularly in its contacts with the West, have been undertaken but little at- 
tention has been given to the evolution of that society. Yet it is only when this 
is studied for each period in Korean history that studies of contemporary Ko- 
rean society can be approached in other than a limited sense. 

The Kory6 ^ )^ period (918-1392) during which the Mongol invasions 
occurred was a great formative period in the history of the development of 
Korean society. The period encompassing the Mongol invasions of the thir- 
teenth century and the subsequent establishment of Mongol military-adminis- 
trative organs on the Korean peninsula was one of the important phases of 
transition in Korean history. 

The development of any society is, of course, continuous, but for the 
purposes of study I have found it convenient to treat the subject at hand in two 
natural divisions. The Mongol invasions of Korea in the thirteenth century as 
a development in Korean history form the subject of the present study. It is 
my intention to treat, in a separate work, the full extension of Mongol control 
in Korea which followed the period of conquest and with which I have dealt 
only summarily if at all in these pages. For the period covered I have, how- 
ever, considered the question of the form and nature of Mongol demands upon 
Koryd as well as the implementation of these demands as an illustration of 
Mongol methods of establishing control in and extracting wealth from con- 
quered nations. The reciprocal of this was the Kory6 response to Mongol de- 
mands and pressures which was obviously limited and guided by her internal 
situation as well as hei external relations. 

The Mongol conquest and subsequent occupation of KoryO represent but 
one phase in the development of the Mongol empire and in many respects the 
least known phase. The Mongols, initially, did not set out to conquer Koryo 


but were at the time fighting the Chin in North China. When a drive across 
South Manchuria led them into northern Koryo, they obtained KoryO's sub- 
mission Avithout fighting a battle against Kory6 forces. There were many 
factors which contributed to KoryO's initial peaceful submission but the key 
factor was that the Mongols represented, or appeared to represent, the new 
power in Manchuria, And KoryO had always been tributary to the power which 
held North China and Manchuria. When it became apparent that the Mongols 
were not at the time strong enough to hold South Manchuria, Koryo severed 
the relationship. This led to a period of sporadic warfare lasting almost 
thirty years. When KoryO finally submitted to the Mongols it was due more to 
internal events than as a result of the conflict. It has been one of the pur- 
poses of this study to examine these events and, if possible, to discover some 
of the reasons behind what were often apparently contradictory act ions by the 
Kory6 authorities. My approach has been primarily philological and in this 
respect I have, in general, endeavored to 'let the records speak for them- 

Unfortunately studies of pre-modern Korean history by Western scholars 
have been extremely limited to say the least, while studies by Korean, Chi- 
nese, and Japanese scholars are often difficult to obtain. In consideration 
thereof, I have divided the present study into two parts. The first part is in 
the form of a descriptive and chronological narrative; the second part deals 
primarily with considerations and consequences of events described in the 
first part and is more analytical in nature. Thus, a 'feed-back' methodology 
is projected. The narrative of events places them in perspective so that an 
analysis of component parts may be undertaken without distortion; the analysis 
of component parts in turn allows modification of the narrative of events. 

Since Homer Hulbert's two volume History of Korea, first published in 
1905 has recently been reprinted, a word should be said about earlier ac- 
counts of Korean history which include J.Ross* History of Corea, first 
printed in 1880, W.E.Griffis', Corea, the Hermit Nation, first printed in 
1882, and J. S. Gale's, A History of the Korean People, which appeared se- 
rially in the Korean Mission Field in the years 1925-1927o It would be too 
easy to subject the pertinent sections of these works to criticism but since I 
can see no purpose which would be served by so doing, I have refrained from 
commenting on what I consider to have been valiant pioneer efforts. 

For the convenience of the non-specialist, I have added an introductory 
chapter which provides a brief background and I have endeavored, particu- 
larly in the narrative, to relegate technical matters to footnotes. However, 
for convenience, whenever a reference consists merely of the abbreviated 

title of the work plus chUan and page numbers, I have simply placed such in- 
formation in parentheses in the appropriate location. 

In the romanization of Chinese (except for .^- which I have romanized ke) 
I have followed the Wade -Giles system with the usual modifications; for Jap- 
anese the Hepburn system, again with the usual modifications. In the roman- 
ization of Korean I have followed the McCune-Reischauer system with the 
following exceptions: 

1) utilized names or terms commonly known in another form, e.g., Seoul, 
H j£ , etc. 

2) spaced rather than linked both particles and auxiliary verbs; rendered S-j 
as ui in all cases; and omitted the diaeresis over e '^M when so called for 
by the MR system. 

In the reconstruction of Mongolian names and terms, I have followed the 
works of Pelliot, Hambis, Shiratori, and Cleaves and, excluding the well- 
known term daruyaci or resident commissioner, references have been pro- 
vided in footnotes. Where no reference is provided the reconstruction is my 
own. Since my knowledge of thirteenth century Mongolian is very limited, I 
have left the majority of these names in Chinese transcription, providing 
orthographic variants when such were encountered, excluding variations re- 
sulting from the well-known Ch'ien-lung language reforms of the mid- 
eighteenth century. 

When the name of a location differs from its current designation, I have 
endeavored to identify or locate it by placing in parentheses following it the 
modern name it is known by or the area in which it is located; more detailed 
references are given in footnotes. 

All bibliographical abbreviations are in capital letters and may be found 
in the bibliography; non-bibliographical abbreviations are listed separately 
preceding the bibliography. 

All dates are lunar except where the western name of the month is given 
in which case they are solar. 

In indicating the reign dates of monarchs, I have commenced with the 
wdnny&n y\_,}^~ and ended with the year preceding the wwinydn of the next 
monarch; when a monarch reigned only during the year of his accession, I have 
accorded the monarch that year as his 'reign-year'. In indicating the birth 
dates of individuals when the age at death was known I have arrived at the 
birth date by subtracting the age plus two years since, as is well-known, in 
Korea like in China, a child is assumed to be one-year old upon his birth and 
adds one year to his age each successive (lunar) new year's day. It should be 
observed that even this method does not always produce the correct year of 

Translations of the titles of works in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese are 
provided in brackets following the title in the original language; when the 
author of such a work has himself supplied either a translation or an alter- 
nate title in a western language, it is so indicated by quotation marks. 

A word of caution must be given regarding large numbers occurring in 
the text. The majority of figures of 10 000 or more should be viewed with 
some skepticism while the number three should always be suspect. 

I gratefully acknowledge the aid given to me by The Rockefeller Founda- 
tion and The Ford Foundation whose generous assistance made it possible for 
me to work at Leiden which resulted in this study, the publication of which 
was aided by a grant from the Netherlands Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten 
en Wetenschappen. Needless to say, the views expressed in this study are 
entirely my own. I wish particularly to thank Mr. and Mrs. Schepel-Verschoo'r 
of Leiden for their many kindnesses. Indeed, my indebtedness to all my Dutch 
friends can be only insufficiently expressed here; I owe a similar debt to Mr. 
Boyd Compton of New York City whose personal encouragement and warm 
friendship gave me the courage to continue. For their generous assistance in 
locating relevant materials I express my deep appreciation to Dr. Li Ogg (Yi 
Ok) J^ ^ of the University de Paris and Madame Meuvert of the Ecole Na- 
tionale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. It is a pleasure to acknow- 
ledge the cooperation and efforts of the firm of Brill & Co., Leiden, and 
Mr. F. B. Krips and Mr. J. F. Krips of Rijswijk (Z.H.) in the final printing and 
publication of this study. 

To my wife T'aesun Henthorn, n^e Yi T'aesun :^ -^ ji]^ , more than to 
anyone else do I owe the undertaking and completion of this study. With gentle 
patience she endured endless toil leaving me free to continue this work, en- 
couraged me through difficult periods when I would have given up, and set by 
her own efforts an example for perseverance which I have endeavored to fol- 
low. She typed the manuscript in all its drafts, offered me the guidance of her 
excellent knowledge of Korean, Sino-Korean, and Japanese, and it is, finally, 
her calligraphy which graces the pages of this work. 

W.E. Henthorn 
Leiden, August, 1963 



The state of Korytt which rose upon the fragments of a shattered Silla 
(Late Period 668-918), was influenced by early contacts with China's Five 
Dynasties and became in its formative years a haven for thousands of refugees 
from the Manchurian state of P'ohai fji 3^ D (713-926) which had been 
crushed by the Ch'i-tan f^ \^y who swept across Manchuria on their way to 
establishing the Liao }^Dynasty (907-1125). Powerful conquerors continued 
to appear in the north as the cauldron of Manchuria repeatedly boiled over 
into Kory6 until the peninsula was innundated in a deluge of Mongol invasions 
in the first half of the thirteenth century. Kory6, its coastal areas favorite 
targets of Japanese freebooters since time immemorial, found its territo- 
ries repeatedly invaded by the Ch'i-tan 2), the Jiircen ^ji masters of the 
Chin y^ Dynasty (1115-1234) '^\ and the Mongol founders of the Yiian ril-(in 
the extended sense ca. 1215-1368) empire. Acknowledged vassal 4) of the Sung 
^^(960-1126), Liao, Chin, Yiian, and, finally, after a shifting initial rela- 
tionship, of the Ming ll\] (1368-1644), Koryft received a steady stream of ex- 
ternal pressures which altered and guided Korean society as it evolved. 

The repeated invasions have led Yi PySngdo ^|^:^ , the dean of 
modern Korean historians, to write that "the history of the KoryS dynasty 
was, it may be said, chiefly a history of engagements with the peoples beyond 
the northern borders." 5) While neither foreign invasions, a highly developed 
maritime trade, nor the gradual Kory6 expansion northward into the upper 
reaches of the Yalu and the Tuman River valleys relate the entire history of 
KoryO, they did provide backdrop and stimulus for internal developments. 

Within the limitations of such criteria, the history of the Kory5 dynasty 
may be divided into three broad periods: 

1) from 918 to 1170, the power of the government remained fairly centralized 
in the person of the monarch; 

2) from 1170 to 1270, Kory6 was under the control of the military government 
and the monarchs became figureheads; 

3) from 1270 onward, power was restored to the monarch while events in Koryo 
tended to reflect, in pro- and anti -Mongol factions alike, the vicissitudes 
of the Yiian and the rise of the Ming until the end of the Kory6 Dynasty in 

At the time of the Mongol invasions, Kory6 was under the firm control of 
a military government as indeed it had been for over fifty years. While there 
appears to have been no great socio-political and hence economic distinction 
between the civil and the military officials at the beginning of the Koryo Dy- 
nasty 6), by the reign of tJijong (r. 1147-1170) '^), a rigid class distinction 
existed between the civil and the military officials. The ranks of the literati, 
who held the government posts of importance, were closed to the military and 
their descendants and reserved for those of royal lineage or the descendants 
of the civil officials. It was not long before the dissipations of tJijong — if the 
records be believed — placed the actual control of the state in the hands of the 
literati and the eunuchs °) who then endeavored to further strengthen their own 
power by making the military as a group as weak as possible while abusing 
them individually 9). This eliminated in a coiip d'etat by Ch6ng Chxmgbu 10) i^ 
1170, and the military then began to compete among themselves for power 11). 
Ch6ng deposed tJijong and placed Myongjong (r. 1171-1197) 12) on the throne 
after a wholesale purge of the civil officials. This was followed by many abor- 
tive attempts by members of Ch6ng's own followers to wrest power from him 
and there were also several unsuccessful attempts to topple Ch6ng by other 
military leaders 1^) until, finally, he was overthrown and killed by Generally) 
KySng TaeSung 15) in 1179 16). The competition for power among the military 
had given rise to strong house armies and so, when General Kyong died sud- 
denly in 1183, Yi Uimin 1"^) became the new military ruler on the strength of 
his house army. Then in 1196, Ch'oe Ch'unghon ^ J^W\ established him- 
self as the ruling power by assassinating Yi. In each case the house armies 
made up of household retainers were the deciding factor in the power struggle 
and it was on the strength of these private forces that power was retained 1^). 

The century of rule by military overlords 19) may be set forth in brief 
chronology as follows: 

1170-1179 Ch6ngChungbu 

1179-1183 Ky6ng Taesflng 

1183 - 1196 Yi Uimin 

1196 - 1258 Ch'oe clan 

1196 - 1218 Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n 
1219 - 1249 Ch'oe U^ 
1250 - 1256 Ch'oe Hang jfj^ 

1257 - 1258 Ch'oe Ui ijl" 

1258 - 1268 Kim Chun /^^ \= Kim Injun) 
1268 - 1270 Im clan 

1268 - 1270 Im Y6n ji<^^yj 
- 1270 - Im Yumu j^\^ jf ^ 

Map of Korea and adjacent areas (ca. 1217) 




During the period of the military government the monarchs were largely 
in the position of figureheads. There were, of course, attempts by the mo- 
narchs to alter this situation which normally led to their removal and exile 
or, upon occasion, their murder 20). Kojong (r. 1214-1259) 21)^ the monarch 
during whose long reign many of the events related in the subsequent pages 
occurred, immersed himself in Buddhist devotions and activities. Ceremonial 
activities accounted for the remainder of his time while the practical affairs of 
government were handled by the various government bureaus which were mo- 
deled, to a large extent, after Chinese counterparts. Distinct from, yet in 
actual operational control of all government organs, were the various organs 
organized and developed by the military rulers. Through this latter structure 
the military rulers guided the affairs of state 22) . 

KoryS's first recorded contact with the Mongols occurred in 1211, i.e., 
the seventh year of the reign of Kory6 Huijong (r. 1205-1211) 23) when a Koryo 
envoy to the Chin court was killed by Mongol soldiers (KS21. 25b). Although 
this was in time to prove a prophetic encounter, Koryo' s first contacts with 
Mongol forces on a large scale began upon a much different note. The 'Record 
of Yuan-Kory6 Affairs', Yuan Kao-li chi-shih <^ ^ ^ a^^' opens with 
a concise statement of the initial phase of Yuan-Kory6 relations: 

"In the thirteenth year (1218) of T'ai-tsu J^;f^ (Cinggis, 1155 -1227), 
the troops of heaven (Mongol) reached Kory6. Their monarch submitted 
and [agreed to] the interchange of envoys and annual tribute. In the nine- 
teenth year (1224) bandits killed our envoy and thereafter [envoys] did not 
come at all" {YKCld). 

As succinct as these few lines are they underscore the salient features 
of Kory6's initial relations with the Mongols. To begin with, the Mongol of- 
fensive which swept across the Yalu in 1218, was directed against the 
Ch'i-tan and not against Kory6, nor was there any particular penetration of 
other than the northern border region. Second, Kory6 submitted to the extent 
of attempting to purchase autonomy by the submission of tribute. And, finally, 
relations were severed following the murder of a Mongol envoy in the first 
month of 1225 24)^ ^nd were not resumed until 1231, when they were force- 
fully reopened by Mongol arms. 

There were in the years that followed, three major turning points in 
Mongol -Kory6 relations on the Kory6 side: 

a. the Kory6 decision to transfer the seat of government from the central 
capital of Kaegy6ng |vf] jf^ (mod. Kaes6ng; see Chapter I note 43) to 
Kanghwa Island in 1232; 

b. the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, and 

c. the deposition and subsequent restoration of the monarch W6njong (r. 1260- 
1274) 25) in 1269. 


These may be briefly characterized as ushering in periods of resistance, 
begrudged cooperation, and active alliance. 

On the Yiian side, the turning point began with the reign of Qubilai (Shih- 
tsung \^ yP , r. 1260-1294) which can be described as the commencement 
of the organized enforcement of Mongol demands through the Mongol military - 
administrative organs established in Kory6. 

When the Mongols commenced their drive in 1209 against the Chin empire 
which held sway over North China and Manchuria, and to which Koryo was 
tributary, it produced some unsettling effects. There were the expected re- 
volts among the Ch'i-tan who had been conquered by the Chin and there were 
also deserters among the Jiirien themselves. Two cases are of particular 
interest to us here. 

In 1211, the Ch'i-tan prince Yeh-lii Liu-ke ^^ ^^ ^ ^ > who had 
been serving the Chin as chiliarch (i.e., Chief of One Thousand) ch'ien-hu 

J^ , rebelled against the Chin and seized control of a portion of the 


Liaotung area. The following year, he submitted to Mongol forces pressing 
eastward across Liaotung and, in 1213, he proclaimed himself ruler of the 
Liao. This, like the establishment of the Qara-Khitay state in Central Asia 
following the fall of the Liao Dynasty in 1125 26) ^ ^as an attempt to revive 
the old Liao empire. Liu-ke was soon ousted from power by a certain Yeh- 
ssu-pu jfc^M ^ and he requested support from Cinggis against the usurper. 

In 1214, the Chin moved their capital south to Feng-ching 3 T ^fv and 
appointed P'u-hsien Wan-nu Jt^ Mf^^j^t ^ Jiircen, to be Pacification 
Commissioner, hsien-fu-shih ^ ^MrW > ^^ ^^^ Hsien-p'ing-lu 27) area 
where the revolt centered. Wan-nu, with some forty thousand men under his 
command, was to check the rebellion initiated by Yeh-lii Liu-ke, but he was 
himself defeated in late 1214, and, using the opportunity provided by an attack 
directed against the Chin under the Mongol General Muqali 28) which resulted 
in the fall of Peking to the Mongol forces, Wan-nu rebelled against the Chin 
in the spring of 1215 {YS 1. 19a). Basing himself in the Chin Eastern Capital, 
Tung-ching # J^^ (Liaoyang), he established himself at the head of a state 
which he designated Ta-chen /vi£. or Great Jiircen. 

In the spring of 1216, the Ch'i-tan rebels fled south from Hsien-p'ing 
j^ Y~ before a Chin army mustered against them and overran the southern 
borders of Wan-nu' s territory, seizing Teng-chou ^^jj\ • Yeh-ssu-pu was 
murdered at this time by one of his ministers, a certain Ch'i-nu ^-^/^ , 
who then assumed the leadership. At this point the Ch'i-tan rebels held the 
area from Teng-chou (mod, Hai-chou J-^ -jn ) to Poju yj^ jj\ (= tJiju^ jU ) 
just across the Yalu River. In the autumn and winter of 1216, Mongol forces 
had bepn engaged in the Liaotung ir'eninsula and, accompanied by Yeh-lii 

Liu-ke, had chased the Ch'i-tan rebels from Teng-chou to the Koryo borders. 
Then the Mongols lavinched an attack on the Ch'i-tan forces at Ta-fu-ying 

^^ ;7\. r^ (located on an island in the lower course of the Yalu River, near 
mod. tliju). Hard-pressed, the Ch'i-tan requested land and supplies from 
Kory6 to continue the fight; when it was refused they crossed the Yalu with an 
estimated ninety thousand men and overran the Kory6 frontier region {YS 154. 
la; IC 9A. 6b). 

P'u-hsien Wan-nu had endeavored to retain his independence but was de- 
feated by the Mongol forces pressing eastward and, submitting to Muqali, he 
sent his son T'ieh-ke )j]J -^* as a hostage {YS 1. 19a). When the Mongol 
forces withdrew following the defeat of the Ch'i-tan rebels late in 1216, 
Wan-nu took his own forces further east toward the Yalu and, in early 1217, 
redesignated his nation the Tung-hsia ^ ^ or Eastern Hsia in 1217 (YS 1, 
19a-b). The name of this state is probably better known as Tung-chen (-kuo) 
or (Land of) the Eastern JiirCen and for simplicity I will refer to them simniv 
as the Eastern JiirCen 29). 

The Ch'i-tan rebels had spent the year 1217 pillaging southward down the 
Korean peninsula, menacing the Kory6 capital. Then, after a long drive to the 
southeast culminated in several defeats, they turned toward the land of the 
Eastern Jiircen in the northeast. 

The Chin, in the meantime, had attempted to strengthen their hold on the 
Liaotung area where they still had strong garrisons and, at this time, con- 
trolled the P'o-su-lu ^ i^j^^ administrative area which lay just west of 
the lower reaches of the Yalu. P'u-hsien Wan-nu, pressed by these Chin 
forces in Liaotung, moved further eastward into the Chin Ho-lan-lu y^j m^jS >^ 
administrative area and based himself along the lower reaches of the Tuman 
River. It was into this area that the Ch'i-tan rebels had fled from Koryo in 
the autumn of 1217, and here they were able to recruit reinforcements. The 
Ch'i-tan resumed their attack on Kory6 in a drive directed toward Koryo' s 
vVe stern Capital, Sdgydng ^ P^ (mod. P'y6ngyang), which overran Kory6's 
Northeast Frontier-District but fell short of the objective at the near-by 
walled-city of Kangdong ^J^ -^ 30) Kory6 forces managed to contain them 
in this area and were slowly gaining the upper hand when, in the winter of 
1218, unexpected allies appeared. 
* Teke 

Notes to the Introduction 

1. For a general article on P'o-hai, see W.E.Henthorn, 'Some notes on Par- 
hae (P'ohai)', TKBRAS XXXVH (1961), pp. 65-82. Also see Ikeuchi Hiroshi 


y&i^ i ' Mansen-shi kenkyu ^ .^f-JC^^^ [Studies on the His- 
tory of Manchuria and Korea], published in 2 vols., TSkyQ, 1933 and 1937. 
For Kory6 attempts to gain Sung support when pressed by the Ch'i-tan ear- 
lier, see M.C.Rogers, 'Factionalism and Koryft Policy under the Northern 
Sung', JAOS 79 (1959), pp. 16-25, and M.C. Rogers, ' Sung -Kory6 Relations; 
Some Inhibiting Factors', Oriens 11 (1958), pp. 194-202. 
Nu-chen -^ jg or Jiirten; later written Nu-chih'^]a_ due to the taboo 
name of Liao Hsing-tsung^ ^ (r. 1031-1054), cf. YS 59.5b. After 
throwing off the suzerainty of the Ch'i-tan, the Jur6en overran the northern 
part of the peninsula in the course of establishing the Chin Dynasty. For an 
account of the Jur6en conquest of northern Kory6 see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, 
Mansen-shi kenkyu, Vol. 2, pp. 199-264 and H.D.Martin, The Rise of 
Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China,. Baltimore, 1950, pp. 55- 
56; for the disasterous defeat of the Koryo army in the .tiircen incursions 
of 1104, see the biography of Yun Kwan^^^ (d. 1111) in KS 96.. lib ff. 
Following this defeat Yun reorganized the Koryo army and erected nine 
walled-cities, s6ngJ:J^ , in the present North Hamgy6ng Province, during 
the reign of Yejong ^ jP (r. 1106-1122). While the 'walled-cities' se- 
cured the eastern littoral, the reorganization of the army was apparently 
only a temporary expedient and it appears that no effort was made to re- 
tain an effective national army at this time. For the role of the walled- 
cities build by Yun see Yun Mubyfing -^ ^ X^ Koju-s6ng kwa Konghbm- 
chin '^ j)^ Jp^ d -^> ]\\'^ /|^ ["Koju Fortress and Kongh6m Gar- 
rison"], YH 1958, pp. 58-98; Tsuda Sokichi ^^ \^ ji^ Jo ^ > 
Chosen rekishi chiri M MM^^h'^^ "^°^- ^> PP- 103-158, (2) vols., 
Tokyo, 1918, and the following archaeological reports: Koseki chUsa 
hokoku -^ ^-a" |)g^ ^^^ [Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], 
and Koseki ch5sa tokubetsu hokoku ^ ^ ^^ -yj^yj^ n\ ^R ^ 
[Special Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], published in 1919 and 1929 
respectively by the Chosen koseki kenkyukai ^^ SX :^ ^h j{}^ ^^^ '^^ 

I use the word 'vassal' here merely to indicate an acknowledged subordinate 
status. KoryS's relations with Sung, Liao and Chin have been the subject of 
several articles by M.C.Rogers and are cited in full in the bibliography. 
The Confucian-based relationship which existed between Koryo and Sung 
and Ming has been described by F.Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in 
East Asia, Baton Rouge, La., 1946, while Koryft-Yiian relations are unique 
in Korean history. An excellent study for the period 962-1174 is Marugame 
Kinsaku JL ^ ^i^ ^^ , Korai to So to no tsukC mondai >f) ^ t.^^ 'O 
iiX^Tii. ["Problems of Goryeo's Intercourse with Sung"], I, CG 17 
(1960), ppri-50; II, CG 18 (1961), pp. 58-82. 


5. Yi 'Py6ngdo , Kuksa taegwan Inj 'X- y\.WX^ [A General History of Korea], 
Seoul, rev. ed., 1958, p. 169. 

6. Cf. Py6n T'aes6p j^ ^ ^ , Koryo-jo ui munban kwa muban 

J] 2 i^ ^ i ^^i 4 it ^^i l-^^^^ ^'^ Military Officials of the Koryo 
Dynasty], SY2 (1961), pp. 1-92. 

7. Wang Ch'6l ^^fj(, the 18th monarch, was born in 1127, ascended the 
throne in 1146, was deposed on the 13th of October 1170, died in 1173, 
and was canonized tJijong ^ ^ . He also had the adult hwi'^'S or taboo 
name of Hy6n^^ . For biographical information see KS 17. 19a, KS 19. 
10a; see also BTKP 113. 1057. 

The majority of Kory6 monarchs had several hwior taboo names which 
are detailed in the works of Courant, Hambis and Rogers, for which see 
the bibliography. I have listed only the taboo name used in the records 
during the period under consideration which is, in most cases, the adult 
taboo name. In those cases where two taboo names were used by the 
same individual during this period it has been so noted. 

8. Although the subject has been generally overlooked, a short study of the 
eunuchs has been done by Yi Uch'61 ^ r^ ^^ , Kory6 sidae ui hwan' 
gwan e taehay6 ^ jg 3^ /^ 5) f ^f '^/ |j ^ o] [A Con- 
sideration of the Eunuch in the Koryo Dynasty'],. SY 1 (1958), pp. 18-45. 
With the rise of the military overlords in 1170, and their subsequent 
purge from positions of power, the eunuchs appear to have played only a 
minor role until the reign of King Ch'ungny6l ;J?, /j, ^ (r. 1275-1308) 
when they again assumed a powerful role in the affairs of State. Cf . KS 
122. 9b-27b. 

9. Yi Pyftngdo, Kuksa taegwan, p. 239. 

10. Ch6ngChungbu '0 yj^ ^ (fl. 1169-1179); for biographical information 
see i<:S128. la-15a; BTKPlZ.m. 

11. Cf. KS 86. 9b. Ch6ng Chungbu exiled Uijong to Kftje Island J£ ;^ ^ 
(S. Ky6ngsang Province), killed the crown prince and put the king's 
younger brother, the Duke of Igyang ^ f^ "/^ > °^ ^^^ throne, viz., 
My6ngjong t9^ ^fj[\ {KS 86, 29b). For a brief study of the rebellion see 
Yun Yonggyun -^ ^^j^'^ > KOrai Kiso-cho ni okeru Tei Cha-fu ran no 
soin to sono eikyO ^ g |J f ^fj I: ^^ ,) i |p .(^ ^ IL -0 

i^ S t H -fi ^M f^^® Cause and Effect of the Re- 

bellion of Ch6ng Chungbu \n the Reign of Kory6 tJijong], SG 2 (1930), pp. 
91-96. Py6n has made an excellent and detailed study of the socio- 
economic distinctions which gradually arose between the civil and mili- 
tary officials and which was, an important factor in the coup d'6tat of 1170, 
for which see Py6n T'aes6p, op. cit., pp. 1-92. 

12. Wang Hun ^ fl/J^ , the nineteenth monarch, was born in 1131, ascended 
the throne in 1171, was deposed in 1192, died in 1202, and was canonized 
My6ngjong 'Qfj [^ . For biographical information see KS 19. lla-b and 
KS 20. 38a-b; also see BTKP 85.794. 

13. For example, the rebellion of Cho vVich'ong ^''ijL ^ (d. 1176; bio. 
KS 100. 7-11) which centered around the Western Capital, S6gy6ng 
(mod. P'y6ngyang), and which lasted from 1174 to 1176. Also, at the 
urging of Kim Podang ^^ ^ '^ (d- 11'73), tJijong returned to Kyerim 
(Kyttngju) from exile on K6je Island but this attempt was crushed by 
Chftng's follower Yi tlimin ^ ^ 9Ji (fl. 1170-1196; bio. /CS 128) who 
murdered the deposed monarch at Ky6ngju in 1173. cf. M.C.Rogers, 
'Studies in Korean History', TP LCVH (1959) 1 & 2, pp. 30-62. 

14. A study of Kory6 civil and military titles is seriously needed. Needless 
to say the subject is a complex one. T'ang titles adopted in Silla times 
were retained in many cases and these were supplemented by the adop- 
tion of Yiian titles in the 13th century, not to mention previous influences 
from Liao, Chin, and Sung. To this must be added those titles and offices 
which were distinctly Korean in origin. Determining the function of the 
holders of these titles is, of course, the difficulty. In this paper I have 
given merely suggestive translations for titles, unless otherwise indi- 
cated. In his Han'guk-sa Vol. U (projected six vols, of which three have 
appeared, viz.. Vol. I, by Yi Py6ngdo and Kim Chaew6n -^ ^ yj^^ , 
Vol. 2, by Yi Py6ngdo, and Vol. 5, Chronological Tables, by Yun Muby&ng 

-f^)l^ ; published by the Chindan Society, Seoul, 1959), Yi Py6ngdo 
has appended as Table 4, 'A Table of the Central Bureaucratic Structure 
of the Kory6 Period' (hereinafter cited Yi, Table 4), and has appended as 
Table 6, 'A Table of Stipends' (hereinafter cited Yi, Table 6), compiled, 
we are told in the 'Introduction', p. 1, by Yi Kibaek -^ % -Q ^.nd An 

>~) y^if vid '"^ ^^ 

KyehySn jlj-, '^ ^ respectively; appended as Table 7 are charts of the 
amounts of paddy fields and forest land allotted (hereinafter cited, Yi, 
Table 7). Since these tables refer to the bureaucratic and military struc- 
ture during the reign of Munjong j^ ^ (r. 1047-1082), the information 
taken from them is given with that qualification in mind. In addition, to 
their annual rice stipends, Kory6 officials received land allowances. 
Each official was granted the privilege of the use of paddy fields and 
forest lands, the latter particularly important considering the large 
amounts of firewood consumed in the Korean ondol J^ j^x! system of 
radiant heating which, as it dates to neolithic times on the peninsula 
(cf. Kim Chaewftn's {^ ^ 7^ synopsis of Korean prehistory in 
Han'guk-sa, Vol. I, pp. 8-64), was certainly in use during this period. 

And, in theory, the land was supposed to revert to the state. For some 
rather general remarks on the Korean ondol system and comparisons 
with Roman methods of radiant heating, see Viesman, Warren, 'Ondol - 
Radiant Heat in Korea', TKBRAS XXXI (1948-9), pp. 9-22. For Silla (as 
well as Paekche, KoguryO) titles and the use of T'ang titles in Silla see: 
F.Vos, 'Kim Yusin, Personlichkeit und Mythos - Ein Beitrag zur Kennt- 
nis der altkoreanischen Geschichte', Oriens Extremus I (1954) 1, pp. 29- 
70, and II 1, pp. 210-236 and the works cited therein. 
In the KoryS army a General, changgun M- m. , had the official grade of 
Fourth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 
200 bushels {sok Ja ) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 75 kydl 
4^ of paddy fields and 39 kydl of forest land (Yi, Table 7). 

15. Kybng Taesung M" ;X^ 4r was born in 1154 and died in 1183. He con- 
trolled the military government from 1179 to 1183. For biographical 
information see KS 100. 16a 3-20b7; also see BTKP 79. 747. 

16. Cf. KS 87. 2a 3. It is interesting to note that following the death of Gen- 
eral Ky6ng, his private guard imit, the tohang M>^^ , did not disband 
and was finally exiled to an island. Cf. bio. of Kyong Taesung/CS 100. 

17. Yi tJimin ^f: ^ ^ji (fl. 1170-1196); for biographical information see 
KS 128. 19a-25b; also see BTKP 144. 1323. 

18. House armies kabydng ]^ j^ of the military rulers were formed of 
their household retainers mun'gaek ]' ] i^ . Upon at least one occasion 
cash inducements were offered for recruitment but this appears to have 
been a temporary measure in time of crisis and to what extent it charac- 
terized these private forces in general is unknown, cf. KS 129. The house 
army of Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n increased to the extent that it was as strong as 
the national army. In the 1st month of the third year of Kojong (1216), 
Ch'oe sent his house army to aid the Koryo army then fighting the Ch'i-tan 
invaders and we read that "when they sent [troops] to ward off the Ch'i-tan, 
the skillful and brave soldiers were all the retainers mun'gaek f^ 1^ of 
the Ch'oe' s, [while] the government army was weak and unable to be used" 
(KS 129). In the 11th month of the same year, Ch'oe inspected his house 
army which stretched twenty-three li X~ while his son U also controlled 

a considerable force of his own {KS 129). By the 20th year of the reign of 
Kojong, the size of the Ch'oe clan's private army was still such that 
Ch'oe U could send his house force in lieu of the government army to at- 
tempt to crush the Koryft rebel Hong Pogw6n J^ nilf jjf! at the Western 
Capital (TT 31, 50. 16). 

The private character of Ch'oe' s forces is well illustrated by two exam- 


1. In the 7th year of the reign of HCiijong IS ^ (r. 1205-1211), the King 
plotted to assassinate Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n, but Ch'oe was saved by his 
guard unit the tobang M> ^ 

2. When armies of monks being used against the Ch'i-tan forces then 
nearing KaegyOng plotted to overthrow Ch'oe, he dispatched his house 
army to crush them {KS 129). 

For a survey article see W.E.Henthorn, 'Some Notes on Kory6 Military 
Units', TKBRASXXXV (1959), pp. 66-75. 

19. The biographies of the members of the Ch'oe and Im clans as well as that 
of Kim Chun are referred to in detail later in the text. 

20. Since the Kory6 monarchs received their patents of investiture from the 
rulers of China — more specifically from the state which controlled 
North China and Manchuria - this was often responsible for Korv6 skull- 
duggery in reporting the succession of monarchs for investiture by China, 
especially during the period of the military government (1170-1270). See 
M. C.Rogers, 'Some Kings of Kory6 as Registered in Chinese vVorks', 
JAOS 81 (1961) 4, pp. 415-422 for an early example of this; also see the 
other works by Rogers which are cited in full in the bibliography. 

21. WangCh'61 ^ a|j( (r. 1214-1259), the twenty-third monarch, was born 
in 1192, ascended the throne in 1213, died in 1259, and was canonized 
Kojong ^ ]fv . For biographical information see KS 22a. 4-9 and KS 
24. 44b-45a. BTKP 73. 701 has, I note, given Kojong' s reign dates incor- 
rectly as 1216-1259. 

22. The extent to which the function of many departments in the central gov- 
ernment was taken over by the offices created by the military is largely 
unknown and warrants a special study. 

23. Wang TOk J:^ ^. , the twenty-first monarch, was born in 1181, as- 
cended the throne in 1204, was deposed and exiled in 1211, died in 1237, 
and was canonized Huijong ,^^ rf> • For biographical information see 
KS 21. 26a-b and KS 23. 33; also see BTKP 38. 357. 

24. There are the expected discrepancies in dates between the Yiian and 
Kory6 records reflecting different records of departure and arrivals, as 
well as receipt of reports of events. In this case, the envoy in question 
was killed in the first month of 1225, but, perhaps because he was the 
envoy for the tribute of 1224, or possibly because he was dispatched in 
1224, YKC renders 1224. In referring back to the event some years 
later, Koryo also refers to him as the envoy of chia-shen ^ W year, 
i.e., 1224 {KS 23. 19b). However, the envoy did not leave Koryft until the 
first month of 1225 (cf. KS 22. 27a). For consistency, I have followed the 
KS in all dates unless otherwise indicated, and have noted discrepancies 
in dates when I have felt it to be germane. 


25. WangChbn^./^ (adult taboo name Sik ^4a..w.Jf^ ), the twenty -fourth 
monarch, was born in 1219, ascended the throne in 1259, died in 
1274, and was canonized WOnjong ^ ^rfy • For biographical information 
seeifS 25. la 5-8 and i^S 27. 48b 8-49b 2. Also see BTKP 122. 1146. The 
entry under father) in BTKP is erroneously given as Hiiijong; it should 
be corrected to read Kojong. 

26. Cf . K. A. Wittfogel and C . S. Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907- 
1125), 'Qara-Khitay', undated reprint from the Transactions of the Amer- 
ican Philosophical Society, Vol. 36. 

27. Hsien-p'ing-lu j§j^ if- j:^- is the present Kai-yiian-hsien f^^ ^, & ; 
see Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien <P )^ ^ '^ i't^^-cl /v^f -W^ 
Commercial Press, Shanghai, 2nd ed., 1933, p. 603. Also see rS 59. 6a. 

28. Muqali had been appointed viceroy of the Chin Empire, Korea, 
and the Liao by Cinggis. Cf. M.Prawdin, The Mongol Empire, N.Y., 
1953, p. 141. ^^ . ^ 

29. Yanai Watari |^ '^ -^ , YUan-tai ching-lUeh tung-pei k'ao j\_j \^ 

4^ fi^ J^ 3tl//^ (being the Chinese translation of three studies 
which originally appeared in Japanese), Commercial Press, 1944, pp. 
85-91, maintains that the designation Tung-hsia ^^ J is a scribal er- 
ror for Tung-chen JS "i^ . Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, p. 581 note 1 
and pp. 643-649, opposes this view. Yanai 's view is based chiefly on the 
fact that the designation Tung-hsia does not appear in the Kory6 records. 
However, as Ikeuchi points out, it does appear in the Tongmun-son 

A- Xj^ compiled by Yu Stingdan ^^ ^ (1170-1232; bio. KS 
102. 6a ff; BTKP 153. 1402) - regrettably unavailable to me - althovigh 
its appearance there is in the heading of a letter and is admittedly contro- 
versial for it is the type of explanatory title which could well have been 
added at a later date. Yet, Yanai's argument is not totally convincing. 
The application Tung-hsia was probably coined after Hsi-hsia ^ ^ 
(Tanqut). However, it is generally referred to in the Korean records (as 
pointed out by Yanai, loc. cit.) as the Tung-chen-kuo (Kor. Tongjin'guk) 

]^_ "Mr ^ since the peoples of the area in which Wan-nu settled had, 
at least as early as 1021, i.e., the twelfth year of the reign of Kory6 
Hy6njor^ M^ !l^v (r. 1010-1031), been known in Korean records as the 
Eastern iiirten Tang yOjin (C. Tung rni-chen) j^ -^ Mr ' ^^' ^^ ^' "^^~ 
36. These designations and the area to which they pertained are clarified 
in ch'ien-pien |ij |i^ 44a of the Ming-YUan-Ch'ing hsi-t'ung-chi Jlj Xli 

Ia %^ ji_l2J > Commercial Press edition, 1934. I have retained the 
designation Eastern Jiirten in all references to these peoples for the sake 
of lucidity. 


30. The leadership of the Ch'i-tan rebels changed several times during their 
stay in Kory6; according to the records as follows: Ch'i-nu was killed by 
a certain Chin-shan /^ J_j who was killed by a certain Chin-shih {i^-^t 
who was killed by a certain T'ung-ku-yii ^aj ^ '^^ ^^^ ^® ^^^» ^^ turn, 
killed by a certain Han-she iJj^ j^ who commanded the Ch'i-tan forces 
at the time of the Kangdong battle. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyU, Vol. 1, 
p. 602, says that Ch'i-nu may have been killed in battle and he maintains 
that Chin-shih is an error for Chin-shan and that no such person as Chin- 
shan existed. While I shall not attempt to give a complete bibiliography 
for the events described in the Introduction, I have drawn material from 
the following sources: YKC lb; KS 22; KS 103; HY 22. 8a-9a; CHSL 4. 22; 
YSi. 19a-20a; YS 149. la-5b; Yanai, loc. cit., Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and the 
succinct accounts contained in Yi Py6ngdo, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 538- 
540, and ToyD rekishi daijiten ^ l4- )^ ^ y^itf-W- > published by 
the Heibonsha ^ f^^^^L , TOkyQ, 1937-39, Vol. 2, p. 273. Additional 
information is also contained in the KoryO-sa biographies contained in 
KS 102, 2uidKS 129. For a description of events in North China at this 
time see H.D. Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan . . . , O. Franke, Ge- 
schichte des chinesischen Retches, Berlin, 1952, BdlVandV; and 
R.Grousset, L' Empire mongol, Paris, 1941, T. I. 


Chapter I 

In the winter of 1218 ^\ ten thousand Mongol troops under the command 
of Marshal 2) Ha-chen 3) (?Qa5in) and Deputy Marshal Cha-la 4) (? ♦ Jala) 
supported by a force of twenty thousand Eastern jfur6en troops sent by P'u- 
hsien vVan-nu (cf. KS 23. 19b-20b) and commanded by \Van-yen Tzu-yiian 
^ 11 'j~ M swept unto Kory6 {KS 103. 4b; KS 22. 16a) from the north- 
east 5). Quickly crushing the Ch'i-tan occupied cities of Hwaju, Maengju, 
Sunju, and T5kchu ^\ they were making directly '') for the walled-city 
sdng 8), of Kartgdong ^\ the last major Ch'i-tan strongpoint in KoryO, when 
a heavy snowfall rendered the roads impassable. The Ch'i-tan were holding 
out in an attempt to exhaust their pursuers and with their supply route cut, 
the Mongol commanders turned to Kory6 for assistance '■^i . Ha-chen sent 
Interpreter H) Chao Chung-hsiang ;^ JT^-f- leading a party of twelve 
persons (cf. IC 6. 13b) to the headquarters 12) of Cho Ch'ung 13)^ Marshal of 
the Northwest Frontier-District 1^) and senior Kory6 commander, with a 
severely worded dispatch which proclaimed that they had been sent by Cinggis 
to subdue the Ch'i-tan who had been ravaging Kory6 for the past three years. 
Requesting troops and provisions, the dispatch also stated that the Emperor 
had commanded them to pledge the two nations in a Elder (Mongols) - Younger 
(Kory6) Brother relationship following the subjugation of the Ch'i-tan {KS 103. 
4b) 15). 

Marshal Cho kept the Kory6 Court informed of the situation by endless 
dispatches and was one of the few to favor meeting the Mongol demands {KS 
103. 5a). Although Ha-chen repeatedly charged them to bring reinforcements 
{IC 6. 13b), Cho's generals were hesitant to act on the Mongol demands and 
only Commissioner of Men and Horse 1^) Kim Ch'wiry6 1"^) spoke out: 'Tre- 
cisely on this day will the nation gain or lose. If we disregard them, I believe 
we will regret it later." "This is my own opinion, " Marshal Cho agreed {KS 
103. 16b). But the Kory6 Court was alarmed by the appearance of the Mongol 
forces and highly suspect of their motives - "The Mongols are the most in- 
human of the northern barbarians. Moreover, they have never previously 
been on good terms with us," it was pointed out. Lost in discussions of 


whether to meet the Mongol demands or not, the Court delayed which merely 
angered the Mongols. Finally, in a dispatch prepared by the Secretariat 18) 
they agreed to fulfil all the instructions proposed, chiefly it would appear, at 
the urging of Marshal Cho {KS 103. 4b-5a). 

As a military man. Marshal Cho wanted to choose someone to transport 
the provisions and reinforcements to the Mongols who would be able to spy on 
them as well, but was having difficulty choosing the right man. Kim In'gySng^^)^ 
a subordinate official begged to be allowed to go.. 

"Your plans," Cho told him curtly, "[are] simply those which your supe- 
riors direct. You are not accustomed to go spying recklessly. How can 
you presume to ask to do so [now]?" 

"I have heard," Kim said, "that the Mongols have taken up battle positions; 
[we should] take example from [the ancient militarists] Sunl^ and 4Vu20) 
\t. [When] I was young I read the Six Books 21) and am well acquainted 
with them. Thus do I presume to ask." 
When the Court allowed it, Cho sent Kim with one thousand picked troops 22) 
and one thousand bushels 23) of rice to assist the Mongols {KS 102. 7b). 

In'gySng arrived at the Mongol camp just in time to take his men to watch 
the Mongol-JiirCen troops attack the Ch'i-tan in the walled-city of Taeju ^j^ ')•)] 
24). Ha-chen and Tzu-yiian welcomed Kim with a feast and music at their 
camp at Tok Mountain ^ Jj to the west of the city. Then both commanders 
had their soldiers provide some entertainment. In'gy6ng formed his men into 
a military square outside the west gate of the Ch'i-tan held city, and the two 
Marshals climbed a height to watch while the Ch'i-tan themselves looked on 
from the city walls. Forty-six Mongols dressed in armor and with swords 
belted on opposed each other (in mock combat). Kim had some of his men 
perform various tricks with a great clamor in front of the army and then, 
selecting tw-enty skilled archers, he had them discharge their arrows into the 
city in a single volley. The Ch'i-tan spectators deserted the walls hurriedly. 
The two Marshals, not to be outdone, invited Kim to a second feast and gave 
him the seat of honor {KS 102. 7b-8a). At the feast he was told by Ha-chen: 
"[Our] nations [should] join to be Elder-Younger Brothers. If you inform 
[your] King and return with a letter [of agreement], then I will also re- 
turn and present it to the Emperor" {KS 103. 5a). 
In early 1219 25)^ preparations were made to take the last Ch'i-tan 
stronghold at Kangdong. Kim Ch'wiry6 and Director of Affairs for the Com- 
missioner of Men and Horse 26)^ Han Kwangy6n ^£ TLj^j. , in command 
of a large force which included cavalry sin'gi, a crossbow unit taegak, and a 
unit identified as naesang 2'') went to join the Mongol-Jiircen forces for the 
assault on Kangdong {KS 103.17a). 


In the group marching toward Kangdong was young Kim Chidae 28) a con- 
script from Ch'6ngdo 29)^ y^ho had filled his father's place in the levy of men 
made for the Kangdong campaign in 1217. He would later rise in the Kory6 
military but the only thing that distinguished him from his fellow soldiers at 
the moment was his shield decoration. While all the other soldiers of his unit 
had strange beasts decorating the top of their shields, Chidae had written a 
simple poem on his shield expressing the idea that loyalty to the nation and 
filial piety could both be cultivated by an action such as his own {KS 102. 21a-b). 
Also in the Korytt forces converging on Kangdong was a cavalry unit under 
Commissioner of Men and Horse Yi Ch6k ■^^i who had already distinguished 
himself in battles against the Ch'i-tan during the two preceeding years {KS 103. 

During a welcoming feast, Ha-chen had the interpreter Chao Chung-hsiang 
tell Kim Ch'wiry6, 

"[If] you would be joined in friendship with us then you must first revere 
yc'sM the Mongol Emperor and then revere Emperor Manno." 
Ch'wiryS replied, 

"The heavens do not have two suns and the people do not have two rulers 
How can there be two Emperors under Heaven? I salute pae i-^ only the 
Mongol Emperor 31)." 

When Ha-chen first saw Ch'wiry6 he was impressed by his appearance. 
Ch'wiryO was six feet five inches (Kory6 measure) tall and had a long flowing 
beard — it is said that when he put on full dress that two maid servants would 
lift up his beard so he could don his girdle. Ha-chen had Ch'wiry6 seated 
with him and asked: 

"How old are you?" 

"I'm approaching sixty," Ch'wiry6 replied. 

'1 am not yet fifty," Ha-chen said. "Since we are already of one house, 
you are the elder brother and I am the younger brother." 
Then he made Ch'wiry6 take the seat (of honor) facing east. 
The next day when Ch'wiry6 again visited Ha-chen' s garrison, Ha-chen in- 
formed him, 

"I have attacked six nations which has given me much experience with 
noble men. [Then] I saw your appearance. How is it so remarkable? 
[This is] the reason I trust you. I look at the troops under [your] com- 
mand and they too are like [members] of the same house [as my men]." 
Then, taking Ch'wiryb's hand, Ha-chen led him out of the gate and helped 
him on his horse. 

Several days later, when Marshal Cho arrived, Ha-chen asked Ch'wiry6, 
"Is the Marshal older than [you]. Elder Brother?" 


"He is older," Ch'wiry6 lied — Cho was 49 at the time. 
Marshal Cho was then given the upper seat at the feast which followed. It was 
now time for the Koreans to be surprised. Cho and Kim discovered, as was 
John of Piano Carpini (Pian de Carpine) to note later 32)^ that according to 
the Mongol custom, the meat was stabbed with a sharp knife and then swiftly 
passed back and forth between the diners each taking a bit then passing it 
back. Of the KoryO soldiers, it is related, there were none who were not re- 
luctant to eat in this fashion {KS 103. 17a-18a). It was probab]y at this time 
that the Mongol and Kory6 commanders "Cha-la and [Cho] Ch'ung agreed to 
be Elder and Younger Brothers. [Cho] inquired of annual remission of levies 
and taxes. Cha-la said, "As the way to your country is distant and it is diffi- 
cult to come and go, each year we will send ten envoys 33) to bring [back] 
tribute" (75 208. 2b) 34). 



(cH'iTA/v Forces) 

Battle Positions at Kangdong 

In the morning the commanders rode to a meeting '^utsiae oi the walled- 
city of Kangdong. Dismounting they walked to within three hundred paces of 
the walls and stopped. Ha-chen then had a trench ten 'feet' ch^bk )\_ wide and 
ten 'feet' deep dug from the south gate of the city to the east gate. The section 
northward from the west gate was controlled by Tzu- yiian and the section 
from the east gate to the north was given to Ch'wiry6. They used the ditch 
that had been dug to prevent escape. No mention is made of the Mongol troops 
which participated in the battle; undoubtedly they covered the southwest sec- 

tor which otherwise would have been unguarded and they probably also backed 
up the ditch in the southeast sector. 

As the end grew near, forty Ch'i-tan came over the walls to submit and 
their chiefs pleaded in front of the Mongol army. Abandoned, their leader 
Han-she (]M^i^ hung himself. Then the functionaries, soldiers, and women 
— an estimated fifty thousand - opened the city gates and came out and sub- 
mitted. Ha-chen and Cho Ch'ung went to watch the submission. Hsi ,f^- , the 
wife of the prince, as well as one hundred of the Ch'i-tan officials were be- 
headed immediately. The remainder of the prisoners were given to the army 
to keep. 

Ha-chen then told the Kory6 commanders: 

"sVe have come 10 000 li and combined our strength with you to smash the 
bandits. This is the fortune of a thousand years. Ceremony warrants go- 
ing to salute the King [but] my army is rather large and it is difficult to 
travel a long way. Therefore I shall simply send an envoy to offer my 

After the battle, the Mongol commanders pledged: 
"[Our] two nations shall eternally be brothers and the descendants of 
10 000 generations will not forget this day" {KS 103. 18a-19a) 35). 
A feast to reward the army was given by Marshal Cho. Ha-chen gave the 
Koryft forces seven hundred women and young boys and returned some 200 
Koreans who had been captives of the Ch'i-tan. Then Ha-chen selected girls 
who were about fifteen years of age and gave Cho and Kim each nine; he also 
gave them each nine fine horses 36). The remainder of the prisoners he had 
accompany him {KS 103. 19a) 3?). vVe are told that "[Cho] Ch'ung took [Kor- 
y6's] Ch'i-tan prisoners and distributed them in the chuf)] a.nd hydn^i^ dis- 
tricts [where] they selected unoccupied wasteland, settled it, and engaged in 
agriculture. It became the custom of the people to call them 'Ch'i-tan sites' " 
{HY 27. lOa-b; also see KS 103. 19a; CHSL 4. 23a). 

Following the fall of Kangdong, a Kory6 delegation was sent to Cha-la's 
Mobile Garrison 38) vvith a proposal for peace 39). 

Kory6 also sent gifts to the Mongol field commanders and a missive, of 
interest as the first recorded communication with the Mongols, which makes 
the claim that Kory6 had already beaten the Ch'i-tan, undoubtedly a diplo- 
matic tactic to play down the importance of the Mongol military action ^^'. 

"[At this time of] Early Spring, sVe beg to consider how you are, looking 
eagerly forward. Our nation has since long been invaded by the Ch'i-tan, and 
this sickness in our very midst we were unable to drive out ourselves. How 
would we have expected that Your Excellency the Marshal would clear out the 
filth for the benefit of our insignificant state, coming from afar with righteous 


troops, exposing yourself to sun and dew in the open field'. As regards our 
small nation, it behooves us as quickly as possible to bring presents to re- 
ward the troops, as a small consolation for their hardships. 

Initially, we did not know the day that [Your] Great Army would enter the 
borders; moreover, the [Ch'i-tan] bandits were blocking the roads. So we 
delayed and did not in time inquire in the neighbourhood. A^e beg to consider 
this most obnoxious and we are therefore tremblingly ashamed, and hope that 
you will magnanimously forgive us. 

We had only just heard that the [Ch'i-tan] bandits had moved into the 
walled-city of Kangdong to defend themselves and so we believed that they 
were merely people already in jail, not worth worrying about. Then we sent 
people to bring thanks and at the same time inquire about your health. These 
emissaries had not yet been able to start on their journey when again there 
were emergency reports, and so we actually heard that the band had left the 
fort and submitted, all being executed or made prisoner ^^>, to the joy of the 
whole nation who clap their hands in unison. This is truly [an example of] the 
righteous [behaviour] of a large State helping a weak one and having pity on 
its neighbor, whereas for [our] small state it is the good fortune one encoun- 
ters but once in 10 000 generations'. »Ve are moved by your great kindness 
and do not know how to require this. Now, in obedience to the King's decree, 
we have roughly prepared some meagre wine and fruit and other gifts, and 
especially dispatched certain officials to bring them to you under escort; 
their quantities are fully entered on a separate list. Please do not refuse 
them as being [too] negligible nor punish us for being too late. 

In fear and trembling [we submit this petition]." 

An immediate reply for the sake of courtesy was sent to Kory6 {YKC 2a) 
but not until some days later was a full reply made when the Mongol com- 
mander sent P'u-li-tai-yeh ^^> with a dispatch to the Kory6 capital of Kae- 
gy(3ng43) (yKC 2a; YS 208. 2a). This was undoubtedly in the way of official 
confirmation of the agreement made by the Kory6 and Mongol commanders 
earlier. The reception given the Mongol delegation provides an interesting 
view of the times and of the Mongol disregard for formal ceremony which the 
Koreans found distasteful. 

"Ha-chen sent P'u-li-tai-wan '^ (i.e., P'u-li-tai-yeh) and others to 
present a missive. They came seeking to discuss peace. The King sent At- 
tendant Censor 44) Pak Siyun yjL 3^ ^ (fl. 1220' s) to welcome them, and 
ordered the civil and military officials to array themselves in their hats and 
girdles and stand separately to the right and left [of the road] from Sontii 
Gate 45) to the crossroad. [When] P'u-li-tai-wan and the others arrived out- 
side the hostel, they slowed, stopped and [dismounting] did not enter. They 


said, 'The King must come out to welcome us.' Thereupon, an interpreter 
was made to appeal to them two or three times. At last, they mounted their 
horses and entered the hostel gate" {KS 22. 16b). Finally, the moment of 
presentation arrived: 

"[When] the King had appeared in the Taegwan Hall ^6) [the Mongols] all 
in fur clothing, hats and girdles, and with bows and arrows, marched straight 
into the hall. [One] took a document from his bosom and, seizing the King's 
hand, gave it to him. The King changed color. Those in attendance were 
shocked, but they did not dare approach. The attending official, Ch'be S6ndan 
/^ ^ 13 (fl. 1220's), said tearfully, 'How can we allow this bunch of bar- 
barians to approach the Most Venerable? Suppose there should be the calamity 
of an assassin? \Ve surely would not be able to prevent it.' Then he suggested 
that P'u-li-tai-wan be taken outside to change into Korean clothing 47). They 
were taken into the palace hall for private homage, only bowing [with raised 
hands clasped] but without prostrating themselves. They were given utensils 
of gold and silver, silks, and otter pelts, [according to] their difference [in 
rank]" {KS 22. 16b-17a). 

Marshal Cho Ch'ung accompanied the Mongol and Jiirien commanders 
northward 48) as far as the border city of Uiju 49) on the Yalu. As they pre 
pared to leave, the Mongol army seized many Kory6 army horses. Protest- 
ing, Marshal Cho told them: "These are all government horses. Even if thej 
die we must bring in the hides; they must not be taken." The Mongols be- 
lieved Cho until one Koryft general accepted some silver in exchange for 
horses. Then, believing Cho had lied, they seized many horses and left {KS 
103. 5a-b). 

Despite the surface appearance of tranquil relations, KoryS's outward 
amity was a gesture designed to gain time. In the autumn of 1219, the KoryO 
authorities, "sent the Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance ^0) Ch'oe Ch6ng- 
bun /^ Jli^ yj^ (fl. 1220' s) et al., eight persons, on an inspection trip of all 
the walled-cities of the Hunghwa [postal relay] circuit ^^i to inspect the arms 
and to accumulate military supplies. Moreover, [the people of] all the minor 
walled-cities entered the major walled-cities for protection. At that time, 
spies reported that the Mongols would use the autumn to return. Therefore, 
preparations were made" {KS 22. 17b). 

This action reflected the Kory6 awareness that they could not purchase 
their autonomy with tribute and minor military contributions. Within two 
years the King himself was advocating resistance and cessation of the pay- 
ment of annual tribute but he was cautioned against it by his ministers {KS 22. 
20b). An indication of Mongol intentions was manifested when Ha-chen and his 
delegation, at the time of their departure from Kory6 left 41 subordinates at 


the border city of Uiju instructing them to "practice the language of Kory6 and 
wait for our return" [KS 22. 17a) 52). 

The first mission sent to receive Koryo's annual triDuie was not long in 
coming. In the eighth month (September 11 -October 9) of 1219, "the Northeast 
Commissioner of Men and Horse seiit a report saying, 'Troops sent by the 
Mongols and the Eastern Jiirfcen nation have come and camped outside Chin- 
my6ng-s6ng 53) to supervise the receipt of annual tribute" (/CS 22. 17b 6-7). 
Their arrival in the Kory6 capital is noted in the next month {KS 22. 17b) but 
other than the general statement that regional products, pangmul, were pre- 
sented {YS 208. 2a; YKC 2a), no enumeration is given of the first annual tri- 
bute nor for the annual tribute which was presented until 1224. 

Koryo's relations with the Mongols were but one of many concerns. Ch'oe 
Ch'ungh6n 54) the military strongman who ruled Kory6, was growing old. He 
passed his sixty-ninth birthday in the dark days of 1217 when the Ch'i-tan 
reached the gates of the capital {KS 129. 25a) and, although both he and his 
son Ch'oe U 55) commanded considerable house armies {KS 129. 23a-b) which 
they used to reinforce their position, there was an increase in assassination 
attempts (e.g., KS 129. 24a-24b) which continued until Ch'oe U managed to 
consolidate the transfer of power following his father's retirement in 1218 
{KS 129. 25b). Some eight hundred Buddhist monks 56) ^j^o had been pressed 
into the army were killed by Ch'oe's house troops when they stormed the 
capital in an attempt to overthrow the Ch'oe clan in 1217 {KS 129. 24a-b). 
There was also a great deal of unrest in the army following the victory at 
Kangdong due to a general absence of rewards for merit. Even the welcoming 
celebration for Marshal Cho was cancelled by Ch'oe — out of jealousy we are 
told but it is also probable that Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n was feeling vulnerable in his 
old age and was afraid of anyone becoming too popular. Marshal Cho wanted 
to remain in the Western Capital after that but Ch'oe summoned him to the 
capital where he gave a private feast for the commanders of the northern ex- 
pedition in the palace — paying for it by making a levy of silver on all the 
officials (A'SC 15. 20a). 

One group of Junior officers were foolhardy enough to voice their com- 
plaints while on a drinking spree in the market place, an act which led to the 
arrest of over a hundred persons who were beheaded by Ch'oe's house forces 
{KS 129. 26a-b). While the disorders of the times were probably responsible 
to some extent 57)^ general unrest among those in positions of power and es- 
pecially among army officers, was without doubt stimulated from within the 
Ch'oe clan itself and related directly to the question of Ch'ungh6n's succes- 
sor. A brief glance at the composition of the Ch'oe clan at this time makes 
this apparent. 


Ch'ungh6n had taken three wives, viz., the daughter of Supreme Gen- 
eral 5^) Song Ch'6ng ^j^ }^ , who bore U^^ and Hyangj^p] ; a girl of the 
Im jii clan ^9) who bore S6ng;^^ ; and a girl of the Wang ^ clan who bore 
Ku^J^ {KS\2'd. 26b-27a) ^^'> . He also had a son, Ch'oe Chun,'^^ , by his 
slave girl Tonghwayj-^l^ ^tl, {KS 129. 27b). Hyang married the daughter of 
Hangj/b the Marquis 61) of Such'un^;?|^ and was made Count 62) of 
Pos6ng 63) i^KS 129. 27a). Chun, who had been given a position in the army as 
subordinate officer by his father and who had risen to Grand General 64) ^as 
killed by Ch'oe U, as was his ha]f-brother Mun Tae ^ ||<J , for plotting to 
seize power as Ch'ungh6n was dying {KS 129. 28a). Ch'oe U then exiled a host 
of people who had formerly served Ch'unghftn — notably commanders and 
officials, many in important posts in the provinces {KSC 15. 22b-23a) — in- 
cluding his younger brother hyang, Hyang' s wife's father Hang the Marquis 
of Such'un; the latter's son Chong^)^ ; the minister Sin S5nwi ^ 'a' ■i) > 
and several of Ch'ungh6ns household retainers, including the slave gir] 
Tonghwa, to various islands. The Marquis of Such'un and his son were al- 
lowed to return later. Hyang was moved to Hongju ^j!^ j-jj where he led an 
unsuccessful rebellion in 1230 which required 10 000 troops, sitnnydng 
4- f^^ 65)^ to quell {KS 129. 28a-30a). 

Little is known of Ch'oe Ku^j;j^ except that he was given a patent of no- 
bility as su - sagong a.nd the honorary title of chuguk 66), Ch'oe S6ng, however, 
honored Princess T6kch'ang j"^^ ^ , one of the five daughters of the exiled 
Huijong 67) jn marriage and was made Earl — later Marquis — of Y6ngga 
^X^ (iCS91. 26a; JCS 129. 26b-27a). Kojong, the reigning monarch, also 
married one of Hiiijong's daughters in 1218, who became Queen Anhye, Anh^"^ 
T'aehu 2^ ^, ivjfe (^^ 22. 15a; KS 88. 35b). This linked the Ch'oe clan 
to the royal family in marriage. 

Just at this time — in the autumn of 1219 — a revolt under the IJiju Ju- 
nior Colonel 68) Han Sun 69) and Colonel '^0) xa Chi swept like wildfire 
through the cities of the Northern Frontier-District with only the Northern 
Defense Command '^^i , Kuju '^2)^ Y6nju, and S6ngju '^3) holding out {KS 22. 
18a). The rebel leaders marked their boundary at the Ch'6ngch'6n River 
3^ II and submitted to P'u-hsien Wan-nu who gave them 10 000 Eastern 
Jiirien troops for their assault on Koryo border cities '^^). They then at- 
tempted to secure their northwestern flank by allying with the Chin Marshal 
Yii-ke-hsia -^ -^ ^ "^^'^ Yii-ke-hsia, however, invited them to a feast 
where he ambushed them. Their heads were then boxed and forwarded to 
Kaegy6ng in early 1220 (K'S 130. 1-3; KSC 15. 24a-b). This action was greatly 
appreciated by the Kory6 authorities who, we can be sure, were looking 
toward the future when they rewarded Yii-ke-hsia with a goblet, a bowl, and 


a basin of silver, two silver wine-cups, fifty bolts {pHl ^ ) of fine grass 
cloth ''^\ fifty bolts of fine silk cloth, five hundred bolts of Kuang-p'ing 
cloth J^ ^ ^ '^'^), and one thousand bushels {sdk) of rice {KS 22. 18b), 
for the Chin garrisons across the Yalu were the last bolts on the door to the 
Kory6 northwest. 

The northwest was in poor condition following the Ch'i-tan raids and the 
revolt (cf. KSC 15. 24b). Army officers sent to restore peace in the tJiju area 
following the revolt slaughtered so many that the revolt arose anew in the 
fourth month (May 4 - June 2) of 1220, requiring 5 000 troops to put down 
{KSC 15. 25a-b). To this were added the foraging of bands of Ch'i-tan rem- 
nants who had fled into the mountains and formed bandit groups {KSC 15. 25b) 
raiding Koryo garrisons {KS 22. 18b). The revolt in the northwest was finally 
quelled in the third month (March 26 - April 23) of 1221 when the rebel lea- 
ders were captured and, after several days display in cangues in the market- 
place, were beheaded {KSC 15. 26b) '78). 

Following the KoryS submission to the Mongols, delegations of Mongols 
and Eastern JiirCen became frequent visitors in the Kory6 capital during the 
next few years as the following simplified chart covering the years 1221-1224 

































1 or more 


YKC 2b 



KS 22. 19b-20a; YKC 2b 



KS 22. 20b-21a 



KS 22. 21a; YKC 2b 



KS 22. 21a-b 



KS 22. 22b 



YKC 2b 



KS 22. 23b 

1 or more 


YKC 2b 



KS 22. 25a; YKC 2b 



or more 

KS 22. 25a 



or more 

KS 22. 25b 



KS 22. 26b; YKC 2b 

A delegation led by Chu-ku-yii '^9) which arrived in the eighth month 
(August 19 - September 17) of 1221 brought a lengthy list of demands (see 
Part II) from Temiige-otCigin 80) the youngest brother of tinggis, Cha-la and 
P'u-li-tai-yeh {KS 22. 20b). This delegation was still in the capital (cf. KSC 


KSC 15. 27a-b) when the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern 
Frontier-District reported that a party led by the Mongol envoy Che-k'o i^<^] 
which had been sent by the Mongol Queen An-chih 81) y^ H had arrived 
outside of the Defense Command toho-pu {KS 22. 20b; KS 129. 30b; KSC 15. 
27a). Angered by the frequence of the envoys Ch'oe U exclaimed: 

"We have still not had time to attend to the envoys who came before. If 
we attend to [these] how many will come later'. vVe should have the Com- 
missioner of Men and Horse comfort them and send them back" {KS 129. 
30b) 82). 
In a matter of days the tJiju District Commandant, pundo changgun, sent a 
report that six to seven thousand Mongol troops had arrived and camped near 
Shih-cheng, in P'o-su-lu 83) {KS22. 20b). Subsequently, the second group of 
Mongol envoys arrived to supervise the national gifts [KS 22. 20b-21a)-. 

Let us turn for a moment to examine Kory6's relations with other coun- 
tries and their hearing, if any, on Mongol-Kory6 relations. At this time, 
Kory6's relations with the Chin were coming to an end. The Chin court had 
attempted to send an envoy in early 1219, but he failed to get through as the 
roads were blocked [Chin-shih 15. 19a; Chin-shih 135. 8a-b) 84)^ however, 
Kory6 did not stop using the Chin year periods, nien-hao, ^ ^ until 1224, 
when Chin power had collapsed in Manchuria {KS 87. 7a). One of the Chin's 
final contacts with Kory6 was an order to subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia- 
nu ^ ^-R ^^ mid -1226 {Chin-shih 17. 5a) 85)^ while the Mongol had ear- 
lier ordered KoryS to subjugate the Jiirten (i.e., Chin) in 1221'. {YKC 2b). Yet, 
despite the fact that the Chin court had moved south to Kai-feng, Chin power 
was still formidable in the Liaotung area until it was swept away by the Mon- 
gol drive eastward across Liaotung in 1230. A last attempt was made by 
Koryo to contact the Chin court in the spring of 1233, but the envoy was un- 
able to get through and returned with the missive undelivered {TYSC 28. 23a- 
24a; KSC 16. 18a). 

Sung Merchant Vessels Arriving in Kory6 1011-1278 ^^^ 

25-year 1011 1025 1050 1075 1100 1125 1150 1175 1200 1225 1250 
intervals 1025 1050 1075 1100 1125 1150 1175 1200 1225 1250 1278 


An occasional merchant ship arrived from the Southern Sung but, as the 
chart shows, this was the dying trickle of such trade. The great era of Sung- 
Koryo maritime trade was past 87) and, like some of the trade between Kory6 
and Japan, especially the island of T'amna ^8) J^^ was partially a conse- 
quence of KoryS ports serving as way-stations between Japan and the Southern 
Sung 89). Official Kory6-Japan trade at this time was a direct outgrowth of 
the raids of Japanese freebooters, ivakoA^l;^ , who recommenced their 
raids on Korean coastal settlements in 1223 after a century of silence ^^). 
The Koryd-sa references show this clearly: 

1) Raids of Japanese freebooters: 

1223 {KS 22. 23b), 1224 {KS 22. 27a-b), 1226 (^-5 2:^. 29a-b), and in the 
fourth (April 18 - May 16) and fifth month (May 17 - June 15) of 1227 {KS 
22. 30a-b) then; 

2) 1227, fifth month: A Korean delegation was sent to Japan to request that 
the raids be stopped {KS22. 33a; TT 31. 39) 91) and Japan sent a letter 
apologizing for the raids on the Korean coast and requested that trade re- 
lations, hu-shih 92) jg^ ^ ^ be established ifCS 22. 30b). 

The raids of the Japanese freebooters recommenced, however, and it was not 
until 1263, following a Kory6 mission to Japan to request that the raids cease 
that a trade agreement was reached. Japan was allowed to send one ship, but 
never more than two ships, annually {CHSL 4. 36a-b; TK IIB. 228). This also 
clearly shows that the impetus to establish trade relations was on the Japa- 
nese, not the Koryft side 93). 

On the northwest border, there was a continuous struggle with the Chin 
Marshal Yii-ke-hsia whose forces repeatedly sacked Kory6 border cities. The 
District Commandant, pundo changgun, of Uiju at this time was Kim Huije94), 
In 1223, he led a raiding party across the Yalu against Yii-ke-hsia '^ -^ '1^ 
whose forces had been hitting Kory6 border cities in sneak attacks. It was 
probably this daring which led to his abrupt appointment as Deputy Commis- 
sioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Later, in 1226, 
Kim led another small raiding party across the Yalu against Yii-ke-hsia after 
the latter's forces had made attacks on Koryo border cities. Not content with 
this, Kim evidently decided to bring the matter to an end by defeating Yii-ke- 
hsia's main forces. With other officials of his district, Kim raised a force of 
10 000 men and with twenty days supply of food crossed the Yalu to attack Yii- 
ke-hsia's stronghold of Shih-cheng. Although Yii-ke-hsia sent a force of troops 
to reinforce the garrison, Kim's attack carried the city. Upon his return, in 
the true tradition of the Kory6 military, he wrote a lengthy poem expressing 
his belief that the general's halberts had not yet wiped out the shame inflicted 
by Yii-ke-hsia. Although Kim had secretly informed Ch'oe U of his intention 


to go after Yii-ke-hsia, his action in levying such a large force of men on his 
own authority, brought official charges against him. Ch'oe U stopped the 
charges from being put into effect but considered that, under the circum- 
stances, a reward for merit was out of the question. 

Yet, by and large, Kory6's greatest concern now that relations with the 
Mongols had been momentarily stabilized, were the Eastern Jur6en who held 
sway over portions of eastern Manchuria and northeastern Korea. Through 
repeated military encounters, notably through the campaigns of Yun Kwan 
J^ ^^ (^- 1111) a century earlier, Kory6 had pushed her eastern borders 
northward toward the Tuman River at the expense of the Eastern Jiirten whose 
holdings were often incorporated into Kory6's domains {KS 96. 11-25). Equally 
as ancient as the Kory6-Jur6en enmity in the mountainous uplands of the north- 
east were their trade relations, especially those which centered in the eastern 
seaboard cities ^^K 

Kory6 on her own part had pursued a policy of placating the Mongols until 
an opportunity presented itself to throw off the Mongol yoke. In 1220, Ch'oe U 
had assembled the Chief Ministers 96) at his residence, and suggested that a 
levy be made on the chdngyong and posting (militia?) units 9*7) of the chu and 
kun administrations of the southern provinces to wall Uiju, Hwaju, Ch'ol-kwan 
/M li|j (a fortified pass) 98) ^ and similar places in the northeast which were 
certain to be attacked if the Mongols invaded. One officials, a certain Kim Chung- 
gu -'^ yr 1^ , objected and reminded Ch'oe that "in recent years the chu 
and kun administrations have Suffered from the pillaging incursions of the 
Ch'i-tan and all the people have fled. Now, if we suddenly make another levy 
on their labor without warning, then the primary [agricultural] pursuits, 
pon 99) J of the state will not be maintained." Ch'oe, however, did not take his 
advice {KS 129. 30b-31a) and the walling was begun, being completed in 1228 
(^"5 82. 35a). 

The following year (1221), when Ch'oe U boldly suggested turning back 
the delegation of Mongols led by Che-k'o ^1" -^T {KS 129. 30b), the King as- 
sembled the officials of the fourth rank and above to ask their opinions on 
whether or not to receive the second Mongol delegation and we are told that 
"the King wanted to make preparations to resist and not present [the annual 
tribute]. The ministers unanimously said: 'They are many and we are few. 
If you do not welcome these, they will surely come to invade. Can we with- 
stand many with few; withstand strength with weakness?" {KS 22. 20b). And, 
"because the demands of the Mongols were endless, the King wanted to give 
them those things which they were obstinately determined to have. [It became] 
therefore [a matter of] slaking their thirst for valuables or of making bloody 
sacrifice of the living." Discussions left the matter unsettled even after a 


prognostication had been taken at the Great Shrine, taemyo y^j0\ , where 
the ancestral tablets of the Kory6 monarchs were as yet enshrined {KSi.03 
32a-b) 100), This stiffening of Kory6's attitude toward the Mongols was nc 
doubt accelerated as much by the conduct of the Mongol envoys as by their 
ubiquity. In 1221, a delegation led by Chu-ku-yii — whose murder in 1225 led 
to the severance of Kory6 -Mongol relations — had shot up the hostel where 
they were lodged until they were locked inside by the hostel officer. A later 
delegation led by Che-k'o had also proved troublesome. After being delayed 
at the frontier they found a cold reception awaiting them in the Koryo capital, 
"We have never heard of this before! Queen An-chih sends envoys and they 
are not entertained'. " Che-k'o exclaimed, "What is the reason?" The Kory6 
officer in charge of the group, Kim Huije, answered, "In past years the 
Great Nation of the Mongols [has been] gracious. Now, the envoys are use- 
less men who abuse their prerogatives if we welcome and entertain them. As 
regards the ceremonies, national gifts, and other matters, we certainly can- 
not put forth our best efforts. [When] you Sir, were in the Defense Command, 
toho-pu, you yourself shot a man. Whether he is alive or dead we have not 
yet ascertained. If he lives then it will be a blessing for you Sir [but], if he 
dies then your party must be detained" {KS 103. 32b-33a). 

However, it was not until the death, in early 1223, of Muqali {YS 1. 22a), 
the Mongol commander that 6inggis had placed in charge of the east, that 
both Kory6 and the Eastern Jiircen again gave serious thought to throwing off 
the Mongol yoke. With Muqali dead and Cinggis occupied in the west, there 
was presented an opportunity which might never reoccur, P'u-hsien Wan-nu 
realized this and promptly declared his own independence and, in early 
1224 101)_ sgjj^- envoys to Kory6. An interesting problem in protocol was pre- 
sented when they arrived with urgent dispatches while Mongol envoys were 
being entertained in the Kory6 capital {KS 22. 25a). The dispatches made the 
point briefly: 

'The armies of Cinggis are always in distant lands 102), we do not know 
where they are. Temiige-ottigin E-ch'ih-hsin |j(^ ^-j^ > '/l" is grasping and 
cruel and they have already dissolved our old friendship." 

The second dispatch offered an incentive for the alliance, suggesting: 

"Let us each establish as before monopoly markets, chio-ch'ang 1^3) 
Ai. -^^ > our nation at Ch'6ngju -Sr ^)-)i and your nation at Ch6ngju 104) 
'^ j]-\ , to buy and sell" {KS 22. 25a). Measures to resist the Mongols had 
not been lacking on the Kory6 side. In 1223, Ch'oe had used his own house 
troops in the corvee to put the moats and walls of the capital in order and 
doled out 300 silver pydng 105) ^^ coins and over 2 000 bushels {sdk) of 
rice to meet the e3q)enses of the undertaking. He also appealed to the gods by 


donating 200 kun 106) of yellow-gold ^^^) for the construction of a 13 -story 
stupa and a kun^ika 1^^) at Hungwang Temple {KS 129. 30-31a). Despite these 
preparations Koryft had no intention of joining with the Eastern Jiirten at this 
point. Eastern Jur6en raids on Kory6's northern border from Sakchu ^09) to 
Hwaju recommenced in 1225 and lasted over the next four years (KS 22. 31a-b; 
KS 22. 31b-32a; KS 22. 34a-b). 

In the spring of 1229, an Eastern Jiircen delegation arrived at Hamju HO) 
on Kory6's northeastern frontier requesting a treaty of peace and friendship 
{KS 22. 36a). The first Kory6 envoy sent to conclude the treaty was unsuccess- 
ful - for which he was imprisoned by Ch'oe U - and a second envoy, a cer- 
tain Chin YSnggap j5^ f |^ ^ was then dispatched to effect a treaty of peace 
{KS 22. 36b). Although he was instrumental in regaining people and livestock 
captured by the Eastern Jiirien in a raid on Hwaju {KS 22. 36b), a treaty of 
peace was never made. So once again the officials of the civil and military 
offices, yangbu m), met at Ch'oe U's residence to discuss a strategy to beat 
the mounted raiders {KS 22. 37a) ^12), 

As these events were transpiring, Kory6 -Mongol relations were suddenly 
ruptured. In the fall of 1224, a Mongol delegation led by Chu-ku-yii arrived to 
supervise the annual tribute and then "in the first month [of 1225 = Februarv 9 
- March 10], the Mongol envoys left [our] Western Capital and crossed the 
Yalu. Of the national gifts which had been presented, they kept only the otter 
pelts and, as regards the remainder, viz., the silks, etc., [this] they aban- 
doned in the fields ^1^). On the way they were killed by bandits. The Mongols 
suspected us. Therefore, relations were severed" {KS 22. 27a) 114), 

Due to this incident all relations hptwpen Kory6 and the Mongols stopped 
in early 1225. 

The Mongols were preoccupied with campaigns elsewhere, notably in 
Central Asia, and troubled by succession disputes so that Kory6 momentarily 
escaped their attention. They turned their attention once more eastward only 
to suffer setbacks in 1228 in North China. Then, after his accession, Ogodei 
(T'ai-tsung;:iC.'^ j r. 1229-1241), made an agreement with the Sung, who 
were to get the Honan area, for a joint attack against the Chin. The campaign, 
which was to last until the final fall of the Chin to a joint Mongol -Sung force 
in 1234, was led by Tului (Jui-Tsung^*^ ; regent 1228) who had assumed 
the regency following the death of Cinggis in 1227 during the Tanqut campaign 
and the election of Ogodei by the Quriltai of 1229. When the Mongol forces 
advanced across Manchuria with the intention of subjugating P'u-hsien \Van-nu, 
they ordered KoryS to field an army against Wan-nu 115), probably envisaging 
a pincer attack with Mongol forces pressing down north of the lofty Paektu-san 
range and Korea pressing: uoward from the south of the range toward the 


Tuman River. KoryS, at any rate, did not comply and it is precisely at this 
time that, as we have seen, Koryo finally endeavored to make a peace treaty 
with the Eastern iurten 116). The Korean records are unusually silent on 
these events, but they took no action attempting as it were to watch from the 
sidelines. Whatever their reasons, their inaction had disastrous conse- 
quences, for the Mongols postponed their attack on Wan-nu (who was finally 
defeated in 1233) to deal with Koryo. And, in the winter of 1231, a large Mon- 
gol force crossed the Yalu {KS 23. la) to begin what was to be an on-again 
off-again conflict lasting some thirty years. 


Notes to C hapter I 

Contradictory dates for the events surrounding the entry of Mongol -JiirCen 
forces into Kory6 and their subsequent alliance against the Ch'i-tan at 
Kangdong render other than general dating innpossible. This, plus the 
number of undated passages which begin vaguely with 'formerly'^y?] have 
made it difficult to place some events in other than probable sequence. 
The main sources for these events, YKC, KS, KSC, and the Kim-gong 
haengguri' gi /^ J^ ^^ ^ I'P in /C 6. 7b -17b agree in general and date 
the arrival of the first envoy from the Mongols on the first or second day 
of the twelfth month of 1218. They also agree that the Mongol forces left 
Kory6 in the second month of 1219. The dating of events between these two 
dates differs between the rather detailed Kim-gong haenggun^gi and the KS, 
KSC versions; the YKC account is unfortunately too brief to be of value in 
this respect. An example of these discrepancies is found in dating the fall 
of Kangdong: KS 22. 16b has the fourteenth day of the first month (Jan. 31) 
of 1219; KS 87. 6b gives the third month of 1219; KSC 15. 16b dates this in 
the first month of 1219, while IC 6. 15a places it on the chi-mao ^ (X^ 
day of the second month of 1219, which is impossible as there was no chi- 
mao day in the second lunar month of 1219. The YS 1. 20a account is a 
simple statement and follows the YKC account. The useful reference work 
CS, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 549-551 places this event in the first month of 1219. 
Martin, The Rise of Chingis .... p. 217 note 54, gives "February 1219" 
for the fall of Kangdong, citing the biography of Yeh-lii Liu-ke in T'u Chi's 
Meng-wu-erh shih-chi, a work which is regrettably unavailable to me. 
Martin also states that "Yanai Wateru, Ken dai kyo ryako tohoko'' (sic), 
"is at pains to show that it really took place in February, 1218". Let me 
correct this error. Yanai Watari, op. cit., p. 96 ff, clearly discusses the 
dating of these events and he places the fall of Kangdong on the 14th day of 
the first month of 1219 (= Jan. 31), thus following the KS account. The ar- 
gument is rather involved, but Yanai does not argue for "February 1218" 
by any means. The IC 6. 14a-15a account contains several dates but they 
are irreconcilable with the KS account. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, p. 607 
note 1, suggests that the IC entry j^ n ^ l^P (day) be amended to 
read j£_ ^ ^ ^Q (12th day = January 29). This is probably as close as 
we'll get, i.e., Kangdong fell between January 29 and January 31, 1219. 
Ill general, I have noi attempted precise dating in reconstructing these 
events, but merely to arrange the events in proper sequence in so far as 
that was at all possible. 
There are one or two other points which can be mentioned at this time, 


rather than discussed piecemeal later. Martin says that Yeh-lii Liu-ke 
was the principal commander of the Mongol forces which entered Kory6 at 
this time. This is in accord with the biography of Yeh-lii Liu-ke in YS 
149. la-5b. The errors in this biography and other errors involving Yeh- 
lii Liu-ke at this time have been discussed at length by both Ikeuchi, loc. 
cit., and Yanai, loc. cit., and I will not here repeat arguments to prob- 
lems which have been solved decades ago, but simply point out that: 

1) Yeh-lii Liu-ke was not outside Kangdong with the attacking forces as hib 
biography erroneously states. 

2) Yeh-lii Liu-ke was not inside Kangdong with the defending Ch'i-tan forces 
as is erroneously stated in YKC, YS, YSCSPM, HYS, etc. This, inci-. 
dentally, is a wide-spread error and appears to have originated in the 
Ching-shih ta-tien. 

3) Kory6 did not supply 400 000 troops at this time as the biography of Yeh- 
lii tiiu-ke {YS 149. 3b) erroneously states. 

4) Yeh-lii Liu-ke had apparently remained behind at Huang-ning-fu^ ■^ 
)M . Cf. Ikeuchi, op. cit., p. 573. 

2. yiian-shuai Ttli B'P or Marshal; for this title see P. Ratchnevsky, Un 
Code des Yuan, Paris, 1937, pp. 140, 238. 

3. Ha-chen O^jS • The name also occurs in the orthographic variants: Ha- 
chih-chi tJ/^^ ^ (FS 208. lb-2a; YKC lb); Ha-chih-chi 0^,-]^ ^ 
(yS154. la); Ho-ch'en ^g (YXC 2a); Ho-ch'e%-^ (F/fC 8b; YKC 
6b), and Ho-cK eng '^:^\ j^ {TYSC 28. 4a-5a; TYSC 28. 14b-17b). H.H. 
Howorth, History of the Mongols, 3 vols., London, 1876, Vol. 1, p. 711, 
says that Cinggis sent his general Kha jen dza la against Kory6, but two 
persons were involved. Cf. YKC 8b and YKC 6. 13b. YKC 2a clarifies their 
ranks: Ho-ch'en was Marshal, yiian-shuai, and Cha-la was Deputy Mar- 
shal, fu yiian-shuai. L.Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che, Leiden, 
1945, p. 16 note 11, discusses the name Qa6in vj/j \^ and on p. 33 he 
discusses the name Qafii'un /-V i^ ;i3 , both of which are suggestive. 
Yanai , op. cit., p. 144, has suggested that the chi ^ of the variant Ha- 
chih-chi is a superfluous character yen-tsu -^l^ iV ; if Yanai is correct, 
then the reconstruction Qa6in would seem to be suggested. 

4. Cha-la ;fL .^'j • Throughout the text {KS & YKC ) tz'u^j\ occurs; I have 
emended it to read laJ^H . The orthographic variations Cha-la ^'J j^ij 
{YKC 2a; YS 208. 2b) and Cha-la Jl. S^ (^^ 23. 16 ff; TYSC 28. 14b-17b) 
also occur. In his Hsin Yiian Shih K'o shao-min y|df ^V ^. writes Cha- 
la-i-erh-tai f L ^'J jfh ii^ > i-^-' -^alairtai (cf. HYS 249. lb). Cha-la 
would suggest a name based on the Jalair tribe and the name Jalairtai was 
quite common. However, I hesitate to follow K'o for two reasons: 1) the 


general confusion which is evident throughout HYS 249 which is the Kao-li 
cHuan of iheHsin Yuan Shih, cf. e.g., HYS 249. 4b, and 2) I have found the 
name written only as Cha-la. Yanai , op. cit., pp. 139-144, has noted much 
of the confusion surrounding Jalairtai which I have discussed at length at a 
later point. Yanai has suggested the reconstruction ?Jala. 

5. In the biographies ofHongPogw6n 'j^^.g ;j;^^ , it is related that Hong's 
father, Hong Taesun Jj'rA-i^'L ' a commander, torydng ^'<^ Z:^^^ , of Inju 
(35 li ]£ south of the^Dld Uiju ^ j)\ cf. TYS 53. 13b-14a) in Kory6's 
northwest near the mouth of the Yalu River, submitted to the Mongol forces 
and joined them in the attack on Kangdong (cf. KS 130. 3 and YS 154. la; 
also cf. YKC lb - the latter writes Hong Taes(5w '^ ). This would put the 
Mongol-Jiircen advance into Kory6 in the northwest rather than the north- 
east. Martin, op. cit., pp. 216-217, postulated a crossing near Uiju in the 

Yet, this appears to be in error and the Mongol forces seem to have come 
down to the Tuman River area where they obtained reinforcements from 
P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then, this joint force entered Koryo from the north- 
east. The cities of Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tokchu are, moreover, all 
located in the northeast. I believe that it is simply a confusion of father 
and son, for Hong Pogw6n, the son of Hong Taesun, did submit to Mongol 
forces at Inju in 1231 (see Chapter II). Yanai, op. cit., p. 99 note 1, be- 
lieves that Hong Taesun was with the Kory6 forces at Kangdong and sub- 
mitted to them there. For a similar opinion see Ikeuchi, op. cit., p. 610 
and p. 611 note 2; also see YiPy6ngdo, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 546-547. 

6. Hwaju |{3 -j-j] , Maengju |^-»] , Sunju iij| ^j-jj , and Tokchu ^^^ J J -j are 
identified respectively by HY 27. 8a, as the present (i.e., Yi Dynasty) 
Y6nghung J\i_J^' in S. Hamgy6ng Province and Maengsan -;% Jj , Sunch'6n 
li|^ )1 1 , and T6kch'6n i^. Ill all located in S. P'y6ngan Province. For 
topographical and historical information see TYS 48. 16b ff, TYS 55. 9b ff, 
TYS 55. la ff, and TYS 54. 21a ff for Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and TOkchu, 
respectively. Precise locations are given in the maps appended to Tsuda 
Sokichi ; i ll3 ;^ :fe ^, Chosen rekishi chiri |j^ §)^ j^ ^i^fe M ' 
Vol. 2, published (in ivols.) by the former South Manchurian Railway 
Corp., Tokyo, 1918. 

7. The text reads J^ ^g iX;^ ' in lieu of ;j^^ read|§ . 

8. Some caution is necessary in rendering the term sdngj,^ . In Korea 
there were sansdng J^ J^^ or mountain citadels of refuge located near 
every major settlement, including the walled-cities. There was also at 
this time a changsong t^ j:^ or long-wall which extended in an undulat- 
ing arch across northern Koryo, beginning in the west near the mouth of 


the Yalu, bisecting the peninsula, with its eastern terminus near the 
present Ch6ngp'y6ng ^ ^ -In general, whens^^ clearly refers to a 
place of permanent settlement I have translated 'walled-city'; when it 
refers to a temporary refuge, I have rendered 'citadel of refuge' and 
where I have been in doubt I have rendered 'stronghold' or simply said 
song. For a survey of the remnants of the various s6ng of the present 
Kyonggi Province which includes some utilized during this period, see 
W.D.Bacon, 'Fortresses of Kyonggi -do', TX5/MSXXXVn (1961), pp. 
1-64. For the location of the walled-cities in the northwest and the iden- 
tification of the garrisons chinAa^ in the area as well as a description 
of the Koryo long-wall behind which they were located, see Yun Muby6ng 

[Geographical Notes on Koryo' s Northern Frontier], part I, YH 1 (1953) 
4, pp. 37-70, and part II, YH2 (1953) 1, pp. 37-89. For a general survey 
of the subject, see T.Shidehara '^}^^ J:^ , Chosen no sanj5 ^^ ,^.|- '^ 
iLl ^^ [Korea's Mountain Citadels], Rekishi chiri )^ >^i^{^$£> 
Vol. 15, No. 5 (1910), pp. 483-486 and Vol. 15, No. 6 (1910), pp. 601-606. 
9. The walled-city of Kangdong ^X J^ )-pi, ^^^ ^°*^ large. The city walls 
were of earthen construction (as opposed to stone) and the circumference 
was 5 759 feet {ch^ok ). Inside the city were only two wells. For topo- 
graphical and historical information see TVS 55. 11a ff, from which the 
above information has been taken. 

10. YKC 2a dates this on the second day of the second month of 1219. 

11. t'ung-shih (Kor. Vong-sa) li^ )C_ • '^^^ Sino -Korean Dictionary Sinjaivdn 

M^'^SM ' Saso ch'ulp'an-sa t|^ ^ iti ^^;1ii > Seoul, 1950, 
854. 3 cites the Kuei-hsin tsa-chih --^^^ ^^ '^ : "In the northern 
regions an interpreter is called thing-shih. " As the person concerned 
does not appear to have been Korean, I have romanized his name in Chi- 
nese, however, his identity is not established. 

12. While it is not stated that the headquarters w6nsu-pu ^^ )^n3 Jm was 
that of Cho Ch'ung, it could have been none other. KS 103. 5a calls Cho a 
Deputy pu^^j Marshal but this is in error. He had been promoted to Mar- 
shal in the seventh month of 1218, cf. KS 22. 15b. At this time he was the 
senior Kory6 commander in the field. The operational commanders be- 
neath him were the Commissioners of Men and Horse pybngmasa ^S^fX- 

Kim Ch'wiry6 in the northwest (cf. KS 103. 16a-b) and Yi Ch6k in the 
northeast (cf. KS 103. 21b-22b). I note that CS Vol. 3^ No. 3, p. 546 in- 
terprets this in the same sense and would place Cho in the Koryft Western 
Capital (P'y6ngyang) at this time, which seems reasonable. 

13. Cho Ch'ung ^yj^ (1172-1220) was a man of Hoengch'onyj^^ )i] , his 


style cha ^1 was Tamyak J^ ^ . He was the son of sijung J^^ S? Cho 
Y6ngin ,^ ^\(\:L^ (1133-1202) and he was given a position in government 
service, pogtvan j^A) ig' (i.e., without resort to exams), by means of the 
Yin ^ privilege. He entered the academy and passed the exams in the 
reign of Myfingjong \]^ ^ (r. 1171-1197). In the reign of Huijong ,^^, \^^ 
(r. 1205-1211) he was appointed to the National Academy, kukchagam 

]M -n" ^ » <^"^ to his literary skills in drafting institutions, ch&n_^^ . 
He was taken out of the academy to serve as Commissioner of Men and 
Horse of the Northeast Frontier District but later returned to civil office 
in the Department of Rites, ye6M^^;^g . In 1216, he was advanced to 
Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affiars, ch^umir(won)pusa 
J^ti ^ ( P^ ) %^\'i$^ ' ^"^^ simultaneously held the rank of Su- 
preme General, sangjanggun h^ ]]£ ^ . He first saw action as Deputy, 
/>M i5)], to Marshal Chong Sukch'6m i§X)^^ M^ against the Ch'i-tan in- 
vasion of 1216-1217. The Kory6 government army at this time was ex- 
tremely weak and even monks were drafted to fill up the ranks. Only the 
retainers, mun'gaek |3^ !^ , of the ruling Ch'oe clan showed any valor. 
This resulted in the terrible defeats of 1216-1217 when the Ch'i-tan 
forces reached the capital and occasioned the Censorate, osadae 
/{k^'P -^i to call for Cho's dismissal. He was recalled shortly after 
being relieved and appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the 
Northwestern Frontier District. A subsequent promotion to the post of 
Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs was opposed by the De- 
partment of Civil Officials, ibu ^^S , and he was retained in his ori- 
ginal position. 

After several victories against the Jiircen Yellow Banner troops that had 
crossed the Yalu in 1217, Cho was given back his full official duties and, 
in 1218, he was made Marshal of the Northwest Frontier District. His 
success in the campaign at Kangdong angered Koryo's military ruler 
Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n and he was given no welcoming return to the capital nor 
other rewards — the general lack of rewards to the soldiers occasioned 
great resentment resulting in at least one attempt on Ch'oe' s life {KSC 15. 
20a-b) — although he was entertained privately by the Ch'oe clan. He was 
awarded the posthumous appellation Munj6ngj^ J^ (cf. KSC 15. 26a). He 
had two sons: Sukch'ang;];)^ ^ (d. 1234) whose biography is contained in 
KS 130. 9 ff and Kyesun :^^^ ■ Cho Ch'ung died on the third day of fhe 
ninth month of 1220 at the age of fifty due, it is said, to illness caused by 
grief, probably over his failure to advance after a successful campaign. 
For biographical information see KS 103. la-6b and the eulogy by Yi Kyubo 

■^^M^ (1168-1241) contained in TYSC 36. 14a-17b from which the in- 


formation given above has been taken except as indicated; also see BTKP 
7. 69. 

14. The Kory6 administrative system at this time contained eight to ]^ or 
provinces, which included the Northwestern Frontier-District, sobukkye 

r^ jiL ^^ ' ^^^° referred to as puukye JL J^-- S-^d as sobumydn 
^ JL- 1^ • ^^ comprised, at this time, the present South P'y6ngan 
Province and the northwestern portion of North P'yongan Province. This 
is clarified by TYS 51. lb which relates that in the fourteen^-h year of the 
reign of Koryo Songjong }q^ ^jf^ (995), the nation was divided into ten 
provinces to '^^. The area under the jurisdiction of the Western Capital 
was made P'aes6-do ^M t^ iM_- • Later it was called pukkye Jll,^ . 
In the seventh year of the reign of Koryo Sukjong ^ /f^ (1102), they 
called it pugmyon Jll )g) • The Northwestern Frontier-District at this 
time contained: 1 capital, kyong ^ , 1 Defense Command, toho-pu ^^ 
%f- }lj , 25 pangd-chu p^ ^0 jj] administrations, 12 garrisons, 
chin /^% , 10 hyonMAs administrative areas. Cf . Tsuda Sokichi, Chosen 
rekishi chiri, Vol. 2, p. 182. 

15. What is meant in this case is KoryS acceptance of Mongol suzerainty 
phrased in the traditional reference to the obedience of the younger 
brother (Kory6) to the elder brother (Mongols) as represented by their 
respective commanders. HY 27. 8a-9a inserts a pertinent character and 
reads "pledged their nations to be Elder Brother and Younger Brother" 
(italics mine). For a discussion of fraternal terms used in Korea's inter- 
national relations see F.Nelson, Korea . . ., and Pow-key Sohn (Son Pogi) 

^1: '^ ^ » 'The Opening of Korea; A Conflict of Traditions,' TKBRAS 
XXXVI (1960), pp. 101-128. Sohn takes issue with Nelson's use of 'Con- 
fucian order' and 'Confucian internationalism' to describe relations be- 
tween China, Korea, and Japan. Sohn (p. 103, note 5) says, "The word 
*Pan-Confucianistic' better explains the situation in the East Asiatic or- 
der, as the philosophy was more or less Confucianistic." 

16. In the Kory6 system there were two pydngmasa ^ ^ -j^ or Commis- 
sioners of Men and Horse, one in the Northeast Frontier-District and one 
in the Northwest Frontier-District. The post called for one of the Third 
Grade in rank and thus was filled by at least a Grand General. Symbols 
of the post were a jade (ornamented) girdle and purple collar, while the 
King himself presented the battle-axe and halbert in dispatching the 
Commissioner to his post. The post was first established in 989, i.e., 
the eighth year of the reign of Koryft S6ngjong y}^ l^ (r. 982-997). Cf. 
KS 77. 33b. 

17. KimCh'wiry6 ^^ Mt^Mi (d. 1234) wasof 6nyang^ p^ ; his father 


was a ranking official in the Department of Rites. Appointed without re- 
sort to the exams, pojf^ , via the Yin privilege to a post as a subordi- 
nate officer in the army, he rose to the rank of Grand General, taejang- 
gun, and was for a time garrisoned in the Northwest Frontier-District. 
In the reorganization of the Kory6 army which followed their defeats by 
the Ch'i-tan, he was appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the 
Northwest Frontier-District under Marshal Cho Ch'ung. His army ca- 
reer after that was exemplary with victories against the Ch'i-tan and 
against various Korytt rebels. He died in 1234 and while his exact age is 
not given, he must have been about seventy -five since he remarked in 
1218 that he was approaching sixty. He was given the posthumous appe- 
lation of WirySl j^ fjl . For biographical information see KS 103. 7a- 
20b and the Kim -gong haenggun' gi '^ ^ ;ff !^ tlj in IC 6. 7b-16b; 
also see Kuk Ch'unghbn Wang Sega )^ ^. !£- ^ i^ |<_ ^^ ^^ ^^^ 
la-20a, and BTKP 56. 540. 

18. sangsd sdng ^^ ^^ = sangsd tosdng iio] ^ J^ 1^ • Kory6 
T'aejo had established in the system of the state of T'aebong ^ |^ (la- 
ter redesignated Kory6), the Kivangp'yongsong ^ |^ ^ which was 
completely in charge of all officials. In 982, i.e., the first year of the 
reign of Koryo S5ngjong J^ 3f^ (r. 982-997) it was redesignated dsa 
tosdng jj'Jp M- ^^^ ; in 995 it was redesignated sangsd tosdng. In 
the reign of Kory6 Munjong ^ ^ (r. 1047-1082) the number of posts in 
the Secretariat was increased considerably. Cf. KS 76. 9a-b. 

19. Kim In'gy6ng /^ //:! -^J, (d. 1235), whose former name was Yanggyong 

fd, /l^ , was of Kyftngju j^- -))] . A descendant in the fourth genera- 
tion of Kim Uijin /^ ^ y^ (d. 1070), he had a precarious childhood 
when his father Kim Y6nggo /^ JK.\'S\ the Commissioner of Hostels 
and Post Stations of the Hunggyo circuit, hunggyo-do kivanydksa i^ X_ 
■^ ^"f --^^^X-j f^ii into disgrace and was jailed during the rebellion 
of Kim Podang /^ j^ ^ (d. 1173) when forces under his command 
were defeated. YSnggo had been sentenced to death despite the pleas of 
the people of the area. Sent to the capital for execution he obtained his 
release thru the intervention of a government minister. His residence 
had already been confiscated by the government and his wife and children 
were starving when the officials of the Htinggyo circuit levied rice and 
silks and gave it to them. Y6nggo was subsequently taken back into gov- 
ernment service. His son, Kim In'gy6ng, passed the second grade exams 
in second place during the reign of MySngjong and was placed in the His- 
toriographical Bureau, sagwan v^ ^^"^ . He rose to prominence during 
the reign of Kojong for his role at Kangdong. Transferred to the Depart- 


ment of Rites, he was subsequently promoted to Councillor of the Right 
of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch^umirivbn iisungsdn Jj^jio ^^ 0^ ^ 
7r^ ^ ' ^°^ ^^ merit at Kangdong. Defeated in 1227 in a battle with 
Eastern JiirSen raiders on the northeast coast, he was slandered and 
subsequently demoted to Governor of Sangju, sangju moksa ^ 'j)\ g^ 
/|# , As he left the capital for his post at Sangju, ignored by his friends, 
some of his pupils accompanied him to the outskirts of the city. Kim 
composed the following poem to meet the occation: 

"Can a single whip be expected to sweep away the Tartar dust com- 

The southern wastes of 10 000 li [await] an ousted servant. 
[My] students with elegant hands have come to bid farewell. 
Moved, it is difficult to stop the tears from wetting my handkerchief." 
Later at Sangju he composed a poem concerning his demotion which he 
put on the city wall. He was recalled to the capital after a short while 
and went on to become President, sangsd ^^ ^ , of the Department of 
Justice, hydngbu ^'j ^p , and later, of the Department of Civil Officials, 
ibu X ^^ • ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^2^^ ^^^ ^^^ given the posthumous appellation of 
Ch6ngsuk ^ ik . For biographical information see KS 102. 7a-9a from 
which the above information has been drawn; also see BTKP 59. 562. 

20. Reference is being made to Sun Wu i^ ^ and vVu Ch'i '^-jx^ , great 
military strategists of China's Ch'un-Ch'iu period, and their works, 
known as Sun-tzu Jj^^ -^ and Wu-tzu _^ ^ . There are several wes- 
tern language translations, e.g., L.Nachin, Sun Tze et les Anciens Chinois 
Oil Tse et Se Ma Fa, Paris, 1948. 

21. While the term yuksd /^ r^ usually refers to the six styles of writing 
or to the six categories into which Chinese characters are divided by 
form, here it could only refer to the Six Classics more commonly re- 
ferred to a.s yukkydng f'^ ^v^ , viz., The Book of Changes ^ ^^^ , The 
Book of History Jl: /,w , The Book of Poetry |^ j|^ , The Spring and 
Autumn Annals ^^Jf-ji' , The Record of Rites ^.^ "p , and The Record 
of Music ^ ^j^ . It is usual to refer to the Five Classics since the re- 
mains of The Record of Music form one of the sections of The Record of 
Rites, however, it is sometimes counted separately to make the Six Clas- 
sics. For a discussion and explanation see Vol. 6, p. 2 of the Prolego- 
mena, J.Legge, The Chinese Classics, 7 vols., Hongkong, 1861. 

22. KS 102. 7b calls them chongbyong jf^^ ^ ; /C 6. 13b calls them chin- 
yang kapchdl ^ '^^ \^ ip. . Perhaps by the latter, assuming ^^ to 
be an error for i^ , we can identify them as the retainers of the Duke of 
Chinyang ^ g^ , viz., the private forces of the Ch'oe clan. 


23. I have used the term 'bushel' to indicate the large bags of rice identified 
as s6k j^ or^i or kok ^\ . 

1 kok = 10 tu ^ (colq. maZ) 
\tu =10 sung 4\- (colq. toe ) 
1 sung = 10 hap /3V (colq. hup ) 

I am not certain of the capacity of a Kory6 kok but I note that according 
to a gloss in the Jih-pen ch^uan |J J^^^ oiHY that one Japanese koku 
^^ was equal to 25 korean/M 4 , that is, the Japanese koku was 2.5 
times as large as the corresponding Kory6 measure {ci.HY 4S. 7a). The 
reference work Keizaigaku jiten ^s^ j^ ^M %% M- published by Iwa- 
nami shoten /^ ij^^ )% i" six volumes, Tokyo, 1931, Vol. IV, en- 
try 1964 ff pertaining to Japanese weights and measures and their his- 
torical basis mentions some KOrai (Kory6) measures, e.g., a KOrai shaku 
J^ , etc. However, I hesitate to accept their account as pertaining to 
Kory6 measures and weights since the ancient Korean state of Kogury6 
was often called simply Koryo in historical accounts and it is possible 
these "Korai" measures entered Japan from that state. I also hesitate to 
accept the HY account since I believe it pertains not to a Kory6 measure 
but to the measure in use in Korea during the Yi Dynasty when HY was 
compiled. A study of Korean weights and measures would be most wel- 
come. An unsigned article dealing with late Yi period measures ap- 
peared under the title 'Korean Weights and Measures', The Korea Re- 
view, Seoul, 1901, pp. 304-306. 

24. CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 547 postulates an identification of Taeju ^ -J ] with 
T'aeju ^ j3~] ; the latter is the present T'aech'6n -^ |1 in North 
P'y6ngan Province. 

25. IC 6. 14a dates this in the second month (Feb. 17 - March 17) of 1219. 
CS interprets all preceding events as occurring between the first and 
sixteenth day of the twelfth month of 1218 (Dec. 30, 1218 - Jan. 14, 1219). 

26. The office of Director of Affairs for the Commissioner of Men and Horse, 

chibydngmasa Jj^(] Js^3^ \-^ , was established in 989, the eighth year 
of the reign of S6ngjong. There was one such office in each of the two 
northern frontier -districts and as its holder was to be of the third grade 
in rank, he was at least a Grand General, taejanggun. His immediate 
superior was the Commissioner of Men and Horse. Cf. KS 11. 33b. 

27. sin'gi J[-^^^ was a general term used to designate the Kory6 cavalry; 
the taegak X )^ was a crossbow unit (cf. KS 129); I do not know what 
type of unit is meant by naesang (/^ )^^ (guards';). 

28. Kim Chidae /^ ;L ^ (^^^^ " ^266) was of Ch'ongdo '|- -^ ; his for- 
mer name was Chungyong W ||j . Marshal Cho, surprised by the poem 


on his shield, had him put in the naesang \)^)){% (guards?) to test his 
capabilities. Proving himself, Kim was given a position without resort to 
the exams, />oJ?|) , as Office Recorders, sarok '^] %^ , of Ch6nju/^ jj\ 
He rose to be ChSlla Province Circuit Inspector, anck'alsa J'J^ ^i^ > 
and gained fame as a suppresser of bandit groups in the area. Ch'oe 
Hang, the son of the military ruler Ch'oe U, was then living at a Buddhist 
temple on Chin Island j:^^ M ^^ the priest Manj6n ^ ^^ and Chidae, 
in apprehending one of his unruly disciples, forced Manj6n to send the 
fellow — a certain Chit'ong ^i] }![_ — to him. Chidae "ordered him 
bound, enumerated his illegal [actions] and threw him in the river." Pru- 
dence and the lack of other than minor excesses protected him in later 
days when Ch'oe Hang succeeded to power as military ruler. In the be- 
ginning of the reign of Wonjong ^ ">i^ (r. 1260-1274) he was promoted 
to President of the Department of Civil Officials, ihu sangso ^ :^0 
),ol "^ J ^"^^ shortly thereafter he retired from government service be- 
cause of age. He died in 1266 at the age of seventy-seven and was given 
the posthumous appellation of Ydngh6n ^ ^S[ . For biographical infor- 
mation see KS 102. 21a-22b from which the above information has been 
taken; also see BTKP 53. 507. 

29. Ch'6ngdo ^^ ^ is in the southern part of the modern N, Kyongsang Pro- 
vince. For historical information see Han^guk-sa sajbn, ^^ |^j ^ 

If it , Seoul, 1959, p. 368. 

30. Yi Ch6k ^ ^j] (1163-1225) of Chip'y5ng-hy6n ^^^^^ was the son 
of Grand General Yi Chun -^4^ • He gradually worked his way up to 
Councillor, nangjung ^9) \b , in the Department of War, pydngbu yf^ 
%p , and there rose to prominence fighting the Ch'i-tan invaders in 
1216-1217. Appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse after the Ch'i-tan 
forces had entered Kangdong, he was offered a selected infantry force 
chCmgye ^^j,fu (called ydnye ^4.i^)u ^^ ^^ grave record). A veteran 
of two years fighting against the mounted Ch'i-tan, he refused the infantry 
soldiers and took only a cavalry force. Following the battle at Kangdong 
he remained in the north as Commissioner of Men and Horse of the North- 
east Frontier-District and, following this, he entered the Bureau of Mili- 
tary Affairs. He died in 1225 at the age of 64 and left no sons. For bio- 
graphical information see KS 103. 21b-22b and his grave record con- 
tained in TYSC 36. 9b-12a. In the latter his name is given as ChOk^f . 
Also see the Yi Ch'umil Ch6k Yanggwanp'yo -4^ J^^ ^ ^f] |^ "^ ^ 
contained in TYSC 29. 18b-19a. 

31. In lieu of 'Mongol Emperor' IC 6. 14a has Sheng-im M ^ (both of which 
refer to Cinggis) and adds the line "I will not salute Wan-nu." 


32. My interest here is not so much with Mongol customs as it is with the 
Korean reaction to them. For Mongol customs mentioned, see the ac- 
counts of William of Rubruck, John of Plan de Carpine, Odoric, et al., 
translated and annotated by W.W.Rockhill, H.H.Yule, P.Pelliot, C. 
Dawson et al., which are listed in the bibliography. 

33. The terms of the agreement are verified in a Kory6 letter sent to the 
Mongols in 1232; envoys were not to exceed ten persons annually in the 
Kory6 interpretation. Cf. KS23. 19a-b. This particular agreement was 
often cited by the Koryft authorities as one of the foundation stones of 
Yiian-Koryfi relations in later days, especially when it was useful to 
counter Yiian demands. See, for example, the petitions submitted to the 
Yiian authorities by Yi Chehy6n in 1323. (/C 6. lb-2a) 

34. YKC 2 and YS 208 place this agreement as occurring prior to the, dispatch 
of provisions and soldiers. However, the detailed record in /C 6. lb ff 
and in the biography of Cho Cheung relate the sequence. Subsequent events 
confirm that this was a binding agreement between the two nations of 
which the Koryft authorities were well aware. Also see YC Vol. 2, pp. 
112-113 for the sequence of events. 

35. IC 6. 15a dates this on the twentieth day of the second month (March 8) of 

36. The number nine since ancient times had mystic connotations to the peo- 
ples of North Asia. 

37. YS 149. 3b relates that Ha^chen's Ch'i-tan prisoners were taken to Ssu- 
lou -^^ J^ , which is identified by CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 551, as Pa-lin 

^.y^\ in Inner Mongolia. Martin, op. cit., p. 217, remarks that 
". . . they were moved to the country immediately west of Lin-huang." 
Lin-huang-fu, to the northeast of the present Pa-lin, and Ssu-lou to the 
southeast of Lin- huang, was the area of the old Liao capital. The Ch'i- 
tan captives were re-settled there under Yeh-lii Liu-ke. Following Liu- 
ke's death in 1220, this area and the people there were inherited by 
Liu-ke's eldest son Hsieh-tu <^^ fj^ . In 1230, Hsieh-tu, after consid- 

erable merit in the field against the Chin in the south, was ordered by 
Ogddei to accompany Sartaq on the campaign eastward across Liaotung. 
He then moved these people to Huang-ning-fu m W Mj where he was 
active in the administration of Huang-ning-lu ) ( ^^ . Hsieh-tu parti- 
cipated in the 1231-1232, and 1235 campaigns in Korea and in the 1234 
campaign against P'u-hsien Wan-nu. See FS 149. 3b- 5b and Ikeuchi, 
Mansen-shi kenkyu, Vol. 1, pp. 611, 627, and 629. 
38. The Mobile Garrison hsing-ying ^^ ^ was the field headquarters of the 
Mongol commander. 


39. Cf. YKC 2a which dates this on the 13th day of the first month (Jan. 30) of 

40. The missive which is contained in TYSC 28. la-b, contains the heading 
"Letter Accompanying Ceremonial Gifts (lit. fruit and wine) Sent to the 
Tent (i.e., Hq.) of the Mongol Marshal of Men and Horse" and a notation 
indicates that it represents correspondence of the tosong which is an 
abridgement of sangsd tosdng j^ '^ Mf"^ > the Kory6 Secretariat. 

41. The text reads hsiao-fu % J-^ which I have rendered "executed or made 
prisoner." Hsiao should probably be understood in the sense of ^ "^ 

"to behead and hang the head in a tree as a warning to others." 

42. P'u-li-tai-yeh J^' $ rj^ {^ • In KS 22. 16b the name occurs in the 
form P'u-li-tai-wan j j j ^ ; in KS 22. 20b it occurs as P'u-hei-tai 

'ifl '^, w ' ^^^ being a common replacement or misrendering for li 
in Mongol names transcribed in Chinese. 

43. The Kory6 administrative system had as many as four capitals, kydng 

0^ , viz., the main capital at Kaegyong )^^ ^^ , the present Kaesong; 
the Western Capital, S6gy6ng ^ -fj'^ , the present P'y6ngyang; the Eas- 
tern Capital, Tonggy6ng j^^^ , the present Ky6ngju; and the Southern 
Capital, Namgy6ng jh ^^ , the present Seoul. KaegySng and S6gy6ng 
date from the reign of Kory6 T'aejo Jy^-^ (r. 918-943); Tonggy6ng 
dates from the reign of Songjong ^V I? (r. 982-997); and Namgyftng 
dates from the reign of Munj6ng ^ )f^ (r. 1047-1082). This is, of 
course, vastly oversimplified. The designation Tonggy6ng had been used 
for the former Silla capital even during the Later Silla period (668-917). 
The history of the Southern Capital is particularly interesting, involving 
the interpretation of several prophecies, based upon which its site was 
occasionally changed. These are discussed at length by Yi PySngdo, 
Han^ giik-saYol. 2, passim. The general context of the various predic- 
tions involving the Southern Capital was the extension or elimination of 
the ruling dynasty by the construction of a Southern Capital which is well 
illustrated by the prediction of a monk who, in the seventh month of 1224, 
prophecied: "Asadal ^^] ^y^ was in antiquity on the site of Yangju 

J^")]] ■ If palaces are constructed on this site and protected, then the 
nation's span will last 800 years.' Therefore, it was so ordered" (TT 32. 
52). And, indeed, a new palace was completed there in the spring of 1235. 
Cf. KS2'i. 28b-29a. Asadal 1^^ /^i^.'^ f^ ^^ i|__ ^^' °^ course, 
the 'capital' found by the legendary Tan'gun^l-f^ -^ , for which see Sam- 
guk yusa ^ l2 ii i- 33. 9, Ch'oe Nams5n ^ fy^ ed., Keijo 
(Seoul), 1946. Also see F.Vos, 'La letteratura coreana,' La Civilti dell' 
Oriente I, Rome, 1957, pp. 1025-1042, esp. pp. 1030 ff. 


The Kory6 main capital of Kaegy6ng was divided into five districts pu 
^Q) , viz., northern, southern, eastern, western, and central. The 
northern district contained ten wards, pang^/j , with forty-seven resi- 
dential-blocks, li j£ ; the southern district contained five wards with 
seventy -one residential-blocks; the eastern district contained seven 
wards with seventy residential-blocks; the western district contained 
five wards with eighty-one residential-blocks; the central district con- 
tained the Royal palaces, etc. Cf. T.Shigeda ^ ^ '^-^ , KOrai no 
koto ^ ^ V) ^ Ji^ , Rekishi chiri, Vol. 16, No. 6 (1910), p. 615 ff. 
Also se T.Sekino )Jf f^ |] , KOrai no kotO (kaijO) oyobi Okyu ishi 

(Mangetsu-dai) ,4 f^ ^ ^ M ^ ^^ ^^ ) ^ i '"S 'A^t^ ' 
Rekishi shiri. Vol. 6, No. 6 (1904), pp. 585-591. The most detailed study 
is that by the late Maema Kyosaku ^]^ f^ ^]y, , KaikyO kyuden-bo 
1^1^ ^|i^ ^i ij ["A Study on Gaegyong Palaces of Gory eo"], 
CG 26 (1963), pp. 1-55. . 

44. There were two sidsa /j^ Jj^^ ^ or Attendant Censors in the Censorate, 
dsadae, at this time, both posts carrying the official grade of Fifth Class, 
secondary. Cf. KS1&. 21b. 

45. S6nui Gate ^ ji p^ was the principal outer gate of the KoryO capital 
of Kaegy6ng.1t was located in the southwest of the city and was often used 
figuratively to indicate the capital. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, carries a 
sketch map of the Koryo capital. The SSniii Gate was one of the twenty - 
five gates in the city. Cf. T.Shigeda, op. cit., p. 617. 

46. The Taegwan Hall y'v^l^/^^^was the main audience chamber at this 
time and so remained until the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island 
in 1232; it was here that the King received all envoys. Cf. KS 22 and KS 

47. The type of clothing was undoubtedly that described for a Mongol delega- 
tion from the camp of Sartaq in the winter of 1231. Similarly attired in 
fur clothing and hats, and with their bows and swords, they too shocked 
the Korean court attendants who "...presented [them] tzu-lo-shan ^^ j'<| 
^A (a not-full-length, unlined uppergarment made of purple silk gauze) 
and girdles and ordered them to change clothing. The Mongol envoys did 
not obey but simply put them on over [their own clothing]" {KS 23. 4a). 
For another example of such behavior see KSIOZ. 32a-36a. The shan 
was worn as the official costume by the highest Kory6 officials and va- 
rious colors were assigned according to rank {KS 72. 9b-14b). 

Friar William of Rubruck has described the dress and head-dress of 


envoys from Solanga (Korea) he saw at the court of Mongke in 1253: 
". . . they wear tunics like the chasuble {supertunicate) of a deacon, ex- 
cept with narrower sleeves. On their heads » . . a mitre like a bishop's 
... in iront it is slightly lower than behind . . . square on top ... of stiff 
buckram, and so polished that it shines . . . like a mirror. . . . And at the 
temples are long strips of the same stuff . . . fastened to the mitre . . . 
which stand out in the wind like two horns . . . When the wind strikes it 
too violently, they fold them up across the mitre over the head; and a 
right iiandsome ornament it is." Cf. Rockhill, William of Rubruck . , „ , 
p. 153; in an explanatory note, Rockhill says the cap was described as of 
stamina rigidata per coloram nigram. Rockhill mentions the black, pol- 
ished horsehair hats of the Koreans and that the 'wings' project from in 
front, not behind. Yet in tne portraits of Yi Saek-^^|- (1328-1396) and 
of Yi Chehy6n -^^ ^ 4^ (1287-1367) of unknown date contained in Yi, 
Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, following p. 644, the caps worn are exactly as de- 
scribed by Rubruck and differ from the late Yi Dynasty headgear de- 
scribed by Rockhill. For Korean costumes of the Kory6 period see KS 72. 

48. According to IC 6. 15b, Kim Ch'wiryo went with Cha-la as far as Choyang 

j^fl 0^ but as there were sacrifices in the Western Capital at that time, 
Kim was replaced by O Sugi ^ i^ ^^ who accompanied Cha-la. KS 
and KSC have nothing like this. A KS entry dated the tenth month of 1219 
merely lists O as being substituted for Kim Kunsu ^i^ ^ v^-p (fl. 1216- 
1220; BTKP 60. 574) to be Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse; 
KSC 15. 22 reads the same. It would appear that Ch'wiryd was replaced 
by Kunsu who was, in turn, replaced by Sugi. The sacrifices referred to 
would have been the Buddhist Festival of Lanterns, ydndung j(i^, j^ , cel- 
ebrated in Kory6 at this time on the fourteenth day (the day before the full 
moon) of the second lunar month; since it was a festival with feasting, 
singing, and dancing, we cannot blame Kim for going. 

49. The old city of Uiju was located somewhat southwest of the present city 
of tJiju. Like its modern namesake, it too warranted the description, 
"die beriihmte alte Eingangsforte Koreas" H, Lautensach, Korea, Eine 
Landeskunde auf Grand eigener Reisen und der Literatur, Leipzig, 1945. 
For historical and topographical information on the border city of Uiju 

^f)] see rys 53. la ff. 

50. hobu sirang j^ %f''^n'^f' or Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance; 
there were two such posts, each carrying the official grade of Fourth 
Class, primary. Cf. KS 76. 15b-17b. 

51. The Hunghwa postal relay Circuit HUnghwa-do £*li -/L^iJ, had twenty- 
nine stations and serviced an area between the capital of Kaegyfing and 


the Western Capital. There were in the Kory6 system twenty-two postal 
relay circuits with a total of 525 post stations. Cf. KS 82. 

52. In the early period there were undoubtedly many difficulties in communi- 
cation between the Mongols and peoples they conquered, which made in- 
terpreters and translators especially valued. One of the Mongol demands 
upon Koryo in the period 1219-1224 had been for men with a knowledge of 
the Chinese written and spoken langviage (cf. TYSC 28. lb-3a) while in 
later days a Korean, one Cho I ^^ ^ , became one of Qubilai's chief 
interpreters {KS 130). The atrocious Chinese of many Yuan edicts may 
have also occasioned misunderstanding. Mongolian written in the Uiyur 
script was also used, playing an important part in Y'lan-Koryd relations 
and we read that "in many of the letters which were exchanged, the Uijcur 
script was used" {KS 89. 13b; also see KS 125. 15a; KS 121. 7a ff). In 
1225, the Koreans began the study of ^ script described only as a 'small- 
er script' soja y]\ ll? when a certain Chou-han f^ :^ submitted to a 
Kory6 border garrison. When it was discovered that he knew the smaller 
script he was forthwith sent to the capital and studies commenced {KS 22. 
26b). I note that CS Vol. 4, p. 14 interprets this to be the 'smaller' Jiir- 
Cen script, a script which had been introduced in 1138 (cf. K.Wittfogel 
and Chia-sheng Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1127), 'Gen- 
eral Introduction', undated reprint from the Transactions of the Ameri- 
can Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, pp. 1-35). This script was widely 
used (cf. pp. 344 and 347, Yi Kimun %r ^ X. » Chungse y6jin-6 un- 
nony6n'gu, ^ ^ ^^ |t || %^^Af\^^ > Nonmun-chip 

(Seoul University Journal, Humanities and Social Sciences), 7 
(1958), pp. 343-395, In fact, we find, as late as 1403, the opening 
days of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), that a Jiircen script was used in in- 
structions sent to the Yi Court [cf. Wada Sei ^{j i^ ^^ , Tdashi kenkyU 
(Manshu-hen) ^ ^]]l ^ ^# ^ ( 3^iii] % ) ["Studies on the His- 
tory of the Far East" (Manchuria)], Toyo bunko ronso j^ -k. j^)^ 
|i^ t ' Series A, No. 37, p. 384]. Yet it seems improbable that the 
Koreans who had been in close contact with the Jfurcen for centuries 
would have been unaware of their script. While events of the times may 
have given the Jur6en script an importance, I would suggest that the 
'smaller script' was not the Jiircen script at all but the Uiyur script. 

53. For topographical and historical information on Chinmy6ng-s5ng /^\g '^^ 
J;^ which was located near the modern W6nsan /^j lil ^^ S. HamgySng 
Province, see TFS 49. 13a. 

54. Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n -^ ,fijj[ (1149-1219) of Ubongij-^ entered mUi- 
tary service at an early age. He rose to power in the struggles which 


erupted in the military government in the later 12th century and seized 
the power of the military government in 1196 by assassinating Yi Uimin 

-^ M, ^^ ^^' 1196). The military government in Kory6 commenced 
with the rebellion of Ch6ng Chungbu ^6 ^^ j^ (do 1179) in 1170, but not 
until the Ch'oe clan assumed power - which it held for four generations 
until 1258 - did the military government manage to gather the full admin- 
istrative regalia of government, although the earlier efforts of General 
Kyong Taesung ^- ;;^ J\\- (1154-1183) had already pointed the way. 
M.C.Rogers has dealt with Ch'oe at some length in his 'Studies in Korean 
History', TP XLVII (1959), pp. 30-62. For biographical information see 
KS 129. A thorough biographical r^sumd is contained in Chosen jimmei 
jisho ^^Sli ^^0 04^ , Chosen Sotokufu |l^ MMt^^M-^ » 
Keijo (Seoul), 1937-39, 1379A ff; also see BTKP 23. 226. 
55. Ch'oe U ^ J:^ (d. 1249), who later changed his name to I f^ , was the 
eldest son of Ch'oe Ch'unghon the military ruler. His mother, Ch'ungh6n's 
first wife, was the daughter of Supreme General Song Ch6ng J^ ^^ . He 
assumed control of the government following his father's death but was 
compelled to fight to retain his power which he did by exiling or killing 
his opposition, including his yovinger brother Hyang ^j^ . Like most of 
the Korytt aristocracy, he favored Buddhism - although he did not hesi- 
tate to ruthlessly eliminate priests when they opposed him. He encour- 
aged and financially aided learning as had his father Ch'ungh6n, yet he 
was not above confiscating the dwellings of commoners in the city and 
razing them to build a private polo field. 

He was enfeoffed as the Marquis of Chinyang ^ 0j; 7^ in 1234 (after 
declining the title in 1221; the patent of investiture which is contained in 
TYSC 33. 17b-19a mentions his merit in protecting the altars of earth 
and grain (i.e., the fatherland), and crushing the rebellious and the re- 
fractory) and in 1242 was made Duke of Chinyang. He had two sons 
- neither by his first wife - who entered the Buddhist priesthood with 

the Buddhist names of Manj6n ^ /^ and Manj6ng ^ ^P ; the former 
he recalled to secular life to succeed him, viz., Ch'oe Hang^ ^/[, , 
The judgement of his contemporaries provides a criterion by which to 
appraise his life: following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Ch'oe U 
was made a Meritorious Minister, kongsin ^j] j^ , posthumously (cf. 
KS 25. 26a). He died in 1249 and was awarded the posthumous appellation 
of Kwangny61 [^ j^[ . His biography is contained in KS 129 following 
that of his father Ch'ungh6n and valuable information on his life and timef 
is contained in TYSC; BTKP 25. 242, I note, fails to mention his second 
son Manj6ng. 


56. The monks were from temples in and near the capital and included monks 
from the temples Htingwang ^ ^ , Ky6ngbok J^ ^-^ , Wangnyun ji. 
■$(^ , and Hongwftn ^/^ j^J in the Kaegy6ng area and the near-by temples 
of Anyang J^ ^ and Suri {\^^^ {KS 129. 24a-b). The latter two are 
identified by CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 519 as being in the present Ky6nggi 
Province at Sihiing -^^ £^ and Kwangju respectively. The construction 
of the most famous of these, Hiingwangsa, commenced in the tenth year 
of the reign of Koryo Munjong J^ >^ (r. 1047-1082) and took some 12 
years; its site remains at Hungwangni ^M. 9i ^ , Kaep*ung-kun ra 

"^ -^P , Ky6nggi Province. It was here that 'National Preceptor* tae- 
gak kuksa y^ ;^ l^ irp Uich'6n ,M. ^ , the brother of K6ryo S6n- 
jong '^ ]^^ (r. 1084-1094) supervised the first carving and printing of 
the Tripitaka or Buddhist Canon, following his return from Sung China; 
it was this work that was destroyed in the Mongol invasions of 1232. 
Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 548 and p. 549, note 2, traces the uprising of 
monks to Ch'oe's disregard of government forces and retention of his 
private soldiers for his own use which resulted in the need to levy monks 
into the army, 

57. Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 552-553, in pointing out the rash of upris- 
ings - he lists seven in the period 1219 to 1230 - remarks that they were 
attributable as much to a quest for power on the part of the leaders as to 
chaotic conditions. Of the seven revolts that Yi lists, two were direct at- 
tempts to overthrow the Ch'oe clan, two were revolts of provincial offi- 
cials, one a revolt by a bandit chief, and two revolts arose in the Western 
Capital which had been a hotbed of rebellion since the revolt of Myoch'Sng 
-^^ ;^ (d. 1135; BTKP 84. 791) in the reign of Injong y/^ ]^ (r. 1123- 

58. The rank of Supreme General, sangjanggun J^ jj^ '^ , had the official 
grade of Third Class, primary (Yi Table 4) and carried an annual stipend 
of 300 bushels {s6k} of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 85 kyol of 
paddy fields and 40 kydlof forest (Yi, Table 7). 

59. She had been the wife of General Son Hongyun _^^^ j^ j|L whom Ch'oe 
had killed; hearing of her beauty, Ch'oe took her himself and put her in a 
house in the capital, Cf. /CSC 15. 20b, 

60. There were two popular methods of selecting generation-names in KoryS, 
All clan members of the same generation would use the same radical in 
their given names. The 'jade' radical, okpii jf^ ^^ , was undoubtedly 
popular, because in radical form it resembles the character Wang ^ , 
meaning 'king' and which was also the sxirname of the KoryS royal family. 
A second method, which prevails widely today, was to choose a generation 


character. An example of this may be seen in the first generation of the 
descendants of Kim Ky6ngson ^^ ]^J(%^ > who used the generation char- 
acter cha Jr^ and bore the names Chahung -4- J^ , Chach'ang ^ ^ , 
and Chay6n -^ i^ - Kim's descendants in the 2nd generation (sons of 
Chahung) combined the two methods and bore the names Sanggi J:^ ^^ , 
Sangyo X JS^ , Sangyttng X X^ , andSangnini^ ^^ {KS 103. 30b). 
BTKP carries many such examples. 

61. The title of Marquis, hu ^^ , was an honorary title which carried an an- 
nual stipend of 400 bushels {sok) of rice (Yi, Table 6). 

62. The title of Count, paeky^Q , was an honorary title which carried an an- 
nual stipend of 240 bushels {s6k) of rice (Yi, Table 6). 

63. ?os6ng ^ ^^ was a kunj^<^ in ChoUa /^ \^ Province with four sub- 
ordinate hydnSt\ • Cf. Han}huk-sa sajon, 138A. 

64. The rank of Grand General, taejanggun -^^ ^ ^ , had the official 
grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual sti- 
pend of 233 bushels {sbk) 5 tu ^ of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 
80 kyol of paddy fields and 35 kyol of forest land (Yi, Table 7). 

65. The term ydng^-f^ is clarified in KS 81. la where we read, "Each ydng 
had about 1 000 men ..." 

66. The honorary title of sagong 'Q ^ was the third (and lowest) of the 
Three Dukes, samgong ^ ^^ , honorary titles bestowed on members of 
the royal household {KS 76. 2b) and carried an annual stipend of 240 bush- 
els {sdk) of rice (Yi, Table 6). The honorary title of chuguk Jf^ )^ was 
the second of two such titles bestowed for merit and carried the grade of 
Second Class, primary (cf. Yi, Han'giik-sa, Vol. 2, p. 133). The prefix 

su vP 'guardian', 'protector', was apparently used to differentiate this 
title from the titles of nobility sado ^ ^^ and sagong I] ^ which 
were bestowed upon the male children of the royal relatives (cf. HY 20. 

67. Htliiong ^& ^^ (r. 1205-1211) was deposed by Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n and died 
in exile in 1237. Cf. CHSL 4. 28. 

68. The rank of pydlchang^'j ^ or Junior Colonel, had the official grade of 
Seventh Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 46 
bushels {sdk) 10 tu of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 45 kydl of 
paddy fields and 12 ky6l of forest land (Yi, Table 7). 

69. The biographies of Han Sun ^k^\^ and Ta Chi ^ ^^ which are found 
together in KS 130. 1-3 relate chiefly the details of the rebellion without 
giving any further particulars of their lives. 

70. The rank of nangjang ^g \jS or Senior Colonel, had the offi'.ial grade of 
Sixth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 86 


bushels {sdk) 10 tu of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 60 kydl of 
paddy fields and 21 kydl of forest land (Yi, Table 7). 
71. The term toho (C, tu-hu) ^6|# , usually rendered 'protector general', 
occurs in Chinese history as early as Han times (cf. Hou Han-shu 118. 
14b). The toho was in charge of the toho-pu \ \ }\^ .In Korean history 
the usage of the term dates to Silla times and traces to T'ang. After 
crushing the Kogury6 capital of P'y6ngyang in 668, T'ang established the 
An-tung tii-hu-fii v^ ^ ^^ yt y<| in P'y6ngyang with Hsieh Jen-kuei 
"^ Ji^ % ^^ Protector General; in 676 they were forced out of the 
peninsula and the tu-hu-fu was moved to Liaoyang; it was finally abolished 
in 758 (cf. Han^giik-sa sajon, p. 218). 

I have chosen to render the term toho-pu as Defense Command. The Yiian 
'Monography on Geography', in describing the KoryS toho-pu, remarks 
that the term was taken from T'ang and that "Kory6 established [as] pu 
i0f , chu jji , hydn"^^^ , and chin/^-^ , some sixty walled-cities. This 
was the toho-pu. " And it notes that although Kory6 retained the old T'ang 
designation, nevertheless, they were without a real toho-pu {YS 59. 4a-b). 
The YS account correctly traces the introduction of the toho-pu to T'ang 
but describes, not the Koryo toho-pu but rather the Northwestern Defejise 
Command plus S6hae Province, i.e., the area submitted by the Koryo re- 
bel Ch'oe Tan W j'-Q^ (which is discussed in detail later). A clearer pic- 
ture is given by TYS 52. 16a which relates that the designation of Chung- 
ban-kun ^ '^'^^ °^ ^^^^ Silla times was changed by Kory6 T'aejo to 
P'aengw6n-kun ^^h J^'%^ a^nd in his fourteenth year (931), T'aejo estab- 
lished there the Anbuk-pu ifnl 3t»^tf • ^^ ^^^ reign of S6ngjong it was 
called Ydngju anbuk taedoho-pu ^ ^j)-j ^^ itj X.^f> ii U^ > ^^ *^® 

reign of Hy6njong it was called Anbuk taedoho-pu. 

The Koryo toho-pu or Defense Command, then referred primarily to a 
city, i.e., the city in which it was located and subordinate administrative 
units. Thus, the Northern Defense Command, anbuk toho-pu v^ ^b ^f> 
p0- U:^ , while it was responsible for the peace in the northwest portion 
of Korea, as a term, referred to the city in which it was located, viz., 
the walled-city of Ans6ng }:^ ^f^ (also called Anbuk; the modern Anju 
Tuk -j)] ) on the Ch'Sngch'on River. There were in the Kory5 system the 
following Defense Commands. 
Northern {anbuk 1^ yij ) Defense Command; 
Southern {annam y^ ^ ) Defense Command; the location shifted to vr- 

rious cities throughout the southwest;. 
Eastern {anbydn bx! ^ ) Defense Command; the location shifted in the 
modern S. Hamgy6ng Province ending at AnbySn, the city which pres- 
ently bears its name. 


Western {ansd ^ -^ ) Defense Command; it was located at the modern 

Haeju 3^ -)-)-| 
For the various locations see Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, map 7. For the 
usage of the term tu-hu-fu in T'ang times see R. des Rotours, Traite des 
Functionnaires et Traite de I'Armee, 2 vols., Leiden, 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 
718-720, and E.G. Pulley blank, The Background of the Rebellion of An 
Lu-shan, London, 1955, p. 223; P.Ratchnevsky, Un Code des Yuan, does 
not list them for Yiian times. 

72. The city of Kuju ^g^ jjj , the present Kus6ng j^ j^^^ in N. P'yongan 
Province, had walls of stone construction seven feet {ch^okj^ ) in height 
and a circumference of 12 335 feet {ch^dk); inside the city were fifty wells 
and springs. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 
31a ff. 

73. For topographical and historical information on the city of Yonju i^-)-]^ 
which is in the modern N. P'yongan Province, see TYS 54. la ff; for such 
information on the city of S6ngju ^ jj-\ , the present S6ngch'6n 

in S. P'yongan Province, see TYS 54. 16a ff. 

74. Cf. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, Vol. 1, pp. 634-635, 

75. Yii-ke-hsia -^ -$' ^^ was a Chin Marshal who garrisoned Ta-fu-ying 

:^J^ ^ (which was located on an island in the Yalu River). In the 
fourth month of 1217, he had fought an unsuccessful night battle with the 
JiirCen Yellow Banner forces of P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then with ninety 
men, had slipped across the Yalu to Uiju where they were held by the 
Kory6 District Commandant, pundo changgiin. At the time Yii-ke-hsia 
was in possession of a tiger-head gold plaque chin-p'ai /^ ^ as symbol 
of his authority. Cf. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu. Vol. 1, p. 581. 

76. Chu 4) ^ interchangeable with chu ^\^^ . A grass cloth produced from 
the fibres of the ramie [Boeheria nivea, cf. E.H.Schafer and B.E. Wall- 
acker, 'Local Tribute Products of the T'ang Dynasty', Tung-fan wen-hua 
(Journal of Oriental Studies of Hongkong University), 4 (1957-58) 1 & 2, 
p. 236], called mosi J^ /] in Korean and often written mosi J^ ^^ . 
It was a regular tribute product of T'amna Island to the Kory6 Court, cf. 
p. 141 note 2, Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra-to -^ ^ \9i^ >i 

ij^fc M. ^ » [Yuan Shih-tsu and T'amna Island], TG 16 (1926), pp. 136- 
142. The term mosi was in use in Kory6 times, cf. F.Hirth and W. W. 
Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua ( -^^ 3^1^ ^' ^^^ work on the Chinese and Arab 
Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-cht 
( 1^ ^ iCij), St Petersburg, 1911, p. 168 and p. 169 note 9; they have 
stated that mau-shi (i.e., mosi) is usually rendered "serge". There is no 
doubt that ramie cloth is meant. Serge is usually called kal yji^ 


77. Kuang-p'ing is the name of a prefecture in modern Hopei; it is also the 
name of a location in Korea. The Kuang-p'ing cloth may have derived its 
name from one of these locations (i.e., from the site of manufacture). 

78. Information on the revolt is also contained in the biography of Kim Ch'wi- 
ry6 KS 103 and it is summarized in CHSL 4. 23b. 

79. Chu-ku-yu ^ -^ i^ . In YS 208 and YKC the name occurs as Chu-ku- 
yu ^ ^ &c^ ; it occurs as Cha-ku-yeh ^{^ -^ \q_^ in KS 22. 25a. In 
KS 23. 4a-5b it is found in the form Kua-ku-yu jj^ ^ ^ , kua /j\^ be- 
ing a mistake for chao //\^ which is also seen in Kua-wa /j\^ \]^ for 
Chao-wa /\^ 0^ (= Java). 

80. KS 22. 29b reads ^ ^^ ; YKC2 & 2b read ^ ^ ^ 1^ ^ -In 
an answer to other demands, a Kory6 missive in TYSC 28. lb-3a refers 
to him as J^ ^^Mj ^ ^ ' ^^^-wang ml J^ °^ Viceroy was a 
title of nobility instituted by Cinggis in 1217 and bestowed as a special 
mark of respect; it held the official grade of First Class, primary. Cf. 
Ratchnevsky, Un Code . . . , p. 186, note 2. The individual concerned was 
Temiige-otCigin, the fourth brother of tinggis. P.Pelliot, Notes on 
Marco Polo, Paris 1959, p. 307, citing T'u Chi (i.e., Meng-uni-erh chi- 
shih) 75. la, says that prior to the downfall of P'u-hsien Wan-nu, d;iiiggis 
had allotted the whole of his territory as a part of the appandage of his 
youngest brother Temuge-ot6igin. This was inherited by his direct des- 
cendants reaching his great-great-grandson Nayan as stated by Marco 

81. The text reads rul ^ -^ '^^ > however, I cannot but wonder if ir- 
is not a scribal error for ^ ; if so then in lieu of Queen An-chih we 
would read Grand Prince Alcitai (or ElCidei). Juvaini remarks that after 
the death of Cinggis in 1227, there was an assembly convoked and "from 
the east came Otegin, Belgiitei Noyan, Elchitei Noyan, Yekii, and Ye- 
siingei." Boyle identifies Elchitei Noyan as the son of Cinggis' brother 
Qach'iuii. See Vol. I, p. 185, J.A.Boyle (translator). The History of the 
World-Conqueror of 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, 2 vols., London, 

82. The records inform us that "at the time, the people believed that the 
quarrel with the Mongols began with this [incident]" {KS 129. 30b). 

83. P'o-su-lu -^ j^^^was the /wj^^ administration in Liaotung which 
bordered Koryo on the Yalu; it was the Liao-yang-lu ^ |3^ J^^°^ the 
Yiian. There is a shih-cheng jQ JT^]^ mentioned in Chung-kuo ku-chien 
ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien <^ ]^ ^ '^^^ J^& ^ ^ i|f -^ . PP- 269- 
270, which was located in Liao-yang-hsien \|^^ on top of Mt. Shih-cheng 

ysj ^^ U-1 and which is identified as the old KoryC (read Koguryo) 


Paegui-sfing ^^^^ (read Paegam-s6ng i^ J^ i^ ). Cf. ifS103. 
32a-36a. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, pp. 624-625 note 2, says that Yanai 
Watari would locate it 18 Chinese U north of the present Chiu-lien-sheng 

84. According to Ch6ng Tagyong ^ ^ ^|^ (1762-1836), the Chin estab- 
lished mutual trade relations, hu-shih, with Kory6 in 1218. Chftng also 
notes that prior to that, the majority of trade had been via the sealanes 
rather than by overland routes or the establishment of markets on the 
border. See chip ^i, kw6n ^ 15, 9a-b, Chdng Tasan chdnjip '^ -^ 

J_] ^ -^ , 3 vols., Seoul, 1960. 

85. In the sixth month of 1226, the Chin court had sent orders to Ke-pu-ai 
^ ^^ ^ ^^^ head of their Liaotung Mobile Bureau, and to Kory6 to 
subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia-nu who had been appointed by the Chin 
as military commander of the P'o-su-lu administration under Wan-yen 
A-li-pu-sun ^ ^^ f^M^-^'-^A. ' Wan-chia-nu subsequently killed 
A-li-pu-sun (which led to the appointment of Ke-pu-ai in 1217), rebelled 
against the Chin, crossed the Kory6 borders and apparently based himself 
along the upper reaches of the Yalu. See Chin-shih 103. 17a-b. He then 
submitted to the Mongols for, as Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, p. 621 has 
noted, according to YS 4, in 1261 he was appointed as daruya£i to govern 
Kory6 in the post created by the Yiian that year in Shen-yang-lu (see 

YS 59). 

86. This chart is based upon material contained in Kim Sanggi's excellent 
study, Y6-song muy8k-ko [R6sum6 of Sung-Kory6 Trade), ^L^ 

^^^■^ incorporated in Tongbang munhwa kyoryu-sa non'go -^ ^ 
^^L. ^ ^^U^M^""- ^ °f Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsfi ^^]J 
X/Jb^i , Seoul, 2nd ed., 1954, pp. 47-88. 

87. Merchant vessels were often a source of intelligence and it is possible 
that some such motive lay behind the visits of the Sung vessels. How- 
ever, at least one of the vessels arrived (at Cheju Island) after being 
blown off course by a storm. The Koryd-sa references to the Sung trade 
at this time are KS22. 21a, KS 23. 36a, KS 25. 20a, andXS 28. 45a cor- 
responding to the years 1221, 1229, 1260, and 1278 respectively. The 
most detailed study i s that by Kim Sanggi, loc. cit.; a more recent but 
less thorough work is Mori Katsumi ^j^ ^ q^ , Nisso to KOrai to no 
shiken boeki i^ ^ t ^^ ^ )L O ^I\^X "^ ^ ["Private 
Tributary Trade of Japan and Koryfi with Sung"], "CG 14 (1956) pp. 545- 
556. Mori expresses some interesting opinions among which is that 
Koryfi and Japan were outlets for surplus goods the Sung Chinese obtained 
in S.E. Asia and the Arab trade, an opinion he reiterates in his 'Interna- 


tional Relations between the 10th and the 16th century and the Develop- 
ment of the Japanese International Consciousness', Acta Asiatica (of the 
TOhO Gakkai, Tokyo) 2 (1961), p. 84 ff. 

88. By T'amna J;t'^ i^ meant the present Cheju Island ^^ -jjj ^ . At 
this time Cheju referred only to the present Cheju City. The distinction 
may be seen clearly in a passage in YS 7. 17a when an attack was or- 
dered on ". . . T'amna as well as Cheju . . . ", i.e., to take the entire is- 
land as well as the city. The island was formerly an independent King- 
dom but by this time it had been effectively incorporated into the Koryo 
administrative structure. For a study of the names of the island see 
Takahashi Toru J^yfllJ- , Saishu-tO meiko ^^"^^1^^^ ' 
CG 9 (1950), pp. 393-412. For a general history of the island see Kim 
PonghySn /^ ^it> Cheju-do ydksa-ji ^^- j-}]^ ^JLlis ' 
Seoul, 1960. For topographical and historical information see TYS 38. 

89. See Mori Katsumi, NissO-tsnto Tanra, ]^ ^)fl_)^ t ^ilj^^ p'Quel- 
part Island and Marine Transportation between Japan and Sung China"], 
CG 21 & 22 (1961), pp. 522-531; pp. 528-531 pertain to this period. As 
Mori has pointed out in his international Relations . . . ', op. cit., p. 85, 
the reason for the decline in the direct trade between Japan and Koryft 
was that in the 12th century Japanese merchant ships began going directly 
to Sung China. 

90. The raids of the Wako or Japanese freebooters who had plagued Korea 
since Silla times, recommenced in 1223 after over a century of silence. 
During the late 13th and early 14th centuries they were a major disaster 
and they raided absolutely every major city and town in Kory6. Cf. Yi, 
Han'giik-sa, Vol. 2, p. 602 ff. The Wako raids continued until the Hide- 
yoshi invasions in the late 16th century. (Actually the cessation resulted 
from Hideyoshi's conquest of Kyushu, the chief Wako base, cf. Brown, 

p. 31). Brown says that "Wako is most commonly translated as 'Japanese 
pirates' but that translation leads to considerable misunderstanding for 
Wako did not always limit their activities to piracy and not all WakS 
were Japanese. They carried on a considerable amount of peaceful trade. 
. . . Contemporary Chinese accounts reveal that many Wako bands con- 
tained as many as twenty, or even thirty per cent Chinese." Cf. D. M. 
Brown, Money Economy in Mediaeval Japan, Fa.r Eastern Association, 
New Haven, Conn., 1951. The WakO raids on KoryO for the period 1375- 
1388 are tabulated in Brown, op. cit., pp. 18-19; the total of 378 raids 
during the period on KoryO alone is an indication of the intensity of their 
sorties. For an account of WakO activities during the period see Sin 


Kis6k ^ ^Ji% , Kory6 malgi (ii tae-Il kwan'gye ,% "^ %- ^^ °y] 

S] ]% yj^^ [Relations with Japan at the End of the Kory6 Dynasty], 
SK 1 (1957), pp. 3-31; English r^sumd pp. 168-173. For their disruptive 
effect on the Kory6 fishing industry see pp. 226-227 of K. Yoshida 
^ 1^ ^^^ ' Chosen suisangyo no kaihatsu katei ^^ S^l 7^^ %. O 
fS i^i^^-i. ["The Process of the Development of Fisheries in 
Corea in the Middle of the Li Dynasty"], TohO gakuho of Kyoto Univ., 10 
(1951), pp. 223-246. For Korean prisoners taken to Japan and their ulti- 
mate repatriation see M.Ishihara ^ ^^ ]^ ]^. , Wako to Chosenjin 

furyo no sokan mondai, J^^ £^ t ^ 3^J^^$~M ^ l^-. ll ]^ & 
["Woegu, Japanese Marauders and the Problem of Repatriation of Korean 
Captives"], CG 9 (1955) and 10 (1956), pp. 47-82. A recent study of the 
Wako which I have been unable to see is the unpublished M.A. thesis of 
B.H. Hazard Jr., Japanese Marauders and Medieval Korea: A Study of 
the Genesis of the WakD, University of California at Berkeley, June 1958; 
this should be a rather definitive study of the subject. Also see Y.Take- 
goshi. The Story of the Wako, Japanese Pioneers in the Southern Regions 
(translated by H.Watanabe), T5ky5, 1940, andY.S.Kuno, Japanese Ex - 
pension on the Asiatic Mainland, 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940; and 
Vol. 2, pp. 387-393, Tsuda Sokichi, Chosen rekishi chiri. O.Karowof 
the Universitat Frankfurt is currently preparing a comprehensive study 
of the Wako and their activities. 

91. Their arrival in Japan is noted in the Azuma kagami ^ ^ ^^ , incor- 
porated in Vol. 4 and Vol. 5 of the 15 volume Zokukokushi taikei J:^ \4q 

^^ ^ ^ , published by the Keizai zasshi-sha ^41 ^^ M %t}A , 
Tokyo, 1902-1904; see Vol. 4, p. 882. For bibliographical information 
on the Azuma kagami, see Vol. I, pp. 31-32 of the Kokusho kaidai j^j ^ 

M M- > published in 2 vols, by the Kuni-kan X <^ ff , Tokyo, 3rd 
printing, 1926. 

92. The term hu-shih %^^- is said by the Tzu-hai !|? y^ to mean reci- 
procal trade with other nations; the Hoii Han-shu section pertaining to 
the Wu Huan _^^d people is cited as a precedent. Cf. Tzu-hai ^% ^^, 
Chung-hua shu-chii yin-hang ^^ ^ '^ M ^P -^^ ed., p. 64 A. 

93. Sansom, Vol. I, p. 438, notes the requests by the Koreans to the Hojo 
Regents to stop the Wako raids, and says that the Regent Yasutoki put the 
pirates to death because he wanted to avoid envolvement with Korea over 
such a trifling affair at this point. See G. Sansom, A History of Japan to 
1334, 2 vols., London, 1958. My own interpretation is that the Hojo Re- 
gents were anxious for trade with Kory6, so much so that they would un- 
dertake a punitive expedition to quell the Kyushu freebooters (if the 


prisoners executed were really freebooters). Yet the recommencement of 
the Wak5 raids shows their repressive measures were only partially suc- 
cessful. Which is to say that the HOjO Regents used the raids of the free- 
booters over whom they could have had only partial control, as a means 
to establish trade relations with Koryft. The Kory6 envoy of 1227 was a 
certain Pak In^j- ^ {KSC 15. 41b). According to the HyakurensU ]>} 
i'^ ^i.^/ , incorporated in Vol. 14 of the 17 vol. Kokiishi taikei ]^ ^ 
-^ ^ , Tokyo, 1906 (Vol. 14, p. 216), ninety men of a band operating 
from Tsushima %A^ ml which had raided Ch6lla Province, had been 
captured by the Japanese authorities and were beheaded due to the Kory6 
request. Pak remained in Japan about a year, returning to Kory6 in the 
eleventh month of 1228, and was richly rewarded by Ch'oe U (}<:SC 15. 43b). 
For bibliographical information on the Hyakurenso, see Kokusho kaidai, 
Vol. 2, 1703A. 
94. Kim Huije S^ ^ ^% (d. 1227) was of Kunsan Island -^^ M ^ and 
followed the merchant vessels which brought him to KaegySng where he 
left the sea and made his home. He entered the army and gradually rose 
to the rank of general. He was appointed to handle the frequent Mongol 
and Eastern Jiir^en envoys who arrived in the Kory6 capital due to his 
acquaintance with poetry and rites. Serving with the resourcefulness and 
bravery which led to his appointment, he was subsequently made District 
Commandant, pundo changgun /^ \^ )|^ ^^ , of Uiju ^ j]\ . After 
his raid against Yii-ke-hsia in 1226, Huije was relieved of his post and 
made Civil Governor, sunmimsa £^ f^\ /j^ , of Ch6lla Province and in 
this post misfortune overtook him. At a time when Ch'oe U was ill, Huije 
believed that Ch'oe would not recover and was rash enough to forecast 
the death of Ch'oe to a Buddhist priest, one Y6nji J^ ^ who promptly 
informed Ch'oe U that Kim was plotting against him. When the officers 
came to Naju ^ -Jji to arrest him, Kim met them without fear. Then, 
asking for permission to speak - "I wish only a word and then I will 
die" - he lamented in verse fashion: 

"I beg to say that the clear river has 100 streams of benevolence, 

And east, west, north, and south forget themselves. 

What shall I do, 

Now that I have suddenly encountered Heaven's ire? 

Thus, a man of the Imperial Path 

Becomes a man of the blue-green sea. " 
And he threw himself into the sea. At the same time, his son Hong Sa 

^A ^ et al., three persons, also perished. The tragedy is summed up 
by two lines which occur in his biography and which would make a fitting 


epitaph: Kim Hfiije was wise and brave and given to books and histories. 
Those who were envious vilified him and he died. 

His biography is contained in KS 103. 32a-36a from which the above in- 
formation has been taken. BTKP 57. 546 gives his name as Kim Hide 
which is unfortunately impossible as there is no character in Sino-Korean 
with the reading te - de lA . It should be mentioned that modern Korean 
(initial) ch-j ^ = middle Korean t-d C. but although such a reconstruc- 
tion is linguistically sound, it is a questionable practice in this case; 
perhaps the BTKP entry is merely a typographical error. I have found 
the final character of Kim's name in three variants, viz., in KS 103. 32a, 
etc.y^^Ch.ti Kor. che-je following Yen Shih-ku's J^ ^^ ^ (581-645) 
well-known explanatory comment on the name of general Chin Jih-ti /^ 
"Q i^ in Han-shu 68. 20b ( i^ ^ J ^ ^ ); KS 103. 34a gives 
"■^rj^ Hwi; KS 103. 35a gives ^^ Van. I have fovind only one example of 
each of the latter two variants and so consider them simply scribal er- 
95. Rogers in an illuminating article remarks (p. 56) that although Koryo 
joined with the JiirCen against the Ch'i-tan when the latter invaded Koryo 
in 1010-1011, that Kory6 regarded the .Jiirften as culturally inferior. He 
also notes (p. 56 note 27) that with the rise of Chin, Koryo urged Sung not 
to ally with them against Liao but insisted that Chin was the real threat 
and (p. 57 note 28) that the Chinese accused Kory6 of desiring to mono- 
polize trade with Jurcen as the reason behind the Kory6 suggestion to 
support Liao; one issue was Kory6's refusal to grant the JiirCen permis- 
sion to cross Koryo with horses for Sung. Cf. M.C.Rogers, 'The Regu- 
larization of Kory6-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', CAJ 6 (1961), pp. 51 ff. 
The Jiirten who accompanied the Mongol missions to Koryo were as ra- 
pacious as their Mongol overlords but were in no position to enforce their 

desire for goods. One such Jurcen who desired rewards, approached the 

/A jL ^2^ 
matter in diplomatic fashion and informed General Kim Huije <^ :^ /OJf- 

of his desires in a line of verse: 

"The Lord of the East (Koryo) has formerly indicated his warmth." 
Huije countered with: 

"The Emperor of the North (Cinggis) has already dispelled the cold." 
Although the implications were plain, the envoy persisted: 

"What was I thinking of to have composed this line " 
Huije, feigning ignorance, replied, 

"Sir, you were thinking of spring [when] you recited. And, because 

it is spring, I rhymed it" 
{KS 103. 32a-36a; KSC 15. 28b-29a). 


96. chaech'u '^ Mi was a term which referred to the civil and military offi- 
cials of the First and Second grades (cf. KS 79. 22) in the Royal Chancel- 
lory, munhasdng f^ 'f ^ , and the Bureau of Military Affairs, 
ch'umirwdn yf|| ^ f>^ (the latter is confirmed by KS 26. 36b), that is. 
Chief Ministers. They were also known as yangbu '^M'^ or the Two 

97. The Kory6 military forces have been calculated at from forty -two to 
forty-eight thousand which included twenty-two thousand posung /{^ g^ 
and sixteen thousand chdngyong Jf^^ ^ . They provided in bt-ief, the bulk 
of the Kory6 army. It is only in recent years that attention has been di- 
rected to the study of the Kory6 military system and the subject is still 
far from being clarified. Perhaps the clearest outline is that presented 
by Yi Pyfingdo, Han' guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 123 ff, although I note that in the 
appended Chart 5B contained in Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, different figures 
are given, viz., posting 8 601 and chdngyong 19 754 than in the text p. 127, 
which gives 22 000 and 16 000 respectively. Y.Suematsu j^ J^^l /f^^O 
Korai yonjyuni tofu koryaku, % ^y^ ^ ^- ^f>M n ^-^ ^^ ^ri^i 
Note on the Forty -two tohu of Kory6], CG 14 (1959), pp. 577-585 suggests 
that the recruiting of these forces was done through the tohu, each being 
responsible for recruiting 1000 men. The subject is much too involved to 
pursue at any length here and those interested are referred to Suematsu, 
loc. cit., who gives most of the pertinent references including the impor- 
tant studies done by Yi Kibaek -^ ^ h - 

98. tJiju ^ ->)] is the present T6gw6n ^^^J^^ in S. Hamgy6ng Province; for 
topographical and historical information see TYS 49. 10b ff. There are 
several mountain passes with defensive structures which are called 
Ch'61-kwan. The one referred to here was in the northeast at Ch'611y6ng 
^^ /^^ on the border of the modern Kangw6n and S. Hamgy6ng Pro- 
vinces. See TYS 49. 3a ff under the entry Ch'611ydng. 

99. The term /)ew^zK- primary pursuits, i.e., agriculture, was already con- 
trasted with mo _;5|^ , secondary pursuits, i.e., manufacturing and trade, 
in the Book of Lord Shang |^ ^ ^ > cf. J.J. L.Duyvendak, The Book 
of Lord Shang, London, 1928, p. 193 note 3. For a discussion of the term 
see E.M.Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, Leiden, 1931, p. 3 note 2, 
and N. L.Swann, Food and Money in Ancient China, Princeton, 1950, 

p. 145 note 118. 
100. The ancestral tablets of the deceased Koryo monarchs which were deco- 
rated with white gold and which were kept in the seven chambers of the 
Koryo Great Shrine taemyo, were stolen by thieves who broke into the 
sanctuary in the fifth month of 1230. Cf . KSC 16. 2a; 


101. Eight Eastern Jiircen envoys are recorded in the KoryS capital in 1223, 
but few details are given {KS 22. 23b). 

102. For the Mongol campaigns in Central Asia at this time see W. Barthold, 
Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions (H.A.R.Gibbs, translator), 2nd 
ed., London, 1958, pp. 441 ff. 

103. The term chio-ch^ang J^^)^^ as used in the Sung and Chin periods de- 
noted government controlled commerce with other states in North Asia. 
Cf . Vol. 5, p. 300b-c, TOyD rekishi daijiten. Chio in the sense of mono- 
poly occurs as early as Han times; for this usage see N. L.Swann, op. 
cit., p. 20 and pp. 61-64. TMP 164. 2a adds the words "it was not per- 
mitted". Chin-shih 50. la gives the definition: "Monopoly markets are 
sites where reciprocal trade, hu-shih, is conducted with bordering 

104. The city of Ch'6ngju -fr -»j was on the southeastern border of the land 
of the Eastern Jiirden and thus in the northwest; for a discussion of its 
possible location see Yi, Han^ guk-sa. Vol. 2, pp. 368-369; also see 
Tsuda Sokichi, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 196-197. The city of Chongju J^:))J 
is the modern Ch6ngp'y6ng ^ ip- in S. Hamgy6ng Province; for topo- 
graphical and historical information see TYS 48. 23b ff; it had marked 
Kory6's northeastern boundary since the reign of Koryo Yejong (r. 1106- 
1122). Cf. Tsuda Sokichi, op. cit., p. 199. 

105. Silver had long been in comparatively wide circulation in Koryo. Iron 
coins were first cast in 996, i.e., the 15th year of the reign of Kory6 
S6ngjong f^ ^^ (r. 982-997) (cf. KS 3. 29b), but not until the reign of 
Kory6 Sukch6ng m ^ (r- 1096-1105) was a mint established and coins 
cast on a large scale. The silver pydng coins were first cast in the 12th 
month of 1102. They were made of one kun n (160 grams) of silver and 
we are told in KS 79. 11 that they were "fashioned in the shape of the 
nation" (??). They were cast to combat counterfeiting of copper coinage 
and to this end were stamped with a seal. In the colloquial they were 
referred to as hwalgu ||] \1 or 'rich ones'. The silver />>'<5n^ coins 
were the last important issue of currency to circulate in Kory6 until the 
Yiian paper notes chih-yuan pao-ch^ao ^ -^ 3^ ^;j; and chung-t^ung 
pao-ch'ao -^p Ji|^ ^ ■^y came into circulation in Kory6 in the 1260's. 
The py&ng coins were prohibited in 1331, i.e., the first year of the ini- 
tial reign of King Ch'unghye "^.^^^ (r. 1331-1332 and 1340-1344) 
when a new issue of small pydng coins were issued (cf. KS 79. 11). Ming 
coins also circulated in Koryo with the rise of that dynasty. Specimens 
of Kory6 coinage, including the pydng coins, are said to be in the pos- 
session of The Bank of Korea and The National Museum in Seoul, and 


the Research Department of the Bank of Korea has done a study Money 
of Korea while a lengthy article with illustrations appeared in TKBRAS, 
and an article 'The Coinage of Corea', by C.T.Gardner appeared in 
JNBRAS Vol. XXVII, pp. 71 ff; but these works are unavailable to me 
and I have never seen them. 

106. The Kory6 Min /f was 157.5 grams although it is usual to calculate it 
at 160 grams for convenience. This was ascertained through an inscrip- 
tion on a Kory6 bell which stated that the bell contained 40 kUn of metal; 
the bell was found to weigh 6 kilos 330 grams. See p. 220, Fujita Ryo- 
saku ^. ^ ^ ^^ ["Inscriptions on Kory6 Bells"], Korai kane no 

meibun ,% ^ |^ O #^ X ' ^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ 187-232. 

107. In the Kory6 period they distinguished the quality and type of gold and 
silver. Terminologies included gold kum /^ , yellow-gold hwanggum 

■^ /^ diXid v^\nie- gold paekkum yQ ^ ; silver mw^^ and white - 
silver ^ ^)^ 

108. hwabydng J^ ^Xj '^^ -^ jfC ' literally 'flower -vase', designates the 
narrow-necked vase called a kundika - similar to a kalaSa, an open- 
necked vase - holding water or any number of other things and asso- 
ciated with AvalokiteSvara who is often depicted holding one in the left 
hand. See S. Mochizuki ^ M J\^ ^ , Bukkyo daijiten //ra-^^y^ 

j'^f ^ , 7 vols., Tokyo, 1931, entry 4356B-C. Kala^a are not com- 
mon in Korean museums today but I have seen many excellent kundika, 
some of them listed as National Treasures. 

109. The northwest border city of Sakchu ^3 ^jjj is in the modern N. P'yOng- 
an province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 
28 ff. 

110. The northeast border city of Hamju 0i^ -^Jt^ is the present Hamhilng 
Mj-^7\ i^ ^- Hamgy6ng Probince. For topographical and historical in- 

formation see TYS 48. 5a ff . 
HI. yangbu ^ Jj^ ; see note 96 above. 

112. This is an interesting illustration of the remark of the philosopher 
George Santayana (b. 1863) to the effect that people who do not learn 
from the past will be forever condemned to repeat it. Koryo had been 
plagued by mounted raiders for centuries, each exhibiting what Witt- 
fogel (p. 669) describes as "machine-like organization plus high mobili- 
ty", cf. K.A. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, History of Chinese So- 
ciety: Liao (901-1125), Appendix V, 'Qara-Khitay', undated reprint 
from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, 
pp. 619-674. 

113. This story of discarding the gifts parallels that of Chu-ku-yii's visit the 


previous spring. Cf. KS 22. 25a. Yet according to YKC he was sent twice 
and thus no duplication of the entries is involved. 

114. Also see YS 208. 2b. Kory6 denied all implication and blamed P'u-hsien 
Wan-nu and Yii-ke-hsia. Ci.KS 23. 20a-21a. 

115. The KS is silent on when the demand was made and we learn of the mat- 
ter via later Yiian edicts and subsequent Kory6 answers regarding Ko- 
ry6's failure to comply {YKC 3b-5a; TYSC 28; both incorporated in KS 23). 
The Mongols did order Kory6 to subjugate the Jiircen in 1221 (YKC 2b) 
but this antedates Wan-nu' s break with the Mongols and refers to aid re- 
quested against Chin forces in Manchuria. One Mongol request to attack 
Wan-nu was made in 1232, cf. YKC 8b. 

116. The Eastern Jiircen raids on KoryS's Northeast Frontier-District had 
continued as noted in the text. Kory6 had failed completely to cope with 
them and the Kory6 forces had suffered a severe defeat at tJiju 'j^ :)3"| 
in the northeast in 1227 {KS 102. 7a-9a). At any rate, they did not field 
an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu. 


Chapter II 

On the 29th day of the eighth month (August 26) of 1231, a large Mongol 
force under the command of Marshal Sartaq 1) (d. 1232) crossed the Yalu and 
surrounded Hamsin-chin ^ Jif4|- = ^^^^ ^ ')')] (-^-^ 23. la) which quickly 
surrendered under the Mongol threats to slaughter the inhabitants if they did 
not speedily submit {KS 130. 9b; KSC 16. 4a). Instrumental in the surrender 
of Hamsin-chin was Defense General, pangsu changgun f/]^^^^ , Cho 
Sukch'ang 2), the son of Cho Ch'ung, who reminded the Mongols of the pre- 
vious pledge of his father. Sukch'ang with a certain Chon Kan ^jf^ (d. 1231. 
10), the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of Hamsin-chin, opened the granary for 
the Mongol troops and then wrote letters instructing Sakchu and S5nd6k-chin 3) 
^W i^^■^J *° submit to the Mongols {KS 130. 9b; KSC 16. 4a-b). Sukch'ang 
subsequently served Sartaq and brought his demands to the Kory6 authorities 
(KSC 16. 10a). 

The Mongol forces seem to have divided. One group apparently going 
north to attack Sakchu and the other following the course of the Yalu down- 
stream ^\ When the first detachments of this second force arrived at Ch6ng- 
ju 5)j the District Commandant 6) Kim KyOngson '') led a twelve-man dare- 
death squad out to meet them. But as fresh Mongol troops continued to pour 
in, the people abandoned the city and scattered to hide. When KyOngson and 
his men returned, they found the city completely deserted. Taking his men 
into the mountains, KyOngson struck out for the centrally located stronghold 
of Kuju where forces from Sakchu, Wiju, and T'aeju 8) were later to rendez- 
vous. Travelling at night and eating without a fire, they managed to reach 
Kuju in seven days (KS 130. 23a-26a). 

From ChSngju the Mongol forces appear to have proceeded to Inju where 
the commander, tory6ng^\ Hong Pogw6n 1^), submitted the area (/CS 130.3b; 
YKC 3a) with 1 500 registered households {YKC 5a). Pogw6n, one of the more 
infamous of KoryS's many deserters, joined the Mongol forces and acted as a 
guide for subsequent Mongol attacks (KS 130. 4a-b). Arriving at Ch'61chu H), 
the Mongols took Mun Tae 12) a military officer of the rank of Colonel, nan- 
jang, who was captured in S6ch'ang-ny6n ^^ ^ '^.^ , and led him beneath 


the city walls where he was instructed to call out to the people that genuine 
Mongol forces 13) had arrived and that the city should speedily submit. Mun 
defiantly shouted: "[They are] not really Mongol troops." The Mongols were 
going to behead him but as the city did not submit, they tried again, and once 
more Mun shouted that they were not really Mongol troops, for which he was 
beheaded. The Mongols quickly launched an attack on the city but it was to 
prove an empty victory. As the provisions ran out and the city appeared 
doomed, the Administrator ^^), a certain Yi Huijok /^ :;^ ^%' , assem- 
bled all the women and children of the city, put them in the granary and then 
set fire to it. Then he led the male adults in cutting their own throats {KS 23. 
la; KS 121. llb-12a; KS 130. 10a; KSC 16. 4b). 

Appraised of events, the ministers of the second rank and above, chae- 
sang 15), met at Ch'oe U's residence four days later to call up KoryO's Three 
Armies 16) and to make levies on the provinces for troops {KS 23. la-b), al- 
though they were uncertain whether or not the invaders were really Mongol 
soldiers or simply Jiirfien forces disguised in Mongolian clothing. 

One Mongol force remained in the northwest, making an initial and un- 
successful attempt to take the walled-city of Kuju [KS 23. lb) and then turning 
on cities they had by-passed like Yongju which fell on the 20th day (October 
17) andSonjuandKwakchul'7) both of which fell on (October 29) the 29th day of 
the ninth month {KS 23. lb; KSC 16. 6b; KSC 16. 7a). A second force advanced 
rapidly down the peninsula attacking, then bypassing Chaju 18) {KS 103. 30a) 
and the Western Capital {KS 23. lb) after encountering stiff resistance. Con- 
tinuing southward they easily overran Hwangju -^ j]]^ and Pongju 19) whose 
inhabitants fled to coastal islands {KS 23. lb). At Pongju they had arrived at 
the first of the great natural barriers, namely, Chabi Pass i^ ,t^^^|) east 
of Pongju, the gateway to central Korea, to Kaegy6ng and the valley of the 

In calling out her own forces, Kory6 had received some unexpected as- 
sistance from Yii-ke-hsia, whom they referred to as the 'petty brigand of 
Masan ^ ^ ' (cf. KS 103. 32a-36a; Masan was in the Yalu River area, near 
tJiju). He offered Ch'oe U five thousand picked soldiers {KS 129. 37a; KSC 16. 

6a-b) and these were incorporated into the Kory6 army (cf. KS 103. 36a-b). 

Pit ^ 
Encouraged, Ch'oe U even sent men to a bandit camp at Mt. Kwanak yj__,'j^ 

^ near Kwangju^ -j-jj for men. Five bandit leaders came forward with 
fifty picked men who were also put into the Kory6 army {KS 129. 37a-b). In 
brief, the forces being sent against the Mongols included Chin and Kory6 sol- 
diers; P'u-hsien Wan-nu's forces were also fighting the Mongols but I have 
found no evidence that he lent a hand at this time. 

Kory6's Three Armies, under the command of General Yi Chas6ng 20) ^ 


departed the Kory6 capital on the ninth day of the ninth month (October 6, 
1231) (KS 23. lb). Their progress was slow and after twelve days, they had 
arrived at the Tongs6n poststation 21) (KS 103. 36a-39a). At sunset a dispatch 
bearer arrived and reported no signs of the enemy and so Chas6ng allowed his 
men to relax. They removed their saddles and were resting when some men 
who had climbed a height shouted: "The Mongols are arriving'." A force of 
some eight thousand Mongol soldiers suddenly appeared. Chas6ng with a cer- 
tain General No T'an r§' j:0 and a few others fought valiantly to save the sit- 
uation. Chas6ng was hit by an arrow and General No was plucked from his 
horse by a long lance in the fighting and both barely managed to escape with 
the aid of some of their men. Slowly the Kory6 forces assembled and began 
to repulse the surprise attack. When the Mongols launched an attack on the 
right flank, they met stubborn resistance. Two crack archers of the petty 
brigand of Masan (= Yii-ke-hsia) proved their worth — at each pull of the 
bowstring a Mongol soldier fell. The Mongol forces then withdrew [KS 103. 

As the Kory6 army continued northward toward the walled-city of Anbuk 
^ ^\l where the Northern Defense Command was headquartered, the Mon- 
gol advance force sent two envoys with a dispatch to P'yongju S^ j-}-\ {KS 23. 
lb-2a), a city about equi-distant from the Kory6 capital of Kaegy6ng and 
Chabi Pass. The envoys were imprisoned at P'y6ngju and then forwarded to 
the capital. One was a Mongol and the other a Jiirten, and from this, the 
Kory6 records inform us, "our nation first believed that they were Mongol 
forces" {KS 2Z. 2a). 

The missive delivered by the envoys informed the Kory6 authorities: "Of 
those who submitted when we arrived at Hamsin-chin, none were slain. If 
your nation does not submit we will, in the end, not go back. If you submit 
then we will turn and go toward the Eastern JiirCen" {KS 23. lb-2a; KSC 16. 

In the northwest, a second assault with catapults was made on Kuju and 
although, we are told, the city walls were smashed in over two hundred 
places, they were speedily repaired and the attack did not carry {KS 23. 2a). 
A week later as a third assault on Kuju was in progress, the Kory6 army ar- 
rived to camp at the walled -city of Anbuk where a pitched battle ended in the 
complete defeat of the Kory6 forces {KS 23. 2a-b; KSC 16. 7b-8a) who then 
sent Min Hui 22)^ ^n officer of the Regional Censorate, piindae 6sa 23) ^ of the 
North(western) Frontier-District to the Mongol camp (cf. KS 23. 3a; KSC 16. 
8a). Sartaq received him, seated in a felt tent decorated with multi-colored 
silk damask and embroidery and with women lined up on each side and told 
him the Mongol attitude precisely and bluntly: "If your country is going to 


fight defensively, then defend yourselves; if you are going to submit, then 
submit; if you are going to face us in battle, then face us in battle. Let it be 
decided quickly'. " {KS 23. 3a; also see YKC 3a. 7). 

Min returned to the Kory6 capital on the fifth day of the eleventh month 
(Nov. 30) with Sartaq's message. The Kory6 answer was to increase their 
forces (^5 23. 3a). With this, the Mongols opened their second drive south by 
taking the city of P'y6ngju whose inhabitants were slaughtered and the city 
razed in revenge for imprisoning the Mongol envoys sent previously {KS 23. 
3a-b). Then they advanced on Kaegy6ng. On the 29th day of the eleventh month 
(Dec. 23) the capital feared the worst. Marshal P'u-t'ao j,^ jfj^ was encamped 
at Kumgyo ^^icp , Marshal Ti-chii j^ ]^ had camped at Osan ^ Jj and 
Marshal Tanqut J^ -^ had camped at P'ori 24) ^^ ^ ^ while the Mongol 
advance force had reached the Yes6ng River J'-f ^ ^J^ a few miles from the 
capital, burning dwellings and slaughtering the people in the surrounding 
country-side {KS 23. 3a-b; YKC 3a). Ch'oe U immediately gathered his house 
troops for his own protection, leaving the defense of the capital to the old and 
weak, it is said {^S 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 9a). But the onslaught of the preced- 
ing months had been too much. Now, in the last of the eleventh month (late 
December) of 1231, the capital itself was surrounded and defeat was too near. 
A respite was desperately needed and so a second mission led by Min Htii and 
Senior Palace Attendant ^5)^ Song Kukch'Sm 26) were sent to sue for peace 
and console the Mongol troops with gifts {KS23, 3b-4a; KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 
9a-b). Sartaq, who was then garrisoned at the Northern Defense Command's 
headquarters in the walled-city of Anbuk, also sent messengers to the KoryO 
capital with a dispatch which upbraided Kory6 and reminded them that follow- 
ing the defeat of the Black Ch'i-tan 27) ^ho invaded KoryO in the Year of the 
Rat (1216), Kory6 had submitted. The basic charges set forth were the killing 
of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yii in 1225 28) and the treatment meted out to the 
envoy A-t'u 6o] jt^ who had been imprisoned at P'yfingju. Submission was 
demanded under threat of seizing the capital and with a promise to spare 
those who submitted and slay those who did not {KS 23. 3b-5b; TYSC 28. 4a-5a). 

As an opening move, Kory6 sent gifts to the three Mongol Marshals 
camped near the capital (^"5 23. 5b). Sartaq had sent Hong Pogw6n to the 
Kory6 capital with instructions for the King {YKC 3a) and Kory6, in turn, sent 
Ch6ng 29)^ the Duke ^0) of Hoean, to effect the peace and convey gitfs to Sar- 
taq {KS 23. 5b; YKC 3a). This was to be the official submission and marked 
the de jure surrender of Kory6's Three Armies as well (cf. KS 103. 30a-b). 

The opening of negotiations inthe last month of 1231 (Dec. 25, 1231 - 
Jan. 23, 1232), however, did not mean an end to the fighting. The Mongol 
forces again turned to cities they had by-passed and successively attacked 


Kwangju, Ch'ungju ,£' ))] , and Ch'6ngju ^^ j)] {KS23. 5b; KSC 16. 9b). In 
the northwest, Ch6n Kan, the Deputy Commissioner of Hamsin-chin, had 
hatched a plot to kill a certain Hsiao-wei-sheng ;]^ j^ )Jl^ and other Mon- 
gols who had been left in charge of the city, and then to flee in boats to the 
capital. The plan miscarried and Hsiao-wei-sheng fled, but the other Mon- 
gols in the city were killed. Then ChOn led the functionaries and people of the 
city to Sin Island |Jf f^ {KSC 16. 7a-b). Although Chaju also held out, the 
fiercest fighting took place at Ch'ungju in the south {KS 103. 36a-39a) and 
Kuju in the northwest. The story of the defense of Kuju, which has become a 
classic in Korean histories, is told in the biographies of Pak S6 ■^^> and Kim 

The city of Kuju was under the command of Pak S6, the Commissioner of 
Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Forces from many of the 
surrounding cities had fled to Kuju to make a stand, possibly remembering 
the city as the location where a decisive victory had been won over the Liao 
armies in 1018 ^2). These forces were quickly employed in the defense of the 
city. A certain Kim Chungon /^ /|'<P j,^, the District Commandant 33) of 
Sakchu, who had abandoned his city and gone to Kuju, was given the task of 
defending the eastern and western walls of the city and Kim KyOngson was to 
defend the southern section. The Defense Command patrol, pydlch'o 34)^ Wiju 
patrol, and the T'aeju patrol provided an additional 250 men who were divided 
to help defend three sides of the city 35). 

"[When] the Mongols arrived [with a] large [force] at the south gate of the 
city, Ky6ngson leading [his] twelve soldiers as well as the patrols of all the 
cities, ordered the soldiers as they were going out of the city gate: 'Do not 
think of your own lives; if fate decrees, die, but do not fall back'. The patrols 
all threw themselves on the ground and [would] not obey. Ky6ngson ordered 
them all to go back into the city and [then] with only his twelve soldiers he 
advanced into battle. [Kim] himself shot an arrow and knocked down one 
mounted soldier [who rode] with a black flag in the vanguard [of the Mongol 
force]. Consequently, [Kim's] twelve soldiers [were encouraged] and fought 
strenuously. Hit by an arrow, KyOngson's arm was dripping wet with blood. 
Still he pressed his men forward without stopping. [Battle] was joined four or 
five times and the Mongols [finally] withdrew. Ky6ngson then formed his lines 
and called his small group to return 36). [Pak] S6 met him and saluted, crying. 
Ky6ngson also saluted with tears in his eyes. From this [episode], [Pak] S6 
commissioned Ky6ngson [to handle] matters [pertaining to] the defense of the 
-ity" (XS103. 26a-29a). 

"The Mongol forces surrounded the city attacking the west, south, and 
north gates of the city repeatedly and heavily. The [defending] Army of the 


Center suddenly went out and attacked them. The Mongol soldiers captured 
Pak Munch'ang JU- Jl^ ^ , the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of Wiju, and 
ordered him to go [back] into the city and instruct them to submit. [Pak] S6 
beheaded him. [Then] the Mongols selected three hundred of their finest ca- 
valry and attacked the north gate. [Pak] S6 [ counter ]attacked and drove them 
off. The Mongols besieged the city, attacking day and night. They loaded 
carts with grass and wood to turn over [by the gates] as they advanced to the 
attack. Ky6ngson used catapults [hurling] molten iron to get rid of them. The 
Mongols [next] constructed towers as well as a great platform which they 
wrapped with cowhide and hid soldiers inside to undermine the base of the 
city walls by excavating a tunnel. [Pak] S6 bored [thru] the city wall and 
poured molten iron [on them] to set fire to the tower. The ground also col- 
lapsed, crushing more than thirty of the Mongol soldiers to death. [Pak] So 
also burnt useless [bundles] of thatch in order to set fire to the wooden plat- 
form. The Mongols were bewildered and scattered" (JCS 103. 23a-26a). 

"The Mongols then attacked the south wall of the city with fifteen large 
catapults very quickly. [Pak] S6 also constructed platforms on the city walls 
and mounting catapults [on them] he hurled stones and drove [the attackers] 
off. The Mongols soaked faggots with human fat ^'^i, accumulated many of 
them, [then] attacked the city with fire. [When Pak] S6 [tried] to put them out 
with water, the fire burned more [fiercely]. He had [his men] mix mud of 
earth and water and throwing it [on the fires] extinguished them. The Mongols 
also set fire to carts loaded with grass and attacked the towers over the city 
gates, [Pak] S6 had stored water on top of the towers beforehand and [they] 
poured it on [the fire-carts]. The flames were then extinguished" {KS 103. 

"[After] firing accumulated brush [near the wooden gates], the Mongol 
troops retired, [then] returned to the assault. Ky6ngson leaned against a 'light 
chair', husang ^U '^ (lit. 'foreign bed'), to direct the fighting. A [Mongol] 
catapult [slung a missile] across [the wall] and it hit directly behind KyOngson, 
smashing and breaking the heads and bodies of the guards, ajol ^^t >^ . 
Everyone begged [KySngson] to move the chair. Ky6ngson told them: 'That 
would not be proper. If I am moving, then the hearts of all the soldiers will 
move [also]'. The expression on his face was quite normal and, in the end, 
he did not move" [KSIOZ. 26a-29a). 

"For thirty days ^°> the Mongols besieged the city, attacking it hundreds 
of times. [But] whenever [they attacked], [Pak] S6 would adapt himself to the 
occasion in order to defend the city. Unsuccessful, the Mongols withdrew 
[but] bringing soldiers from the cities of the Northern Frontier -District, they 
returned to the assault. They set up thirty catapults in a line and attacked, 


breaching the wall in fifty places. [Pak] S6, as soon as [the walls] were 
smashed, chained iron bands [across the holes] and repaired them. The Mon- 
gols did not dare renew the assault. [Pak] S6 came out to do battle and won a 
great victory. 

"[In the twelfth month], the Mongols attacked with large catapults again. 
[Pak] S6 also fired catapults, flinging rocks and killing them in endless num- 
bers. The Mongols withdrew and camped in a wooden pallisade in order to de- 
fend [themselves]. Sartaq sent the Kory6 interpreter Chi Oisim ^(^ ^ 53iv 
and the Recorder of the Academy, hangnok 39)^ Kang Uch'ang X' -^ ^ 
with a dispatch from Ch6ng, the Duke of Hoean, to instruct them to submit. 
[Pak] persevered and did not submit. 

"The Mongols then built scaling ladders, unje -^ )/^ > and assaulted the 
city. [Pak] S6 met and attacked them with 'large implements for slashing', 
tae up'o ^^^ j)\^ ^ _;^ . There were none which were not smashed and the 
ladders could not approach. During the siege, an old Mongol general of sev- 
enty years of age toured beneath the city walls to look over the city ramparts 
and equipment. He sighed and said: 'I have followed the army since I bound 
my hair [into plaits as a youth] and so I am accustomed to seeing the cities of 
the earth attacked and fought over.. Still I have never seen [a city] undergo an 
attack like this which did not, in the end, submit' " {KS 103. 23a-26a). 

"The Mongols said: 'This city has Avithstood many with few. Heaven pro- 
tects it, not the strength of men.' Then they lifted the siege and left" (^"5 103. 

Although Kory6 had formally submitted, the garrisons at Kuju and Chaju 
still held out. Song Kukch'6m had been sent to instruct the garrison at Chaju, 
which was commanded by the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of Chaju, Ch'oe 
Ch'unmy6ng ^^\ to surrender butCh'unmy6ng simply closed the city gates in 
his face. Kukch'6m could only curse him and return to the capital. In 1232, 
following the submission of Kory6's Three Armies, Sartaq brought this to the 
attention of Ch6ng, the Duke of Hoean, who sent General Tae Chips6ng '^2) 
with a Mongol official to bring about the submission of the city. Arriving be- 
neath the city -walls they informed them that "The Court as well as the Three 
Armies have already submitted. You should speedily come out and submit," 
Ch'unmyfing, sitting in the gate-tower, had men answer them saying, "[Since] 
an edict from the Court has not yet arrived, how can we trust you and submit?' 
Chips6ng replied, "The Duke of Hoean has already come to request that you 
submit. Since the Three Armies have also submitted is this [order] unbeliev- 

Ch'unmy6ng's men answered, "The people in the city do not [even] know 
that a Duke of Hoean exists'. " 


The Mongol functionary then charged Chips6ng to enter the city but they 
were driven off by a hail of arrows {KS 103. 30a-32a). 

At about this same time, Min Htii was sent with some Mongol functiona- 
ries to bring about the submission of Kuju. This group also stopped outside 
the city and informed the defenders that KoryS's Three Armies had already 
submitted and that the Duke of Hoean had been sent to negotiate peace. De- 
spite endless argument, Pak S6, the commander of Kuju, refused to submit. 
Min Hiii became so exasperated that he wanted to draw his sword and kill Pak 
himself. Finally, after he was convinced that further resistance would be go- 
ing contrary to the King's commands, Pak gave in and the city submitted {KS 
103. 23a-26a). 

While Kuju and Chaju finally submitted following the surrender of the 
Koryo authorities, their defenders, Pak S6 and Ch'oe Ch'unmyong were al- 
most executed for their stubborn resistance as both the Court and Ch'oe U 
feared the Mongols' anger. Yet they were spared by the Mongols who admired 
their courage and subsequently, they were lauded by both Mongols and the 
Koryft authorities. The Mongol attitude was stated eloquently by a Mongol 
functionary at the Western Capital where Ch'oe Ch'unmy6ng was being held 
for execution. "Although he went contrary to our orders," the Mongol func- 
tionary said, "he is a loyal subject of yours. We are not going to kill him now 
that you have already pledged peace with us. Would it be proper [for you] to 
kill the loyal subjects of all [your] cities?" {KS 103. 30a-32a; also see KS 103. 

Despite the isolated fighting, Kory6 had in fact submitted. Sartaq had 
sent Kory6 General Cho Sukch'ang with nine Mongols to transmit a missive to 
Kory6 which demanded enormous amounts of goods. Alluding to goods pre- 
viously sent by Ch'oe U whom they referred to as ydnggong /^^ or Great 
Minister 43)^ they demanded good gold and silver, pearls, and otter skins. 
Then, telling Kory6 that their army was many days from home, they demanded 
10 000 small horses, 10 000 large horses, 10 000 bolts {p^ it) of purple gauze, 
20 000 otter skins and clothing for an army of one million men'. As hostages, 
they demanded the King's sons and grandsons, his daughters, and the off- 
spring of the provincial lords; five hundred boys and five hundred girls were 
demanded for presentation to the emperor. In addition, each high official was 
to present a daughter, a thousand girls and a thousand boys were demanded. 
The Kory6 Crown Prince was ordered to lead this retinue {KS 23. 5b-7b). 

Kory6 then presented an enormous amount of tribute, including gifts to 
the Mongol field commanders, but had no intention of sending hostages at this 
point {KS22. 7b-8a). Cho Sukch'ang, the Kory6 rebel, was appointed Grand 
General to head the tribute mission and given a petition to present to the Em- 


1^31 - aiz 

peror, in which Kory6 disclaimed responsibility for the slaying of the Mon- 
gol envoy in 1225, blaming it instead on the Chin commanders in Liaotung 
whom they said had often dressed their men in Mongolian clothing and raided 
the Kory6 border towns. The manacling of the Mongol envoy A-t'u at P'y6ngju 
was explained as resulting from ignorance; they could not believe that Mongol 
forces would attack them since the two nations had been on good terms {KS 23. 

While the Duke of Hoean continued his diplomatic manoeuvers and Mongol 
delegations continued to appear at the capital (KS 23. 9b-10a; YKC 3b), the 
Koryo ministers were meeting under Ch'oe U's direction and the first mention 
of moving the capital was made {KS 23. 10b). At this point, the course to 
take was still undecided and negotiations continued {KS23. lla-b). 

During the previous year (i.e., 1231), Ch'oe U had been advised to trans- 
fer the capital to Kanghwa Island by a certain Yun In ^ 0^ , the Deputy 
Commissioner of Sungch'6n-pu A ^j/^ , who had, with a colleague, se- 
cretly sent his family and servants to the island when the Mongol forces 
threatened the capital. Ch'oe sent men to inspect the island but enroute they 
were seized by the Mongols (^5129. 37a-b). Ch'oe however retained the idea; 
he even considered the feasibility of going to distant Ullung Island in the Sea of 
Japan {KS 129. 40a). In the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 1232, a meeting 
of the chief ministers, chaech^u, to discuss resistance to the Mongols was 
held 44) and shortly thereafter, Ch'oe assembled all the officials of the fourth 
rank and above {KS 23. 13b) at his residence to suggest that the capital be 
transferred to Kanghwa {KS 129. 37a-b). While many of the officials favored 
defending the capital (A'S 23. 13b), suggesting that refuge on Kanghwa was not 
feasible as a long-range plan {KS 102. 6a ff), ". . . yet they were afraid of 
[Ch'oe] U and no one dared utter a word [in opposition] . . . Commander, 
chiyu 45)^ Kim Sech'ung 46) of the Night Patrol, ya pydlch'o 47)^ pushed open 
the door [to the council meeting] and entering, told U sharply, 'The succes- 
sive generations have held Songgyftng yj^^ ^^ (i.e., Kaegy6ng) since T'aejo 48) 
for all of two hundred years (sic). The walls of the city are strong and the 
soldiers' provisions are sufficient. Assuredly we should combine [all] our 
forces and defend it in order to protect the fatherland, sajik ;^Jly^ (lit. al- 
tars of the earth and grain). How can we abandon the capital?' " {KSC 16. 15a-b; 
also see KS 129. 37a-b; TT 31. 48. 15-49. 3) Ch'oe then asked Kim for his 
plans to defend the city but Kim, who had apparently spoken in a moment of 
rash bravado, was unable to reply. General Tae Chips6ng, Ch'oe U's father- 
in-law 49)^ told Ch'oe that Kim's advice was the prattle of a young girl and he 
wanted to take Kim out and behead him. Others at the council meeting sup- 
ported the idea and Kim was executed {KSC 16. 15b-16a). 


Supported by General Tae, who also favored moving the capital {KSC 16. 
15a), Ch'oe U was able to push through his plan to transfer the capital to 
Kanghwa Island {KS 23. 13b-14a) ^^K Ch'oe U then advised the King to leave 
the palace quickly and go to Kanghwa. Hundreds of carts and wagons were 
seized to transport Ch'oe's household goods to Kanghwa. Notices were posted 
in the city setting the date for the people of the city's five wards to move to 
the island and threatening those who did not meet the schedule with judgement 
by military law^^). Commissioners were then sent to each province to eva- 
cuate the people to mountain citadels of refuge, sansCnig, and coastal islands. 
An army of two thousand men, irydnggun, was levied to begin construction of 
palaces on Kanghwa {KSC 16. 16a) 52). 

In the spring of 1232, the bulk of the Mongol troops had departed {KS 23, 
9b) 53). Martial law was lifted in the Koryo capital {KS 23. 10a) and, exclud- 
ing a quickly quelled slave rebellion at Ch'ungju 54) (^kSC 16. lla-12a), a 
measure of peace was seen on the peninsula. 

While by the third month (March 24 - April 21) of 1232, the Mongol army 
had withdrawn — a small detachment returned to get provisions from the 
S6nju granary {KS 23. llb-12a) - the Mongols did not simply abandon their 
gains but endeavored to put them on a more permanent basis by establishing 
daru|(a6i or residence commissioners, chiefly in the northwest {YKC 3a; 
YS 154. lb). 

Care was maintained during this time to remain on good terms with the 
Mongols while meeting as few of their demands as possible. Cho Sukch'ang 
had been sent in the fourth month (April 22 - May 19) of 1232 with a petition 
pledging Kory6's vassalage and with a variety of gifts for the throne, for 
Sartaq and for the sixteen functionaries under Sartaq's command. The petition 
stated, in brief, that they were able to present only 977 otter skins (of the 
1 000 demanded), since they had previously had no experienced trappers. Un- 
fortunately, the petition declared, hostages could not, for a variety of rea- 
sons, be produced {KS 23. 12a-13b; TYSC 28. 7b-9a). 

Although Kory6 was familiar enough with the ancient system of tribute 
and hostages, the Mongols were a new experience and their demands were of 
a different character then Kory6 had previously encountered. For the Mongols 
regarded everything and everyone in a conquered nation as absolute chattels, 
a concept which differs considerably from the Chinese-oriented system with 
which Kory6 was accustomed. The demands seemed endless: goods, hostages, 
'transplanting' of farming families, armies of men, ships, etc. {KS 23; TYSC 
28) 55). xhe hand-writing was on the wall, but preparations had been made. 

On the first day of the seventh month (July 20) of 1232, Kim In'gy6ng was 
appointed to garrison and defend Kaegy6ng with 8 000 soldiers, p^allydng, un- 


der his command QCS 23. 14a-b). The transfer was then implemented; the 
King proceeded to Sungch'6n-pu, a major departure point on the mainland 
opposite Kanghwa, and then to the island where he was lodged in a hostel, 
kaekkwan ^^^&'P , mute testimony to the abruptness with which the decision 
to move was implemented ^^i . 

With the move to Kanghwa, an attempt to eliminate Mongol control on the 
mainland was made; the daru^faCi or resident commissioners set up by the 
Mongols were killed {YKC 3b; FS208. 3a; ATS 23. 14b-15a). 

A particular pertinent matter at this point is the question of the estab- 
lishment of Mongol control on the peninsula and the attempts by Kory6 to 
eliminate this control. The Yuan Kao-li chi-shih remarks briefly: "In the 
third year of T'ai-tsung J^ ^ (= 1231) we conquered them find Wang Ch'6l 
(= Kojong) again submitted. Seventy-two daruj^aCi or resident commissioners 
were placed in the hydn of the capital prefecture to supervise them and the 
army was withdrawn. The following year they killed all [of the officials] of 
the offices which the Court had established and rebelled [seeking] refuge on 
islands in the sea" {YKC la; see also 75 154. lb; YS 59. 5a). In another entry 
dated in late 1231, we read that following Sartaq's first attack and the Kory6 
submission, "subsequently, they established seventy-two daru)(a6i or resi- 
dent commissioners in the capital as well as all the chu and hydn adminis- 
trations to remain and govern [them], then they withdrew the army" {YKC 3a). 
A further entry reads, "In the sixth month (June 20 - July 19, 1232), the na- 
tion (= Kory6) rebelled, killed the daru^ati of each hy6n and led the people of 
the capital as well as all the chu and hydn administrations and fled to the is- 
lands of the sea to offer resistance" {YKC 3b; also see YS 2. 3a; YS 154. lb). 

There has been some hesitation in accepting this account due to a brief 
commentary written by the Kory6 historian-statesman-poet Yi Chehybn/zT 
M' ^S- (1288-1367) ^^^ on the Kao-li section of the 880 + 14 chuan Ching-shih 
ta-tien kSt ^ :K ^ oi 1329-31. Now, according to the notice by Wang 
Kuo-wei ^ )^ 41. (1877-1927), the Yiian Kao-li chi-shih was extracted by 
Wen Yen-shih J^ ^^ (1856-1904) ^8) from the Yung-lo ta-tien ;,j^ ^^ 
^Jm. of 1403-07, into which it had been copied from the Ching-shih ta-tien. 
It should also be mentioned that, as has already been pointed out by H. 
Franke 59)^ the Kao-li ch'uan J] ^^J- of the Yuan shih {YS 208) is little 
more than a summary of the material contained in the Yiian Kao-li chi-shih, 
which is to say that both were based on the Kao-li section of the Ching-shih 
ta-tien. Thus, Yi Chehy6n's critical remarks apply equally to all pertinent 
portions of the three works. The major points Yi makes may be briefly set 
forth as follows: Were these daruya6i established in their posts by order of 
the Yiian Court or were they established by the military commanders? The 


area concerned, viz., the capital prefecture, is small for such a large num- 
ber of officials. And, as the daruj^aci are not unimportant persons why were 
their names not recorded? Further, no details are given of the establish- 
ment of these posts nor of the subsequent slaying of the officials. The national 
history of Kory6 does not mention them and so, Yi informs us, he asked sur- 
viving elders about the matter but there were none who knew. Yi's belief is 
that it was a false accusation used as a pretext for an invasion, i.e., they 
were not established and they were, consequently, not slain (/C sdlchdn ^f[_, 
^j 1.6b-8a)60). 

Unfortunately, the evidence, drawn from the Koryd-sa itself goes against 
Yi ChehyOn's views. The Korean historian Yi Py6ngdo has drawn the conclu- 
sion that ". . . while there is no doubt that daruya6i were stationed in the Wes- 
tern Capital and its subordinate districts, it is unclear whether the number 
was seventy-two" ^^^ It is known that in the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 
1232, four daru^aCi were stationed in the Kory6 northwest {KS 23. 13b-14a). 
And, at the time of the transfer of the capital, the Kory6 authorities sent a 
man to seize the weapons of the daru^ati in the various cities of the Northern 
Frontier-District {KS 23. 14b). It is also known that there was a darupti 
stationed in the Western Capital in the eighth month (August 18 - Sept. 15) of 
1232, and that an attempt was made to kill him {KS 23. 14b-15a). Further, a 
Kory6 missive dated the second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232 refers to 
daru^aii being stationed ^ ^ (= ^ ^ ) in the border cities and in the 
capital where they were being well treated {TYSC 28. 5b-6a). Again, another 
KoryS missive answers the Mongol charge of killing and detaining them in the 
ninth month (Sept. 16 - Oct. 15) of 1232 {TYSC 28. 10b-12a). Further, in the 
second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232, the Mongol envoy Tu-tan ^6 ^ , 
a Ch'i-tan who had been with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in 1218, himself 
told the Koryft monarch that he was in complete charge of Kory6's affairs {KS 
23. 10b). It is also known that in the last months of 1231, the people of the 
following cities fled to islands to escape the Mongol attack in the north- 
west: SOnju {TVS 53. 34a-b), Ch'angju {TYS 53. 25a), Unju {TYS 54. 8a), Pak- 
chu {TYS 54. 12a), Kaju {TYS 52. 32b), Kwakchu {TYS 53. 37b), Maengju {TYS 
55. 9b), T'aeju {TYS 54. 14a), and Unju {TYS 55. 13b), all cities located in the 
northwest. There were, further, at least two Koreans of importance serving 
the Mongols, namely, Hong Pogw6n (who submitted the city of Inju) and Cho 
Sukch'ang (who submitted the city of Hamsin-chin = tliju) as has already been 
pointed out. The evidence from the Kory6 records alone is overwhelming and 
we must reject Yi Chehy6n's view. 

There is one other consideration which seems to support the Ching-shih 
ta-tien account. During the late Kory6 period, as a result of a demand from 


the Yiian to submit an account of each reign, abbreviated chronological ac- 
counts of the history of Kory6 were compiled. For example, the Ponjo p'ydn- 
nydn kangmok ;^\^ j^^ A^ 4~,4l^ S ^^ ^2 kwdn compiled by Min Chi f^ 
<^ (1248-1326; BTKP 80. 755) and the Sedae p'ybnnybn chdryo ^ //^ i%^ 
^^ ^^ $. in 7 kwdn compiled by Min Chi and Kw6n Pu )[^ ;| (1262-1346; 
BTKP 77. 732). The original demand dates to 1278 {KS 29. 36b) and, in 1307, 
the entire Kory6 Veritable Records, sillok ^ /^^ , in 185 kwdn were sent to 
the Yuan court in Ta-tu ^^ ^p {KS 32. 32b-3'^3a); five years later, in 1312, 
they were returned. It would certainly seem then, that the Yiian historiograph- 
ical bureau was well informed on matters pertaining to Kory6 just prior to the 
compilation of the Ching-shih ta-tien while Yi Chehy6n would not have had ac- 
cess to the Yiian records "2), 

Thus, I believe we may not only accept the account of the Ching-shih ta- 
tien (viz., as incorporated in the YUan Kao-li chi-shiJ^ but may further clarify 
the area which these officials controlled, namely, from the Western Capital 
north to the Yalu comprising all of the present North P'yongan Province and 
a large portion of the present South P'y6ngan Province. 

The establishment of officials by the Mongols in the cities of the north- 
west was not to go without opposition by Kory6. The Kory6 rebels serving the 
Mongols whom the Kory6 authorities had been forced to accept and often to 
reward were not to be ignored either. The most important Kory6 city the 
Mongols held was the Western Capital which had been left under the control of 
Hong PogwOn with the withdrawal of the Mongol army in late 1232. Shortly 
after the transfer of the capital from Kaegyftng to Kanghwa Island, in the 
eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232, the Civil Governor, sunmusa j^ 
^^'ix. ' ^^^^^ General Min Hui and Office Recorder, sarok ^ (^^ , Ch'oe 
Chaon y^ j,||^ f^ and others intrigued to kill the darujja6i. The people of the 
Western Capital learned of this and said: "If they do so, then [the people of] 
our Capital will certainly be exterminated by the Mongols like P'y6ngju." 
Thereupon, they revolted. Ch'oe Chaon was seized and imprisoned while the 
members of all other government offices in the Western Capital fled to Cho 
Island Jf^ ^ {KS 23. 14b-15a). 

With this, Hong Pogw6n, the Kory6 rebel serving the Mongols, assembled 
the lost and scattered people of some forty chu and hydn districts and awaited 
the arrival of Mongol forces {YKS 3b; YS 154. lb). The KoryO authorities had, 
in accordance with the theories in which natural phenomena were linked with 
the destinies of the nation (i.e., ohaeng ^i^ !/^ or the theory of the five ele- 
ments), made careful note of unusual natural phenomena. Among the more 
foreboding signs, in the fourth month of 1232, it was reported from the nor- 
thern districts, that many of the bears were leaving the mountains and fleeing 
to the coastal islands'. {KS 54. 36a) 


Sartaq's second attack which opened in the eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 
15) of 1232 {YKC 3b; YS 154. lb), swept southward into the valley of the Han 
with comparative ease. Then a deus ex machina solution was provided. In an 
attack on Ch'6in-s6ng 63)^ Sartaq was struck and killed by a chance arrow 
from the bow of Kim Yunhu ^^\ a Buddhist monk who had fled to the strong- 
hold and who, if we may believe his own story, was unarmed when the fighting 
began {KS 23. 25b; KS 103. 39b-40a) 65). With the death of Sartaq, T'ieh-ke 
huo-erh-ch'ih J^^ -J- ^ JL :i>t^ led the army in withdrawing from Koryo, 
leaving Hong Pogwon at the Western Capital {KS 130. 3-4) to supervise those 
locations whose submission had already been obtained {YKC 3b; YS 208. 3a; 
yS 154. lb). 

The first Koryo effort to eliminate Mongol control in the northwest had 

While the Mongol forces rode over the peninsula in 1231-32, a steady 
stream of correspondence was maintained, and continued even after the flight 
of the Kory6 authorities to the safety of Kanghwa island. The documents 
{YKC; KS 23; YSC 28; KSC 16) are too lengthy and too repetitive to be given in 
full, yet a brief summary of the main points is in order. 

An early Mongol charge was the slaying of the envoy Chu-ku-yii {KS 23. 
4a-5b); in a reply dated the 29th day of the twelfth month of 1231 (= 29 Jan., 
1232), Kory6 blamed this on the raids of neighboring peoples, saying that 
Ke-pu-ai 66) ^ ^. ^ had been disguising men in Mongolian clothing and 
raiding Kory6 border cities and implying that they suspected him of killing 
the Mongol (TYSC 28. 4a-5a = A'S 23. 8b-9b). In a later reply dated the eleventh 
month (Nov. 21 - Dec. 20) of 1232, Kory6 explained that the envoy had come 
by way of P'o-su-lu .'-i£ --^ ^^and not through the territory controlled by 
P'u-hsien Wan-nu 67)j on the return trip he was slain by Yii-chia-hsia ^ 
^d ^' (= Yii-ke-hsia). Yii-chia-hsia, they said, had his men dress in Mon- 
golian clothing and smashed three cities on the Kory6 northern border {TYSC 
28. 14b-17b = KS 23. 18b-22b). 

To this charge the Mongols were in the tenth month of 1232, to add the 
shooting of the tung-lu-shih ^ ^^'i"^ or 'commissioner of the eastern lu- 
administration' {KS 23. 20b). Kory6 accused P'u-hsien Wan-nu of dressing 
men in Kory6 clothing, arming them with Kory6 bows and arrows and of then 
ambushing a second group of Mongol envoys sent to Kory6 in the mountains 
between the two nations. A certain Wang Hao-fei ^ ^^ ff- , they said, had 
fled from Wan-nu to KoryS and told of the incident in detail. Wan-nu, Kory6 
said, had also smashed two Kory6 cities in the northeast. The Mongols, Kory6 
maintained, were laying the crimes of Yii-ke-hsia and Wan-nu on Kory6's 
doorstep {TYSC 28. 14b-17b = KS 23. 18b-22b). 

"•■* T'eke -qorci 

The Mongols also demanded that Kory6 explain the sudden 'about-face', 
the killing and detention of Mongol resident commissioners, and the transfer 
of the Kory6 capital to Kanghwa. Among the reasons Koryfi gave for trans- 
ferring the capital was that a certain Song Ipchang 68) y^ JL^ ^^^ ^^^^ 
from the party of Chi Uisim and returned with the news that the Mongols were 
raising a large force to attack Kory6 cities. When the people heard this they 
were alarmed and fled from the cities. This in turn caused Kory6 to fear that 
they could not produce the annual tribute since the cities were being deserted 
(rySC 28. 10b-12a = XS 23. 15a-16b; TYSC 28. 14b-17b = ^:.S 23. 18b-22b). Song 
had been exiled to a distant island for his false statements, they explained 
{TYSC 28. 12a-13a = /CS 23. 16b-17b) and although they had sent for him follow- 
ing a Mongol demand that he be produced, it was feared that he was lost at 
sea on the return journey for nothing had been heard of the party {TYSC 28. 
19a-20b = KS2Z. 23b-24b). 

The Koryfi general Cho Sukch'ang who had submitted to the Mongols at 
Uiju in 1231, had been detained by the Kory6 authorities and to Mongol de- 
mands to produce him, they explained that, unfortunately, General Cho had 
fallen ill after returning from the Mongols and was still sick in bed {TYSC 28. 
12a-13a = KS 23. 16b-17b; TYSC 28. 19a-20b = KS 23. 23b-24b). 

A census had also been demanded, as well as fielding an army against 
P'u-hsien Wan-nu, neither of which was done by Kory6 {TYSC 28. 13b-14b = 
KS 23. 17b-18b) although Kory6 had furnished ships and seamen {KS 23. lib; 
KSC 16. 13b) in response to Mongol requests to aid in the pacification of Liao- 
tung {TYSC 28. 9a) but no action was taken to send either troops or settlers 
(farming families) into the Liaotung area {TYSC 28. 7a-b =KS 23. lla-b)69). 

Nor were hostages forthcoming {TYSC 28. 7b-9a = KS 23. 12a-b). Mongol 
instructions for the King, the high officials, and Ch'oe U to come out were 
ignored {TYSC 28. 12a-13a = ifS 23. 16b-17b) as were demands for a list of the 
names and positions of civil and military officials {TYSC 28. 9a-10a). Koryo 
did produce some tribute and, just prior to the killing of Sartaq, begged that 
the Mongol army be withdrawn with the promise to forever after submit tri- 
bute {TYSC 28. 14b-17b = KS 23. 18b-22b). 

Yet in a reply (dated the twelfth month of 1232 = Jan. 12 - Feb. 11, 1233) 
to an Eastern iiirden letter, which in effect drew the two nations together in 
cooperating against the Mongols, Koryo pointed out that they didn't trust the 
Mongols and that it had not been their original intention to have close rela- 
tions with the Mongols. Perhaps KoryS was encouraged by the Id^'^ng of Sar- 
taq, for the letter points out that many Mongol prisoners had been taken at 
that time {TYSC 28.21b-22b = KS 23.25b-26b). Early in 1233, an effort had 
also been made to send an envoy to the Chin court, but the envoy was unsuc- 


cessful as the roads were blocked and he returned (TYSC 28. 23a-24a; KSC 16. 

This, at any rate, was the general situation when, in the spring of 1233, 
a Mongol envoy arrived -with an edict listing Kory6's 'crimes', and we read 

"On the twenty -fourth day of the fourth month (June 3) of the kuei-ssu 
^ ^ > fifth, year (of the reign of T'ai-tsung :^'^^ = Ogodei, r. 1229- 
1245), instructions were given to Wang Ch'ol ^ ;3l^(i.e., Kory6 Kojong) to 
repent his transgressions and come to Court, in an Imperial Edict which said:* 

Your memorial reporting the facts involved was drawn up entirely in false 
statements and phrases of excuse. How difficult it is to know one from the 
other. If you were not false, you would come for an audience. From the pre- 
vious pacification of the Ch'i-tan until the slaying of Cha-la ^^' j^) j^j you 
have not sent a single soul to [Our] gates '^1). You have never acted in com- 
pliance with the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation. This is your first 
offense. And when those who were sent to offer the precepts and instructions 
of Immortal Heaven summoned you, then you dared to kill [them] '''2). This is 
your second offense. Moreover, with regard to Chu-ku-yu, you plotted to 
harm him and claimed Wan-nu's people killed him. If you had seized [and 
turned over to us] the man (Wang Hao-fei) who made the original report, then 
it would be clear. If Wan-nu had really tried to cause the downfall of your 
country, [then when] we ordered you to attack Wan-nu, why did you hang back 
without advancing? This is your third offense. We commanded you "73) to raise 
an army and, as before, we ordered you to present yourself at Court, but 
these clear instructions you dared to resist. You did not appear at Court [but] 
sneaked away to the islands of the sea. This is your fourth offense. Further- 
more, [when] we ordered your households to come together and be counted "^4), 
you claimed that if the people left the cities to be counted, they would fear be- 
ing killed and flee to [the islands of] the sea and that, when you once cooperat- 
ed in an expedition with the troops of Heaven, your people were enticed to 
leave the cities under the pretense of being counted and then were wantonly 
slain '5) Now, you dare to submit false statements to this effect. This is 
your fifth offense '^^K In addition to these offenses, you have been deceitful 
and evil innummerable times. When we sent you the precepts and instructions 
of Immortal Heaven, you were not attentive and wished to do battle. But when 
we, trusting to the powers of Supreme Heaven, attack and smash your cities 
and villages, there are cases that those who are blind and will not submit are 
exterminated; yet there are also those who submit and work hard and, whether 
man or woman, they have never been wantonly slain ..." 

The edict continued in pointing out that the officials of ten Kory6 cities '^'^), 


including the Western Capital, had already taken a census of their households 
and were remitting taxes and that all were living peacefully as before. The 
edict called upon kory6 to field an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu '^8) or suf- 
fer the consequences, and it called upon the Kory6 Court to obey the 'precepts 
and instructions of Immortal Heaven'. 

The Kory6 answer was to be a renewed offensive aimed particularly at 
ousting Hong Pogw6n from the Western Capital which, as the edict quoted 
above indicates, was still under Mongol control in the fourth month (May 11 - 
June 9) of 1233 {YKC 4a). 

The following month 79), what the Kory6 records term a 'revolt' broke 
out in the Western Capital. P'il Hy6nbo ^^\ Hong PogwOn and others killed 
the Pacification Commissioners 81) , Grand Generals Ch6ng Oi 82) and Pak 
Nokch6n 83) and rebelled with the whole city (XS 23. 27a; i^S 121. 11; KSC 16. 
19a-b; CHSL 4. 27b). As the Kory6 army was in the southeast quelling a re- 
volt in the Eastern Capital, Ch'oe U in the twelfth month of 1233 (^ Jan. 2 - 
Jan. 30, 1234), sent three thousand 84) of his house troops with Min Hui who 
was now Commissioner of Men and Horse of the North(western) Frontier- 
District to subjugate them. They captured P'il Hy6nbo and escorted him to 
the capital where he was cut in two at the waist in the market place. Hong 
Pogw6n escaped but they managed to capture his father Hong Taesun, his 
younger brother Hong Paeksu jf:^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ children. The re- 
maining people of the Western Capital were then moved to islands and subse- 
quently, it is related, the Western Capital became a desolate site {KS 23. 
27a-b; KSC 16. 19a-b; 75 154. lb). Two months preceding this attack. Hong 
Pogw6n had petitioned the Mongol authorities requesting permission to bring 
his people into Liaoyang because of attacks first by Koryo and later by Jiirten 
and Ch'i-tan forces {YKC 5a). In the spring of 1234, rewards were passed out 
to the Kory6 soldiers who had retaken the Western Capital and one Hong Kyun 
^^ S'^ ' ^ Vice-Minister of the Department of War, was sent to govern the 
city {KS 23. 27b). The Koryfi rebel Cho Sukch'ang was beheaded in the market- 
place {KS 23. 28a) because, we are told, of something P'il Hy6nbo had said 
{KSC 16. 20a), but in reality, he had been held by the Kory6 authorities since 
late 1232 on the pretext of illness (cf. TYSC 28. 12a-13a; TYSC 28. 19a-20b). 

Hong Pogwon had fled northward to Liaotung where he and his people 
were settled between Liaoyang -^ j3^ and Shenyang ^*. ^^ . In 1234, he 
was placed in command of the army and people of Kory6 and ordered to sub- 
jugate those of Kory6 who had not yet submitted {KS 130. 3b-5a; YS 154. 2a). 

After settling at Tung-ching, Hong Pogwon was given control of the north- 
western portion of Kory6 {KS 130. 3b-5a; CHSL 4. 27b) 85). At this time a 
Mongol edict came down instructing the people of Kory6 that anyone who would 


capture and bring to court the Kory6 monarch and the instigators of the re- 
sistance (i.e., Ch'oe U, et al.), would be placed on an equal footing with Hong 
Pogw6n and settled in the Tung-ching area. Those who resist will die; those 
who submit will live, the edict warned {YS 154. 2a; YKC 5b). 

This situation concerned the Kory6 authorities who, as we have seen, 
were holding Hong's relatives whom they had captured in the Western Capital 
earlier. Ch'oe U, in an apparent attempt to placate Hong and win him over, 
elevated his father to the rank of Grand General and his younger brother to 
the rank of Colonel, nawg;aw^ {KSC 16. 19b), however, they were still held as 
hostages and were not to obtain their freedom for many years. 


Notes to Chapter II 

1. The name occurs in several orthographic variants including: sa-li-Ca}^^ 
J(-'^ ^^{KS23. la; KS2Z. 5b; 75208. 2b); sa-li-ta ^^^jj-^ !?^ (YS 208); 
sa^li-ta ^4i^/ft J^J {KS 23. 4a; TYSC 33. 17b-19a); sa-erh-Va ^^^^^ 
{YKC 8b); sha-ta ^L k^ {KS 23. 16b). In YKC 3a, KS 23. 4a, and YS 120. 
15a we find sa-li-Va huo-li-chHh y^^ X- ^''^ (F/CC writes huo-erh-chHh 

Yanai Watari ^ |^ ^ , Yilan-tai ching-lueh tung-pei k^ao, p'. 139, 
suggests Sarlai, Sarita, or Saritai. BTKP 99. 935 suggests ?Sarta. I sug- 
gest Sarta[q]-qorCio How many persons of note bore the name Sartaq, I do 
not know. Probably the most famous bearer of the name was Sartaq, the 
son of Batu. For the reconstruction of his name see L.Hambis, Le- Cha- 
pitre CVII dii Yuan Che, with supplementary notes by P.Pelliot, issued as 
a supplement to TP XXXVIII, 1945, p. 52 and p. 53 note 2. Also see Huang 
Ta-hua %- J^ 0r , Yuan fen-fan chu-wang shih-piao ^ '^ i^ ^^ 

j£^ ^ ^ , incorporated in Vol. 6, ppo 8243-8250 of the Erh-shih-tvu- 
shih pu-pien. As W. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia 
(translated by V. and T.Minorsky), 2 vols., Leiden, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 31, 
has already noted, in Mongolian the word Sartaqtai refers to a "representa- 
tive of Muslim culture"; -tai is, of course, simply an adjectival ending. 
The word qordi means 'archer, quiver-bearer' in Mongolian. 
Yet, in the so-called 'Secret History' perhaps better known under its Chi- 
nese title Yiian-ch^ao pi-shih y\^ ^^ ^j^:?C ' ^* ^^ ^^^*^ ^^^* Ogodei sent 
Cha-la-i-erh-t^ai huo-erh-chHh yj;|^ jA ;^^ O^ ^ '^^ (Jj ^^ (Jalair- 

tai-qorci) to conquer the JiirCen and the Solongvud. Then a certain Yeh-su- 
tieh-erh huo-erh-chHh '[^jI^i^)^ ^^^^1K (Yesiider-qorCi) was 
sent to assist him. See (1) 2. 28a-b, Shiratori Kurakichi ^ % )^ '^ 
Onyaku mobim genchD hishi ^ ^y% ^l <J -<f -^^ ^/vvjj -^ , Toyo 
Bunko, Series C, Vol. VIII, TOkyO, 1942; for a translation of this brief 
passage, also see E.Haenisch, Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, 
Leipzig, 1948, p. 139. The Solongyud refer to the Koreans; it is usually 
said to refer to parts of Manchuria and northern Korea. 
A discussion of the word Solongyud is contained on p. 68 of Pavel Poucha, 
Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, Supplement to the Archiv Orien- 
talni. Vol. IV, Prague, 1956. Also see W.W.Rockhill, The Journey of 
William . . . , p. 152 note 5 and P.Pelliot and L.Hambis, Histoire des cam- 
pagnes de Gengis Khan, Leiden, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 175 ff. 
Further, CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 69, identifies the son of Sa-li-ta as Ta-ch'u 
j:J^ '^ (Ta6u), while HYS 249. 2b writes Jalairtai yf^L ^ ^^^ ^ ^ 


in lieu of Sa-li-ta. The Ch'ing scholar Ch'ien Ta-hsien (1728-1804; see 
A. Hummel, Eminent Chinese ..., Vol. 1, pp. 152-4) mentions Jalairtai 
as "[A man] of the reigns of T'ai-tsu (Cinggis) [through] Hsien-tsung '^, 
1^ (Mongka); he was a Marshal who conquered Kory6 (lit. a conquering- 
Kory6- marshal)". Cf. Ch'ien Ta-hsin, YUan-shih shih-tsu-piao ^ ^ 
^ ^^%i- (completed in 3 chiian in 1791), incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 
8297-8392, of the Erh-shih-tm-shih pu-pien ^ 'f' JL ^ ^t^ ^^ , a 
work in six volumes, K'ai-ming shu-tien j^J "^^ ^ j^ ed., 1935; ref- 
erence is to p. 8301. Ch'ien correctly recorded the brief notice which ap- 
pears in YS 133. la, the biography of Taiu, Jalairtai's son. There it is 
related that Jfalairtai served T'ai-tsu. In the chia-yin ^ \^ year of the 
reign of Mongke (1254) he was sent to conquer Kory6. This is supported by 
YRC 9b where his name is given as Cha-la-ta ^j ;^'J ^^ (I have emended 
the tzu ^M of the text to read la). The Kory6 records where his name is 
usually rendered Ch'e-lo-ta ^ V^ ;\_ , also confirm this and his ap- 
pearance in Kory6 is dealt with at length later. 

Juvaini mentions that Ogodei sent an army against the Solongyos (Koreans) 
twice, but does not mention their commander. Cf. J. A. Boyle, The His- 
tory of the World-Conquerer, Vol, 1, p. 194, and p. 195-196; Boyle also 
calls attention to the passage from the Secret History cited above and sug- 
gests that perhaps it is the expedition to which Juvaini refers. 
The account given by the Secret History is then in conflict with the other 
Yiian and the Kory6 records. William Hung, 'The Transmission of the Book 
Known as JTie Secret History of the Mongols', HJAS 14 (1951), pp. 433-492, 
has noted (p. 450 note 43) that the compilers of the Ching-shih ta-tien were 
not permitted access to the Secret History and, consequently, YKC which 
was drawn from the former could incorporate nothing from the latter. 
Yanai, op. cit., ap. 139-144 has discussed at some length the confusion in 
T'wChVs ^ M Meng-tm-erh shih-chi ^ X^ yu ^ |^ biography 
of Jalairtai and has pointed out that T'u Chi erred because he followed Shen 
Tseng-chih's ^;)^ ^i^ JfA (1850-1922) explanation in the C/z'm-c/?e«^-ZM- 
chu i^ ^j£ ^^ 1^*^° *^^ effect that Jalairtai and Sartaq were the same. 
The CS identification of Ta6u as Sartaq's son is a similar confusion. Yanai, 
op. cit., p. 141, further suggests that the Jalairtai -qorfci mentioned in the 
Secret History is an error for Sartaq; Yanai also maintains that the Yesii- 
der-qor6i mentioned in the Secret History is not mentioned in the Yiian or 
Kory6 records dealing with events in Kory6. In this latter point Yanai is in 
error and I also disagree with him on the point that for Jalairtai in the 
Secret History, we should read Sartaq. 
The matter of the account in the Secret History is more important than 


Yanai suspected. The two events mentioned are related and do not refer to 
two isolated events separated in time. They refer specifically to events 
which occurred in Kory6 in the reign of Mongke and not of Ogodei. The 
error in the Secret History is in the 'dating' of the passage, not in the 
events themselves nor in scribal error in writing a name. 
In 1254, the chia-yin ^ "^ year of the reign of Mongke, Jalairtai-qorci 
was sent to conquer Kory6. He was murdered (lit. 'died violently) in 1259 
(cf. KS 24. 42b). In 1259, shortly after this, a certain Yesuder, Yeh-su-ta 

fe i^ li- ^^® ^^ charge of affairs in Koryft. Cf. KS 25. 3a-b. He was 
previously Jalairtai's deputy, viz., Yu-ch^ou-ta /^ ^'ii. • Cf. /CS 24. 

Before returning to the matter of the Secret History, let me summarize 
concerning the several individuals who have been confused with each other: 

1) in 1218-19, an unidentified Mongol named Cha-la was Deputy Comman- 
der of Mongol forces in Kory6 and he died sometime prior to 1233; 

2) in 1231-32, Sartaq-qorCi commanded the Mongol forces in Kory6 and he 
was hit by an arrow in battle and died in the twelfth month of 1232; 

3) <falairtai-qor6i commanded the Mongol forces in Kory6 in the invasions 
of the mid-1250's and he was murdered in 1259; 

4) Yesuder -qorii was ordered to replace the last named. 

With regard to the Secret History, while it is generally believed to have 
been compiled in 1240, Hung, loc. cit., has suggested that it was compiled 
in 1264. If we follow Hung's assumption that the Rat year dating of the Se- 
cret History applies to the entire ms. (10 + hsU-chi i^ ^ 2 chilan), then 
the next Rat year following Mongke's "^ ^ year is indeed 1264 and pre- 
cisely the date Hung postulated. At any rate, one thing is certain, and that 
is the passage cited above cannot have been written prior to 1254, and was 
almost certainly written after that date. 

After completing this, I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has also 
studied the problem and reached the sauie general conclusions; a bit later I 
discovered A. Waley's 'Notes on the YUan-ch'ao pi-shih\ B.S.O.S. 23 (1960) 
which deals with the same problem and reaches a similar conclusion. Both 
Waley and Ledyard would date the Secret History after 1258. 
Cho Sukch'ang ^ ^^% (d. 1234) was the eldest son of Marshal Cho 
Ch'ung ^ ;'!' (cf. KS 103. 6b). He submitted to the Mongols in 1231 and 
subsequently served their forces. Although the Kory6 authorities promoted 
him, clearly as a result of his position with the Mongols, they regarded 
him as a rebel. Consequently, when Kory6 opened a drive to retake their 
northwest area in 1233, Sukch'ang was taken along with P'il Hy6nbo ^ 
^^ 1^ ^'^'^' ^^® following year he was beheaded in the market-place {KS 


23. 28a). His biography is contained in KS 130. 9b-10a from which the above 
information has been taken except as indicated. Also see BTKP 9. 39 which, 
I note, gives his 'highest office' as Grand General, taejanggun, while his 
biography says that in official office he reached the rank of Supreme Gen- 
eral, sangjanggun . Despite this, I believe ihsii BTKP is correct in giving 
his rank as Grand General. YKC 3b which notes his dispatch to the Mongol 
court and which gives his name as Cho Sukchang ^^ A^^t% > gives his 
rank as General, changgiin. Yet KS 23. 28a — which BT/CP appears to have 
followed — says simply that in the third month of 1234, Grand General Cho 
Sukch'ang was beheaded in the market-place. The /CSC 16. 10b; 16. 14b; 
and 16. 20a accounts follow the corresponding iCS accounts. It appears that 
KS 23. 12a is a scribal error which was transmitted to his biography in KS 
130. 9b-10a and perpetuated in /CSC 16. 14b. 

3. S6nd6k-chin ^ y^- ^^, also known as Koju ^ -)j^ , is the present 
Kow6n ^ f^^ in S. HamgyOng Province. For topographical and historical 
information see TYS 48. 27a-29a. 

4. There may have been two forces advancing separately into Korea, one at 
Uiju and one at Sakchu, but this is conjectural. We know that the Mongol 
forces attacked Hamsin-chin (= Uiju) {KS 23. la); Sakchu, Wiju, T'aeju, 
andCh6ngju(/CS103. 23a-26a); Inju(/CS130. 3b); Ch'61chu (XS 23. la; KS 
121. llb-12a) and we know by /CS103. 23a-26b, etc., that Mongol forces 
were still fighting at various border cities while the attack on Kuju was in 
progress. The evidence suggests the reconstruction I have outlined in this 

5. The city of Ch6ngju y^"))] was located 25 li south of Uiju, 10 li north of 
Inju and was in the modern N. P'y6ngan Province, For topographical and 
historical information see TYS 53. 13b. 

6. Pundo changgiin /^ ^^ ^ '^ or District Commandants were stationed 
in the northern border cities, but I am unsure of their function. 

7. Kim Ky6ngson ^^ )^^\ i^- 1251), whose name was formerly Unnae 
^ JlL y w^s *^^ ^^^ °^ ^^^ Taes6 /^ ^ ^ (d. 1257; bio. KS 104; 
BTKP 67. 651). He entered government service by means of the Yin privi- 
lege and rose to prominence in the defense of Kuju with Pak S5. Promoted 
to the rank of Grand General with the post of Director of Affairs of the 
Censorate, chi-dsadae-sa )f^ J/^ -P ^ ^ , following the siege of 
Kuju, he was subsequently, in 1237, appointed to the post of Special Com- 
mander, chihwisa Jt^ J-jP JS , of ChSUa Province where he was instru- 
mental in crushing a large bandit group led by a certain Yi Y6nny6n (^ Y611- 
y6n) -"^ ^^ (d. 1237; BTKP 146. 1341) and his brothers which had 
been plaguing the Naju "^ -jH area. For this feat Kim was appointed 


Director of Memorials in the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umirwdn 
chijusa yj^j^ }^ |3^ ^Q ^^^ > and then, after being cleared of plot- 
ting to poison Ch'oe U, he was transferred to be Coadnainistrator of the 
Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umirwdn pusa, | 1 1 ^'Jjx.- Exiled to Paeng- 
ny6ng Island ^ ^^H-^ when Ch'oe Hang took over the government in 
1249, he was drowned in 1251 on Ch'oe's orders due to his relationship 
by marriage to O Sungj6k ^;)|^ 4'^ (d. 1251; BTKP 88. 826) the son 
by a former husband, of Ch'oe Hang's stepmother who was exterminated 
by Ch'oe in an act of revenge. Kim had one son Hon ^^(1239-1311; see 
KS 103. 29a-30b) who was the paternal first cousin of Queen KySngsun 
^ ''[^ i;^- Kim KyOngson's biography is contained in KS 103. 26a-29a 
and in HY 27. 17b-18a from which the above information has been taken 
except as noted; also see BTKP 61. 591. 

8. The city of T'aeju ^^ jj-\ is the present T'aech'6n ^ v] in N. P'y6ngan 
Province. The city of Wiju ^^ -)•}•] was located in the modern N. P'y6ngan 
Province about half-way between the modern Pakch'ftn M ii] and 
T'aech'6n. For topographical and historical information see TYS 54. 14aff 
and TYS 54. 6a ff for T'aeju and Wiju respectively. 

9. I understand the term torydng ^9)^^ in the sense of 'commanding offi- 
cer, officer-in-charge', etc., and have generally rendered it 'comman- 
der'. Yet several other possibilities immediately suggest themselves. It 
may have also been used in the sense of district magistrate analogous 
with hydllydng ;^|/^|^ or Magistrate of a hy&n. It could refer to a 'com- 
mander of one thousand' as a ydng/^^ was a unit of 1 000 men in the 
Koryo military system (cf. KS 81. la), and we see that Hong Pogw6n was 
a cavalry commander, singi torydng {YKC 5a). This would not be incon- 
sistent with the decimal organization of the Koryo military which had 
chiefs of fifty, chiefs of one hundred, and chiefs of one thousand, each of 
whom were issued a plaque, p'ae )j€, of authority (cf. YKC 15a). Fur- 
ther, in the tenth month of 1172, i.e., the third year of the reign of 
My6ngjong, military men were placed in charge "... from the three capi- 
tals, kydng ^^ , the four Defense Commands, toho (-pu) ^f \i (/'f4 )> 
the eight mok^^ administrations, reaching down to the kunj^^ , hydn 
■^J^^ , hostels, kwan^^ , and post stations, yok^'^ ...'' {KS 19. 22b). 

It is interesting to note that a certain Chi Kwangsu is called the chief of 
the Ch'ungju slave army in KS 129, 37a-b while he is called the torydng 
of this same force in KSC 16. 12a. 

Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, appended Chart 5 which deals with the regional 
military forces, lists one "Senior Colonel In Charge", torydng chung- 
nangjang ^^ /^|) vi? ^A ^^ , as the chief military officer at the cities 


of Anbuk-pu j^ J,tjj1^ > Kuju, S6ngju, Yongju, Chongju ^jj\ , and 
Sukchu^ jji in the Kory6 northwest, and a total of 16 toryong as the 
chief officers of various cities in the northeast. 

10. Hong Pogw6n ;^^4 i^. (1206-1258) of Tangs6ng ^ ^^ , had the 
former name of Pongnyang^-^ j^ . He had gone to live in Inju where his 
father Hong Taesiin ^^ ^ |.i^ was commander, torydng. Due to his 
father's position Pogw6n was made a cavalry commander, singi torydng. 
In 1218, his father had submitted to the Mongols when the latter were 
attacking the Ch'i-tan at Kangdong. Pogwon submitted to the Mongols in 
1231, and joined Sartaq in his attack on KoryC. After being driven from 
Kory6 by Koryo forces in 1233, he assembled 1 500 registered households 
and went north into Liaotung where they were settled between Liaoyang 
and Shenyang J}?fe!- v^^ . In the summer of 1234 he was bestowed with a 
golden tally, chin-fu /f\ ^^ , and given charge of all Koreans who had 
submitted. He subsequently accompanied the invasions of KoryO under 
Tanqut and A-mo-k'an. In 1250, he was awarded the tiger tally, hii-fu 

^ X% , and placed in charge of the people and army of Koryo. He sub- 
sequently accompanied the invasions of Koryo under Yekii and Jalairtai. 
Later he sent his son, Hong Tagu -^ ;^ jj_ , with Jalairtai' s forces 
into Kory6. In 1258, he engaged in a bit of black magic which ended in a 
name -calling bout with Sun, the Duke of YongnyOng, after the latter had 
been sent to the Mongols as a Kory6 hostage. Since Sun had joined the 
Mongols and had married a Mongol princess, it proved disastrous for 
Hong Pogw6n when the Emperor (Mongke) heard his daughter's story. 
When Pogw6n learned that they were going to inform the Emperor, he 
converted his goods into money in order to 'bribe' prince Sun and then 
went to seek the latter, but in the wrong direction. At that moment, he 
encountered an Imperial messenger — apparently sent by the Emperor — 
and the Imperial Messenger then ordered several tens of strong men to 
kick Pogw6n to death. This was in 1258 and he was then fifty-three. He 
had seven sons of whom his second son, Hong Tagu, is most well-known. 
Pogw6n was later posthumously given the title of Chia-i tai-fii -O- ^ 

J^ ^ , Marquis of Shen-yang j^ f§)i'^ ' ^^*^ awarded the post- 
humous appelation of Chung-hsien -|^, >^ . For biographical information 
see YKC; YS 154. la-9a; KS 130. 3a-5a;"c//SL 4. 33a-b from which the 
above information has been taken. Succinct accounts are also given in 
Han^guk-sa sajdn -^^ )|^) ^ ^ -M: » published by the Tonga ch'ul- 
p'ansa >^ ^ ^ "^^llxi ' Seoul, 1960, p. 421 and the Tdyd rekishi 
daijiten, Vol. 3, 143; also see BTKP AO. 371. 

11. The city of Ch'fllchu /^ -))\ is the modern Ch'61san .0^ ^ in N. P'yongan 


Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 18a ff. 

12. Mun Tae ^ ^ (d. 1231) has a brief 'biography' in KS 121. llb-12a which 
simply relates the incident described in the text without giving any further 
particulars of his life. 

13. The reasons for the Mongols emphasizing their identity is that the Koryu 
cities had been raided by non-Mongol troops, chiefly Jiirten, who wore 
Mongol uniforms and claimed to be Mongol soldiers. Cf. KSC 15. 36a; KS 
103. 32a-36a. Also see Yanai, op. cit., p. 108 note 1. 

14. While there were three Administrators, p'an'gwan |^i] r^ , assigned to 
each of the two Northern Frontier -Districts who were to be of the fifth 
or sixth grades (cf. KS 77. 33b), I am unsure of either their grade or 
number at the town-level. 

15. chaesang '^ Jf-hl = chaech'u "^ Jf^i , i-e., ministers of the second rank 
and above. The term itself is a rather ancient one in Chinese history and 
occurs in texts from the third century B.C.; it became the regular offi- 
cial term for the Premier in the late Chou period. Cf. p. 4, Sven Broman, 
'Studies on the Chou Li', BMFEA No. 33, 1961, pp. 1-90. HY20. 27b 
states that Ch'oe I (= Ch'oe U) held the post of chaesang, i.e., prime 
minister, however, they are using the term in a literary sense. 

16. The term Three Armies refers to the organization of the Kory6 army 

into three divisions each commanded by a Battle Commander, chinju ^4 ^-^ 
^ , who held the rank of General or above. According to the encyclo- 
pedia TMP 109. 5b, in the third year of the reign of Uijong ^^ ^^ (1148) 
one of the army commanders submitted a petition requesting that Koryo's 
Five Armies be reduced to Three Armies and it was approved. A division 
into five armies was tried at least once after that, viz., against the Ch'i- 
tan invasions of 1216-18 but was quickly scrapped in favor of the tradi- 
tional (cf. KS 1) system of three divisions after a series of defeats (cf. 
KS 103. 15b-16a). Yet, in view of the repeated use of the number three 
as a pseudo -number throughout the KS, I cannot but wonder if the number 
three in 'Three Armies' did not carry some 'magical' flavor at the time. 

17. ThecityofKwakchu f^ t)-] is the present Kwaksan Jg J^ in N. P'yongan 
Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 37a ff. 
The city of S6nju ^ -j-j-l is the present S6nch'6n ^ }l| in N. Hamgy6ng 
Province; for topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 34a ff. 

18. The city of Chaju "l^^, -)-)-] is the present Chasan |^ ^ in S, P'yongan 
Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 54. 25b ff. 

19. Pongju ^|(^ t)j is the present Pongsan ,[|[^ jL in Hwanghae Province. For 
topographical and historical information see TYS 41. 27a ff. 

20. Yi Chas6ng 4r 4- ^ (d. 1251) was of Ubong ij^^ which was also 


the ancestral home of the powerful Ch'oe clan who ruled Kory6 at this 
time. His father was President, sangsd y^ ^ , of the Department of 
War, py&ngbu. His biography characterizes him as a man who was brave 
and strong, and good at archery; he followed the army and gradually rose 
to the rank of Supreme General « In the year following the Mongol on- 
slaught of 1231, Chasftng, as Battle Commander, chinju p:^ JL , of one 
of KoryO's Three Armies, assisted in quelling the slave-monk uprising 
which occurred in Kaegy6ng following the transfer of the capital to 
Kanghwa Island. He subsequently was in command of forces which quelled 
a slave revolt at Ch'ungju in 1232 and, in 1233, he led an army on a two- 
day forced ride to put down a large bandit rebellion emenating from the 
area of the Eastern Capital. He died in 1251 and was awarded the post - 
humous appellation of Uiry61^ yj^ . For further biographical informa- 
tion seeKS 103. 3a-39a from which the above information has been drawn; 
also see BTKP 126. 1175. 

21. The Tongs6n postal relay station ^]^J J{^^^ was on the eleven station 
Piry6ng circuit ^ y^ "^^ . It was the Pongju station. Cf. KS 82. 9b. 

22. Min Hui f^ ^^ (fl. 1230-1249). Little is known of Min other than his 
active role in resisting the Mongols. He ultimately reached the post of 
Supreme General but was exiled in 1249 when Ch'oe Hang came into 

23. pundae 6sa /^ ^ JjM ^_^ or Regional Censorate; I do not know how 
many Regional Censorates there were nor their administrative structure. 

24. I note that according to YS 149, which contains the biographies of Wang 
Ying-tsu X ^M ' I-la-mai-nu ^ ^j f^ ^Ji_ and Hsieh-tu |^ 
fjl , that each of these persons was in KoryC. Wang was deputy to Sar- 
taq; I-la-mai-nu was one of Sartaq's principal commanders; and Hsieh- 
tu, the son of Yeh-lii Liu-ke was another commander. Yet I have not 
seen these persons mentioned in the Kory6 records. 

25. naesi nangjiing ]^ Jj^ ^f)"^' Song's position was that of waesz or Palact 
Attendant and his rank was that of nangjung. 

26. Song Kukch'6m j^ ]D ^^ (d. 1250) of Chinju ^| ^.>| , was good in lit- 
erature, passed the exams, and was placed directly in the Historio- 
graphical Bureau, sagivan. From this post he entered the service of 
Ch'oe U, later serving his son Ch'oe Hang, and was active in the CMng- 
bang Xjf <^ or Civil Council. For biographical information see KS 102. 
14a-b; also see BTKP 104. 980. 

27. Hei :£-, or Black Ch'i-tan, is the Chinese rendering of Qara-Khitay, cf. 
Wittfogel and Feng, 'Qar5-Khitay', pp. 619-674. They have also noted 
this and remark that the Mongols tended to identify the 'Chin' Ch'i-tan 


with the Black Ch'itan of Central Asia and cite this incident as an exam- 
ple of mistaken identity. Cf. Wittfogel and Feng, op. cit., p. 625, note 69. 

28. There is little doubt that the killing of the Mongol envoy was in part re- 
sponsible for the return of the Mongol forces to Kory6. G.Vernadsky, 
'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa' , HJAS3 (1958) 1, pp. 
337-360, mentions (p. 346) the apparently unwritten inviolability of am- 
bassadors and points out that ". . . it was by murdering the Mongol envoys 
that the Russian princes brought down the Mongol wrath upon their heads 
in 1223". W. Barthold, Four Studies . . . , Vol. 1, p. 37, remarks that the 
expedition against Turkestan in 1219 was due to the killing of Mongol en- 
voys by the Khorezm shah. The charge was often repeated in Mongol mis- 
sives to Kory6. Cf. TYSC 28; KS 23. 20b ff. 

It should also be noted that the s laying of a Mongol envoy provided a rea- 
sonable pretext both for invasion and for subsequent demands. The opin- 
ion that the Mongols simply used the slaying of the envoy as a pretext for 
invasion has been expressed by most Japanese and Korean scholars; see, 
for example, Yanai Watari, Meng-ku-shih yen-chiu r^ -^ ^^^ Jh 
(being the Chinese translation of articles published in Japanese in TG), 
Commercial Press, 1932, p. 11, and Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Mansen-shi keti- 
kyU, Vol. 1, p. 626. 

29. Ch6ng/f^, (d. 1234) was the son of Chinjf^ , the Marquis of Y6ngin ^ 

//i- |£ (d. 1220; BTKP 113. 1064). His mother was Princess Y6nhui 
li: ;f^^ ^ ^ ' *^® daughter of My6ngjong ^^ ^^ . Ch5ng himself 
married Princess Ky6ngny6ng h<^ ^0 ^ ^ » ^^^ daughter of Sinjong 
■).-^ ^^ . He was first enfeoffed as Count of Shihting ^^ iM. j^ , later 
advanced to Marquis of Sihung, and then, still later, made Duke of 
Hoean --^ ^ Jf^ . He died in 1234. Biographical information is con- 
tained in KS90. 9b-10a; also see BTKP 114. 1072. 

YKC 3a and YS 2. 2b identify him (incorrectly) as the younger brother of 
Kojong, then the reigning monarch. The Mongols were demanding hos- 
tages from the royal family among whom the Crown Prince was particu- 
larly desired (cf. YS 120. 15a). Kory6 later showed no hesitation in send- 
ing the Duke of Y6ngny6ng, falsely labelled as the Crown Prince to the 
Mongols as a hostage. Therefore, I regard this as a Kory6 tactic, i.e., 
the Kory6 authorities were simply passing Chong off as the King's 
younger brother with the intention of submitting as their hostage if no 
alternative was offered; I do not believe this is a case of scribal or other 
error in YKC. Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 555, note 1, is also of the 
opinion that the Kory6 authorities misled the Mongols. 

30. The title of Duke, kong J^ , was an honorary title and except for occa- 


sional awards which were often posthumous, was customarily reserved for 
members of the royal family, especially the cadet branches. It carried 
with it an annual stipend of 400 sdk 10 hi of rice (Yi, Table 6). HY 20. 24b 
informs us that the enfeoffed members of the royal relatives were charged 
with no affairs, and "those that were, by their relationship, venerated, 
were the Dukes, kong; the next were the Marquis, huj^^ ; the distant 
[relatives] were made Counts, paek/j|^ [while] the young were made 
sado ^ ;^^ and sagong ^ ^ . In general they were called Princes, 
chewang %Jt ^ 

The titles sado and sagong were the second and third of the Three Dukes 
samgong ^ -^ ; the first was taewi ^!^ • While all of these hono- 
rary titles held the official grade of First Class primary, their stipends 
and allotments varied considerably. See iCS 76. 2b. 

31. Pak S6 ){\ ^ (fl. 1230's) of Chukchu Jj ^))\ first rose to prominence 
as defender of Kuju against the Mongol invasion of Sartaq in 1231-32. For 
his valiant defense of Kuju he was appointed Senior Councillor, p^ydng- 
jangsa ^ # ^ of the Royal Chancellory mimha {sdng) fl 'f ( ^ )> 
and even the military ruler Ch'pe U told him: "Sir, in the nation [your] 
fidelity is really incomparable." We are told that he retired to his native 
village following the battle at Kuju but his biography inKS 103. 23a-26a 
tells us little other than his role as defender of Kuju; BTKP does not 
list him. 

32. The Koryo victory over the Liao forces at Kuju in 1018 resulted in the 
Liao dropping their demands for six Korean cities and for the Kory6 mo- 
narch to visit the Liao capital. Cf. Kim Sanggi /^ M- ^ , T^an^gu iva 
Hi hangjaeng \^ -^ ^] °] ^^ ^j , [The Ch'i-tan Incursions and Re- 
sistance Offered], Kuksasang Hi chemunje ^ )\ % ?\ H^ ^ M^ , 
["The Problems of Korean History"], 2 (I960), pp. 101-175. 

33. iC5 103. 23a-26a reads />M«rfo c/iaw^^w; /CS 103. 26a-29a reads simply 
sujang yj^ )]|^ or military officer. 

34. toho(pu) pydlch' o ^fi li { )^ ) ^J ^;j/- . The pydlch'o -;^] P/ or 'those 
especially selected' were elite teams of infantry. I have chosen to render 
pyolch'o as 'patrol'. A more detailed discussion of the pyolch^o is given 
later. This particular pydlclfo was probably from the Northern Defense 
Command, anbuk toho-pu, located at the walled-city of Anbuk (mod. Anju 

y|2 ^))] ) to the South of Kuju. 

35. In reconstructing the battle at Kuju, I have followed the sequence of 
events as set forth in KSC 16. 5a-6a; KSC 16. 7a-b and KSC 16. 8b .which 
differ in minor respects with the accounts in the biographies of Pak and 


36. Where I have rendered 'called his small group' the text reads \)^ ^^ 

^Jv. jlv. and I am unsure of the meaning. ??"blew twice on a bamboo 

37. This is the earliest of four such instances of the Mongols using human fat 
that I have seen. While naphtha was widely used in making fire missiles 
in the middle eastern campaigns (cf. the works of Barthold and of Bret- 
schneider), yet John of Piano Carpini (cited H. Yule and H.Cordier,T/re 
Book of Ser Marco Polo, 2 Vols., 3rd ed. London, 1929, Vol. 2, pp. 180- 
181) noted the mixing of human fat with Greek fire and remarked that 
"this caused the fire to rage inextin^ishably." 

P.Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, P^aris, 1959 (a posthumous publication, 
see the forword by L.Hambis), p. 22, cites the Hsii tung-chien kang-mu 
account of Bayan's siege of Ch'ang-chou in 1275, which relates that Bayan 
killed and burnt captives and "used the boiling fat of the corpses to manu- 
facture fire-missiles which were thrown to set alight the wooden 'che- 
vaux-de-frise' of the wall battlements ..." It was used again in Kory6 in 
1236, in an assault on Chukchu >[J jj] cf. KS 103. 25b-26a. 

38. KS 103. 26a-29a gives twenty days for this attack. 

39. There were two Recorders of the Academy, hangnok ^B, /^f^__ , assigned 
to the National Academy, kukchagam ; they were of the official grade of 
Ninth Class primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 10 
bushels (sdk) of rice (Yi, Table 6). 

40. taeup'o ^^ '|] is defined following its appearance as: "Tae up^o 
signifies a large blade, a large weapon" J:^ ^ j,-^ ^ ')^'J] )^^ '^. 
The usual interpretation of the word is taken from this definition and is 
simply fe'MW k'al ^ IJ' or 'large knife', e.g., Yi, Han'guk-sa p. 555. 
Tae ^ is without doubt to be read Uun 'large', i.e., the adjectival or 
modifier form of the qualitative verb k^ta. I read u in the sense of 'to 
go', i.e., kal ' u ^j ' ^ and P'o^^ in the meaning of 'stream, rivelet' 
= ke^kae ^j '- 9)j . Xe in the sense of 'implement, devise' is com- 
monly added to verb bases to form substantives and it survives, for ex- 
ample, in ji- 'to carry on the back', plus ke, = jige 'packboard'. S.E. 
Martin, Korean Morphophonemics , Baltimore, 1954, pp. 51-52 gives 
several examples and G. J.Ramstedt has discussed ke at length in his 
"Koreanisch kgs 'Ding, Stiick", Journal de la Soci^te Finno-ougrienne , 
LXVm, 1945. 

The reason for interpreting ^ as 'knife' k^al is probably due both to the 
definition following its appearance and the fact that kal (i.e., u • kat) is an 
older form of k''al 'knife'. The latter is attested in the Yi Dynasty work 
Hunmin chdngum haeryebon ;|"] ^j£. "^ ^-f- ^^J ./K- (cf. p. 28, 


Tonga Saegiigd sajdn -f" 4 ^^ ^ ^ 4 ^ » Seoul, 1959). Yet, 

if we accept the premise that^)|] = ke = 'implement', as I believe is cor- 
rect, then, as ke adds to verb bases it follows that kal in noun form must 
be rejected. This immediately suggests kal ^ k''al as an older verb form. 
One immediately thinks of the modern kalkita ^Jr ?] C\ 'to slash, to 
beat'. From the verb kalkta, kakta Ramstedt has postulated; n. kalgo 
« ? * kalga)() and its derivatives kalgori 'a hook, a curved stick'. See 
G.J. Ramstedt, Studies in Korean Etymology, Memoires de la Socidt^ 
Finno-Ougrienne, XCV, Helsinki, 1949; also cf. karida, p. 98; kalda, 
p. 87, and kalda, p. 88. 

While it is tempting to postulate the incorporation of a Chinese loanmorph 
here (?^|^ as a verb 'to cut, to cut through' mod. Ch. chHeh ^ , T'ang 
Ch. kHet, mod. Kor. kydl — as a noun read kye in mod. Kor.), it would 
seem that in this word we have a form of the *kalga)( postulated by Ram- 
stedt. Therefore I reconstruct up^o as *kalge [)f]'^* kalkke[}(] and trans- 
late tae up^o or k^im kalge^ as 'large implement for slashing, large im- 
plement for smashing'. For the T'ang pronunciation of kHet see B. Kal- 
gren, ^Grammata Serica . . . ', 87. 279 f. The above reconstruction is of 
course tentative; a great deal of work remains to be done in Korean 
palaeographic studies before firm conclusions are reached. 

41. Ch'oe Ch'unmyOng )^ ^ ^^ (d. 1250), a descendant of Ch'oe Ch'ung 
^ y^ (d. 1068; bio. KS 95. la ff; BTKP 23. 224), was of Haeju ^ ;);)•] . 
For his merit in the defense of Chaju he was appointed Coadministrator 
of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch^uminvon piisa. He had one son, 
Chom f^ , who became an officer of the guards. His biography in KS 
103. 30a-32a is principally an account of his defense of Chaju; also see 
BTKP 25. 229. 

42. Tae Chips6ng :^'%__}n, (^- 1236) was one of the military officers sur- 
rounding Ch'oe U. He secured his position by marrying his daughter to 
the military overlord. KS carries no biography for Tae but his activities 
are mentioned in KS 23 and KS 129; also see BTKP 110. 1030. 

43. This document and the preceding dispatch from Sartaq contained in KS 23. 
4a-5b, have been studied and 'translated' by Murakami ShSji y)^^il. jL^ 
Moko raicho no honyaku ^^ ^ it Jl^ ^ Ift if ["Translation of 
Mongolian Credentials in the Goryeo-sa"], CG 17 (1960), pp. 81-86. After 
completing this , I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has translated 
and annotated these documents and that his study, unavailable to me, will 
appear in a future issue of JAOS; this should be a definitive work. Mura- 
kami suggests (p. 86 note 1), that the term ydnggong is simply being used 
as 'Your Excellency', kakha ^£i < . According to Kim Sanggi, to the 
Koreans the term, which was used in Silla times, meant a member of the 


royal family who held the rank of Duke, Marquis, or Count. Cf. pp. 220- 
221 and p. 240 note 7, Kim Sanggi, Kory6 muin ch6ngch'i kigu ko J-, '^ 

^p\j A^ liic ya Ax J^ ^ ' incorporated in Tongbang munghwa. . . , 
pp. 207-243. Yet the Koreans themselves referred to Ch'oe Ui as ydng- 
gong (cf. KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35a-b), and I note that Ch'oe Hang's posi- 
tion in the entry recording his death in KS 24 is given as chungsd-ydng 

"^ ^ ^^ • According to Tzu-hai, 87B, the term ydnggong was first 
used by Emperor Hsiao-Wen :^ X. t' °^ *^® Northern Wei as a title 
of respect for Kao Yiin ^ ^ (390-487; see H.A.Giles, A Chinese Bio- 
graphical Dictionary, London, 1898, p. 369, entry 970) who held the post 
of 'Chancellor of the Secretariat' -^P -:^ /^ .1 believe Murakami's 
suggestion is closer to the mark. 

In 1232, the Mongol Marshal Ho-hsi J^ -^ seht an envoy to the-Kory6 
authorities with two bolts (p'il ^ ) of gold damask /^^ ^» and a missive 
addressed to the ydnggong /A J^ . Ch'oe U refused to receive it and the 
envoys then tried, unsuccessfully, to give the missive to Ch6ng, the Duke 
of Hoean. Ch'oe finally had Yi Kyubo write an answer for ChOng to take 
back {ci.KS 129. 37a-b; ATSC 16. 14b). The letter written by Yi is proba- 
bly that contained in TYSC 28. 9a-10a and addressed to Marshal Ho-hsi 
and dated in the fifth month of 1232; a reply from the Duke of Hoean also 
addressed to Marshal Ho-hsi follows in TYSC 28. 9a, both referring to 
Mongol demands for Kory6 military assistance in the Liaotung area. 
Perhaps the Ho-hsi mentioned is the individual whose name occurs com- 
monly as Tanqu[t] '^ ^ . As is well known, Ho-hsi was a common 
Chinese name for the Tanqut or Hsi-hsia country during this period and 
from this derived the Mo. Qasi, a name tabooed from 1236. Cf. P.Pelliott, 
Notes on Marco Polo, pp. 115 and 126. The affairs of Kory6 at this time 
were in the hands of Ch'oe U and the Kory6 correspondence with the Mon- 
gols was largely prepared by Yi Kyubo (1168-1241; BTKPUl. 1268) who 
acted as a sort of Secretary of State for Ch'oe U until his (Yi's) death in 
1241, as may be seen in the genealogical record attached to the front of 
his collected works. TySC. 

44. The stimulus was probably a second Mongol missive sent to the Kory6 
court in the fifth month of 1232. Cf. YKC 3a. 3. 

45. chiyu ^^ ^^^ ; KS 129. 37a-b reads chihivi -jf^ W ; I have rendered 
simply 'Commander' since I am unsure of the function of a chiyu. The 

chiwi-sa, appear to have been especially dispatched to troubled areas 
and it appears to have been a temporary post. For example, a Supreme 
General was appointed Special Commander, chihwi-sa j:^ W |^ , of 
the southeastern provinces and a Circuit Commissioner was appointed as 
his deputy. Cf. KS22>. 30a. 


46. Kim Sech'ung ^^ -^ y'^ died on the sixteenth day of the sixth month of 
1232, cf. BTKP 64. 621. Other than his brief appearance before Ch'oe at 
this time, little is known of him. 

47. According to KS 81. 15b, the Ya pydlch'o ^ ;§i] \}j or Night Patrol was 
organized by Ch'oe U to patrol the capital area at night to prevent vio- 
lence. The organization of the Ya pydlch^o is discussed in detail later. 

48. Wang K6n J-.'^ the founder of the Kory6 dynasty, was born in 877, 
reigned 918-943, died in 943, and was canonized T'aejo :^ X9l • for 
biographical information see KS 1. Ia5-b8 and XS 2. 16al-8; also see 
BTKP 112, 1047. 

49. Ch'oe's first wife, who was of the Ch6ng<;^g clan, died in the fifth month 
of 1231 and was given the funeral of a queen {KSC 16. 3b-4a). Ch'oe sub- 
sequently married the daughter of Tae ChipsSng {KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 

50. The KoryS capital was transferred to Kanghwa Island in the seventh month 
of 1232 {KS 23. 14a-b; TT 33. 359a-b) where it remained until the fifth 
month of 1270 (^"5 26. 34b). The wisdom of Ch'oe's move is apparent. 
Kory6 forces had proved no match against the Mongol forces on the main- 
land despite stubborn and often heroic resistance. In shifting to Kanghwa 
Island, KoryS's one remaining asset, her maritime tradition could be 
utilized. Government storage granaries were located at coastal harbors 

— the two exceptions were located on the Han River — and maritime 
transport of grain was already the normal mode employed (cf. KS 79. 

Kanghwa, a large island off the coast of the modern Inch'6n /(^ ii| , is 
separated from the mainland by a strait ". . . infested with rocks and rap- 
ids and with a tide rushing like a mill-race ..." (cf. M. M.TroUope, 
'Kanghwa', TKBRAS, 2 (1901) 1-36, p. 1). Since the Mongols had never 
been noted for their skill in amphibious warfare, Kanghwa Island made 
an excellent refuge. The move also set a precedent and the island was 
used as a refuge by the Koryo court from the Qadan i'^^4t" rebels in 
1290 (For a general account see K.Susa ^^ //^ % )^ > ^^^ ^^ ^^" 
daishiseki ^ 'O ^ J^ ;^ ^^ , T5ky5, 1937, p. 65 ff) and later by 
the Yi Dynasty court from the Manchu invasions in the early 17th century, 
see W.W.Rockhill, China's Intercourse with Korea from the XVth Century 
to 1895, London, 1905. For topographical and historical information on 
Kanghwa Island see TYS 12. 215-221. 

51. We are told that the population of Kaegyfing had reached 100 000 house- 
holds ho jp {cf. KS 102. Sa.;. KSC 16. 15a) which, at the usual m.p.h. 
(mouths per household) rate of 5-1 would give a population of 500 000 


persons. Yi, Han^guk-sa Vol. 2, p. 563, note 2, would read ^mouths^ ku 
'O in lieu of 'households', ho, making 100 000 persons and a more be- 
lievable figure. 

52. Kim Sanggi, Tongbang munhwa . . , pp. 127-128, gives an account of the 
various palaces, Buddhist temples, and the like which were constructed 
on Kanghwa in the period 1232-1270 when it was the capital of Koryo. 

53. Sartaq apparently withdrew his forces westward into Liaotung. Cf. Yi, 
Han^guk-sa Vol. 2, p. 557. 

54. The slave rebellion at Ch'ungju was a rather interesting development and 
is reflective of the disorder of the times. The story begins just prior to 
the Mongol attacK on Ch'ungju in the winter of 1231 (KSC 16. 9b). A cer- 
tain U Chongju -^ ^yfi » ^^^ Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of the city 
and the Administrator, p^an'gwan, one Yu Hongik ^x. 'i^ ^ ' ^^° 
quarrelled continually, had a falling out when they discussed the defense 
of the city after hearing of the approach of Mongol troops. Chongju as- 
sumed command of a 'Selected Force of the Upper Classes' Yangban 
pyblch}o -^ J;j£ /jjJ^J/ and Hongik took command of the slave army, 
nogun ^yi^ '^ , and a selected force, chamryu pyolch'o ^ ^ ^ij ^,\j- 
They were mutually suspicious of each other and when the Mongol troops 
arrived they fled leaving the defense of the city to the slave army and the 
selected force who routed the Mongols. Returning they checked the gov- 
ernment and private silver utensils and the slave army offered the pre- 
text that the Mongol troops had stolen them. Some local officials secretly 
plotted to kill the head of the slave army. Learning of this, the slave army 
accused the officials for deserting the city and then wanting to charge the 
slaves with the Mongols' crime. Gathering under the pretense of a burial 
party, they assembled their followers with blasts on a conch shell and 
then took over the city, threatening the families of any who dared to flee, 
setting fire to the homes of the plotters, and then hunting down and killing 
those against whom they held grudges (ifS 103. 36a-39a; KSC 16. lla-12a). 
In the first month of 1232, upon the request of U and Yu, Ch'oe U ap- 
pointed two administrators, one Pak Munsu J^i. ^M~ and a certain 
Kim Ch6ng ^ ]i| , as Temporary Military Governors, anmu pyblgam 

^ i^ ^') ^ ^^^C 16. Ila8-b9). Pak and Kim returned in the same 
month escorting the commander, torydng, of the slave army, the yongsa 

Chi Kwangsu ^{^ tlj ^ , and the Buddhist priest Ubon }^ ^ {KSC 16. 
12a) who had apparently both been conspicious in the defense of Ch'ungju. 
Ch'oe U rewarded them and appointed^^o^^^ , Kwangsu a military officer 
with the rank of captain, kyoivi Jf^^^-^ , and made Ubon head of the im- 
portant temples^ /aeH'dwsa-c^M "X^f^^^jOi Ch'ungju and elevated him 


to the rank of samjiing -_ y£ (= samjung taesa ^ ^ ^ iji^ ; for an 
explanation of which see Yi, Han'guk-sa Vol. 2, p. 143) cf. ii'S129. 37a; 
KSC 16. 12a. 

After returning to Ch'ungju, Ubon stirred up a revolt and, in the eighth 
month of 1232, Kory6's Three Armies commanded by Yi Chasftng were 
sent to suppress the uprising iJiSC 16. 17a). As tney were building a 
bridge to cross a deep river near Ch'ungju, the army was contacted by 
several rebel leaders who desired to kill Ubon and surrender. This was 
accepted by the government forces and enabled them to enter the city. 
Those of the gang who were bold and robust fled and those supporters who 
remained were captured and executed. The valuables, and livestock 
seized by the gang were brought back and presented to the authorities in 
the capital {KS 103. 36a-39a; KSC 16. 17a-b). 

55. Mongol demands are discus sed in detail later. 

56. The removal of the capital from Kaegy6ng stimulated a rebellion in the 
city. A certain Yi T'ong J^ jv^j , a servant, chorye ^ |J^ , of the 
Censorate, dsadae, assenibled the petty bandits in the capital area and 
the slaves in the city and drove out the military commander left to gar- 
rison the city. Then, pretending to represent KoryS's Three Armies, he 
sent dispatches to Buddhist monasteries in the area to assemble bands of 
monks to strengthen his group. When KoryS's Three Armies were sent 
against them, the rebels advanced a force to meet the government army 
near Sungch'6n-pu, the landing point from Kanghwa. As this was taking 
place, the Kory6 Night Patrol, ya pyolch^o, reached the city and gained 
entrance by pretending to be a part of the rebel band then fighting at 
Sungch'6n-pu. The government forces arrived shortly thereafter and the 
rebellion was crushed QiS 103. 36a-39a). 

57. Yi Chehyon, one of the foremost historiographers of the Koryo period, 
was born in 1288 and died in 1367, the sixteenth year of the reign of King 
Kongmin ;^ ^ ^ (r. 1352-1374) at the age of eighty-one. For bio- 
graphical information see KS 110. 21a-42a and the genealogical informa- 
tion contained in Ikchae-chip ^~^ :^ , his collected works. His home 
was a well-known gathering place for historians, and perhaps the national 
history he is mentioned as working on {KS 110. 39a) — he was an official 
historian — may partially remain in his surviving works. Viz., the K^ik 
Chhinghdn Wang Sega j^ ^^' W- i. -^ 'Ic (^•®-' annals of Kojong) 
contained in IC 9A. la-20a. I note that the birth-death dates for Yi in 
Han'guk^sa sajdn ^^ ||^ ^ i^^^ ' ^^oul, 1960, are correctly giv- 
en on p. 280 but are erroneously given as 1386-1397 on p. 314, undoubt- 
edly a printing error to which such works are regrettably prone. BTKP 


125. 1166 reads the name as Yi Chaehybn. This brings up a problem 
which, as does romanization, confronts all students of Korean history 
and literature. His name is written y^ ^ ^ . The character M- has 
the three readings of chae, che, and cha, only the latter two having com- 
mon identity slogans, viz., nara • che and sangusiraehul • cha, while the 
reading chae is so uncommon as to lack an identity slogan. I can see no 
reason to deviate from the practice of modern Korean and Japanese his- 
torians in using the most common modern reading until it is historically 
proven that a less common reading is applicable. The most common 
reading of the character ^^ is che; therefore I read Yi Chehyon and con- 
sider BTKP to be incorrect. 

58. For biographical information see Vol. 2, p. 855, A. Hummel, Eminent 
Chinese of the ChHng Period, 2 vols., U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C., 1943. 

59. See p. 25, H. Franke, Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolen- 
herrschaft, Leipzig, 1949. Franke also discusses at length the surv^iving 
portions of the Ching-shih ta-tien. Franke was not, of course, the first 
to notice this . Some 20 years earlier Yanai Watari, Meng-ku-shih yen- 
chiu, pp. 104-126 discussed the relationships of the Yiian Veritable 
Records, shih-lu, with the Ching-shih ta-tien and (p. 121) pointed out 
that YS 208 (he calls it the Jih-pen cKuan )£) y^\_\% ) was based on the 
Ching-shih ta-tien. 

60. I believe we can answer some of Yi ChehySn's questions. First, these 
officials were established by Sartaq who was, of course, acting under 
Imperial Orders (cf. YS 154. lb; YS2. 2b; YS 59. 4b-6b; YKC 3a). And 
this was in keeping with Mongol custom at the time. Bretschneider, 
Mediaeval Researches, Vol. 1, p. 293, notes that when Cinggis captured 
a western country he placed a daru)(a6i in every city. 

In later days, as Yi ChehySn remarks, the daruyaCi were indeed impor- 
tant persons. Bretschneider, op. cit., p. 190, has already pointed out 
that in the biographical section of the Yiian shih all the distinguished 
Mongols, with few exceptions, were either with the army or were pro- 
vincial resident commissioners. Yet it is also well knO\vn that the period 
prior to 1260, i.e., the ascension of Qubilai, is not covered in detail in 
the Yiian records and perhaps this is the reason that their names have 
not been transmitted. In later days, i.e., after 1270, there was only one 
darup6i and one vice-daruya6i in the Kory6 capital and it was probably 
this system with which Yi was familiar, Yi's remark on the small size 
of the capital prefecture where he understood the seventy -two daruyaci 
to have been stationed does not apply since the area concerned was the 


entire Koryo northwest and not merely the capital prefecture. And, as we 
have seen, the Koryo records do indeed mention them. 

61. Yi, Han'giik-sa Vol. 2, p. 560. 

62. There was an earlier Korean participation in Yiian records by Kim Py6ng 

/^ 1^ (d. UOl; BTKP 64. 613) and Im Ik^i^]^ (d. UQ\;BTKP 46. 
436) who accompanied Prince Sim^j J- when the latter went to the Yiian 
court as a hostage in 1271, and they assisted in the compilation of the 
records, shih-chi ^ ^,][v , of Shih-tsu (Qubilai). 

63. KS 23. 25 identifies the location as "a small stronghold, sdng^oi the vil- 
lage of Ch'6in )^\c-., a hamlet subordinate to Suju y]i^ ^)\ " TYS 10. 
16b remarks that it was of earthen construction and had a military 
granary l^ /^ . The story of; the shooting of Sartaq is also given as 
well as mention of Sartaq' s attack on the citadel of refuge at Hanyang 
^ 6^ (mod. Seoul). Also see vV. Bacon, ^Fortresses ..., p. 12 and 
p. 16. 

64. Kim Yvinhu /^ j^ /(:£ (fl. 1230' s) of Kyongju was a Buddhist priest who 
was living at Paekhy6n-w6n j^ j.,^ 6^ when the Mongol forces arrived 
in the area in 1232. He declined an appointment as Supreme General, 
sangjanggim, as a reward for shooting the Mongol commander Sartaq, 
saying, "At the time of the battle I was without bow and arrows. How can 
I presume to falsely receive an important reward?" He was then given a 
temporary appointment as Colonel, nanjang, and, subsequently, was ap- 
pointed Special Supervisor of Defense, pangho pyolgam of Ch'ungju's 
citadel of refuge where he played a major role in the seventy -day siege of 
Ch'ungju. He was promoted to Supreme General for his feats at Ch'imgju 
and given the post of Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern 
Frontier -District but, as the Eastern Frontier-District had already fallen 
to the Mongols at that time, he did not go to his post. No other particulars 
of his life. are given in his KS 103. 39b-40 biography; see also CHSL 4. 27; 
BTKP carries no entry. 

65. According to YS 208. 3a this occurred in the eighth month of 1232. How- 
ever, in a Koryti answer to an Eastern Jiir^en dispatch contained in TYSC 
28. 21b-22b =KS 2Z. 25b-26b, we learn that Sartaq died on the sixteenth 
day of the twelfth month of 1232 = January 27, 1233. 

66. The Ke-pu-ai -S /{^ ^ here mentioned is Wan-ti-han Ke-pu-ai 5^ 

1^ ^ -J) 'j " 1% whom the Chin had placed in charge of the Liaotung 
Mobile Bureau 'l^J^;J'J'^ in 1219. Cf. p. 8206A-B, Wu T'ing-hsieh 

^ ^i^-^'^lA , Chin fang- chennien-piao /^ /j ^J ^ ^L. > incorpo- 
rated in Vol. 6 of the Erh-shih-uM-shih pu-pien; also see his biography 
in Chin-shih 103. 


67. Mongol envoys came and went through Wan-nu's territory because of the 
Chin garrisons in the south, viz., in P'o-su-lu. The KoryO letter is sim- 
ply saying that despite Korean protests, the envoy insisted on returning 
via P'o-su-lu and thus, the whole matter was taken out of Korean hands. 
Whether the Koreans were connected with the killing of the envoy is un- 
Known. Yanai, Yiian-tai . . . , pp. 135-138 believes that it is unlikely that 
the Koryo authorities were not connected with the incident. 

68. A certain Song Tukch'ang '^ !{^ % , a military officer of the rank of 
Captain, kyowi X^§A who had been in the mission headed by Chi Cisim, 
escaped and returned to the Kory6 capital to report that Chi had been sent 
under escort to the Mongol Emperor and that the rest of the party had 
been detained by Sartaq. Cf. KS 23. 14a; YKC 3b. He is our Song Ipchang 
nnd the Kory6 authorities were protecting him. Kim Sanggi, Sam py61ch'o 
wa ui ku ui nan e tae hayo ^ ^j ;^,j/ Jj. X ^j ^[^ »^j ^|'^ ^\ o^j 
[Concerning the Sam pydlchfo and their Rebellion], incorporated in pp. 
92-204, Tonghang munhiva kyoryu-sa non'go ^^f] iL jll, X- ^-^^j ^ 
yk 5^ (^°l' ^ °^ *^® Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsS ^^ ]^ ji 1"^%^ ) 
Seoul, 1948, pp. 124-125, and pp. 155-156 note 24, points out that he is 
probably also the Song Ui 5t^^ who was Coadministrator of the Bureau 
of Military Office in the court of W6njong in 1270 at the time of the trans- 
fer of the capital back to Kaegyong and who is described as a subordinate 
officer who was promoted for just such an action as is described for Song 
Tukch'ang. A certain H6 Kongjae J-^ ^i\ A ^"^ ^^®° mentioned in the 
Koryo missive but I have been unable to identify him {YKC 3b; KS 23. 14). 

69. The last cited Kory6 missive is dated the third month of 1232 and corre- 
sponds to the withdrawal of Mongol forces from KoryS. These forces 
were subsequently sent against P'u-hsienWan-nu in the Liaotung area, 
hence the request for troops from Koryfi. (Cf. YKC 8b • the request was 
made in 1232). Portions of the Liaotung area had been repeatedly 
scorched by warfare (cf. YS 59. 5a), in 1216, for example, the Mongols 
had defeated 30 000 Chin troops at Kai-chou-kuan f^ j)\ %^ , driving 
them eastward to Ta-fu-ying ^ ^^^ ^^^- ^^ ^^^' '7b-8a). Hence the 
requests for farming families to be sent to Kai-chou-kuan. Chung-kuo 
ku-chien ti-ming ta-tz\u-tien, p. 9'^4A identifies Kai-chou as the pres- 
ent Feng-ch'eng /|[j ^m.. Ta-fu-ying was on an island in the Yalu River, 
near the modern Uiju. 

70. As accused, Koryo had not sent envoys to the Mongol court prior to 1232, 
and this wa*= in accordance with the original agreement. Because the 
roads were blocked, the Mongols were to send envoys to collect the trib- 
ute. According to YKC, the first Kory6 embassy went to the Mongol Court 


in the fourth month of 1232, and a second embassy went in the tenth month 
of 1232 {YKC 3b). There were, of course, many envoys sent to the garri- 
sons of the Mongol field commanders in Kory6. 

The Cha-la mentioned here, however, presents a problem. CS Vol. 3, 
No. 4, p. 104, postulates an identification with the envoy Chu-ku-yii. 
Yanai, op. cit., p. 143 note 2, suggests a textual lacuna and believes 
that the Cha-la mentioned here is an error for Han-she im ^^ , the 
Ch'i-tan leader at Kangdong in 1218-19. Yanai's supposition of an omis- 
sion in the text is based on what he terms the faulty grammatical struc- 
ture, but this could be said for the entire missive which is written in a 
colloquial style and Yanai is rather quick to solve problems by suggest- 
ing lacunae or textual corruption — although he is quite often correct. If 
it is assumed that as far as the name is concerned we are dealing with 
a certain Cha-la, then both the CS and Yanai's suggestions must be dis- 
carded on linguistic grounds, as must the equation of Cha-la with Sa-li-ta 
(Sartaq). Who then is this Cha-la? 

According to the documents in TYSC 28, following the slaying of the en- 
voy Chu-ka-yii, P'u-hsien Wan-au informed a Mongol representative in 
his territory that Koryfl had turned away from the Mongols. In order to 
learn the truth of the matter, the envoy set out for Kory5 but was am- 
bushed by Wan-nu's men who dressed in Korean clothing and killed the 
envoy in the mountainous border area between the two nations — ac- 
cording to the Kory6 explanations (cf. TYSC 28. 14b-17b). This envoy 
must have been the Commissioner of the Eastern Lu-administration, 
tung-lu-shih, Kory6 was accused of killing (cf. KS 23. 20b). This I would 
suggest is our Cha-la — again, assuming no textual error — and he is 
possibly the same Cha-la who was with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in 
1218-19. I note that a later Yiian missive, dated in 1249, mentions that 
Ho-ch'e /^ ^ and Cha-la ^\\ ^J were already dead and treats Cha- 
la, Chu-ku-yii and Sartaq as separate individuals. 

71. For kuanht] read ch^iiehf^i^l , an abbreviation of kung-ch^uek y^ ji^\ , 
'palace gates', an expression which was often used to designate the Em- 

72. Where I have rendered "to kill [them]" the text reads M fj) . While it 
may be an abridgement of a phrase like ^<| J^^ \^ %^ » ^ believe it is 
a simple compound but I am unsure of the meaning. 

73. ^-y- 5^5 = i^ ^ > i-e-, 3"^ ^ ; similar to the often used ///j^ igL for 

\^ % in Mongol documents contained in KS 23 and TYSC 28. 

74. The reasons for demanding a census were practical ones: taxation, cor- 
vee, and military service. In 1235-36, an extensive census of North 


China was carried out and on the basis of this, social status and obliga- 
tions were fixed. Cf. Schurmann, Economic Structure . . , , p. 7. While it 
remained an often repeated Yiian demand (cf. Qubilai's instructions to 
Kory6 W6njong in YKC 9b-10), KoryS avoided it as long as possible. 

75. Kory6 had said that the refractory ^^ peoples (perhaps a reference to 
Hong Pogw6n) of one or two cities in the north, in order to rebel f^ , 
had wantonly instructed ^ |^^,) the daru)ca6i of the city to slay the j)eople 
and the daruyaci had also killed the envoy sent by the Kory6 authorities 
{KS 23. 21a-b). Yet, Pian de Carpine remarked that when the Mongols 
held a city in siege that they would endeavor to entice the inhabitants to 
surrender and then, if they surrendered, would say to them "come out, 
so that we may count you according to our custom". When the people 
came out, the Mongols separated the artisans and those they desired as 
slaves and the rest they killed. Cf. pp. 37-38, C.Dawson, The Mongol 
Mission, London, 1955. Barthold, Turkestan . . . , p. 435-436, mentions 
chat at the fall of Gurganj in 1220, the artisans were separated from the 
rest of the population and "The children of tender years and young women 
were made prisoners; the remainder of the inhabitants were killed." 

In one instance, when the Mongol took a Kory6 city, all males over the 
age of ten were killed and the girls, women, and young boys were divided 
among the soldiers. Cf. p. 29, Yu Hongnyftl ^M ^^ },'), , Kory6 ui W6n e 
taehan kungnyo -, J) ^ 5^) iG °^] ^j ^ % -^ ["Presentation of 
Women from Kory6 to the Yuan Court"], The Chintan Hakpo j^yf^^ ,^ 
^^ (published by the Chintan Society, Seoul), 18 (1957), pp. 25-46. 

76. Howorth, op. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 135, summarizes this edict but mentions a 
different fifth offense, viz., ". . . fifthly of having killed his prefects." 
The majority of Yiian edicts contained in YKC end with the phrase J^X^^q 

r^ t^ ^a ;L i:. :^ ^ If. ^ $ (e.g., YKC 6a, 6b, 8a, 9b) a 
closing formula of which Vernadsky says, ". . . the Great Yasa of Chingis 
Khan recommended the following formula: "If ye resist — as for us what 
do we know? The everlasting God knoweth what will happen to you." 
See p. 96, G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, The Mongols and Russia 
(a history of Russia, 3 vols, published to date ?), New Haven, 1953; 
W.Kotwicz' articles in Collectanea Orientalia 4 (1933) and 10 (1936) are 
cited but neither are available to me. In iiTS 23. 4a we find the initial for- 
mula often used in Mongol correspondence employed. For a discussion of 
these formulae see Vernadsky and Karpovich, loc. cit., and the works 
cited therein^ also see G. Vernadsky, 'The Great Yasa of Chingis Khan', 
p. 345. A discussion of the initial formula may be found on pp. 135-139 of 
Wladyslaw Kotowicz, 'Formules initiales des documents Mongols aux 


xme etXIVe ss', Rocznik Orientalistycsny, 10 (1934), pp. 129-157, the 
only article of W.Kotowicz I have been able to see. Lien-sheng Yang, 
'Marginalia to the Yiian Tien-chang', HJAS 19 (1956), pp. 42-51 has 
pointed out (p. 44) that imperial decrees normally used in North China 
were translated from Mongolian into colloquial Chinese and designated 
sheng-chih -^ o > ^ term often found in Mongolian edicts sent to 
Koryo. Yang also discusses opening and closing phrases in Chinese which 
appear in these documents. 

77. The text {YKC 4b) mentions "Within your borders, the ten walled -cities 
[subordinate to] the Western Capital which are under the jurisdiction of 
Kim Sinhyo,_ et al. . . . " || i_ ^f^ ^ ,^ ^^ ^k \% ^ % f\\ f 

^ '^'^^^ • ^ fi^*^ this passage a bit strange since there is no mention 
of Kim Sinhyo in the Koryo records. There is also the possibility that the 
text is corrupt and that the two characters vm ^ should come between 
the characters j^^ and ^ . In such case we would read, "Within your 
borders, the ten- walled cities of Kum(s6ng), Sin(s6ng), Hyo(s6ng), etc., 
which are subordinate to the Western Capital ..." YKC 5b mentions the 
capture of a Sins6ng /j^ J^ , a Kumsansfing /^ ^ ^^ and a Kumdong- 
s6ng /^ 3l^ ^4 . 

78. P'u-hsien Wan-nu's state fell in the ninth month of 1233 and Wan-nu was 
beheaded (cf. rS 11; FS 59. 5b). 

79. Yanai, op. cit., p. 114, p. 116 note 8 and p. 117 note 1, argues that this 
occurred in the tenth month of 1233 and not in the fifth month as recorded 
in the KS. Hong PogwSn's petition to move to the Liaotung area due to 
Jur6en, Ch'i-tan and Kory6 attacks in the tenth month would seem to sup- 
port this. Yet, one would think that Kory6 would have endeavored to re- 
take the lost territory in the northwest while the Mongols were attacking 
P'u-hsien Wan-nu, whose state fell in the ninth month of 1233. The Mon- 
gols were also busy with a final drive upon the Chin capital which fell in 
the first month of 1234. Therefore, I have followed /CS. Hong's petition, 
incidentally, is evidence that it was the entire northwest and not merely 
the area of the Western Capital which Hong held, for the JiirCen and Ch'i- 
tan attacks would have been much further north than the Western Capital 
and probably reference is made to border cities. 

80. P'il Hy6nbo ^ ^ ^ (d. 1234), see BTKP 99. 930. BTKP incorrectly 
renders the last character as po^M ; it should read po ^ , 

81. Sdnyusa ^ i'^'i$_ ^^ simply a rather lofty way of saying Pacification 
Commissioner. In KSC 15. 22b5 we find a sdnyusa who was a general ap- 
pointed earlier {KSC 16. 22a8-9) to pacify the rebellion of Han Sun at Uiju. 

82. Ch6ng Ui 'M^{d. 1233), see BTKP 17. 164 2indBTKP 17. 165. 


BTKP's ChSng Ui ^g ||l is the same person as their Chftng Oi '0 ^ 
which a simple cross-check of their references indicates. There is a 
brief biography in KS 121. 10 ff. 

83. Pak Nokch6n ^j. ^>^S^ (d. 1233), see BTKP 94. 878. Little is known of 
him beyond his unsuccessful trip to the Western Capital. 

84. The number 3 000 is consistently used for the number of men in the house 
army of the Ch'oe clan and I suspect that it is a pseudo-number and should 
read 'several' rather than 'three' thousand. For such usage see p. 218, 
Yang Lien-sheng, 'Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History', 
HJAS 12 (1949) 1, pp. 217-225. 

85. The phrase 'the forty walled-cities' occurs repeatedly in the Kory6 rec- 
ords and it is simply a reference to the northwest section of the country, 
i.e., the Northwestern Frontier -District. 


Chapter III 


By late 1233, Mongol armies led by Prince Giiyiik and Prince Al6itai 
ytit ^'^•^ 1) had completed the conquest of P'u-hsien Wan-nu's Eastern 
Jur6en; in the first month of 1234, the Mongol forces, supported by Sung 
troops who were to get the Honan area for their participation, seized the Chin 
capital at Feng-ching and completed their conquest of North China. Then, at 
the Quriltai held by Ogodei in 1235, it was decided to field armies against 
KoryO, the Southern Sung, and the nations west of the Volga, while a fourth 
group was sent to the borders of Cashmir 2). 

In the seventh month (July 17 - August 15) of 1235, Mongol troops raided 
the Eastern Defense Command, anby&n toho-pu. Coastal defenses were hur- 
riedly begun on Kanghwa and the inhabitants of the Southern Capital and near- 
by Kwangju were ordered to evacuate their cities and come to the island {KS 
23. 29b). The next month the Mongol offensive, under the command of Tanqut- 
batur 2| and Hong PogwOn opened Avith the capture of Yonggang f^ [h^j , Ham- 
jong J^ 1x1 J ^'^^ Samdung ,^^^, major cities in S6hae Province {YKC 5b; 
KS 23. 29b; YS 208. 4a). Later that year the Mongols began throwing Eastern 
Jiirden troops into the battle in the northeast {KS 23. 30a). During late 1235, 
Mongol and Eastern Jiirten forces had pushed down Korea's rough eastern 
littoral as far as Haep'y6ng 3;^^ (mod. Sangju/:^ ^)]\ ) {KS 23. 30a). But 
these forces were only an advance group; in the tenth month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 
11) of 1235, reports sent in by the military commissioners in the northeast 
and northwest all told the same story: many Mongol soldiers crossing the 
frontier {KS 23. 30a). 

In the spring of 1236, Mongol forces which had been camped in some 
seventeen places in the north {KS 23. 31a-b), began moving south. Hwangju 
^ y}] , Sinju /) J :)-)] , and Anju ':g^ jj-^ fell in the third month (April 8 - 
May 6) of 1236 {KS 23. 31b); in the eighth month (Sep. 2 - Oct. 1), Mongol 
forces had reached Kaeju ph jj] '{KS 23. 31b); the following month encoun- 

ters were reported at the Southern Capital, and south of the Han River at 
P'y6ngfaek -3^ 3^ , Aju ')\- -»] , and Hayang-chang 3^ f^jt' ^^ *^® 


onset of winter (November), Mongol forces had penetrated to Chonju^) {KS23. 
32a), some 470 kilometers south of the Yalu. 

During this period, Kory6 did not once attempt to field an army against 
the Mongols, nor was there any Mongol attempt to storm the island of Kang- 
hwa, either at this time or later 5). Kory6 offensive action was limited to the 
guerrilla-like raids of small patrols, pydlch'o, which harassed the Mongols 
with surprise night-raids and ambushes in Korea's many mountains (e.g., KS 
23. 29b). Population centers which had strong defensive installations and ca- 
pable garrisons like Ch6nju, Ch'ungju, etc., were left to defend themselves. 
The people of the small towns, unprotected cities, and scattered settlements 
in the valleys were evacuated to coastal islands and mountain citadels of re- 
fuge {e.g.,KS 23. 29b); this latter defensive measure was once again to as- 
sume large proportions as it had previously in 1231-32. 

On Kanghwa Island an elaborate set of defensive works was erected (e.g., 
KS 23. 29b; KS 23. 33b). Kory6 also attempted to stimulate the northern Chi- 
nese and the JiirCen to continue resistance to the Mongols at this time but 
little is known of the outcome of their efforts (cf. TYSC 28. 24a-25b). 

There were also actions of a spiritual or religious nature of which the 
greatest were Buddhist activities although the astrologers and diverse divin- 
ers were not overlooked. One astrologer submitted the suggestion that the sun 
be worshipped during the morning hours from 7 AM to 11 AM in order to 
exorcise the Mongol troops from the peninsula (fiTS 23. 29b) ^K 

But undoubtedly the greatest religious activity directed toward the re- 
moval of the invaders was the monumental task of recarving the Buddhist 
Tripitaka, Taejanggydng -):^ f^ i|^. Begun in 1237, the 81 137 woodblocks 
comprising the Tripitaka were completed some sixteen years later in 1251 
(cf. KS2A. 2b-3a; KS 129. 50b) "7). A similar Buddhist activity was the chaehoe 
M^ /^ designed to cleanse or purify the nation in which Buddhist monks 
were feasted. There are many records of '30 000 monks' being feasted (e.g., 
1225 - KS 22. 28b; 1231 - KS 23. 2b; 1238 - KS 23. 35a, etc.) and this is often 
interpreted to show the strength of Buddhism in Kory6. Such an interpretation 
misses the mark. First, 30 000 is a pseudo-number and refers to all the 
monks in the nation 8). Second, the ceremony which dates to Silla times was, 
of course, religious in origin and concept but it was, like the carving and re- 
carving of the eighty -one thousand xylographs of the Buddhist Tripitaka, a 
religious act designed to exorcise or scourge invaders from the land ^'. Fur- 
ther, it was largely the Court and not the military government which devoted 
themselves to these activities. In fact, the frequent Buddhist ceremonies in 
which the King participated is evidence that his power was symbolic rather 
than actual at this time. And in this respect there is a striking analogy be- 


tween the Kory6 coxirt under the military government and the Japanese Court 
under the HojO Regents ^^'. 

The Mongol onslaught brought with it a renewal of desertions from the 
Kory6 ranks which continued the build-up of a strong Korean settlement in 
Liaotung. In the fifth month (June 14 - July 12) of 1238, a certain Cho Hy6nsvip 
$M. i\ f J ^"^ 0^6 Yi W6nu -i: j^ jj!.^ submitted to the Mongols with 2 000 
men. Cho was given a Silver Plaque or authority of a Chiliarch, chHen-hu,2cci^ 
he and his people were placed under the command of Hong Pogw6n in Liaotung. 
A certain Yi Kunsik -^ ^ ^ also submitted with twelve people at this time 
{YKC 5b; YS 208. 3a-4b). 

Despite Koryo efforts to resist, the Mongols were too much. Another re- 
spite was desperately needed and peace negotiations were opened in the win- 
ter 11) of 1238 (JKC 6a) with Kory6 pledging eternal submission {KS 23. 33b- 
34b; KSC 16. 27a-b). The Kory6 envoys returned with the Yiian reply in the 
spring of 1239 {JKC 6a), accompanied by twenty Mongols (A"S23. 34b). With 
the opening of negotiations and the Kory6 submission, the Mongol troops with- 
drew (KS 23. 34a). 

One of the demands brought by the first delegation of Mongol envoys was 
for the King to present himself at the Mongol Coxirt; a second delegation of 
137 Mongols brought a similar demand a few months later i^S 23. 34b; KSC 
16. 28a). As the Kory6 Queen Dowager, Vaehu 'j^)'^ , had died just at this 
time {KS2Z. 34b), the King used the three-year mourning period (cf. KS&A. 
22b) to avoid the demand ( YKC la; YKC 6b). It was still to be many years be- 
fore the Mongols would be able to coax the King even across the straits to the 
mainland. KoryO used many excuses: the King was ill {KS 24. 7b-8a), mourn- 
ing for his mother {YKC la; YS 208. 4a), later he was too old {KS2A. 3a-b; 
KS 24. 7a-8a), etc. Yet the Mongol demands, particularly their demand for a 
hostage, could not be ignored. KoryO's first effort was to dispatch Ch6n 12), 
the Duke of Sinan {KS 23. 34b), whom they passed off as the King's younger 
brother (cf. YKC 8a), to the Mongol Court with a retinue of 148 men to present 
a petition and tribute {YS 208. 4a). For the next several years he scurried 
back and forth conveying Mongol demands and Kory6's evasive replies. 

At this point the Mongols repeated some of their demands in a forcefully 
worded edict which called for Kory6 to endeavor to fulfil several specific 
instructions: to leave the islands, to take a census of the people and submit 
household registers, to produce hostages, to submit annual tribute, and to 
produce those who had transgressed (by advocating resistance, i.e., Ch'oe U, 
et al.) {YKC 6b -8a). 

The pressure for the King to visit the Mongol Court and the demands for 
hostages resulted in a bit of fakery. "In the summer, the fourth month of the 


twenty -eighth year of the reign (of Kojong = May 13 - June 10, 1241), they took 
a royal relative. Sun ^^), the Duke of Y6ngny6ng, and proclaimed him to be 
the [Crown] Prince. Leading ten officials and male relatives, he entered the 
Mongol [Court] as a hostage" 14) (^s 23. 35a-b; also see KS 87. 9a; YS 2. 7a; 
YS 208. 4b; ^F20. 25a). The substitution was not discovered until some four- 
teen years later and it is easy to imagine a look of disbelief on Mongke's face 
when he asked Wang Sun, "Why did you call yourself the Prince before?" 

Sun replied: "[When] I, [Your] Servant, was small, I was broi^ht up in 
the palace and I believed that the King was my father and I regarded the Queen 
as my mother. I didn't realize that I was not [their] hostage son" {TT 32. 56. 
4-5; also see ^"5 99. 5a). 

Wang Sun was of royal blood, but his family had branched from the 'main 
stem', taejong yv^ ^ , several generations back and, moreover, Chon^Ji|. , 
the Crown Prince, was then twenty -two years of age and qualified as a hostage. 
Thus, Sun was, in this case, unacceptable. Yet Sun, the Kory6 sacrificial goat, 
was to serve the Mongols loyally and even to marry a Mongol Princess, one of 
the daughters of Mongke; the first link by marriage between the Mongol and 
KoryS royal families. 

And so, in 1241, the thirteenth year of the reign of Ogodei, the great 
Mongol General Uyer 15) led seventeen-year old prince Sun, and the rela- 
tives 16) of Hong Pogwftn, whose release Tanqut-batur had been instructed to 
obtain two years earlier (cf. YKC 5b), to the Mongol Court at Qara-qorum. 
Ogodei was so pleased, it is related, that he awarded tjyer with the office of 
supreme military commander over seven ZM^^('province') administrations 
{YS 120. 15a; KS 130. 4b; YKC 6a. 10). 

This engendered a truce which was to last, after a fashion, until 1247 1"^), 
Koryo tribute missions, which recommenced as a preliminary effort in late 
1239, once again trekked toward the Mongol Court (ft:S 23. 36a; YKC 6b; YKC 
8a) and buildings began to spring up at Sungch'6n-pu, the jumping-off point 
for Kanghwa on the mainland, for the lodging and entertainment of the frequent 
Mongol envoys. The question on Kanghwa was how long they would be able to 
avoid the frequently repeated Mongol demand for the removal of the court and 
officials back to the former capital (e.g., YKC 7a). While the Mongols were, 
some years later, able to get the King to cross to the mainland for short per- 
iods to meet Mongol envoys, Ch'oe U and his successors, were to remain on 
the island the rest of their lives. For it was principally Ch'oe U and the mili- 
tary faction surrounding him who were responsible for Kory6's continued re- 
sistance. The breathing spell was used to recover and re-equip. One measure 
taken was to send the active Min Hui, et al., 37 men to the southern provinces 
in 1243; "they were called Special Supervisors for the Encouragement of 


Agriculture, ktvdnnong pyolgam 18) ^jj W '^\] ^, but really they were 
to prepare the defenses" (/fS 79. 7b-8a; KS 2Z. 36a-b). 

The Mongol reaction to the continued Kory6 stalling was as expected ^^>. 
It was decided at the Quriltai which elected Giiyiik (Ting-tsung ^^ ^^ , r. 
1246-1248) in August of 1246 20)^ to launch an attack on Koryo and, in the 
autumn of 1247, a Mongol force, commanded by Marshal A- mu-k' an jJ^ -1^ 
y]j\(j and supported by Hong Pogw6n, arrived to camp in the Y6mju J:& -)j-] 
(mod. Y6nan J^ }^ ) area {KS23. 39a-b; YKC 8a). In early 1248, the Kory6 
authorities issued an order to the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the 
Northern Frontier -District to lead the inhabitants of all the walled-cities in 
the northern district to seek safety on the coastal islands {KS 23. 39b-40a). 

Frequent groups of mounted Mongols appeared who said they were hunting 
but whom the Kory6 authorities suspected of being reconnaissance groups 
(e.g., KS 23. 39b) and we read that "the S6hae Province ^^ 3^ j^ Circuit 
Commissioner, anch^al-sa, reported that forty mounted barbarians forded 
the Ch'6ngch'6n River 3^ 'M iJll a-nd entered the borders saying they were 
hunting marmots. Due to this, all the yanghan (i.e., military and civil offi- 
cials) 21) who had gone to Songdo jl^j/^^fi i- Kaegy6ng) returned to Kanghwa." 
At the time, they had sent the yangban to go in shifts to guard Songdo {KS 23. 
40a). This passage would imply Mongol control north of the Ch'ongch'on River 
which is not unbelievable as some cities in the northwest are recorded in the 
Yuan records as having been retaken at this time (cf. YKC 8a). There was, 
moreover, no real offensive launched southward from this area. Further, 
Chon, the Duke of Sinan, who had been sent to the Mongol Court in the tenth 
month (Oct. 22 - Nov. 20) of 1245 (ATS 23. 38a), returned in early 1249 (XS 23. 
40b) just after news had come in of the death of Giiyiik, the Mongol Emperor 
{KS 2Z. 40b), which implies relations had not been severed. The Mongols did, 
at any rate, control the area north of the Ch'6ngch'6n River but it should 
probably be viewed as 2ifait accompli which the Kory6 authorities had no al- 
ternative but to accept. In support of this, we see that from the third month 
(April 4 - May 3) of 1250, all the people of the North(western) Frontier-Dis- 
trict, pukkyCf were moved southward to the Western Capital, Kaegyong, and 
Sohae Province area (cf. ^"5 23. 42a; /i'SC 16. 41a). 

There was, however, no lull in the arrival of Mongol delegations in Koryo 
nor the dispatch of envoys to the Mongols by Kory6 (e.g., KS 23. 24a). Koryo' s 
relations with the Eastern Jiirten were as bad as ever despite the fact that 
both nations were nominally under the Mongol cloak. In answer to a dispatch 
from an Eastern Jiirfcen Chiliarch received in the spring of 1247, which in- 
formed Kory6 that they would send some fifty men into Kory6 territory to 
search for fugitives who had fled into Kory6, Kory6 replied that between the 


two nations, the mountains were formidable and the roads perilous and there- 
fore empty of travellers. The reply went on to accuse the Eastern Jiirten of 
raiding Kory6 under the pretext of hunting or tracking down fugitives and sug- 
gested that the matter be submitted to the Mongol Emperor; the frontier, 
Kory6 said, was to be considered closed (KSC 16. 36a). Hostilities flared 
briefly with raiding Eastern Jiirten troops in late 1249 and extended into late 
1250 {KS23. 41a-43a). 

In the interim, additional fortifications were erected on Kanghwa Island 
{KS 23. 43a) which now consisted of coastal defenses along the side of the 
island facing the straits {KS 23. 29b), an outer defensive wall on the island 
{KS 23. 33b), and a middle defensive wall around the city of Kangdo {KS 23. 
43a). To the queries of the Mongol envoys who pointed out that they had already 
submitted, Kory6 replied that the installations were for the protection of the 
people from Sung 'pirates' 22) (^kS 23. lb). While there was a germ of truth in 
the statement, the additional fortifications were erected just after Ch'oe 
Hang 23)^ tj^e son of Ch'oe U, took over control of the Koryo military govern- 
ment upon his father's death in 1249 {KS 23. 41a-b). 

Defensive installations did not, of course, constitute the sole construction 
on Kanghwa Island. In the city of Kangdo ^X;^6 which served as the capital 
on the island, palaces and governmental buildings were slowly build through 
the years. The King who had first been lodged in a hostel, was moved into the 
home of a general {KS 23. 28a). Shortly thereafter, mention is made of an 
audience chamber, naejdrl y^ J^^ {KS 23. 27a), but not until 1243, is the main 
palace, porC gwol j^ fM , mentioned {KS 23. 37a). After the transfer to the 
island, it is related, the designations of the ball fields, the palaces, temples, 
and shrines all resembled those of the former capital, while the many Bud- 
dhist festivals and assembles were all performed according to the old cere- 
monies {KS 23. 28a). One manner in which this was done was the utilization of 
private dwellings already on the island. An example of this is the confiscation 
of a private residence which was designated Pongun Temple ;^SL }^- ^ after 
its famous namesake on the mainland {KS 23. 27a). Among the buildings of in- 
terest were the National Academy, Kukchagam ]^ -^ ^^ built in 1251 and 
located in Hwasan-dong 1^^ J_] ^]Q {KS 24. 2b) and the Office for Xylographs 
of the Tripitaka, Taejanggybng p^andang y^ ^ ^^ A'A,'^ located outside 
of the west gate of the city {KS 24. 2b-3a), where in 1251, as related above, 
the recarving of the Tripitaka was completed 24), 

Of interest also are the buildings belonging to the ruling Ch'oe clan which 
included the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe Clan, Chinyang-pu ^ '^ )j^ 
{KS 23. 33a). But more spectacular were the Ch'oe mansion and grounds. In 
1234, Ch'oe U had used the Guard Corps, tobang ^^ ^ , and 4000 soldiers 


to transport lumber by ship from the old capital, in the process of wh^rh it is 
said many were drowned. They also brought back enough pine and juniper trees 
to make a park 'several tens of li ' in area by the Ch'oe mansion {KSC 16. 
22a). One of the sights of the new capital was Ch'oe U's 'winged pavilion', 
sipcha-gak "^ ^ ^ > so-called because it was built in the form of a cross 
and which, a contemporary assures us, "Truly it is that which has never been 
seen among men" {TYSC 24. la). It was located to the west of Ch'oe' s resi- 
dence — to the south was an enormous tower, said to be capable of seating 
1 000 persons, which overlooked the Ch'oe polo field [TYSC 24. 3b-4D). Both 
Ch'oe U and his successor Ch'oe Hang were fond of polo, kyokku 25) i^ ^ ^ 
which was chiefly a military sport in Kory6 and often played by the Kory6 ca- 
valry units, sin^gi (e.g., KS 81. 13b). At times the matches sponsored by the 
Ch'oe clan had the appearance of festivals. The King and Chief Ministers were 
invited and often featured javelin throwing and mounted archery; competition 
was flavored by awarding prizes while at times the meets continued for five 
or six days {KS 129. 35; KS 129. 45b). 

The death of Ch'oe U in the winter of 1249, brought with it the expected 
repercussions. The Guard Corps, tobang, immediately assembled at Ch'oe 
Hang's residence {KSC 16. 39a), although Ch'oe U had thoughtfully given his 
son five hundred men of his own house army the previous year {KSC 16. 38a). 
Two of the first casualties were Director of Affairs for the Bureau of Military 
Affairs, chich^umirwdnsa, Min Hui and Coadministrator of the Bvireau of Mili- 
tary Affairs, Kim Ky6ngson, who were exiled to islands. Several other mili- 
tary and civil officials, and thirty of Ch'oe U's concubines suffered the same 
fate {KSC 16. 39a). Reassured of his position, Ch'oe Hang, in an attempt to 
gain popularity among the people, remitted the special regional tribute and 
the fishing boat and fish-pond taxes of several regions (KSC 16. 39b). But 
these measures were to small avail. The first attempt to overthrow Ch'oe and 
to restore power to the monarch occurred in the third month (April 4 - May 3) 
of 1250, when Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, one Chu Suk 
)^ ^ (d. 1250; BTKP 19. 180), attempted to use the Guard Corps, tobang, 
the Night Patrol, ya pyolch^o, and some soldiers to this end. Chu's indecision 
led to the failure of the plot and resulted in a wide-spread purge {KS 129. 43a; 
KSC 16. 40a-41a; TT 32. 60) which lasted into the following year when Ch'oe 
Hang used the Night Patrol, ya pydlch^o, to eliminate his stepmother of the 
Tae clan, her family, including a son by a former husband, and her slaves 
{KS 129. 45b-46a; KSC 17. la-2b; TT 32. 63). 

In addition to his Chinyang fief 26) and large land holdings in the Kaegy6ng 
area, Ch'oe Hang also inherited control of the organs of the military govern- 


Let us pause at this point for a brief consideration of these mechanisms 
and their development 27). 

The Chungbang ^ J^ or Military Council was one of the earliest organs 
to be utilized and traces its origins to the reign of Mokchong;^^^ '^ (r. 998- 
1009) when it was established as a central headquarters for the high military 
generals of the army and the royal guard units {KS 11. 30a). 

The early military rulers, i.e., before the rise of the Ch'oe clan, r\iled 
through the Military Council (see HY 17. 3a) and control of the Military Coun- 
cil, i.e., the military men who comprised it, was essential to the retention of 
power since these military men commanded the various units of the govern- 
ment army 28). During the reigns of tJijong and My6ngjong, the Military Coun- 
cil grew in importance ifCS 11. 30a) until it not only handled military affairs 
but also handled criminal cases; regulated trade to the extent of setting mar- 
ket prices and standardizing the bushel {kok) and peck [tu) measures {KSC 12. 
51b-52a). Military officials were placed in charge in all the provincial posts 
in 1172 {KS 19. 22b), a necessity in the capital as well due to the purge of the 
literati. An exception were the Administrators, p^an^gwan, of the chu and 
chin administrations in the two Frontier-Districts who were not allowed mili- 
tary appointments (KSC 12. 30a). Following the rise of the Ch'oe clan, the 
Military Council lost its importance as a central governing authority and many 
of its functions were shifted to other organs. After the overthrow of the Ch'oe 
clan in 1258, the Military Council was retained. It was abolished briefly in the 
reign of King Ch'ungs6n J^> 'J^ ,^(r. 1309-1313) but was reestablished and 
continued in use until the end of the Kory6 period {KS 11. 30a) 29). 

In 1209, Ch'oe Ch'unghon established the Kyojdng togam ^^)|l^6 fa. 
or Supreme Directorate as an emergency measure to put down an attempt to 
overthrow him {KSC 14. 25a-b). During the rule of Ch'oe U it assumed many 
of the functions previously handled by the Military Council and became the 
chief governing body of the military rulers who were appointed to head it as 
Supervisor, pyolgam. The Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate was, in 
brief, the military overlord and the appointment as Supervisor was always 
made by the King 30), following which all the officials would make their ap- 
pearance to present congratulations, etc. The Supreme Directorate, which 
lasted until the overthrow of the Im clan in 1270, supervised the various de- 
partments of government and it is said that "in general, all that which was 
implemented emanated from the Supreme Directorate" {KSC 15. 38a). Collec- 
tion (and remission) of special regional taxes and tribute was also handled by 
tax-collectors, suhwagivdn ^'\)l^j['^ ^ (lit. harvest-men) placed in the va- 
rious provinces by the Supreme Directorate; these officials were recalled 
when Ch'oe Hang assumed power and their duties were turned over to the Cir- 
cuit Inspectors, anclVal-sa {KSC 16. 39b). 


In the sixth month (July 7 - Aug. 5) of 1225, Ch'oe U established the 
Chongbang^^' j^\l^ or Civil Council in his residence. The officials of the 
Civil Council who were appointed government officials had private designa- 
tions, as opposed to the official title of their posts, viz., those who became 
ministers were called Chdngsaek sungsdn '-0^ ^ ^{^ ^^ or Ministers who 
were members of the Civil Council; those of the official grade of Third Class 
were called Chdngsaek sangso J^jxl o /^ ^ °^ Presidents of Departments 
who were members of the Civil Covmcil; those of the official grade of Fourth 
Class and below were called Chdngsaek sogyong j^ ^ ^j- ^|I] or Secreta- 
ries who were members of the Civil Council. Beneath the latter were selected 
literati called Chdngsaek soje i^3C S -f ^M- ^^ Scribes, who were also 
known a.s pHl-to-ji (Mo. bicigeii) ^2) ,j^ ^ jij-^ ^ ^ho carried writing mate- 
rials and made notations on matters brought up for Ch'oe' s decision by the 
officials of the Civil Council. It is related that at the time the Civil Council 
was established, all the officials had gone to Ch'oe U's residence to present 
the Annual Resume of Government chdngnydn tomok j^^^;^d ^ ^^^- As 
Ch'oe U sat and heard the reports, officials below the Sixth Class in official 
grade bowed twice, while those outside the hall prostrated themselves on the 
ground {KSC 15. 34b). The Annual R^sumd of Government undoubtedly included 
the personal record sheet, generally known as chdngan jt3C'^> which listed 
the merits and demerits of each official and which formed the basis for ad- 
vancement. The decisions reached in the Civil Council were passed on to the 
King who "simply handed them down and that was all." The Civil Council, at 
any rate, outlasted the military overlords. Following the fall of the Ch'oe 
clan it was established in an appropriate palace at the suggestion of the Con- 
fucianist Yu Ky6ng {KS 105. 2a). It was abolished in 1298, reestablished in 
1320, abolished and immediately reestablished in 1345, abolished and rees- 
tablished once more in 1352, and, during the reign of King Chang ^ (r. 1389), 
the designation was changed to Sangsd-sa /a] ^^ ^ {KS 75. 2b-7a; KSC 15. 
34b; IC sdlch'dn 1. 8b-9a; /C9A; CHSL 4. 25a). 

In addition to the above there were other organs and units associated 
closely with the Ch'oe clan. The Ch'oe holdings, for example, were handled 
by the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe clan, known first as Hungnydng-pu J^ 
!^>^ and later as Chinyang-pu ^ f^p{ • But far more important were 
the various military units which grew powerful during the rule of the Ch'oe 
clan, and which included the tobang or Guard Corps. The term tobang wzs 
originally used by the military overlord General Kyong Taesung for a select 
unit of 110 bodygviards he organized in 1179 and which was disbanded following 
his death in 1183. Shortly after Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n rose to power, a sudden cri- 
sis developed when his brother Ch'oe Ch'ungsu )^ J^ f^^ (d. 1197; BTKP 


24. 228) rebelled with 1000 soldiers. Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n subsequently formed a 
private guard unit, selecting those that were brave and strong from among 
the civil and military functionaries, and the soldiers. They were divided into 

six units, p6n >((_ 3^', to do guard duty on alternate days at the Ch'oe resi- 


dence and were called the tobang or Guard Corps; they also acted as an escort 
when Ch'oe left his home. Originally composed of six units, by 1257 their 
strength had increased to thirty-six units. During the rule of Ch'oe U, the de- 
signations Inner Guard Corps, nae -tobang y^ ^-^-^ , and Outer Guard Corps, 
oe -tobang ^ I ^^^ , appear which indicates a division of this large group al- 
though the reason for the division or its significance is unknown 35). The 
Guard Corps, although originally the private guard of Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n, as- 
sumed an important role as a power instrimient and the later military ruler • 
Im Y6n utilized a six unit Guard Corps. The Guard Corps was finally dis- 
banded in 1270 following the fall of the Im clan {KS 100, 18a; KS 129; HY 17. 
36; TT 29. 4; TT 34. 74; TUK 6. 36b-37a). 

Other military units included the Sdbang ^ ^ or Civil Guards estab- 
lished by Ch'oe U. It is related that among Ch'oe U's retainers, mun'gaek ^f 
p^ l^ , there were many learned scholars and so, in 1227, they were di- 
vided into three units. While their duties are not entirely clear and it is dif- 
ficult to see a distinction between the Civil Guards and the Guard Corps, they 
did act as a guard unit. It has been suggested that they were scribes who also 
did guard duty 3*^'. The Civil Guards were disbanded in 1270 following the 
downfall of the Im clan {KS 129; KS 130, 26b). 

A discussion of other military units associated with the military rulers 
and the Ch'oe clan in particular, is contained in the Appendix 'Patrols', 

As Ch'oe Hang was consolidating his own power, Mongol-Koryo relations 
which had been relatively calm during the interlude following the death of 

.. .. .. r^ 

Guyuk in 1248, once again became turbulent. When Mongke (Hsien-tsung ^, 
^^f^ , r. 1251-1259) ascended the throne, he repeated the two strong Mongol 
demands that the King visit the Mongol Court and that the Kory6 authorities 
leave Kanghwa Island and return to the old capital on the mainland {KS 24. 3a; 
KSC 17. 4a). The Chief Ministers and those of the official grade of the fourth 
rank and above discussed a reply to the edict. While it was suggested that the 
Crown Prince be sent to the Mongol Court, a second proposal was made that 
they could offer the excuse that the King was too old and ill to visit the Mon- 
gol Court and that there was still time to re-examine the proposition of send- 
ing the Crown Prince {KS 24. 3a-b). 

Some two thousand Eastern Jiirten troops were reported crossing the 
frontier in mid-1252 {KS 24. 4a), just prior to the arrival of a delegation of 


Mongol envoys who again endeavored to get the King to cross the straits and 
receive them. The Korean refusal to follow the Emperor's instructions infu- 
riated the Mongols {KS 24. 4b). By the autumn of 1252, Kory6 quietly began to 
prepare for the worst and Special Supervisors of Defense 38) were sent to all 
the mountain citadels of refuge {KS 24. 5a). In early 1253, three hundred Eas- 
tern Jiircen cavalry surrounded Tungju 39) in the northwest {KS 24. 5), a 
small raiding party was reported in the summer and then, a few days later, 
the gravity of the situation was revealed. Some inhabitants of W6nju^ 9:)] 
who had been taken captive by the Mongols, returned to inform the Kory6 
authorities that A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogw6n had told the Emperor that Kory6 
was building heavy fortifications and had no intention of returnii^ to the 
mainland. The Emperor, they said, had ordered the Imperial Brother Sung- 
chu 40) to take a force of 10 000, go through the nation of the Eastern JiirCen 
and enter from the Eastern Frontier -District. At the same time, he had or- 
dered A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogw6n to proceed to the Northern Frontier- 
District. These forces, the informants said, were then encamped at Ta-i- 
chou y'C^f '))] {KS 24. 6a). 

Actual operations were under Prince Yekii ^^' who sent a delegation of 
sixteen men to the Kory6 court in the fifth month of 1253 {KS 24. 6a), but ap- 
parently there was no change in the Korean position, for on August 3 {chia- 
shen ^ W day of the seventh month) of 1253, Mongol troops crossed the 
Yalu. Dispatches were immediately sent to the Circuit Inspectors, ancK'alsa, 
and the Civil Governors, sunmunsa, to lead the people to seek refuge in the 
mountain citadels and coastal islands {KS 24. 6b). By August 10 {ksin-mao 
^ pp day of the same month)^ Mongol forces had forced the Taedong River 
^>)^5X {KS24. 7a). 

An attack on Kanghwa was evidently anticipated, for the Koreans prac- 
ticed naval warfare in the straits, but far more active were the regional pa- 
trols, pydlch'o {KS 24. 7a). 

The KoryS Chief Ministers had debated whether or not the Crown Prince, 
tonggung j^ ^ , or his younger brother Ch'ang ^2) ^^ ^ the Duke of An'- 
gy6ng i^ j^ ^ , should be sent to lead the officials of the third rank and 
below out to submit {KS 24. 7; KS 130. 48b-49b). In a previous discussion re- 
garding submission, Ch'oe Hang told the ministers, all of whom advised sub- 
mission, that they had submitted the spring and autumn tribute continuously 
and they had sent three hundred persons (as envoys) who had not yet returned. 
Even though they submitted, Ch'oe said, he feared it would be profitless {KSC 
17. 8a-b). 

Even as they met, one Mongol force rode through the northeast pillaging 
and a second force was active in S5hae Province. Prince Yekii had sent mis- 


sives repeating the Mongol demands, informing the Kory6 authorities that he 
had been sent to find out if the King were really too old and sick to go to the 
Mongol Court, and he had set a limit of six days for the King to appear on the 
mainland {KS 24. 7b-8b). 

After sending gifts to the Mongol commanders, the Koryft Chief Ministers 
finally decided upon a reply: if the Mongol armies would withdraw, they would 
leave the islands and return to a peaceful life on the mainland (KS 24. 8b). 
Yekii replied that the troops could be withdrawn when the King came out and 
submitted; the alternative was to continue the fighting QCS 24. 9a). 

On the mainland the Mongol forces rode unchecked in groups numbering 
from ten to three thousand. As before, Kory6 maintained a defensive position 
with the exception of the raids of the patrols, pydlch'o, which were, in the 
main, limited to small-scale ambushes and surprise attacks (JKS 24. 8-14). 

Fierce fighting surrounded many of the cities whose garrisons could 
count on little save their own efforts to withstand the Mongol troops. Ch'ungju 
)^' "yy] managed to hold out through a seventy -day siege which began in the 
ninth month (Sept. 25 - Oct. 23) of 1253 (/<S 24. 9a; KSC 17. lOb-lla) chiefly 
through the efforts of Special Defense Supervisor Kim Yunhu. When provi- 
sions ran out, Yunhu advised his men to forget their class differences and 
then by way of encouragement, burned the government slave registers '^3) and 
divided up the livestock which had been captured. Yunhu also promised that 
all who put forth their best efforts would be given official rank. In this way, 
the soldiers were encouraged and Ch'ungju held {KS 24. 12a; KS 103. 39b-40a; 
KS 130. 9a; KSC 17. 14a). The Kory6 authorities kept Kim's pledge early the 
following year. Kim himself was made Supervisor of the Gate Guards, kam- 
munwi ^ f^ ^^^ , with the temporary rank of Supreme General, while those 
of his force, including the government slaves and the paekchbng ^^ ]^ J 
class, were given rank in accordance with their station {KS 103. 40a; KSC 17. 

Other cities were not so fortunate. At Ch'unju ^ j)\ the Mongols erect- 
ed a double barricade of wood around the city to prevent escape. Inside the city 
the wells ran dry and so the blood of the livestock was drunk. Some, in their 
hopelessness, burnt themselves and their families to death. An attempt was 
made by a dare-death squad to break through the palisade but it was unsuc- 
cessful!. In the end the Mongols slaughtered the inhabitants of the city {KS 24. 
9a; KS 121. 12a-b; KS 130. 9a). 

In the winter of 1253, Yekii fell ill at Ch'ungju - which was then under 
siege — and was told by a diviner that he should not remain long at that spot 
if he wished to recover. And so, leaving A-mu-k'an and Hong PogwBn to carry 
on, he rode north withl 000 picked cavalry. Koryft sent Hui 45)/'^ ^ t^e Count 


of Y6ngan ^^ ^ llil > to convey gifts to him at Kaegy6ng and to request the 
withdrawal of the Mongol forces. Yekii told them accusingly, "The troops can 
be withdrawn only when the King crosses the river to welcome my envoys." 
Then he sent Mangyudai, meng-ku-ta v^ -^ ^ , et al., 10 men to Kanghwa 
(ifS 24. lOa-b). 

There had been a great deal of discussion on Kanghwa about the approp- 
riate policy to follow in order to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces 
{KS 24. 8a; KS 24. 9b-10a) and they tried to win some respite by sending gifts 
to Yekii and his commanders, notably A-mu-k'an {KS2A. 8a-b; KS2A. 10a). 

These measures had proven ineffective and so when the delegation led by 
Mangyudai arrived at the new palace at Sungch'6n-pu, the King, who had for- 
merly received envoys at Chep'oy]^ 3m the entry point on Kanghwa (e.g., 
^"5 24. 6a-b), crossed to the mainland escorted by 80 men of the Night Patrol, 
ya pydlch^o, to meet them. Mangyudai accused the King of killing thousands 
to save himself and charged him to submit. At this point (1235.11 = 
Nov. 23 - Dec. 21), Yekii sent an envoy to tell them to establish daru^aci or 
resident commissioners and to dismantle the fortifications on Kanghwa. There 
was also a letter from one of his officials ^^i demanding gold, silver, otter 
pelts, ramie cloth, and other items (/CS24. 11a). Answering the letters, 
Kory6 replied that it was not their custom to live exposed and pointed out the 
tragic truth that they had been the target of plundering pirates since time 
immemorial. They also reminded Yekii that he had promised to withdraw his 
forces if the Kir^ crossed to the mainland to welcome his envoys but that the 
promise was not kept. On the contrary, they complained, his letter clearly 
indicated that the Mongols intended to establish daruyaci and to station 10 000 
troops in Kory6. How, they asked, could they be expected to return to the old 
capital on the mainland if this was the result of Yekii' s promise {KS 24. lla-b) 
To the demands for goods they pleaded insolvency but they did sent articles as 
evidence of their good faith {KS 24. lib). 

In the twelfth month (Dec. 22, 1253 - Jan. 20, 1254), the siege at Ch'ungju 
was finally lifted and, in the first month of 1254, Ch'ang, the Duke ot An'gy6ng, 
who was destined to play an important role in later events, was dispatched to 
the Mongol garrison (^"5 24. 12a; KSC 17. 15a) 47). 

Although the Mongols tried their hand at amphibious warfare, landing 
seven troopships on Kal Island ^ ^ in the second month (Feb. 19 - Mar. 20) 
of 1254, and taking captive thirty households {KS2A. 13a), the situation was 
relatively calm from the winter of 1253 when the siege of Ch'ungju was lifted. 
This is attributable to the withdrawal of Mongol forces following the dismissal 
of Prince Yekii due, not to illness, but to his resentment at being attached to 
the forces of Prince T'a-la-erh 48) 3^^') _^ • The forces under A-mu-k'an 


began their withdrawal In the spring of 1254 after the arrival of Ch'ang, the 
Duke of An'gy6ng, at their camp {KS 24. 12b). 

As the Kory6 monarch was getting into the habit of crossing to Sungch'on- 
pu, which by this time had grown to a small walled -city, to entertain Mongol 
delegations in a new Korean move toward reconciliation and, as a pestilence 
racked the capital {KS 24. 14a), a Master of Divination, chdnch'dm J^ ^ , 
of An'gy6ng-pu ^ j^' jf^ or Household Bureau of the Duke of An'gy6ng, re- 
turned from the Mongols with the news that the Emperor had commissioned 
Jalairtai, Che-lo-ta 49) ^ |;| -^ ^ to govern Tongguk 50) ^^ |^ ^ i.e., 
Kory6 {KS 24. 14a; KSC 17. 16a-17b). Shortly thereafter, a Mongol envoy ar- 
rived with a dispatch 51) which said that although the King had come to the 
mainland, Ch'oe Hang, Yi Ungny6l ^^JX » Chu Y6nggyu j^ Jc^i , 
and Yu Ky6ng 52) JM ^^^ had not come over. "Was this truly submission?" 
the note asked {KS 24. 14a-b) 53). 


Notes to Chapter III 

1. Cf. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, Vol. 1, p. 636; also see Yanai, Yuan-tai 
..., p. 70 ff andp. 114. 

2. Cf. Howorth, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 135; Boyle, op. cit., pp. 195-198; Yanai, 
YUan-tai . . . , pp. 117-118, who places this assembly in the autumn of 1234. 
Also see YS 2. 5a. 

3. Tanqut-batur ^ -^ y^^^f>^^ • Tanqut refers, of course, to the na- 
tion of that name, also known as Hsi-hsia. Batur, a contraction of Ba'atur 
(< Bavatur), means 'hero' in Mongolian. 

4. The city of Chonju J^ jj^ is in the modern N. Ctiolla Province. For topo- 
graphical and historical information see TYS 32. 548b-557b. 

b. It is generally said that the Mongols, unskilled in amphibious warfare, and 
with only a comparatively weak force in Kory6, were unable to take Kanghwa 
Island and so they tried to force the Koryo authorities off the island and at- 
tempted to bring about their submission by ravaging the mainland. See Yi, 
HarVgiik-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 567-568, and Yanai, Yuan-tai . . . , p. 127-128. 
Yanai, op. cit., p. 118, has also noted that the Mongols seldom concentrated 
their forces during this period but scattered in small groups to pillage. Yet, 
the Mongols certainly considered the idea of attacking Kanghwa and, in 
1232, had even built ships for that purpose. A certain Py6n Y6 -$:, ^ who 
had been captured at T'aeju, persuaded them that it was too dangerous to 
try and so they burnt the boats. Pyon managed to escape and was given the 
rank of Supreme General for his deed. Cf. TYS 54. 15b-16a. 

6. For the role of the astrologers, whose religious function is often overlooked, 
also see KS 24. 5b. For an example of monks as prophets see KS 23. 28a. A 
thorough study of the subject has been made by Yi Py6ngdo, Koryo sidae ui 
ydn'gu ^ ^ 1^^ /j'-^ o,j ^ 1^ [Research on the Kory6 Period], Seoul, 
1954; another excellent source is Part II of Hy6n Sangyun's ^ Jf^^ j^ , 
Chosdn sasang-sa -^j^ ^i, ^'M^'^ ^^^^* ^ published iv AY 3 (1960) 1, 
pp. 261-312 and Part n in AF 4 (1961) 1, pp. 299-355; presumably the other 
sections will also be published in future issues olAY. 

7. These endeavors have been well summed up by H.Hammitzsch and F.Vos, 
Die Religionen Japans und Koreas, Stuttgart, 1963 (Chapter 'Buddhismus'); 
"So wurde das Tripitaka [Taejang-gydng) zweimal gedruckt; das erste Mai 
(in der ersten Halfte des 11. Jahrhunderts) als eine Art Beschworungsmittel 
(!) gegen die Einfalle der Khitan, das zweite Mai zwischen 1237 und 1251. 
Die 81 258 Holtzplatten zum Druck der zweiten Ausgabe befinden sich heute 
in Haeinsa, einem KJoster auf dem Kaya-san, westlich von Taegu." 

The most detailed studies are Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, Vol. 2, 


pp. 483-642, Tokyo, 1937, and P.Demi^ville, 'Les Versions Chinoises 
du Milidapanha' , Bulletin de V Ecole Franqaise df Extreme -Orient XXIV 
(1924), pp. 1-301; see pp. 190-207. Also see L.G.Paik (Paek Nakchun 
]^ ^;^ ) 'TripHaka Koreana', TKBRAS XXXII (1951), pp. 62-78. 
The carving of the Tripitaka was done by the Bureau for the Tripitaka, 
Taejang togam ^ 0^ J^^ ^ , located outside the west gate of the city 
of Kangdo. It is interesting to note that this bureau also published the 
Hyangyak kugUp pang ^^p ^ ^<^%j 'O > *^^ old*^st surviving Korean 
medical text; a reprint was made in the reign of Yi T'aejong ;J\^ ^ 
(r. 1401-1418), and a second reprint in 1427. The sole surviving copy is 
at present in the Archives of the Imperial Household Bureau of Japan, cf . 
Doo Jong Kim (Kim Tuj6ng), 'Hyang Yak Ku Kup Pang', Bulletin No. 12, 
(I960) of The Korean Research Center, Seoul, pp. 35-36. 

8. Cf. Ninomiya Keinin -^ ^g* ^ ^i , Korai no saikaj ni tsuite ^ ^ 

O ^^i^ ll --0 . i -^ [TheKory6C;we;?oe], CG 21 & 22 (1961), 
pp. 228-236. 

9. The intent of the carving and recarving of the Tripitaka has been well 
summarized by Lee who says that "The intention of this enterprise was 
to repel the invading Tartars and Mongols by meritorious deeds to Bud- 
dha." Cf. P.H.Lee, 'Introduction to the Chang'ga: The Long Poem', 
Oriens Extremus, 3 (1956), pp. 94-115; also see TYSC 41 and note 7 

.10. See Sansom, op. cit., p. 441 for the situation in Japan at this time. 

11. Winter was normally an ideal time for negotiations. The repeated with- 
drawal of Mongol forces nOrth to the Yalu region during the winter was 
not a matter of weather alone but formed an important institution of 
nomadic life, the hunt. During the frequent periods of respite, Mongol 
forces in Kory6 often occupied themselves in hunting (e.g., KS 23. 40a). 
This was evidently a common practice and Bar Hebraeus (viz., Gregory 
Abu'l Faradj, 1225-1286) in his Chronography cites the Mongol Hunting 
Statue, "When (the Mongols) are unoccupied after a war with enemies, 
they shall devote themselves to the chase." Cited Vernadsky, ^The Scope 
...', p. 351. 

12. Ch6n/(^, the Duke of Sinan ^fj ^ '^ (d. 1261), was a descendant in 
the eighth generation of Hyonjong M^ ifv , but he was not Kojong's 
brother. Kojong had no brothers, as I have pointed out previously. This 
was simply a Koryo ruse which they had used before and were to use 
again. Ch6n was the son of Wang Ch'un ^ ^^> the Duke of Hawon 
3^ 5>^v^ (ci.KS 90. 9a-b), while Kojong was the son of Kangjong 
^ ^ (cf. KS 22. la; /CS 24. 44a-b). Chon's daup^hter later married the 


Crown Prince (= WSnjong) after the latter' s first wife had died. For bio- 
graphical information see KS 90. 9a-b; also see BTKP 114. 1068. 

13. Wang Sun ^ 0^ (1224-1283), the Duke of Y6ngny6ng J< ^ ^ , was 

a descendant in the eighth generation of Kory6 Hy6njong. He later married 
a Mongol Princess, one of the daughters of Mongke, and after the death of 
Hong Pogwon succeeded to the latter' s position as supreme commander of 
the Korean community in the Liaoyang -Shenyang area. He returned to 
Kory6 with Yekii's forces {cf.KSC 17. 7b-8a) and then with Jalairtai's 
forces and, in 1262, he led troops against the rebel Li Tan ^yf^ in the 
Chi-nan ^^ ^ area. In 1270, he led a contingent of troops to Koryo to 
aid in suppressing the rebellion of the Three Patrols, sam pyblcKo. He 
visited the Kory6 royal family at this time, but fell ill in the eleventh 
month of 1270 and returned to Liaoyang. He died in 1283 at the age of 61. 
He had several sons: Im^|^, Hwa^;^ , CheJ>;iJ_ , Hui ^£j , and Ong ^ . 
His YS 166 biography also mentions a son under the Mongol name of Wu-ai 
J[_j y^_ who went on to a rather successful career as a soldier. 
Yanai, Yuan-tai . . . , p. 119, says that Sun was sent as a hostage, never 
to return to his native land. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 569, says the 
same. This is incorrect. He returned with his family in 1270, as I have 
said above. Ci.KS 26. 34a. For biographical and historical information 
see KS 90. 7a-9a and YS 166. la-b; also see BTKP 119. 1114. 

14. The term fu-lu-hua j^ .^. ^^ , Mo. tuy^aq, 'guards', is defined fol- 
lowing its appearance in KS 23. 35b: "Thi-lu-hua, in Chinese they say 
hostage son, chih-tzu ^ -4- ," P.Pelliot, Notes sur Vhistoire de la 
Horde d'Or, pp. 15-16, defines the term as "garde du corps"; they were 
so called, because they often performed guard duty at court. Also see 

p. 518, Lien-sheng Yang, 'Hostages in Chinese History', HJAS 15 (1952), 
pp. 507-521; this study is also incorporated in Studies in Chinese Insti- 
tutional History, Cambridge, 1961. Reference to this substitution is men- 
tioned in a decree issued in 1268, cf. YKC 13a-b. 

15. iJyer, Wu-yeh-erh -^ -{Oj j^ , had accompanied Sartaq's forces in the 
conquest of Liaotung in 1230 and subsequently followed him into Kory6 in 
1231-1232. His activities in North China have been detailed by Martin, 
op. cit., passim. His biography in the Yuan shih makes it plain that a 
royal hostage had been demanded as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of 
Sartaq's forces earlier. According to this account, "Kory6 was afraid 
and requested peace. Wu-yeh-erh (Uyer) instructed them saying, 'If we 
can take the Heir Apparent as a hostage, then we will withdraw the 
troops.' " {YS 120. 15a). For the reconstruction of the name Uyer see 

p. 43, P.Pelliot, 'Notes sur le "Turkestan" de M. W. Barthold', TPXVU 
(1930), pp. 12-56. 

16. Hong Pogwftn's father, Hong Taesun ^jt ^^^H'^- 1218-1250) was not 
among those released. He was apparently freed in 1250. Cf. KS 23. 41b- 
42a; KS 130. 4b {YKC and YS 154. la write Hong Tae.s<:^n ;3L ^ ^£ ). 

17. Contributing to the peace was the death of 5godei in late 1241; the Em- 
press handled affairs until the election of Giiyiik in 1246. 

18. Pyblgam ^'J ^|j^ were special supervisors in charge of temporary bu- 
reaus; togam ^v^ ^ designated a supervisory bureau; kam ^^ desig- 
nated a supervisor of a permanent bureau. 

19. Yanai, Yiian-tai . . . , pp. 120-122, attributes the 1247 invasion of Korea 
to the Korean failure to submit tribute. 

20. Pian de Carpine mentioned that several princes of the Ch'i-tan and the 
Solanges (= Koreans) were present at the Mongol court at this time. Rei- 
erence is probably being made to Prince Sun. Cf. Rockhill, The Journey 
of William . . . , p. 20. 

21. When the Kory6 court was in formal session, the King sat facing south. 
The civil officials lined up according to rank on the east, hence the name 
tonghan ^ ^j£ or eastern file; they were also called mimban y^ p)j_ or 
literary group. The military officials lined up according to rank on the 
west, hence their designation soban ^^ ^jj, or western file; they were 
also called muban ^\ j^if^or military group. Collectively, they came to 
be known as yangban j^ ^j^ and this term took on the meaning of 'aris- 
tocracy, upper classes'. The term yangban is still used today, but 
chiefly as a term of reference meaning simply 'gentleman, gentlemen'. 
There was one other pan in the Kory6 system, viz., the namban y^ J.)^ 
or southern file, after their position at court, whose members consisted 
chiefly of palace functionaries who were as a group restricted to posi - 
tions up to, but not beyond, the official grade of Eighth Class. The posi- 
tions of the officials at court are set forth in detail in KS 67. 31b-32a. 
The yangban as a system was established in the 14th year of the reign of 
Songjong (r. 982-997), cf. Suematsu Yasukazu, Korai no shoki no ryOban 
ni tsuite ;j^ ^ O M % ^ >^ iii il ^ ^>\ [Concerning the 
Yangban of the Early Kory6 Period], TG 36 (1946) 2. 

22. Piracy had been endemic in Korean waters since time immemorial. Ko- 
rean coastal settlements were easy prey and the several thousand (3 000 
plus) islands along the Korean coasts made Korean coastal waters es- 
pecially attractive to freebooters. Who these Sung 'pirates' were I do not 
know. The powerful Sung pirates Chu Ch'lng ^^ ^^ and Chang Hsiian 

^^ 5^ are known to have had a large fleet operating in Chinese waters. 
Later, in 1290, after they had deserted to the Mongols, they were com- 
missioned to transport grain from Korea and Manchuria. Cf. Jung-Pang 


Lo, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance During the Reign of Qubilai 
Qaqan, 1260-1294', FEQ 13 (1954) 3, pp. 262-285 and H. F.Schurmann, 
op. cit., p. 126, note 3. Lo and Schurmann give several examples of Sung 
pirates who operated along the China coast in the thirteenth century. 
There were also many Chinese adventurers with the Wako. Brown, loc. 
cit., estimates that 20-30% were Chinese. In the seventh month of 1266, 
a Sung pirate ship was captured by the Koreans; seventy pirates were 
killed and five prisoners taken in the fighting. Cf. KS 26. 8a. For Eastern 
Jiircen pirates operating along the Korean coast earlier (in the eleventh 
century), see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Mansen-shi kenkyu. Vol. 2, pp. 265-348. 

23. Ch'oe Hang ^ 3/Lj (^- 1257) was the son of Ch'oe U by a dancing girl. 
He entered the Buddhist priesthood as a Zen (Kor. S6n)J'«^ priest with 
the name Manjon M-. ^ and gathered about him a band of rowdy follow- 
ers who terrorized the areas where he stayed. He was recalled to secu- 
lar life by Ch'oe U and given the name Hang ^fjj • He assumed power 
upon his father's death in 1249, and instituted a purge to secure his own 
position which extended to the elimination of his stepmother of the Tae clan, 
her relatives, and supporters. He initially took a girl of (presumably an- 
other) Ch'oe clan as a wife but he abandoned her when she became ill and 
married the daughter of Cho Kyesun ^ -^ ^a) , son of Marshal Cho 
Ch'ung. He had one son, Ui jjj] , as the result of illicit relations while 
he was a Zen priest. For biographical information see KS 129. 41b-52a; 
also see CHSL 4. 29b; and BTKP 24. 232. • -. 

24. For the various constructions on the island at this time see Yi Py6ngdo, 
Koryb Sidae ui Y6n''gu, pp. 275-278. 

25. Imamura Tomo /^ yf^^j %.]^ in his Chosen fuzojm shiryo shusetsu sen, 
hidarinawa, dakyu, pakachi j^^ %^ J^ f^ ^ jj^'| ^^ ^uj^ ^ ^^^ 

^^ 'kM> f^ ' ChGsenSotokufu, Keijo (Seoul), 1937, pp. 278-285, 
makes some disappointingly desultory comments on polo in Koryo and 
remarks that polo entered Koryo from T'ang China via P'ohai and that 
the first reference appears in 918 in the Koryo-sa. 

26. The Ch'oe fief in Chinyang ^ ^ (mod. Chinju ^ #) in S. Kyongsang 
Province) dates to 1205, when Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n was given an honorary 
fief of 1 000 households and actual fief of 300 households. For a discus- 
sion of the Ch'oe holdings and their growth, see pp. 74-75, Kim Jong-gug 
(Kim Chongguk) /^^S^ iM > Korai bushin seiken no tokushitsu ni kan- 
suru ichi kosatsu^ ^ M. € & ^^t ^ # t l~ M i 3 — 

;# J^ ["Inquiry into the Characteristics of the Military Government of 
Goryeo"], CG 17 (1960), pp. 51-80, which is an excellent study of the 
military government. 


27. In addition to the references cited in the text, I have drawn material for 
this rdsum^ of the organs of the military government and the Ch'oe clan 
from the following studies: Kim Sanggi, Kory6 muin chSngch'i kigu ko 

^%] K ^ ^^ ^X 3& j\^kJ{h ^ ' incorporated in Tcmgbang 
munhwa . . . , pp. 207-243; Gim Jong-gug, 'KOrai bushin . . . ', and NaitO 
Shumpo y-^ ^ ^ -^^ , KOrai jidai no jubO oyobi seibD ni tsuite 

l]li0^^l'^i;|yi^-^>3c;^U5>i^^ t [Concerning the 
Chungbang a.nd the Chdngbangoi the Koryo Period] incorporated in pp. 
274-295 of Chosen-shi kenkyu ^^ jtf-^^if^ (pagination continu- 
ous), published by the T5y0shi kenkyu-kai Ji^ jX ^ ^jj" ^ ^g^ of 
Kyoto University (printed in Okayama City |^ ^i-) T ^' 1961; and the 
accounts contained in Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 527 ff ^ndHan^guk-sa 
sajon, passim. 

28. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryo muin . . . ', would divide the period of the military 
government into three periods, viz., pre-Ch'oe (1170-1196), Ch'oe 
(1196-1258), and post -Ch'oe (1258-1270). Gim Jong-gug, 'K5rai bushin 

. . . ', has pointed out that the early military overlords made effective use 
of the pubydng Jj^ ^ or militia units in the power struggle. This empha- 
sizes the importance of control of the Military Council in the 'pre-Ch'oe' 
period. Gim also makes the point that provincial armies such as existed 
in Japan at the time, did not exist during this period in Kory6 and that 
the house troops, kabydng, of these military rvilers were of a different 
character. Gim would place the development of strong house armies in 
the 'Ch'oe' period as against the general view of an earlier development. 

29. There were also a Generals' Council, changgunbang 3JI| ^ j$: , and an 
Officer's Council, kyoivibang j^%?{ J^ ; presumably they were direct- 
ly subordinate to the Military Council, but little is known of their func- 
tion. For a discussion see Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 209, and Gim, op, cit., 
p. 75 ff. 

30. There were two 'exceptions', viz., Im Y6n received the appointment from 
Ch'ang whom he had put on the throne and Im Yumu received the appoint- 
ment from Chong J:j^ , the Marquis of Sunan i))^ I^ /|^ , who had been 
placed in charge when WOnjong went to the Mongol court. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 
'Kory6 muin . . . ', p. 217. It should be mentioned that the military rulers 
from Ch'oe U onward, all received appointments as Coadministrator of 
the Bureau of Military Affairs, as well. 

31. The term Ch6ngbang ii-^J^j^ suggests an analogy with the Japanese man- 
dokoro Jt^j-yf , the Central Administrative Bureau vinder the Kamakura 
and Muromachi Shogunates; the actual resemblance between the two and 
possible influences remain to be studied. 


32. ioT the reconstruction of this word see p. 257, P.Pelliot, 'Les mots 
mongols dans le ^%^ p^ ^)^ Korye sa', JA 217 (1930), pp. 251-266. 

33. Tomok ^j5 )i] during the Yi dynasty signified the promotion and demc- 
lion of officials in the sixth and twelfth month of each year I am uncer- 
tain whether it was so used at this time or whether it included other 
matters as well. 

34. Pon _y^ was used in the sense of 'shift, watch' when the tohang or Guard 
Corps was first organized since they were primarily units whose /Jon or 
watches did guard duty on a shift basis. The iermpon also came to be 
used in the sense of 'subordinate unit', e.g., in the reign of King U 

(= Sinu ^ ^-^ , r. 1375-1388), the Three Patrols were referred to 
in restrospect as "the three units^on^of our nation's Night Patrol" {KS 
81. 26b). The tobang or Guard Corps grew in size until it contained 36 

35. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryo muin . . . ', p. 231, believes that when Ch'oe U took 
over the military government, he organized his own house troops into 
the Inner Guard Corps for his own protection and then designated the 
tohang established by Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n as the Outer Guard Corps to do 
guard duty at the homes of his relatives. 

36. Gim Jong-gug, 'Korai bushi . . . ', has studied the relationship of the 
mun'gaek or 'retainers' to the military overlords and has pointed out that 
the mun'gaek of the early military rulers were themselves often military 
men of high rank. 

37. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryo muin • . .', p. 238; however, also see Yi, 
Han^giik-sa, Vol. 2, p. 532. Kim, op. cit., pp. 237-238, sees Mongol in- 
fluence here and in the scribes of the Supreme Directorate as well as in 
Ch'oe U's mounted guard corps, the ma pyolch^o ^^ )j'J J'y . Yi, 
Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 529, believes the vise of the Mongol term for 
scribe is reflective of later Mongol influence and not their original de- 

38. Pangho pyolgam p/^ |fH ^'1 ^_ or Special Supervisors of Defense, were 
temporary appointments made anew for each crisis and were in charge 

of the defense of the various mountain citadels of refuge, sansong, and, 
at times, of the walled-cities, which is made clear in KS 24, 25 and 26. 

39. For historical and topographical information on the city of Tungju ->^ ))] 
see TYS 49. la ff. 

40. 'Imperial Brother' Sung-chu ^3^ ^ jd> ij-Jv . I am uncertain of his 
identity. However, the inforniants were correct. In 1258, he led troops 
into the old Hwaju J\-f\ -})\ area where he established a Governor's Com- 
mand, tsung-kuan-fu, under two Kory6 rebels (A'5 24. 38b) and in 1259, 


he and Yii-ch'ou-ta (Yesiider) were in Tung-ching where they were visited 
by the Kory6 Crown Prince on his way to the Mongol court (of. KS 24. 
42b-43b). Actual operations were, however, under Prince Yekii (cf. KS 
24. 7a-b; YKC 9b; CHSL 4. 31a; YS 3. 5a-b; YS 154. 2b; YS 166. la); also 
see note 41. 

41. Prince Yekii j^ J^ J^ ^ ; the name occurs in several orthographic 
variants including: yeh-k'u '[U_j )^' (A'S24. &;KS 24. 1;KS 24. 8; CHSL 
4. 31a) and yeh-hu M )% i^^^ ^b; 75 4. 12a). For the reconstruction 
of this name see Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII . . . , p. 24, who also lists the 
va.ri?Lnts yeh-k'u ^tf ^ {YS 3. 2b; YS 3. 5b) 2ind yeh-k'u [U^ ^ {YS 3. 
6b). According to Yanai, YUan-tai . . , , p. 124 note 2, Yekii was the half- 
brother of Tolui, Mongke's father. 

42. Wang Ch'ang ^ ^^ was the second son of Kojong and Queen Anhye. His 
former name was Kan/jJJLj- ^^ was first made Marquis of An'gyong J^ 

J^ 4^ ^^^ then, shortly before being sent to the Mongol Court in 1253, 
was advanced to Duke ^jX • He was put on the throne in 1269 when Im Y6n 

iyN Jjy^ deposed W6njong /Q, \f^ , Ch'ang's elder brother, but was de- 
posed the same year as a result of Mongol pressure. He was posthumous- 
ly canonized Y6ngjong ^ '^ . His son Hyon^j^; , the Marquis of Han- 
yang J^ ^ , married a daughter of King Ch'ungny61 ^. ^j[ ^ . For 
biographical information see KS91. 6a-7a; BTKP carries no entry. 

43. For slavery in the Kory6 period see Kameda Keiji >M^ )'3 ^^^^— 'Korai 
no nubi ni tsuite', ^|] ^ /; ^^^^ ll lll^ ^ ^ i [Slavery in Koryo], 
SG 26 (1936) and 28 (1937); Sudo Yoshikose '^ ^ ^ Z^ > 'Korai 
makki yori Chosen shoki ni itaru nubi no kenkyu', ^ ^ JF tQ ^ 

^ ^MM Mi'- Ai i>L^i O Jh^ ^5l'' [Research on 
Slavery from the End of the Kory6 period to the Beginning of the Yi Dyn- 
asty], RGK9 (1939), Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

44. For a study of the /)aefec/?wz^ ]3 ^ in the Kory6 period and a critical 
review of previous studies, see Hatada Takashi jj^ 'g ^f^ , 'Korai jidai 
no hakutei ^|j ^ ^^ ^'t ^ 1^ J ["Paekchong in the Kory6 Period], 
CO 14 (1959), pp. 291-308. For the paekchong in general see Imanishi 
Ryu -j^ ^ ||j , Chosen hakutei ko ^)^ ^i -{^ '] .^ [A Study of the 
Korean PaekchSng], Geihun '-^ ^ IX, 4 (Kyoto 1918), pp. 337-363; 
H.Passin, 'The Paekchong of Korea; a brief social history', Monumenta 
NipponicaXll (1956-1957), pp. 195-240, and H.Passin, 'Untouchability in 
the Far East', Monumenta Nipponica XI (1955), pp. 247-267. In the latter 
study, Passin remarks (p. 235, note 18) of the term paekchong \.h2i\. ". . . 
until the Yi Dynasty, it referred to a subclass of the 'good' people, just 
as in Japan, that had 'neither government service nor property'. This 
usually included farmers." 


45. Hiii'/J^ , the Count of Yongan J<^ 1^ ^^ (d- 1263), was the son of vVang 
So ^ ^^, , the Duke of Yangyang ^ gjr J^ and the nephew of Sinjong 

j\Jp ^^ . For biographical information see KS 91, la; also see BTKP 
115. 1078. 

46. The official was termed hu-hua-chi ^Q ^^ ;^^ but I am unsure of the 

47. Yu, op. cit., p. 31j says that Prince Ko was sent to the Mongols as a 
hostage at this time. He gives no source and I have failed to find that 
there was even a Prince Ko living at this time. There were two royal 
princes at this time, namely, Ch6ny]M. , the heir-apparent and Ch'ang 
^^ his yovinger brother. I believe that Yu erred due to the confused text 
of HYS 249. 4b which is the only source I have seen which might have 
caused him to make such a mistake. In the HYS text there is a mass con- 
fusion of several Korean Kings and Prince Ko enters the confusion. This 
Prince Ko had not yet been born. If Prince Ch'ang is meant, then it is a 
different story. He did go to the Mongol Court at this time. 

It was possibly Prince Ch'ang and his party whom Friar William of Ru- 
bruck mentions seeing at Mongke's court in 1254, although it could well 
have been another group since Friar William calls them simply 'envoys'. 
Cf. Rockhill, The Journey of William . . . , pp. 152-154. 

48. According to YS 3. 4a, Prince Yekii was dismissed from command of the 
forces attacking Kory6 in the 1st month of 1253, and Jalairtai was ap- 
pointed to succeed him. The error in dating has already been pointed out 
by Yanai, YUan-tai . . . , p. 124 note 4. YS 3. 5a-b carries the entry dated 
the 12th month of 1253, that Prince Yekii was commanded to conquer 
Koryo; this entry is also erroneously dated. YSZ. 5b carries the entry, 
dated in 1254, that Jalairtai was commanded to subjugate Koryo and 
shortly thereafter, he appeared in Koryo. YKC 9b dates the appointment 
of Yekii in 1253 and the appointment of Jalairtai in 1254. 

The first we hear of Yekii in the Koryo records is in the fourth month of 
1253 {KS 24. 6); the last we hear of him in the Koryo records is in the 
eleventh month of 1253 {KS 24. 11). Therefore, his appointment was in 
early 1253, and his dismissal and the subsequent appointment of Jalairtai 
was either in late 1253 or early 1254. 

As for Prince T'a-la-erh X^"^') '^■rt. » ^ cannot but wonder if the la of 
this name is not a scribal error, as there was a Prince (of the first rank), 
Kuo-wang )|^ ^ , Tacar i^j^vj^^^' ^^'^ was the grandson of 
Temuge-ot6igin whose descendants to the fourth generation inherited the 
former lands of P'u-hsien Wan-nu as an appandagc. 

49. Jalairtai, the father of Tacu, was of the Jalair tribe and served Cinggis 


{YS 133. la-b). From 1254 to 1258, he led the Mongol forces against 
Kory6, accompanied first by Hong Pogw6n and later by the latter' s son 
Hong Tagu {YKC 9b). There are several orthographic variants of the 
name. XS usually renders Ch'e-lo-ta >|3 '^^ ^ . YKC 9b has Cha-la- 
tai jfl,^J\ ^ (as does FS 133. la-b), Cha-la-ta ^i] ;^ij 7^|- and Ch'e- 
tzhi-ta y^^ T^i] -)r (for tz''u read la). While the period of time involved 
was considerable and we do not know his age during the latter period,. 
Mongol generals of seventy years are known to have been with the Mon- 
gol forces in Kory6 {cl.KS 103. 26a). 

50. Tongguk y^ ]^ was one of the early designations for Korea. Other 
names included Solongyos, which Shiratori would trace to Kor. Silla ^M 

1^ plus Ch. kuo )^ . Cf. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiragi no kokugO ni tsuite 
^il ^ ^ W -% ^- -Wj ^' 1 [Concerning the National Designations 
for Silla], Rekishi chiri, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 369-454. There was also an 
ancient name for Korea in Central Asia and towards the end of the T'ang 
it was written Mukuri in Sanscrit and Mug-lig in Tibetan. Cf. Bagchi, 
Deux lexiques Sanskrit -chinois , rev. ed., 1929, I, 295, cited Pelliot, 
Notes on Marco Polo, p. 235; also see Shiratori, loc. cit. There is, how- 
ever, reason to believe that Mug-lig, the Turkish Biikli, transcribes A'/o- 
he '^f^'$^{Kor . Malgal) , cf. G.Clauson, 'A Propos du Manuscrit Pelliot 
Tib^ain 1283*', JA CCXLV (1957), pp. 11-24. The name of Korea was 
transmitted to the west with the 'Gori' of Giovanni da Empoli (1514). Cf. 
Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 234-237 who suggests that the 'Gori' of Fra Mauro 
is probably the same name in which case such knowledge should have 
reached Europe at least in the middle of the 15th century. For this de- 
signation see M.C.Hagenauer, 'Encore la question des Gores', JA 
CCXXVI (1935), pp. 5-115. There were many other designations for Ko- 
rea, for which see the chapter "Kukho-ryu" )^ ^^-ll^in Ch'oe Namson 
# 1$] i- ' ^^^^^ saw^szfe ^^ if'^M • ChiH-pYon ife,^£^, 
Seoul, 1948, pp. 131-162. 

51. The dispatch also accused the Korean authorities of executing Korean 
functionaries who had submitted their cities. A certain Yi Hyon -^ il*^ 
was one of the persons concerned {KSC 17. 17a) and he had been beheaded 
in the market-place, his property confiscated, and his relatives exiled to 
islands {KSC 17. 15a-b). The Korean authorities were able to produce 
two other deserters whom they displayed to the envoy to allay his sus- 
picions {KSCll. 17b). 

52. Yu Kyong yf^p 5|{(^(1212-1289); his style, cha, was Ch'6nny6n ^ ^- ; 
another style was Changji j|^ ^ . He passed the exams in the reign of 
Kojong and gradually rose to be Headmaster, taeaasong ^s.^ ^ )^, of 


the National Academy, kukchagam. He worked in the Ch6ngbang 
or Civil Council while Ch'oe Hang was overlord and was one of the prin- 
cipal leaders in the overthrow of Ch'oe Ui which ended the rule of the 
Ch'oe clan. He was later exiled by Im Yon, but was subsequently sum- 
moned to return. He was later exiled again, and died in 1289 at the age 
of 79. He was given the posthumous appellation of Munjong j^ 3f^ . One 
of his more noteworthy endeavors was that he was in charge of the His- 
toriographical Bureau, sagwan, while the Veritable Records, sillok, of 
Sinjong )f.^ '^ , Huijong _|,^ ^fv , Kangjong jj ^ , and Kojong ^:^j 
rf^ were being compiled. He had one son. Sung d^ (1248-1298; BTKP 
153. 1401). For biographical information see KS 105. la-8a; also see 
BTKPl^l. 1384. 
53. Thi s was not the first time that the Mongols had attempted to coax one of 
the Ch'oe military rulers to the mainland. In 1232, they had tried, also 
unsuccessfully, to get Ch'oe U to leave Kanghwa. Cf. KS 23. 24b. 


Chapter IV 

On September 6, 1254 {jen-hsu ^^z J% day of the seventh month), the 
Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse reported that Jalairtai had crossed 
the Yalu at the head of a force of 5 000 men {KS 24. 14b). By September 8 
{chia-tzu ^ -^ day of the same month), 3 000 Mongol advance cavalry sol- 
diers reached Sohae Province {KS 24. 15a). By the time that the main Mongol 
forces entered the northwest on August 19 {ping-tzu v^ -^ day of the eighth 
month), the advance cavalry had reached Kwangju i^ jj-j {KS24. 15a). 

Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gy6ng, returned with ten Mongol envoys who un- 
doubtedly repeated the Mongol demands {KS24. 15a) and Koryo sent a delegate 
to Jalairtai's camp with gifts of gold, silver, wine utensils, pelts, and coins 
for Jalairtai, and the other Mongol commanders as well as for Hong Pogw6n 
and Sun, the Duke of Y6ngny6ng. When this delegate returned he brought 
news of a new modification of the Mongol demands: when the ministers and 
people came out to submit, they were to shave their heads ^1 {KS 24. 15b). 

With no sign of Kory6's willingness to submit, Jalairtai's forces swept 
southward to renew the attack on Ch'ungju but a violent storm caused them to 
lift the attack almost immediately {KS 24. 16a). As the Mongol forces rode 
south, dispatches from the Eastern Frontier-District reported many Eastern 
Jiirien troops crossing the border {KS 24. 15b). 

In the next 10th month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 11), a Mongol force attacked the 
mountain citadel at Sangju y^ jj] where their fourth ranking official was shot 
by a Buddhist monk from Hwangny6ng Temple -^ A^ ^ . The siege was 
finally lifted after the Mongols had lost an estimated fifty percent of their 
force {KS 24. 16a). 

Koryo envoys sent to request the withdrawal of Mongol forces {KS 24. 16) 
returned with the news that Jalairtai had said, 'If Ch'oe Hang [reverently] 
leads the King out to the mainland, then the troops can be disbanded" {KS 24. 
20a; also see CHSL 4. 32a). But it was still to be some time before Kory6 was 
to submit completely. 

In the first month (Feb. 9 - March 9) of 1255, inhabitants of Taegu :;k^yf 
(= Taegu jx. Ji^ ?) who had been captured and then escaped, reported that 


the Emperor had instructed Jalairtai to return speedily with the army and 
that the Mongol forces garrisoned in the Northern Frontier -District had al- 
ready crossed the Yalu (KS 24. 20b). Other detachments of Mongols were 
also riding northward {KS 24. 20b; KS 24. 21a), and Jalairtai himself was then 
encamped at KaegySng {KS 24. 21a) 2). Taking advantage of the situation, 
Kory6 immediately sent envoys to present regional products and again beg for 
the disbanding of the Mongol troops {KS 24. 20b-21a). The situation remained 
relatively calm until the eighth month (Sept. 3 - Oct. 1) of 1255. The Moi^ol 
forces had withdrawn to the northern borders and were then encamped on the 
borders of IJiju and Ch6ngju from Mt. Hyongje )/{_, ^ U-\ to Taebu-song 3) 
{KS 24. 22a). There was some pillaging in the north, mostly of farm oxen and 
horses {KS2A. 22b; KS 24. 23a) and the Eastern Jiir6en still raided on the 
east coast {KS 24. 22b) but there was no major offensive. The Mongol forces 
appear to have merely withdrawn north of the Ch'6ngch'6n River although at 
least one raiding party came south of the river {KS 24. 23a). 

Martial law was lifted on Kanghwa in the second month (March 10 - 
April 8) of 1255 {KS 24. 21b) and Kory6 immediately began to repair the dam- 
age. Conditions had reached an extreme with the abandonment of the farms. 
In the third month (April 9 - May 7) those who had sought safety on the islands 
and in the mountain citadels were ordered to return to the mainland. The re- 
moval of the peasants from the land, in many cases by forced evacuation, to 
the coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge had the immediate effect 
of consuming stores and leaving fields idle 4). To which were added the pil- 
laging of the Mongols and natural disaster in the form of a drought which re- 
occurred through the late 1250's. There was a general famine and the old and 
the weak died of starvation in great numbers . Other victims were those dis- 
tant from their native villages, as were the young as infanticide increased 
{KS 24. 21b); A continuous stream of escapees made their way back and the 
roads were covered with the skeletons of the dead. Although small doles of 
rice were distributed to alleviate the suffering, the dead were without number 
{KS 24. 22a-b). At the end of 1254, an estimated 206 800 persons had been 
taken prisoner during Jalairtai' s invasion, the number of dead was beyond 
reckoning, and the countryside was reduced to ashes (it's 24. 20a-b; CHSL 4. 
32a). We are told that ". . . those who died of starvation were multitudinous; 
[the corpses of] the old and weak clogged the ravines and it reached the point 
where some tied babies in the trees and left" {TT 33. 71). Officials of the 
fourth rank and above were ordered to present plans for stabilizing the life of 
the people, and for withstanding the enemy iJKS 24. 22b), one outcome of which 
was the dispatch of a Commissioner for the Encouragement of Agriculture, 
kwdnnong-sa ^j] ^^^ , to each province (KS 24. 22b; XS 78. 4a). Condi- 


tions on the mainland naturally affected those on Kanghwa Island. Maritime 
transportation of grain had been the principal method utilized prior to the 
removal to Kanghwa and after the transfer of the capital was implemented, 
grain transport ships would simply stop at the island instead of proceeding up 
the river to Kaegy6ng. The general shortage of grain led to the suggestion in 
1257 that fields be distributed in lieu of official salaries and a Bureau for 
Distributing Land, kiipchdn togam ^'^ ]^ ^p ^ , was established 5) to 
implement the suggestion {KS 78. 18b). 

In the eighth month (Aug. 4 - Sept. 2) of 1255, reports received of Mongol 
forces raiding south of the Ch'6ngch'6n River and the appearance of twenty 
Mongol cavalrymen at Sungch'6n-pu were sufficient to cause the capital to de- 
clare martial law again {KS 24. 23a). Korean envoys returned with six Mongol 
envoys the next month to report that the Mongol forces were again moving 
south ^). ialairtai and the Duke of Y6ngny6ng, in command of a great force, 
had reached the Western Capital and the advance cavalry was already at 
Kumgyo "7) in S6hae Province. 

Mongol activity in amphibious warfare increased. They built ships and 
attacked Cho Island y|;|' ^ , unsuccessfully however, in late 1255 {KS 24. 
24a). Then, in the first month (Jan. 29 - Feb. 27) of 1256, word was received 
that the Mongols were planning to attack the southern islands so a fleet, 
chusa 8), with 300 men was sent south under General Yi Kwang ^^^ }^ and 
General Song Kunbi ^^ ^ (fl- 1250-1270) (KS 24. 24b). In the e'ngage- 
ment which followed, General Song inflicted a defeat on the Mongol forces by 
a ruse and captured four of their officials {KS 24. 25a). 

As usual envoys were scurrying back and forth and Jalairtai told one 
group that if the King came out to welcome his envoys and if the Crown 
Prince went to the Mongol court, then the Emperor would cause the army to 
be withdrawn {KS24. 25b) 9). 

In mid-1256 the Kory6 patrols, pyolch^o, were again active on the main- 
land, attacking small Mongol detachments {KS 24. 25b-26a). The Mongols 
themselves were at the same time attacking Ch'ungju again (KS 24. 26a). The 
effectiveness of the Kory6 sallies, in which even Ch'oe Hang's Guard Corps, 
tobang ^t^ , participated {KS 24. 25a), is attested when Jfalairtai angrily 
told a Korean envoy who had come to his Naju 1^) camp, "If you desire peace 
and friendship, then why do you kill our soldiers in great numbers ?" (KS 24. 

But as long as Mongol forces were on the peninsula, action against them 
could be expected. Jalairtai was encamped at Mudung Mt. ^^ ^ 2J_| at 
Haeyang 3^ i>}^ (mod. S. Ch611a Province), whence he sent a force of 1 000 
south to pillage {KS 24. 26b-27a). People were again being evacuated to coastal 


islands when Jalairtai, the Dvike of Y6ngny6ng, and Hong Pogw6n arrived 
outside of Kaphwan River W ^,''\ . They unfurled their flags, pastured 
their horses in the fields, and climbed Mt. T'ongjin ;^ '# J, to look at 
Kangdo Ji-^P (the capital onKanghwa). Then they withdrew to camp at Suan- 
hyon ^ ^^ JrJ^ {KS2A. 27a). If an assault on Kanghwa was planned it never 
materialized, for in the ninth month (Sept. 20 - Oct. 19) of 1256, Kim SugangH) 
returned from the Mongols with the report that the Emperor had sent an envoy 
with an order for the army's return. A few days later Jalairtai ordered the 
army to return northward {KS 24. 27a-b). In the following month, martial law, 
after having been imposed for fifteen months, was lifted and the soldiers were 
disbanded {KS 24. 27b). 

The respite from the Mongol forces was not to last long, but in the interim 
there were other diversions. In late 1256, Sungsan 12)^ the Governor, tsung- 
kuan 13)^ of T'ung-ching province {lu^^) led his family and a handful of fol- 
lowers to submit to Kory6. When asked his reasons for coming, Sungsan re- 
plied: "It is not because the Mongols are perishing while your country is flour- 
ishing. I came simply because I have committed three crimes. When Jalairtai 
entered the southern districts [of KoryS], I [was charged with] garrisoning 
Uiju and I was xmable to defend it; that is the first. Then, they sent me to en- 
courage agriculture, [but] the forage and grains were not abundant and the 
storehouses were barren; that is the second. When I heard that Kory6 soldiers 
were coming, I sent seventy men to investigate. Not one man returned; that is 
the third." For his submission, SungSan was rewarded with grain, implements, 
textiles, and three slaves {KS 24. 27b-28a). 

Conditions were bad both in the countryside and on Kanghwa; thieves en- 
tered the Vaeja-pu ys^^ ){^ or Household Bureau of the Crown Prince and 
stole a number of items {KS 24. 28a) and we read that: "There was no snow 
this winter ^^•, and [through] starvation and disease, the roads were once 
again covered with corpses. One kun n of silver was worth [only] two kok 
wn of rice" {KS 24. 28a). The regions were in similar condition or worse. 
One i;5)rising at W6nju ^^ ;)9] (in mod. KangwOn Province) in mid-1257 
was finally crushed after a battle at the Hungw6n Granary jSi^- ^^/^{KS 24. 
28b) which suggests a 'rice riot'. In the intercalary fourth month (May 16 - 
June 13) of 1257, there was a great famine in the capital (JKS 24. 29a). The KS 
period of spring hunger brought a general tightening of belts in the capital; it 
also brought out the ravenous Eastern .tiirCen in the northeast (KS 24. 29a; KS 
24. 29a-b) and renewed Mongol activity in the northwest (fiTS 24. 29a-b). Kory6 
made her usual preparations by dispatching Special Supervisors of Defense, 
pangho pyolgam to all the strongholds (KS 24. 29b). Envoys were again sent 
to request the withdrawal of troops as soon as the Mongol advance cavalry 


reached KaegySng, and P'u-po-ta ^^ ijx.7C_ ^^^^ ^^^ Kory6 envoy Yi Ong 
-^ ^i^' "Whether we go or remain is up to Jalairtai" {KS 24. 29b). By the 
sixth month (July 13 - Aug. 11) of 1257, the main Mongol force had arrived in 
the Western Capital (/(S 24. 29b) and Mongol envoys once again began appear- 
ing at Siingch'6n-pu to be taken to the Chep'o Hostel jf^ 5)1) 't'^ ^^ ^^^ entry 
port on Kanghwa and then escorted to see the King in the palace at Chep'o 
{KS24. 30a). The familiar demands were made. Jalairtai told one Korean 
envoy, "If the King comes out in person, I will then withdraw my forces. And, 
if you order the King's son to enter our Court, eternally, there will be no 
later grief" (KS 24. 30a). This^of course, was actively debated by the Kory6 
authorities and many strongly favored sending the Crown Prince as hostage in 
order to secure peace. It was finally decided, "First, to send a royal kinsman 
to survey the situation and thereafter, they could send [the Crown Prince]. 
Then, they dispatched Hui, the Duke of YOngan, to present 100 silver pyong- 
coins, ceremonial gifts (lit. fruit and wine), and other items to Jalairtai" {KS 
24. 30b). "When he returned from Jalairtai's camp, he said that Jalairtai 
asked, 'Why have you come?' He answered, 'While Your Excellency has or- 
dered your forces to return southward, you have also prohibited them from 
destructively trampling [the growing] grain. As our King was greatly pleased, 
he sent me [Your] Servant, to offer this cup of wine.' <talairtai said, 'I will 
withdraw and camp at Pongju on the day the Crown Prince arrives.' " {KS 24. 


A decision to send the Crown Prince to the Mongol Court as a hostage 

was being actively sought by the Chief Ministers at this time {KS 24. 30b-31a) 

and this resulted in Kim Sik ^^J.5\^ again being sent to Jalairtai's camp to 

present gifts of ceremonial items (lit. fruit and wine), silver coins, otter 

pelts, and other articles in order to observe his intentions {KS 24. 31a) ^5), 

The Mongols again tried their hand at amphibious warfare, capturing 
Sinwi Island ^^^ ^ ^ {KS 24. 31a; KS 121. 22b) and invading Ch'angnin 
Island ^ )a^^ (KS24. 31b-32a). But in naval matters, Kory5 with her 
long maritime tradition completely outclassed them. The Kory6 fleet also 
provided transport for forces sent against the Mongols. One instance occurred 
in the summer of 1256, when, "they sent General Yi One-Thousand ^^) ^ S-r 
with a fleet with over 200 men to ward off the Mongols in the southern pro- 
vinces" (/fS 24. 26b). "General Yi One-Thousand fought with the Mongol forces 
at Onsu-hyon y^j\{^^J^^ (in mod. S. Ch'ungch'Sng Province), took several 
tens of heads and seized over 100 men and women who had been taken captive. 
[Upon their return] Ch'oe Hang rewarded the soldiers with six kun of silver" 
{KS 24. 26b). 

In the tenth month of 1257, Kim Sugang returned from the Mongol Court 


where he had once again been successful in obtaining the Emperor's permis- 
sion to have the Mongol armies in Kory6 withdrawn {KS 24. 32a) which once 
more brought a measure of peace to the peninsula. During the months that 
Kim had been at the Mongol court, Ch'oe Hang had died {KS 24. 29a) to be 
succeeded by his son Ch'oe Ui 1'^). Discussions were again held regarding 
whether or not to dispatch the Heir -Apparent (as a hostage) as well as prepa- 
rations for resisting the Mongols {KS 24. 32a). 

In the beginning of 1258, as the Mongols were busy walling Uiju in the 
northwest {KS 24. 32b), a plot was afoot in the Kory6 capital which was to re- 
sult in the overthrow of Ch'oe Ui and the final fall of the Ch'oe clan from the 
power it had held for over sixty years. Upon his assumption of power in 1257, 
Ch'oe Ui had made some rather niggardly doles of rice {KS 129. 52a-b), but 
through t+ie continued years of poor harvests and famine he had consistently 
refused to open the granaries and distribute adequate relief which turned the 
populace against him {KS 105. lb; KS 129. 53a-b; KSC 17. 34a). And after 

Ch'oe Hang's death, Ch'oe Ui, it is related, trusted only Ch'oe Yangbaek 18) 
and Yu Nung ^^i while he grew cool toward the old Ch'oe clan retainer Kim 
Injun 20) ^ho consequently felt insecure {KS IZO. 12a; KSC 17. 34a). Then, 
when he exiled the cruel and sadistic Grand General Song Kiryu 21), a former 
supporter of Ch'oe Hang and Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol, he be- 
came even further estranged with Yu Ky6ng, Kim Injun, and the latter' s sons 
who had tried to intervene in Song's behalf. Song was exiled and his suppor- 
ters were reprimanded by Ch'oe Ui for intervening {KS 122. 28-29: KS 129. 
53b; KSC 11 . 34a-b). 

Then, the Sinuigun 22) cavalry's commanding officer, torydng. Colonel, 
Pak Huisil 23) and Commander, chiyu, Colonel, Yi Y6nso -^-ji 4§ (^1- 
1250' s), secretly told a group of people which included Yu Ky6ng, Kim Injun, 
Kim Sungjun (Injun's brother). Acting Colonel Yi Kongju ^ ^jX J^^ (^1- 
1250's), General Pak Songbi 24) Colonel in Charge (of the Night Patrol ?) 
torydng nangjang, Im Yon 25), Lieutenant, taejong^^), Pak Ch'onsik ^j- j^ 
^^ (fl. 1250's), Junior Colonel, pyolchang tongjong, ^j] J|4 1^ iL Ch'a 
Songu 27)^ Colonel Kim H6ngch'wi 28)^ and Kim Injun's sons Kim Taejae ^2^ 
■^ j^^ , Kim Yongjae 29)^ and Kim Sikchae /^ ^Jf"^ > t^^^t Ch'oe was 
friendly only with the specious and the petty, that he believed slander and was 
full of superstition; and advised the group that the time for action was grow- 
ing short. Subsequently, they decided to carry. put the matter (of killing Ch'oe 
Ui) and set a date, the eighth day of the fourth month because of the lantern 
viewing {KS 129. 53b; KSC 17. 34b). Kim Injun had invited Ch'oe On 30)^ then 
Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, chhimirivdnsa, to discuss 
the matter with him {KS 99. 7a). It was probably in this way that Senior Colo- 


nel, chungnangjang ^l)^ Yi Chu ^ Jff heard of it. Yi, with Ch'oe On's son, 
the leader of one of the Royal Guard units, Kydnyong haengsu Sp M^y(^ "g" 
Ch'oe Munbon ;^ jL. y^, Major, samvon 32) Yu T'ae^ ^ , Captain, 
kyowi 33)^ pak S6n J^-i. j:^ , Lieutenant Yu Po 34) /^ ^ ^ et al., secretly 
wrote to Ch'oe Oi and communicated the plot to him. Ch'oe Yangbaek, the 
father-in-law of Kim Taejae_,one of Kim Injun's sons, was apparently warned 
by the letters 35)^ for he reported the matter to Ch'oe tJi (KS 129. 54a; KSC 
17. 34b). This was on May 1, 1258 (i.e., ping-tzu ^ ^ day of the third 
month. Cf. KS 24. 32b-33a). Ch'oe tJi hurriedly summoned Yu Nung to discuss 
a piano By that time the sun had already set. Yu Nung advised that as it was 
night, that there was nothing to be done, but he suggested that a letter of in- 
structions be sent to the Night Patrol Commander, chiyu, Han Chonggwe 36)^ 
and that they wait until morning and then summon Yi Irhyu 37)^ et al., to force 
the soldiers to subjugate Kim Injun; there was, he said, still time. Ch'oe Ui 
approved it. {KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 34b-35a). 

Kim Taejae's wife was present and she heard these measures which she 
reported to her husband. He in turn reported the matter to his father, Kim 
Injun, advising him that the matter must be speedily carried through and that 
there was not much time left {KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 35a). Kim Taejae had be- 
lieved that it was Pak H&isil who had leaked the affair to Ch'oe Yangbaek {KS 
129. 54a; KSC 17. 34b), and it was not until after Ch'oe tJi's death that it was 
revealed that Ch'oe Munbon had divulged the matter when one of the letters 
was found {KS 99. 7a). Kim Injun heard his son's report and then led his sons 
to urge the Siniiigun cavalry (to act with them). Kim met Pak Htiisil and Yi 
Yonso and told them that since the matter had leaked out, that they could not 
go according to their previous plan (but must act speedily). Then he assem- 
bled the plotters and Junior Colonel Pak Y6ngj6ng s^ J[(^ ^ , Lieutenants 
S6 Ch6ng ^i^ii and Yi Che 38)^ and Im Y6n {KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35a). He 
had sent Im Yon, Commander Cho Munju ^^ i(_-^i ' ^^^ ^ Susan ^ ^ 
)j_j to arrest Han Chonggwe and kill him. He also summoned Commander S6 
Kyunhan 4':^-^<]5^ ®^ ^^'' *° assemble the Three Patrols, sam pyolch'o 39)^ 
at the Hall of Archery, sach}6ng ^<f j|^ . They sent men to cry out in the 
road, "The Yonggong '^ -^^^ (= Ch'oe UI) is dead'. " All those who heard this 
gathered. Yu Kyong and Pak S6ngbi et al., also arrived. Then Kim Injun sug- 
gested that an important minister who held the respect of the people be 
brought in to lead the crowd as a great affair such as they were em- 
barked upon could not be carried out without a leader. Then he summoned 
Ch'oe On. Kim also met Supreme General of the Ungyang jj ^;^ gviards^O) 
Pak S6ngja 41) and discussed the matter {KS 129. 54b; KSC'n. 35a-b). Kim 
Injiin then summoned Ch'oe Yangbaek. Yangbaek had not even entered the 


the hall (where they were meeting) when some soldiers of the patrol, 
pydlch^o, [seized him and] pushed burning torches into his mouth; then 
they beheaded him (KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35b). Im Y6n also went to the 
home of Yi Irhyu and beheaded him {KSC 17. 35b; KS 129. 54b). Kim In- 
jun, in the meanwhile, had ordered Ch'oe Ui's gate guards not to report the 
situation. He then distributed files of soldiers in an open space; [their] burn- 
ing pine [torches] made it bright as day. Although there was a great clamor 
from the crowd there was not one of Ch'oe house soldiers, kabyong '^ j^!^ , 
who knew about the situation {KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35b). In the early dawn, 
the Night Patrol smashed down the walls around Ch'oe Ui's home and went in- 
side (the grounds). Song Wonbal ^'^\ a strong soldier, and the maternal uncle 
of Ch'oe tJi, was gviarding Ch'oe' s house and hearing the clamor became 
alarmed. He managed to hold off the soldiers trying to get through the small 
door, but seeing that he could not succeed by himself, he wanted to shoulder 
Ch'oe Ui over the wall, but Ui was too fat and heavy. Then SOng helped tJi up 
to his room and blocked the door with his body. O Susan broke in and Song 
fled, pursued by the soldiers of the Night Patrol who caught him and beheaded 
him by the river bank. Ch'oe tJi and Yu Nung were also caught and beheaded 
(XS129. 55a). 

Then, Yu Kyong, Kim Injun, and Ch'oe On, et al., went to the palace to 
return the government to the King {KS2^. 32b-33a; KS 99. 2a; KS 129. 55a). 
Kim Injun stepped forward while they were conferring with the King and ac- 
cused Ch'oe Ui of sitting and watching the people starve to death without aid- 
ing them; it was, he said, an act of righteousness that they had executed him 
{KS 130. 12b). Promotions were apparently made on the spot. Yu Ky6ng was 
made Deputy Minister of the Right of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umir- 
w6n uhusiXngs&n Jj.^ ^ p^ ^ -i'l yf^ ^ ' ^^^ Songbi was made Grand 
General, Kim Injun was made General and the others were all awarded rank 
in accordance with their station {KS 24. 32b-33a). And then, "On May 4 {chi- 
mao ^ ^p day of the 3rd month), the King honored the Kangan Hall ^ ljj~ 
■^^ with his presence. All of the officials offered congratulations. It was like 
a new enthroning ceremony. vVhen it was over and they were coming out, Pak 
Songbi and Kim Injun used the occasion to lead all the Meritorious Ministers, 
the Left and Right Patrols, pydlch'o, the Sinuigun cavalry, and the Guard 
Corps, tobang, into the courtyard of the audience chamber. They knelt around 

the King and shouted ^manse^ ^ J^ (lit. 10 000 years = 'Long live the King'). 
Then they doled out the household property of Ch'oe Ui and it was divided and 
distributed in accordance with the recipient's station {KS 24. 33a). 

The distribution of the Ch'oe clan's wealth was not so quickly completed 
nor was it as meagre as the above passage implies. A few other records of 


the disposal of their property in 1258-1259 gives a clearer view of their hold- 
ings. Ch'oe Ci's grain was doled out and bestowed upon the officials according 
to the station of the recipient; the Household Bureau of the Crown Prince, 
t^aeja-pu, received 2 000 bushels {sdk), the princes, chewang, Chief Minis- 
ters, chaech^u, the civil and military officials, even the minor functionaries, 
the soldiers, the government slaves, chorye j^ f^ , and the common people 
of the city received doles of at least three bushels {KS 129. 55a). Yu KySng, 
for example, received two hundred bushels {s6k) of rice, a class-A mansion, 
and lands (/CS105. 2a). Silks, paek ^ , presumably from the Ch'oe stores, 
were given the princes, the Chief Ministers and down to the lower ranking 
civil and military officials, according to the recipient's station (KS 129. 55b). 
The horses Ch'oe had raised were divided among the civil and military offi- 
cials of the fourth rank and above {KS 24. 34a; KS 129. 55b). Colonel Pak 
Siinggae ^^i Jf[ >|<C $u was sent to Ky6ngsang Province and Palace Atten- 
dant, naesi, Ch6n Chong /i^^]^ , was sent to Ch611a Province to confiscate 
the slaves, the fields and orchards, the silks and silver, and the grains of 
Ch'oe Ui and his brother, the Buddhist Priest, Manjong {KS 129. 55b). Some 
15 000 bushels {sdk) of rice were later taken from Ch'oe IJi's separate store- 
house to supplement the salaries of the officials of the fourth rank and below 
{KS 80. 16a-b) and, in late 1259, three thousand kydl 44) of Ch'oe Ui's land's 
were distributed to the princes and the various officials {KS 78. 4b) 45), 

Lavish rewards and promotions followed the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan 
{KS2A. 33a-34a). Of particular interest for the light it throws on the incident 
are the special awards made to the soldiers of the Night Patrol and the Sinuigun 
{KS2A. 33b) 46)^ and the individuals given the honorific title of Meritorious 
Guardian of the Altar of the Earth, ivisa kongsin 47) ^f^ ;^J^ ^h pi . Those 
especially honored were Yu Kyong, Kim Injun, Pak Huisil, Yi Yonso, Pak 
Songbi, Kim Stingjun, Im Y6n and Yi Kongju. 

Later, as a result of a petition submitted by the Chief Ministers, the 
sons of Yu Ky6ng and Kim Injun were each given the official grade of Sixth 
Class, and were presented with 100^3^3/ of fields, and 15 slaves each; the 
sons of Pak Huisil, Yi Yonso, Kim Sungjun, Pak Songbi and Im Yon were each 
given the official grade of Seventh Class and were presented with 50 ky6l of 
fields, and five slaves each {KS 24. ZZh-Zldi-, KS 105. 2a). 

If we look back over these events briefly, it becomes clear that there was 
discontent among the leadership group and general discontent among the popu- 
lace. The latter attributable to bad harvests due to drought and the pillaging 
of the Mongols which led to widespread famine; the former due to the perso- 
nal relationship between Ch'oe Ui and those who had formerly served the Ch'oe 
clan. Ch'oe Ui not only failed to issue doles in this period of dearth, but even 
instituted private tax-collectors on Kanghwa Island. 


It is also clear that the military units involved were the Night Patrol and 
the Sintiigun led by Pak Huisil, Yi Y6nso and Im Y6n. There were two groups 
involved in the struggle against Ch'oe Ui. The Confucian-Royalist faction led 
by Yu Ky6ng and supported by the aged literatus Ch'oe Cha 48) (now 72), who 
desired to send the Crown Prince as a hostage to the Mongols in order to 
bring an end to the fighting {KS 24. 30b; KS 102. 15b-16a) 49)^ The real power 
group, however, was the military faction of Kim Injun, whose interests coin- 
cided with those of the Confucianists as far as the elimination of the Ch'oe 
clan was concerned but who had no desire to drastically alter Koryfi's policy 
of continued resistance to the Mongol forces, although they advocated, as 
future events show, a temporary cessation of the fighting. As a withdrawal of 
the Mongol forces could only be gained by concessions to the Mongols, they 
supported these concessions, e.g., sending the Crown Prince as a hostage. 
But, as later events testify, complete submission to the Mongols was the no- 
tion of the Confucian-Royalists, not of the Kory6 military. 

It also appears that the restoration of a measure of power to the monarch 
was prompted chiefly by Yu Ky6ng. As later events show, the overthrow of 
the Ch'oe clan did not mean that the monarch regained complete control of the 
government at all. The real power in Kory6 still remained in the hands of the 
military. With Ch'oe gone, a struggle began among the men who had over- 
thrown him to reconcentrate power in their own hands. An initial casualty was 
Ch'oe On, Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, who was banished 
to distant Huksan Island ^, iL| ^ {KS 24. 33a). 

In the meantime, the Kory6 authorities were still concerned with the 
Mongol forces on the mainland. 

Although the Kory6 authorities had dispatched the Night Patrol against an 
advance force of one thousand Mongol cavalry {KS 23. 33b) and skirmishes 
continued on the mainland {KS 24. 34a-b), they now pursued a policy which 
sought to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces. Thus, in the fourth 
month (May 5 - June 3) of 1258, when the King heard that Jalairtai had sent 
an envoy to spy on the actual state of the move back to the mainland, all the 
civil and military officials were sent across the straits to Sungch'6n-pu where 
repairs were made to the palaces and to the homes of the officials {KS 24. 33b). 
But such measures did not fool the Mongols and, when Mongol envoys appeared 
in the sixth month (July 3 -July 31), they conveyed a threat from the Emperor 
to storm Kanghwa unless the Kory6 authorities came to the mainland and sub- 
mitted. The usual demands were again made: if the King and Crown Prince 
came to the Western Capital and submitted, the troops would be withdrawn. To 
all of which the King replied that he was much too old and ill to travel far. 
Then, Hui, the Duke of Y6ngan, was sent to Jalairtai's camp {KS 24. 34b-35a). 


This Kory6 delegation returned and informed the King: Yesiider ^^^ Yii-ch'ou 
/^ -^, told me, [Your] Servant, 'The Emperor has placed the business of 
Koryo with me and Jalairtai. Do you know this? Whether I leave or remain 
rests simply on whether your nation submits or not. Even though your King 
does not come out in person, if he sends the Crown Prince to welcome [us] 
and to surrender in front of the army, then on the same day, we will withdraw 
the army. If you refuse, then we will unleash our forces and enter the southern 
regions.' I answered simply, 'The Crown Prince will come to present himself " 
{KS 24. 35a-b). 

Yet, when Yesiider showed up at Sungch'6n-pu in the seventh month (Aug. 
1 - Aug. 30) of 1258, he was first asked to come with a few cavalrymen and 
see the Crown Prince at Mt. Paengma )^ ^ V-] (near Sungch'6n-pu). "Am I 
to go and see the Crown Prince or is the Crown Prince to cume to see me?" 
Yesiider asked. A few days later he was informed that the Crown Prince was 
ill and unable to come. After a few days wait, the Mongols, declaring the 
falsity of Kory6, let their forces loose to pillage {KS 24. 35b-36a). 

A second Mongol delegation from Jalairtai's camp received the same 
answer from the King himself. "The Crown Prince is ill," the King told 
Mang^udai, "How can he come out?" {KS2A. 37a-b). For the next ten months 
the Mongol forces rode rampant over the countryside and even remote moun- 
tain villages were sacked. The Eastern iiirten troops were also active in the 
northeast and in the winter of 1258, "the Eastern Jiircen came with a fleet, 
surrounded Song Island yf^ M of Kosong-hyon ^ ^,^}rwtv» ^^^ burnt the 
warships" Q^S 24. 38b). 

The Mongols had by this time decided to occupy Koryo themselves. They 
had begun in the northwest by walling Uiju in early 1258. When the Eastern 
JiirCen and Mongol troops attacked in the northwest in late 1258, the people of 
some fifteen c/?M-administrations including Hwaju, Chongju, Changju J^ jj) , 
Uiju >^ •;)-)j , and Mimju sought refuge on Cho Island Ji^ % . Because of 
the number of people involved, the Northeast Commissioner of Men and 
Horse, a certain Sin Chipp'y6ng ^|^ %%^ > forcibly transferred them to 
Chuk Island ^T ^, which was without wells or springs. Grain supplies were 
requested, and presumably sent, from the capital. At this time, Cho Hwi 51) 
of Yongjin-hy6n ||j 3^ ^^^ , T'ak Chfing :& ^ of Chongju, and men of 
Munju and Tungju, killed Sin Chipp'ySng and the Deputy Commissioners of 
Hwaju and Tungju, and men of the Capital Patrol, kyong pydlch'o Jy^ 3^'J :^)j 
planning to bring in the Mongol forces. Then they attacked Kos6ng ^ ^j^ , 
burning dwellings, killing, and plundering. Subsequently, they submitted the 
area north of Hwaju to the Mongols. The Mongols then established the Ssang- 
s6ng ^^^ Governor's Command, /sMn^-fewaw-yw ^^. ^ )H > in the Hwaiu 


area 52). Cho Hwi was made Governor, tsung-kuan, a position which was in- 
herited by his son and grandson; T'ak Chong was made Chiliarch, ch'ien-hu 53). 
Cho's men subsequently guided Mongol and Eastern Jiircen troops in attacking 
other Korean cities {KS 24. 38b; KS 130. lOa-lla; CHSL 4. 34a). 

The appearance of permanent installations on the lower part of the wes- 
tern coast begins with the record of a Koryo delegation sent to the daru^aci or 
resident commissioner in the twelfth month of 1268, where they blamed Ko- 
ryo' s past resistance on the military overlords. Since Ch'oe tJi was already 
dead, they said, they wanted to come to the mainland in order to obey the 
Mongols commands but they feared the Mongol troops; "[when] the cat guards 
the mousehole, [the mouse] simply does not dare to come out," they explained 
{KS 24. 39b). A second delegation, led by Vice-President of the Department of 
Justice, hyonghii Strang ^)j ^^ J^ ^^ , Yi Ung, is recorded as having gone 
to the Western Capital to the camp of Myriarch Wang ^ 54) (^^^5 24. 40a) who 
asked them: "Doesn't your Monarch love his people? Why does he listen to 
the stories of [the deserters] Yun Ch'un 55) and Sungsan [that he should] not 
come out and submit? If he submits then even the down on the plants will not 
be molested." At that time, it is related, Myriarch Wang had led an army of 
ten thousand to reconstruct the old walls at the Western Capital, and to build 
warships and open military colonies, thm-tHen 56)^ as a long-term occupation 
policy [KS 24. 40b). Thus, Koryo lost her northeast area to the Mongols and 
Mongol forces had occupied both tJiju and the Western Capital on a permanent 

Koryo resistance during this period, while stubborn, was weakening. In 
the first month (Jan. 25 - Feb. 23) of 1259, the Eastern Jur6en raided Kum- 
gang-s6ng /^ ^M Jt^ and a 3 000-man patrol was sent against them {KS 24. 
39b). There was a great increase in the number of revolts, especially those 
led by the local officials themselves {KS 24. 34a; A'S 24. 37b) and in many 
cases the people would simply kill the Supervisor of Defense and surrender 
rather than fight (e.g.,iiCS 24. Zlh;KS 24. 39a). Some measures were taken in 
an attempt to bolster loyalty and resistance. For example, in the summer of 
1258, ". . they bestowed upon each District Magistrate, hojang ^'^' , and Colo- 
nel of all the walled-cities of the Northern Frontier -District, one kun of white 
silver and two bolts {pHl) of black silk gauze" {KS 24. 34b; see also KS 24. 40a). 

Such measures were predictably too few and too meagre 58). The last en- 
try for the year 1258, makes the point: "This year the grain of all the pro- 
vinces was exhausted due to the pillaging of the Mongol troops' {KS 24. 39b). 
Thus pressed Kory6 yielded to Mongol demands to send the Crown Prince to 
the Mongol Court as a hostage. They also agreed to remove the capital from 


Kanghwa Island back to Kaegy6ng, but it was still to be many years before 
they kept the latter promise (K'5 24. 40b-41a). 

With a peace agreement concluded in the third month (March 26 -April 24) 
of 1259, priority was given to agriculture and "they ordered the Magistrates, 
suryong y^ /p , of the chu and hydn administrations to lead the people who 
had fled from the disorders back to the mainland to plow and plant [the land]" 
{KS 24. 41b; duplicate entry KS 79. 8b). 


Notes to Chapter IV 

1. Rubruck, Plan de Carpine, and others have described the Mongol custom 
of shaving a square on the top of the head, shaving both temples to the 
ears, shaving the back of the head, and then wearing the remainder of the 
hair in long plaits behind the ears. See Rockhill, The Journey of William 

. . . , p. 72 and Dawson, The Mongol Mission, pp. 101-102. In 1278, when 
Mongol customs and clothing were introduced into Kory6 by fiat, this cus- 
tom was included. Even students were shaved — the only ones who appear 
to have escaped this tonsorial treatment were the masters of the Court 
School. Ci.KS 72. 21b. 

2. KS 2A and CHSL 4. 32b-33a credit the withdrawal to the diplomatic efforts 
of Kim Sugang /^ "^ pj'J who had accompanied Mongol envoys to Qara- 
qorum where he pleaded for the withdrawal of the Mongol forces. See note 
11 below. 

3. CS Vol. 3 No. 4, p. 242 identifies Taebu-s6ng ^^^S(j ^^ Ta-fu-ying 

^v ^ ^ ' ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ near Uiju, Mt. Hy6ngje was probably in the 
vicinity of Ch6ngju. The camps then were located from Uiju northeast 
along the Yalu River. 

4. Attempts were naturally made to alleviate the situation by bringing fields 
back into production. In early 1254, commissioners had been sent on an 
inspection tour of the citadels of refuge and sea islands of Ch'ungch'6ng, 
Kyongsang, and Cholla as well as Sohae Province, to measure and dis- 
tribute land {KS 78. 4a). Then, in late 1256, instructions were issued per- 
mitting those who were not in excess of one day from their villages to re- 
turn to cultivate the fields {KS 78. 4a-b). Wastelands along the coast and 
lands belonging to the royal household, kung ^-^ , the temples, sa if , 
and the monasteries, w6n p^ , were distributed to supplement the above 
{KS 78. 4a-b). 

5. Perhaps 're-established' would be a better word here, for this bureau cer- 
tainly existed earlier. Cf. KS 102. 14b ff . 

6. YKC 9b merely remarks very succinctly that Kory6 was attacked in 1256, 
1257^ and 1258. 

7. Kumgyo /^^ was the overland relay station at Umgang j3^ ^X \ i* was 
one of the 16 stations on the Ktimgyo circuit i | \j (/CS 82. 9). 

8. Chusa 4]~ ^rp or tleet, cf. 9.479C, Daikanwa jiten -^^ J^ jf.l^ ^f-,^ , 
published in 13 vols, by Daishukan shoten ^^ 'jj^ 'fg '% )% > Tokyo, 

9. Howorth, p. 212, says "in 1256, the King of Corea went in person to Man- 
gu's court to do homage." Howorth cites d'Ohsson, ii. 321 (i.e.. Baron 


d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchingis-Khan jusqu^a Timour 
Beg ou Tamerlane, Paris, 1852). The basis for d'Ohssoa's statement 
was undoubtedly FS 3. 7a which relates that in the sixth year of the reign 
of Mongke, the Kao-li kuo-wang ^ '^ ]^ J- and the heads of other 
nations came to court. Since Kojong, the Kory6 monarch at the time, 
never went to the Mongol court, the passage must be considered erron- 
eous. It may be a reference to prince Sun, as kuo-wang referred to a 
Prince of the first rank in the Mongol system, however, I believe that it 
is more likely a reference to W6njong's visit to the court of Qubilai in 

10. The city of Naju ''^ -)•)] is in the modern S. ChoUa Province. For topo- 
graphical and historical information see TYS 35. 615a-622a. 

11. Kim Sugang ^ ^^ )^'J (fL 1232-1250's) passed the exams in the reign 
of Kojong and was placed in the Historiographical Bureau, sagwan, then 
gradually rose to the post of Attendant Censor, siosar A^ ^^f] ^ . He 
was twice responsible for the withdrawal of Mongol forces. He was first 
sent to Mongolia on a tribute mission to present regional products and to 
ask for the withdrawal of Mongol troops in Kory6. He accompanied the 
Emperor into the walled-city of Qara-qorum, and, when the Emperor 
declined to order the troops to disband since the Kory6 authorities had 
not returned to the mainland^ Sugang made an analogy of the Kory6 posi- 
tion. "It is like the game entering the burrows when the hunters pursue; 
can trapped animals [be expected] to obey and come forth when [the hun- 
ters] stand before them grasping bow and arrows? Again, it is like when 
ice and snow are cruelly cold and the veins of the earth are frozen shut; 
can the grasses and trees live?" The Emperor assented and told Kim, 
"You are indeed an envoy who is equal to [the task of] uniting [our] two 
nations in friendship." Thereupon, he sent one Hsii Chih ^{^%^ to Koryo 
to order the troops to disband 

Later, when the Mongol troops returned, Sugang was once more dis- 
patched to requeist that they be withdrawn. The Emperor at the time was 
in the field against the Sung and Sugang went to his Mobile Garrison, 
hsing-ying y. r ^ . Once again, the Emperor allowed the troops to be 
disbanded and sent an envoy to accompany Sugang back to Koryo. For 
biographical information see KS 102. 20b-21a. 

12. SungSan y)-^ ^Ij ; for the reconstruction of this name see L.Hambis, Le 
Chapitre CVII . . . , p. 130. 

13. There was a tsung-kuan Vf^, ^% or governor in the Yuan lu administra- 
tion. See Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 33. There was also a tsung-kuan or 
commander under the myriarch, wan-hu ^ y> . See Ratchnevsky, op. 


cit., p. 238; also see F.Aubin, Index de ^Un Code des Yuan\ Paris, 1960, 
p. 504. 

14. The entry of the absence of snow is not merely a record of an unusual 
event but rather has important agricultural significance, specifically con- 
cerned with barley and similar crops which are planted prior to the snow- 
fall and which ripen in the spring. Snow insures a good barley crop in the 

15. This entry is paralleled in KS 24. 32a. 

16. One-thousand was a number used in lieu of the given name which was a 
practice much in vogue at this time. Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Form of 
the Paper Note Hui-tzu of the Southern Sung Dynasty', HJAS 16 (1953), 
pp. 365-373, p. 366 note 6. His real name may have been Yi Kwang, see 
KS 24. 24b. 

17. Ch'oe Ui y^ ji^ (d. 1258) was the illegitimate son of Ch'oe Hang and, as 
Ch'oe Hang had no sons by his principal wife, he made tJi his heir. Ui 
was the last of the Ch'oe military rulers; he was killed in early 1258, 
after having held power for only one year. For biographical information 
seeKS 129. 51-55; also see BTKP 30. 282. 

18. Little is known of Ch'oe Yangbaek )^ ^ /j^ (d. 1258) beyond his parti- 
cipation in the events depicted here. For biographical references see 
BTKP 31. 289. 

19. Yu Nung J:^f] |^ ^d. 1258) was of Ch6nju /^ j^] . He was the son of Se- 
nior Councillor, p'yCmgjangsa, Yu So y^p |2 (d. 1258; BTKP 152. 1396). 
Little is known of him other than his brief service with Ch'oe Ui. For 
biographical information see XS 101. 12b; also see BTKP 151. 1387. 

20. Kim Injun ^^^ y^::L.^]%_ > also known as Kim Chun /^/j;^ (d. Jan. 24, 
1269), was a slave of Ch'oe Ch'unghon who rose to power during the rule 
of Ch'oe Hang. Curbed and held down when Ch'oe Ui came to power, Kim 
was one of the principal leaders in the revolt which overthrew the Ch'oe 
clan. Following the downfall of the Ch'oe clan, Kim attempted to concen- 
trate power in his own hands. In 1260, he was given an honorary fief of 

1 000 households and an actual fief of 100 households. In 1263, he was 
appointed Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate, kyojdng pydlgam -^^ 

^ 3') ^ (in KS\Z^. 14b4, read kyo ^}^va. lieu of ^feyoyg^). In 1265, 
he was made Marquis of Haeyang 3^ ^"j^ • ^'^ 1269, he was killed by 
Im Y6n who then seized power himself. Kim Injun had three sons: Taejae 

^ ;^ , Yongjae )^ )^j^ (also called Chu;;|^j; ), and Sikchae ^JfJl . 
For biographical information see KS 130. 12a-20b; also see BTKP 55. 529. 

21. Song Kiryu ^^^ '^ ^\W\ ^^' 1250' s), who has the distinction of being one 
of the two persons classified as 'rapacious functionaries' by the compilors 


of the Koryd-sa, had served Ch'oe Hang as Commander, chiyu, of the 
Night Patrol, ya pyolch^o. Advanced to Grand General with the post of 
Special Supervisor of Defense and of Sea Lanes of Ky6ngsang Province, 
Kydngsang-do suro pangho py6lgam, he led the Night Patrol there to for- 
cibly evacuate the people to islands, killing those who would not obey the 
order, burning dwellings and seizing cash, grain, and lands. When a re- 
port of his activities was sent up by the Circuit Inspector, anch^al-sa, 
Kim Injun attempted to intercede in his behalf but Ch'oe Ui exiled Song 
and reprimanded Kim Injun, et al., for their intervention. "Song was later 
recalled following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan. For biographical in- 
formation seeKS 122. 28a-29a. 

22. The Sinuigun was a cavalry unit formed of men who had escaped and re- 
turned from the Mongols. For further details see the sectionon 'Patrols', 

23. Little is known of Pak Huisil Jj\. ^ 'J (fl. 1250's). He had been sent 
as envoy to the Mongol commander in Koryd prior to the overthrow of the 
Ch'oe clan and, following the coup, he was sent again to request that the 
Mongol forces withdraw so that the Koryo authorities could return to the 
mainland {KS2A. 39b). 

24. Pak Songbi j^\- Jf^;^ jtb (d- 1278) was of T6gw6n J(^^ J^_^ . Due to his role 
in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan he was made Grand General (J^S 24. 
33a) and went on to reach the post of Chamjijdngsa j^Jt ^{] 3^ ^ . He 
had one son, Pak Songdae ^j- ^ ^J:^ . For biographical information 
see KSIZO. 20b; also see BTKP 94. 885. 

25. Im Y6n JfJf^Jfs^ (d. 1270) had the former name of Sungju ^i^jf^ . He was 
uncertain whether Chinju ^M ^H or Ch'uju n^ ^m was his ancestral 
home but later he accepted the former as his real ancestral seat. Physi- 
cally powerful, it is said that he could knock a man flat or toss him to the 
rafters with ease. He was kept as a private soldier by a General and la- 
ter returned to his native village, only to flee when the Mongol forces 
arrived. Subsequently, he was appointed a Lieutenant, taejdng j3^( ^ , 
in the army. At this time, a certain Im Hyohu )^^y}$i_ had illicit re- 
lations with Im Yon's wife. Im Yon learned of this and seduced Im Hyohu' s 
wife in revenge. Hyohu reported this to the authorities who wanted to 
charge Im Y6n. At this point, Kim Injun, aware of Im Y6n's physical 
strength, got the charges dropped and got Im Y6n an appointment as Colo- 
nel. Thereafter, Im Y6n habitually called Kim Injun 'father'. His rank at 
the time of the revolt against Ch'oe Ui is given as toryong nangjang or 
Colonel-in-Charge; it would appear that he was leader of the Night Patrol, 
ya py&lch}o, whose strength he subsequently used to overthrow Kim Injun. 


Im Y6n's power, as is made clear in his biography, was based upon the 
vmits of the Three Patrols, sam pydlch'o, viz., the Left and Right divi- 
sions of the Night Patrol, and the Sinuigun cavalry. As Im YOn's activi- 
ties are given in some detail in the text, I shall not repeat them at this 
point. He had five sons: Yugan ^'^ ^^ , Yumu '|'4 ^ , Yuin ^\^ Jg , 
Yugo 'b^ th , and Yuje ^)'^ JrJ . For biographical iirformation see KS 
130. 20b-27a; also see YKC and BTKP 48. 458. 

26. The rank of lieutenant, taejdng \3^J]^ , also called toejaw^ f^-^ ' 
had the official grade of Ninth Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4), an annual 
stipend of 16 bushels (sok) 10 pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an 
allotment of 30 kydl of paddy fields and 5 kyol of forest lands (Yi, Table?), 

27. Ch'a Songu i^jf-^/^X^ (d- 1269) ultimately rose to the rank of General. 
He was a member of Kim Injun's faction and was killed in the power 
struggle in 1269 when Kim was overthrown {KS 130. 20a). Little is known 
of him beyond his brief role in these events. For biographical references 
see BTKP 20. 188. 

28. Little is known of Kim Hongch'wi /^ ^^ ^^ , however, he did rise to 
the rank of Grand General, and he was exiled in 1269 when Kim Injun was 
overthrown. See KS 130. 20a; XSC 18. 35a-b. 

29. Kim Yongjae /^ j^ j^ (d. 1269) had the former name of ChuJ;^ ; he 
died in the power struggle which overthrew his father, Kim Injun, in 
1269. For biographical information seeKS 130. 19a-b;5Ti(:P 55. 525. 

30. Ch'oe On M.':^ (d. 1268) of Ch'angwSn ^ )^^ , passed the exams in 
the reign of Kojong and gradually rose to be Administrator of the Bureau 
of Military Affairs. Kim Injun had discussed the plot against Ch'oe Ui 
with him and Ch'oe On's son, Munbon, secretly wrote to Ch'oe IJi and 
informed him of the plot. After the death of Ch'oe Ui, Mimbon's letter 
was found. Kim Injun and Yu Kyong endeavored, on the basis of this, to 
have Ch'oe On and his son executed but the King would not go along with 
it and so Ch'oe was banished to an island, as were the rest of the group 
who had written and informed Ch'oe Ui of the plot. Later, Kim Injun had 
Ch'oe recalled. He went on to hold the post of Senior Councillor, p^yong- 

jangsa, in the Royal Chancellory , munhasong. He had two sons: Munbon 
Si_ y^ ^^'^ Mullip (r Munnip) J^ jl. • ^^r biographical information 
see ^5 99. 7a-8b; also see BTKP 21. 258. 

31. The rank of Senior Colonel, chungnangjang ^ ^p ^ > had the official 
grade of Fifth Class (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 120 bushels (sok) 
of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 70 kyol of paddy fields and 27 
kydl of forest lands (Yi, Table 7). 

32. The rank of Major, sanwon V^ ^J , had the official grade of Eighth 


Class, primary (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 33 bushels (sdk) of 
rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 40 kydl of paddy fields and 10 
kyol of forest lands (Yi, Table 7). 

33. The rank of Captain, kyowi jf-^ ^^ , had the official grade of Eighth 
Class, secondary, an annual stipend of 23 bushel {sdk) five pecks (tu) of 
rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 35 kydl of paddy fields and 8 kyol 
of forest land (Yi, Table 7). In the early days of the dynasty, the title was 
Subordinate Officer, omyj^ ^^<| (JKS 81. 6a-7a). 

34. I have been unable to identify these persons. It is interesting to note that 
they were mostly lower ranking officers. 

35. According to KSC 17. 34b, Kim Taejae had communicated the affair to 
Ch'oe Nangbaek believing the latter to be one of the plotters. 

36. Little is known of Han Chonggwe ^i ^^ Aji (d. 1258) other than his 
participation in the events cited here. The importance of his position as 
Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol, stresses the real power of that 
unit. For biographical references see BTKP 36. 330. 

37. Little is known of Yi Irhyu J^ Q /{Jf^id. 1258) other than his participa- 
tion in the events cited here. For biographical references see BTKP 134. 

38. Yi Che ^ |^ (d. 1269) was one of Kim Injun's faction. He rose to the 
rank of General and committed suicide when Kim Injun was overthrown 
in 1269. For biographical references see BTKP 129. 1178. 

39. This is the first appearance of the Three Patrols, sam pyolch'o, as a 
unit in the records. The Three Patrols were the Left and Right divisions 
of the Night Patrol, and the Sinuigun cavalry. For a further discussion 
see the section on 'Patrols', pydlch'o. 

40. The Ungyang m \$. (lit. 'hawks on the wing') was one of the two 'armies' 
kun '^ ; the other was the yongho j|^ )^ (lit. 'dragons and tigers'). To- 
gether they had a complement of three thousand men (pseudo -number?). 
Yi KibaeK -^ ^^ '^ has already expressed the opinion that they were 
the King's guards. See p. 132, Yi Kibaek, Koryo ch'ogi pyongje e kwan- 
han hudae ches61 ui komt'o |^ f£ %)] p^ ^ ^] ^] f] ^} ^^^^ 

Iaj a -^^^ I^J t"^^ *^® Military Institutions of the Early Ko-ryeo Per- 
iod"], AY 1 (1958) 2, pp. 129-154. 

41. Little is known of Pak Songja j\\- J^j\^ (d. 1264) other than his parti- 
cipation in the events cited here. For some biographical references see 
BTKP 94. 887. 

42. Little is known of S6ng Wonbal jqjy /Cj ii.(d. 1258) other than the few 
items mentioned in the text. For biographical references see BTKP 107. 
1013; correct the BTKP reference KS 127. 55a to readies 129. 55a. 


43. The text reads Pak Sung^ae j'i\ ^L^ 5 I believe that kae is an error 
for ik ^ , and that the individvial concerned is Pak Sungik JlI >|{^ ^ , 

a member of Kim Injun's faction who reached the rank of General and who 
was killed when Im Y6n overthrew Kim Injun in 1269. See KS 130. 20a; 
for biographical information on Pak Sungik see BTKP 95. 895. 

44. There are various theories on the kyol, a term which was in usage in 
Silla times. The most widely accepted version is that given by Yi, Han'- 
guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 162 ff. One ky6l was 33 square paces, po -^ , or 
45.496 sq. meters, 2kydl were 46.66 square paces, etc. A different 
theory sees the kyol as a unit of farmland which produced one hundred 
pack-boards, chige, of rice; one chige containing 10 sheaves, one sheaf 
containing 10 handfuls, i.e., the kyol as a measure of the value of land as 
evidenced by its productive capacity. For this theory see Kim Chaejin 

/^ IX ^T> Chon'gyolche yon'gu )^ i^ ^'] ^ '_£ ["A Study of the 
Kyol System"], Nonmun-chip< |j^ JC^ ^ (1959), Kyongbuk University 

P>- jtj y^^^^ > Taegu, Korea, pp. 71-115. With regard to the 
linear measurements mentioned, in the 23rd year of the reign of Munjong 
(r. 1047-1082), the following measures were adopted: 
6 ch^on <\' =1 pun /^ 
10 pun = 1 ch^ok X- 

6ch'dk =\po ^ 

45. This was done in the ninth month of 1259, part of what appears to have 
been a general redistribution of land among the officials in the capital 
area. Also involved were some 2 000 kydl of fields controlled by the gov- 
ernment granary ^^ ^^ , and the fields of Haum-chin J-o] |i^ ^^ and 
Kanghaenyong jX j^ '^' 

46. The members of the cavalry units of the Five Armies were also given 
awards of silver and grain according to their station at this time. Since 
no mention is made of their participation in the overthrow of the Ch'oe 
clan, I assume the awards were made to insure their support after the 
fall of the Ch'oe clan. Members of the Night Patrol and Sinuigvm cavalry 
were each given three bushels {sok) of rice, one kun of iron, and three 
bolts {pit) of cloth. There appears to have been some discontent in their 
ranks, for a week prior to this they had crowded the King's carriage in 
front of the palace, perhaps seeking rewards. 

47. The title was awarded in several grades from First Class to Fifth Class, 
and those so honored were given rice and colored satin, etc., while those 
among them who had been serving as slaves were, extending to their sons 
and grandsons, given permission to take the exams for civil service. 

48. Ch'oe Cha ^ j|^ (1188-1260) was a descendant of the famed Kory6 Con- 


fucianist Ch'oe Ch'ungJ^ ;^ (d. 1068; BTKP23. 224), and himself one 
of the more important literati of the Kory6 period. His style, cha, was 
Sud6kJ^Jj^^^, and his literary appellation, /io, was Tongsan-su 4} )lj 

^ . He had strongly advocated making a settlement with the Mongols, 
pointing out the crowded conditions on Kanghwa Island and the shortage of 
land there. He visited Kim Injun and entertained him, for which people 
abused him. He died two years after the fall of the Ch'oe clan and was 
given the posthumous appellation of Munch'6ng ^ ^%- . His works in- 
cluded the Kajip ^ ^ in 10 kwdn and the Sokp'amin-chip ^^;f ^j^ |^ 

-^in 2 kwdn. For biographical information see KS 102. 14a-16a; also 
seeBTKP2\. 205. 

49. It is interesting to observe a precedent in Koryo-Chin relations, for it 
was due principally to the Confucianists that Kory6 became a vassal of the 
Chin. Cf. M.Rogers, 'The Regular ization of Kory6-Chin Relations (1116- 
1131)', CAJ 6 (1961), p. 62 note 58. 

50. Yesiider. The name occurs in several variants including: Yii-ch'ou ^-^ 
^, (ifS24. 35a-b); Yii-ch'ou-ta /^ ^^^ j|^ (ifS 25. 3a, etc.); and Yii- 
su-tu /^f^ ^ ^ {KS2A. 15b; KSC 17. 18b). Mr. Gari Ledyard of Ber- 
keley has brought it to my attention that a certain Yesiider is mentioned 
in the Ching-shih ta-tien section on postal relays, jam ^-^ , preserved 
in the Yung-lo ta-tien under the date 1262.4; this is also noted in CS 
Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 308, relating to the KS 25. 3a account of an order from 
Yesiider to Koryo to establish postal relay stations south of the Koryo 
Western Capital. Cf. Yung-lo ta-tien, Chimg-hua shu-chii ^ ^ % M\ 
edition, Peking, 1960, 19416.22.11b. I note that there is also a certain 
Yesiider mentioned in Yung-lo ta-tien 19417.22. 2b. In both instances the 
name is written "i^j^^'f^LJ ^^'^ ^'^ ^^^ instances, the identification 
remains conjectural. I have followed Shiratori, Onyaku . . . , (1)2. 28a-b in 
the reconstruction of this name. A certain Yesiider -t*Jj j^ ^^ ^^ is 
also mentioned in the FS 93 section on household taxes, k^o-chai Jf^ ^ , 
for which see Schurman, op. cit., p. 99 and p. 105-106 note 11. 

In 1254, Yesiider /^j^-^ and P'u-po-tai -^ Jj^^ arrived in 
Kory6 (A'S24. 15b) with cavalry units to reinforce Jalairtai. Following 
Jalairtai's murder in 1259, Yesiider took charge of affairs in Koryo and 
was stationed in Tving-ching. According to his conversation with Prince 
Chon when the latter arrived in Tung-ching enroute to the Mongol Court 
in 1259, the Emperor had placed Prince Sung-chi ^^ ^ in charge of 
conquering Koryo and an ?rmy was already in readiness to begin the as- 
sault {KS 24. 43a-b); Yesiider, it would seem, was at the time subordi- 
nate to Prince Sung-chi. 


51. Cho Hwi ^ "9^ (fl. 1250-1270's) was originally from Hanyang-pu J^ 

'f% )^^ ^^ *^^ ^^^ River Delta, but later went to live in Yongjin-hyon 
^1 5^ ^^■^ ^^ ^^^ northeast. He rebelled in 1258, and submitted the 
northeast area to the Mongols who placed him in charge as Governor, 
tsung-kuan. His post of governor was transmitted to his son Yanggi ^ 
j.% and to his grandson Kwak >j|6 . For biographical information see 
KS 130. 10a-12a; also see BTKPl. 71. The 5 T/CP entry "d. 1356-10" is 
in error; the date Cho died is unknown. 

52. In the twelfth month of 1258, the Mongol Prince San-chi (a.w. Sung-chu; 
Sung-chi) led troops into the old Hwaju area {KS2A. 38b). After conso- 
lidating Mongol gains in the Kory6 northeast by establishing a Governor's 
command, he withdrew to Tung-ching {KS 24. 38b). 

53. Ch'ien-hu ^ j^ , Chiliarch or Chief of One -Thousand. See Aubin, op. 
cit., p. 502 for references to Ratchnevsky, Un Code . . . , concerning 
this title. The division of the Mongol army into sections of 10, 100, 1 000, 
and 10 000 was ordered by Cinggis in an article of his Yasa and corre- 
sponded to tne Mongol social organization, for which see G.Vernadsky, 
•The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa', HJAS 3 (1938) 1, pp. 

54. Wan-hu ^ j!c) Myriarch or Chief of Ten-Thousand, See Ratchnevsky, 
op. cit., p. Vin and p. 139. Also see F.W. Cleaves, 'Biography of Bayan 
of the Barin in the Yiian Shih', HJAS 19 (1956) 3 & 4, p. 203 note 5. 

55. Yun Ch'un ^ Jj^ was the Special Supervisor of Defense at Yanggun-song 

j^ y^^^^ and he submitted the city to the Mongols in the 1250' s. The 
Mongols selected 600 of the best troops from the city and placed Yun in 
charge of them. He returned to rejoin Koryo, for which he was rewarded 
by Ch'oe Hang and placed in the army as a general. See KS 130. 31a-b. 

56. T^un-fien {^ ^ or military colonies, one type of government land under 
the Yiian. See Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29. 

57. The post of hojang <p. J^ or Magistrate was a post in the regional ad- 
ministrative system which dates in usage to the second year of the reign 
of Songjong m ^^ (r. 982-997). There was a general reorganization in 
the reign of Hy6njong ^J) jf^ (r. 1010-1031) of the provincial administra- 
tion which placed eight Magistrates, hojang, and four Deputy Magistrates, 
pu-hojang, in those chu, pu, kun, and hydn districts which had over 1 000 
taxable male adults, chong T ; in districts with over 500 taxable male 
adults there were seven Magistrates and two Deputy Magistrates; dis- 
tricts with over 300 taxable male adults had five Magistrates and two 
Deputy Magistrates; districts with less than 100 taxable male adults had 
four Magistrates and one Deputy Magistrate. The number of Magistrates 


and Deputy Magistrates assigned to the Frontier-Districts, while it cor- 
responded to the number of male adults in each community, was slightly 
less than the above. There were, of course, other provincial posts which 
are set forth in KS 75. 45a-49a, from which the above information has 
been taken. An excellent study of the subject is Gim Jong-gug (Kim Chong- 
guk) ^ If if , KOrai jidai no kyori ni tsuite ^ ^ ^^^^ ^ ^^f^li 

■O <. ■> ^ ["On the Provincial Government Officials in the Goryeo 
Dynasty"], CG 25 (1962), pp. 71-122. 

With reference to 'taxable male adults', chdng '^ , "[In] the national 
system, at sixteen years of age, males (lit. people ^ ) became advilts, 
chdng ^J , commencing [their eligibility for] national corvee duty; at 
sixty years of age they were considered old and were released from cor- 
vee duty." The basis for this was the annual census conducted by the 
functionaries of the chu and kydn administrations and registered people 
were taxed by household; levies for military service, levies-in-kind, 
and corvee service were based upon the household registers {KS 79. la). 
58. Kory6 relief measures taken are outlined in KS 80. 41b-42b; some infor- 
mation is given in KS 79. In the month preceding this: 'They doled out 
20 kiln of white silver from the Sinhiing Treasury, exchanged it for seed- 
grain and distributed it to the poor" {KS 79. 8a-b). 


Chapter V 

On May 14 {chia-im W i^ day, fourth month), 1259, Ch6n fjffi- , the 
Crown Prince, with a retinue of 40 persons, set out for the Mongol Court. A 
levy of one kun of silver was placed on those of the fourth rank and above, 
and in decreasing amounts on those below the fourth rank to meet the ex- 
penses of the journey. Only 300 horses for the National Gifts could be pro- 
duced from the capital area and as these were considered insufficient, horses 
were purchased on the road. Therefore, there were few Civil or Military Of- 
ficials, yangban, who rode {KS 24. 41b-42b; KSC 17. 47b-48a; CHSL 4. 34a) ^\ 

As the Crown Prince rode toward the Mongol Court, a report from the 
north came in that Jalairtai had died violently and that the Emperor had sent 
men who seized three of the Mongol commanders {KS 24. 42b). This placed 
Mongol affairs in Kory6 with Yesiider and Prince Sving-chi TK^^ :g (a.w. Sung- 
chu; San-chi) whom the Kory6 Prince met in Tung-ching on his way to the 
Mongol Court. Troops had already been massed at Tung-ching for another in- 
vasion of Koryo and it was only after Prince Ch6n had convinced Prince Sung- 
chi the KoryO authorities were carrying out the Mongol demand that the people 
return to the mainland, and reminded him the Mongols had agreed to disband 
the troops if the Crown Prince went to the Mongol Court, where the troops 
actually disbanded {KS 24. 43a-b; KSC 17. 48a-49a). 

Included in the peace agreement was the demolition of the fortified walls 
on Kanghwa and Mongol envoys arrived in the fifth month (May 24 - June 21) 
to supervise their destruction {KS 24. 42b). The dismantling of the inner for- 
tifications by the militia men, produced great anxiety {KS 24. 42b-43a) but 
when the Guard Corps, tohang, was ordered to tear down the outer fortifica- 
tions, the people began to purchase boats and the boat price soared (XS 24. 
44a; KSC 11. 49a-b). 

At this time, Kojong, after occupying the throne for 47 years, died (on 
July 21, 1259) at the age of 68 at the home of Yu Ky6ng {KS 24. 42a). With the 
Crown Prince enroute to the Mongol Court, his younger brother, Ch'ang, the 
Duke of An'gyftng, was suggested for the throne by Kim Injun but this was ve- 
toed by the Chief Ministers of the Civil and Military Departments, yangbu, 


who cited the ancient precedent of the succession of the eldest son, perhaps 
with the memory of troubles with Chin in mind {KS 24. 42a-b; KSC 17. 49b- 
50a) 2). Failing in this, the ambitious Kim Injun was quick to ingratiate him- 
self by supporting the Royal Grandson, Vaeson j;^ ^'L , Prince Sim 3). who 
was then formally placed at the head of the government until the Crown Prince 
returned. Junior Colonel Pak Ch'6nsik J[X ^^ )r^ was dispatched with a re- 
port of the matter to the Mongol Court {KS 25. la-b; KSC 17. 49b-50a; CHSL 4. 

The envoys Pak Htiisil and Cho Munju '^9^ %^ )^^ (fl. 1250' s) 4) previous- 
ly sent to the Mongols to request the removal of Mongol garrisons from Oiju 
and the Western Capital, although they had contacted Hsien-tsung (Mongke) 
who was at the time (3rd month = March 26 - April 23, 1259) leading the expe- 
dition against the southern Sung, failed in their objective {KS 25. 2a-3a; KSC 
17. 51a). Upon their return, in the eighth month of 1259 (Aug. 20 - Sept. 18) 
they were accompanied by the Mongol envoy Shih-lo-wen f^ V<^ \'-o\ bearing 
a dispatch from Yesiider which, in brief, ordered Koryo to establish j^mdz 5) 
or overland relay stations, fully equipped with attendants and horses, south of 
the Western Capital for the use of the Emperor's messengers; the relay sta- 
tions to the north of the Western Capital — presumably reestablished by the 
Mongols — were to be used jointly {KS 25. 3a). 

While the Koryfi authorities had, in response to Mongol demands, re- 
peatedly declared they would return to the old capital, they had as yet made 
no effort to do so. In Yen-tu dot J^B , Hong Tagu, the son of Hong Pogw6n, 
had told the Emperor that it was not true the Koreans had returned to the 
mainland. A Korean envoy heard of this and informed Yesiider that it was sim- 
ply slander. Yesiider promptly sent a Mongol envoy to Koryo to inspect the 
progress being made to return to the mainland. Some action had to be taken 
and it is clear that it was taken because of the presence of the Mongol envoy 
who had come to gather first-hand information on the transfer. So, in the 
eleventh month (Nov. 16 - Dec. 15) of 1259, the Kory6 authorities began to 
levy an army of 30 yOng (i.e., 30 000) to construct palace buildings in the old 
capital. They also informed the Mongol envoy that the Emperor had allowed 
them three years due to the necessity of transporting building materials and 
constructing new palaces, dwellings, and the like in the old capital. Their 
reluctance to act they said, was because the Crown Prince, who was to as- 
cend the throne upon his return, was still absent {KS 25. 3b-4a; KSC 17. 

With the winter, famine set in again in the capital {KS 25. 3b) and forces 
were secretly sent against Mongol raiding parties on the mainland {KS 25. 
3a-b; KS 25. lb; KS 25. 5a; KSC 17. 52b; KSC 17. 53a). These raiding parties, 


many from the Mongol garrisons in the northeast and guided by Kory6 desert- 
ers (cf. KS 130. 10a-12a), were the real reason the Koreans stayed on the 
islands. At this time, the Special Supervisor of Resettlement, chhdpae pyol- 
gam '^ ^^Y ^)] ^^ , of Sfthae Province reported that all the people who had 
returned to the mainland had been made captive by the Mongol troops, and he 
requested that the return from the islands to the mainland be stopped (XSC 17. 
52b). The severity of the situation is attested by the sharp increase in upris- 
ings and desertions to the Mongols {KS 25. 3a; KS 25. 5b; KS 25. 6a). Even a 
Recorder of the Palace Guards, anae tobydngma noksa J/^^ ]:^ ^|3 j^ 

..ft] 14 i- > shaved his head and submitted to the Mongols {KS 25. 6b) 6). In 
the winter of 1259, ". . . there was a great famine in the capital. The officials 
and the people were searching for food. Those from the southern chu districts 
streamed [back] to the provinces. The Military Council, chiingbang, [ordered] 
the Censorate, dsadae, to prohibit the officials from leaving the palace and 
there were many officials who starved to death" {KS 25. 3b; also see KSC 17. 

In the meantime, while Prince ChOn was enroute to present himself, 
Mohgke^who was in the field leading an attack against the southern Sung, died 
in the seventh month (July 22 - Aug. 19) of 1259 ?), at Tiao-yii-shan /|A] ^, 

J_j (in mod. Szu-ch'uan Province ^^^ 1'] -^ ). At this time. Prince Chon 
was at Liu-p'an-shan ;\ *^ ^ (in mod. Kan-su Province iJ^ /t^ -ig )• 
The Mongol Prince Qubilai who was also in the field against the Sung, was at 
that time at 0-chou ^8 f)\ (in mod. Hupei Province). Following the death of 
Mongke, Ariy-boge j5o] ]£. -^^ 4( ^^'^- p^ W, '$^ % ^' one of Mongke's 
three brothers ^i , hurriedly convened an assembly of princes in Mongolia and 
was elected Qan. Hearing the news of Ariy-boge's action, Prince Qubilai made 
a quick peace with the Sung and hurried north with his forces 9). Enroute he 
met Koryo Prince Chon and learning that the latter had come to offer his sub- 
mission, Qubilai was greatly pleased. At this meeting in the field. Prince 
Qubilai is related to have exclaimed: "Kory6, a nation 10 000 li [distant]; 
T'angT'ai-tsung himself led an expedition [against them] and was unable to 
obtain their submission ^^K Now their Heir Apparent himself comes to me. 
This is the will of Heaven." At this same audience, Chao Lang-pi H), then 
Pacification Commissioner, hsuan-fu-shih ^^' , of the Chiang -huai 5i ^^ 
provinces, is said to have told Qubilai, "Although Kory6 is called a small na- 
tion, due to its perilous mountains and seas, our nation has used troops 
[against them] for over twenty years and they are still not our vassals" {KS 
25. 8a-9b; also see KSC 18. 3a-b). 

Accompanied by Prince Ch6n, Qubilai continued northward to Ching- 
chao-fu j^^ J^M^ • Here, in the second month (Mar. 14 - Apr. 11) of 1260, 


Prince Ch6n received news of his father, Kojong's death {KS 25. 6b). He was 
allowed by Qubilai to leave immediately and Qubilai ordered the darupCi or 
resident commissioner Shu-li-ta -^ ^^ )z and Kang Hwasang l^) to escort 
Prince Ch6n back to Kory6 {KS 25. 7a-b; KSC 18. 3a-4a) l^) where they ar- 
rived at Kaegyong in the following month {KS 25. 7b-8a). 

Prince Ch6n's absence had given the KoryS authorities an excuse for not 
leaving Kanghwa while Yesiider had endeavored to have the move coincide with 
Prince Ch6n's return. He even suggested that Kim Injun should lead the offi- 
cials out to welcome the King at the Western Capital (/i'S 25. 6b-7a). As a con- 
ciliatory move, the Kory6 authorities ". . . ordered the officials great and 
small, the people, and the Buddhist priests, each to build living quarters in 
the old capital" {KS 25. 7a). 

Several officials were sent to the Western Capital to welcome Prince 
Ch6n but at the time he had already passed the Western Capital with the Mon- 
gol escorts {KS 25. 7a-b). As Prince Ch6n journeyed south, "the Royal Grand- 
son, desiring to return the metropolis to the old capital, made Grand General 
Kim Panggyfing ^5) ^nd General Kim Sungjun, et al., Special Supervisors of 
Resettlement, chhdbae py6lgam. Opening the granary, they distributed 6 420 
bushels {kok) of rice, one bushel to every prince and official in order to aid 
in the expenses of constructing dwellings" {KSC 18. 2b; also see KS 25. 7b). 
This interesting passage says, in effect, that the total number of officials 
and princes was 6 420 for the capital or central government and it appears to 
be correct 16). 

At KaegyOng, Prince Ch6n had accompanied Shu-li-ta to inspect the con- 
struction of palaces then underway. From Kaegy6ng they rode south and, 
reaching the outskirts of Sungch'6n-pu, Shu-li-ta who had been sent back with 
Prince ChOn as daruyaci, decided to test the Prince's intentions and invited 
him to proceed ahead into Sungch'6n-pu. When Prince Ch6n took him at his 
word, Shu-li-ta angrily withdrew and camped in a field on the outskirts of the 
city, expressing his desire to return. Apparently Shu-li-ta was holding the 
Crown Prince, for not until after a visit by Prince Sim and a present of a 
parrot (decorated) basin and thirty ktin of white gold did Shu-li-ta consent to 
remain. The next day he crossed to Kanghwa in the same boat with Prince 
Ch6n. Due to the insistence of Shu-li-ta to transfer the capital, the Koryo 
authorities divided the civil and military officials as well as the militia force 
into three shifts to go and come from Kaegy6ng in order to indicate their in- 
tention to transfer the capital (XS 25. 9b-10a; KSC 18. 4a) ^'^\ 

Early in the fourth month (May 12 - June 10) of 1260, a Mongol envoy 
arrived with a letter which declared, "Of all beneath Heaven who have not 
surrendered, there is only your nation and Sung." Specifically referring to 


Kim Injun and mentioning rumors of intrigue and rebellion in Kory6, the letter 
closed with "At the time when the Emperor had not yet ascended the throne, 
we heard that the King had arrived in the Western Capital and remained there 
eight or nine days. We suspected there was a calamity therefore we bestow 
this letter" (KS25. 10a-12a; KSC 18. 4a-6a; 75 208. 4b). Fortunately for W6n- 
jong these suspicions appear to have been unfounded 18), 

On June 3 {ivu-um j\i ^A- day of the fourth month) 1260, Prince Ch6n, or 
Wonjong as he was later canonized, ascended the throne in the Kangan Palace 

)$" ^ 3SL°^ Kanghwa Island {KS 25. 12b; KSC 18. 6a) and, a few days later, 
a Mongol envoy arrived with an Imperial Edict 1^) which in addition to contain- 
ing specific instructions for W6njong, was at the same time an answer to va- 
rious requests he had made - apparently prior to returning to Kory6. There 
was to be a transfer of all people back to the mainland from the islands, agri- 
culture was to be encouraged, while Qubilai promised to stop all pillaging by 
the soldiers, to withdraw the army, and to release all Koreans taken prisoner 
since the previous spring 20) . 

A subsequent edict in the sixth month (July 10 - Aug. 8) clarified these 
points somewhat further: clothing and headdress were to follow the Koryo 
custom 21) J the speed of the transfer back to the old capital was to accord 
with their ability (i.e., no time -limit was set, but they were to move as quick- 
ly as their ability permitted); the troops garrisoned on the Kory6 side of the 
Yalu River were to be withdrawn in the autumn, while the party of the daruyaci 
or resident commissioners being sent to KoryO (to replace Shu-li-ta) had al- 
ready been recalled (ATS 25. 19a-b; YKC lOa-b; XSC 18. 9a-b). Qubilai fulfilled 
his pledge and released some 440 households, i.e., 2 200 persons, taken cap- 
tive (K'S 25. 16a; also seeKS 25. 12b-13a) and, in the autumn, the withdrawal 
of Mongol forces began, but even the Emperor could not prevent pillaging as 
the army withdrew 22) (^-5 25. 19b-20a). 

One reason for Qubilai's indulgent attitude toward Koryo, in addition to 
his meeting with Prince Ch6n in the field, and his own succession dispute 
with Ariy-boge 23) ^as Kory6's prompt submission of tribute — a mission 
was sent to present regional products as soon as WOnjong returned {KSC 18. 
6a) and the rapid dispatch of Hui, the Duke of Y6ngan 24)^ to present con- 
gratulations on Qubilai's accession to the throne {KSC 18. 7a), by which Kory6 
became the first nation to present congratulations iJK^S 25. 18a-b; KSC 18. 9a; 
CHSL 4. 36a). 

Another reason was the resettlement of the Kory6 northwest. There had 
been two mass evacuations of the area north of the Western Capital, viz., 
once in the period 1231-1232 and a second time in the period 1248-1250. In 
the tenth month (Oct. 26 - Nov. 23) of 1261, there was a large-scale move- 


ment back into the northwest which re -populated the cities of Unju, Pakchu, 
Kuju, Kwakchu, Maengju, Muju, T'aeju, and Suju 25) ^^ j-j-j . 

Internally, Kim Injun, backed by both WOnjong and Sim, the latter in- 
vested as the Crown Prince in the eighth month (Sept. 7 - Oct. 6) of 1260 {KS 
25. 18a), continued to increase his power. In the sixth month he was given the 
crucial post of Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs {KS 25. 16b) 
and before the year was out he was given the honorary title of "First Merito- 
rious Protector of the Altars of the Earth", replacing Yu Ky6ng who was de- 
moted to "Fifth Meritorious Protector . . . etc." {KS 25. 16a-b;/<'S 130. 14a). 
Yu Ky6ng's demotion is an interesting event for his actual power had been 
clipped since the winter of 1258. At that time, only eight months after the 
overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Yu had taken over control of the Civil Council 
but had overreached himself. Im YOn and Kim Sungjun who hated Yu Kyong 
had slandered him to Kim Injun, the real strongman. Kim, in turn, had told 
the King, the aging Kojong, that Yu Ky6ng wanted to seize the King's power. 
This apparently was an excuse for Kim to round up Yu Ky6ng's supporters. 
Three of them, viz.. General U Tukkyu ^ i^ ^ , Commander, chiyu, 
Kim Tugyong /^ i'^ t^, and Junior Colonel Yang Hwa y^ J^Q were im- 
prisoned and later beheaded; another of Yu's backers. Colonel Ky6ng W611ok 

1^ ■f[_^ t^^ was exiled 26), Yu Ky6ng heard of these events and went to the 
Palace to protest but to no avail, and Yu himself was dismissed from his post 
as minister, simg-sdn ;>|^ ^^ {KSC 17. 43a-44a). Yu, however, was made 
Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a post of considerable 
power, in the next month (fiS 24. 39a), probably due to the support of the aged 
monarch Kojong who moved into Yu's home early in the following year {KS 24. 
41b) where he died within a month {KS 24. 44a-b). 

It is also interesting to note that Kim Injun was at least partly responsible 
for the investiture of Prince Sim as the Crown Prince. Wonjong had wanted 
to invest Prince Sim earlier, but hesitated to do so after the Royal Consort, 
pi 27) u J ^ had slandered him. The Royal Consort, the former Kyongch'ang 
Princess 28) was the daughter of Ch6n, the Duke of Sinan, and had borne 
T'ae 29)^ the Marquis of Siyang ^^ f^ ; Chong ^0), the Duke of Sunan; the 
Kyongan Princess )% l^ ^^ ^ , and the Hamny6ng Princess 31) j^ ^ 

r^ ^ . In slandering Prince Sim by telling W6njong that the Prince had not 
been pleased to hear of W6njong's return, the Royal Consort was, of course, 
attempting to promote the interest of her own son. Prince Sim was the eldest 
son of W6njong by Queen Sun'gy6ng ^2)^ Wonjong's first wife who died in 1237. 
Kim Injun was responsible for dispelling W6njong's doubts of Prince Sim and 
the investment took place. Prince Sim, incidentally, did not forget the matter. 
He was later enthroned, viz.. King Ch'ungny61 }^. f,'| ^ (r. 1275-1308), 


and in the third year of his reign, he had her tried, and degraded to the status 
of a commoner iJKS 25. 18a; ifS 88. 36a-37a; /CSC 18. la.-h; HY 20. 29b). 

The year of 1260 saw W6njong secure on the throne, peace restored on 
the peninsula and, although there were still demands that the capital be moved 
from Kanghwa, construction work was being completed in Kaegy6ng serving 
as an excuse for remaining on the island, and Kory6 had won the pleasure of 
Qubilai by managing to be the first to present congratulations on his succes- 
sion to the throne (KS 25. 18a-b; CHSL 4. 36a). The cost of the various cere- 
monial activities connected with the enthroning of Wonjong, the investiture of 
the Crown Prince, the investiture of the Kyongch'ang Princess to be Queen 
j£_ j);^ (f[S 25. 18a), the elevation of the Queen Mother (i.e., Wonjong's mo- 
ther) to be Queen Dowager {KS 25. 17b), the taking of a consort by the Crown 
Prince, plus the requirements of the other members of the royal family, 
consumed during the year ". . . over 1 000 kun of gold and silver, over 3 000 
sdk of rice, and cloth beyond calculation" {KS 25. 20b) 33). 

There were other diversions in the Kory6 capital apart from the succes- 
sive ceremonial matters. Because of the great drought, the King put aside 
sun parasols and banned the wearing of sun hats by the officials (KS 25. 16b). 
There were several earthquakes, one violent enough to destroy many houses 
in the capital {KS 25. 16b) 34). Cheju presented her usual annual tribute and, 
as had grown customary in these years, "they took the Cheju tribute horses 
and presented them to the civil and military officials, tongso w^ {h , of the 
fourth rank and above" {KS 25. 17a-b). 

In the fourth month (May 1 - May 30) of 1261, Kory6 sent Crown Prince 
Sim to the Mongol Court to offer congratulations on the pacification of Ari)(- 
boge with whom Qubilai had been contesting for power. The expenses for the 
trip were met by the usual levy and we read that "at this time, the Chief 
Ministers down to those of the fourth rank produced one kun of silver; those 
of the fifth rank produced two bolts {pHl) of white ramie; the sixth rank one 
bolt; in the seventh, eighth, and ninth ranks, every two men produced one 
bolt, in order to meet the expenses of the journey" {KS 25. 17a). 

During the following years, in addition to coping with the raids of both 
Chinese {KS 26. 8a) and Japanese freebooters (e.g., KS 25. 29b; KS 25. 31a-b; 
KS 25. 32a; KS 26. 7a-b), the Kory6 authorities were concerned with passively 
resisting the establishment of Mongol control on the peninsula as well as at- 
tempts to get the KoryS capital transferred back to the mainland. Koryo trib- 
ute missions wound their way to the Mongol Court (e.g., KS 25, 23b) and, in 
addition to the spring and autumn tribute, Kory6 was frequently called upon 
to fulfill demands for various supplementary items (e.g., KS 25. 24b-25b). In 
the winter of 1262, an edict arrived which reminded Kory6 of the injunctions 


laid down by Cinggis upon surrendering states that they must send hostages, 
submit population registers, establish post-stations, raise an army, provide 
provisions, and support the Mongolian army. "Now, with the exception that 
a hostage (i.e., Wang Sun) has already been sent, the remaining matters have 
not yet been carried out" {KS 25. 26a-27b), the edict charged. In the fourth 
month (May 9 - June 7) of 1263, when Kory6 envoys brought back word that 
the Emperor was angry at not receiving a report on Koryo's progress in ful- 
filling the requirements set forth, a tribute mission was dispatched with a 
memorial outlining the difficulties due to the desolation into which the country 
had fallen {KS 25. 29b-31a). The following year, W6njong was summoned to 
the Mongol court where he presented himself in the autumn, ninth month, then 
returned to Koryo in the winter, twelfth month of the same year {KS 26. 5a-b; 
YKC lib). One reason for the summons was undoubtedly to try to speed up 
KoryS's response to Mongol demands 35)^ 

In late 1266, the first of several events occurred which was to shatter 
completely the relative calm which had existed on the peninsula. At the Mon- 
gol Court, Cho I 36)^ a former Korean Buddhist monk who had become an in- 
terpreter at Qubilai's court, had interested the Emperor in Japan, and the 
first Mongol envoys Hei-ti^'^) , a shih-lang^^) in the Department of War, and 
Yin-hung ^9)^ a shih-lang in the Department of Rites, had been dispatched 
to Kory6, whence they were to be guided to Japan with an Imperial Edict for 
the rulers of that nation (i^S26. 8b-9a; YKC llb-12a; KS 130. 27a). 

This embassy journeyed south as far as Koje island ^^' ^ y^ with Korean 
guides, then returned ostensibly due to bad weather which made the crossing 
impossible. There is, however, good reason to suspect that the envoys were 
not too anxious to go and that the Koreans encouraged them to turn back, even 
providing pretexts which included reasons for abandoning the effort to bring 
Japan withinthe Mongol sphere (iiTS 26. 9b-10a; /CS 130. 27a-b). These efforts 
by Koryo were to no avail and several embassies were later sent to Japan ^D. 
The first Mongol missive and an accompanying Korean missive was delivered 
by a Korean, a certain Pan Pu J^fe ^ ^ who was sent to Japan at Qubilai's 
insistence {KS 130. 21h;KS 26. 10b-12a). Concomitant with those efforts was 
the construction of ships in Koryo, originally begun in 1259 at the Western 
Capital. In 1268, Koryo was ordered to prepare ships, foodstuffs and raise 
an army to be used in the campaign against the Southern Sung or for an inva- 
sion of Japan (^5 26. 15b; KS26. 18a; see Part H). 

As these events occurred, the embers of the power struggle within Koryo 
were slowly being fanned into flame as Kim Injun, the prime mover in the 
overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, slowly increased his own power. Wonjong him- 
self had remarked confidently, "Kim [Injjun serves me. The previous King 


(i.e., Kojong) has slain the tyrants and restored the government to the Royal 
Family" {KS 130. 14b). Such was W6njong's faith in Kim that when he left for 
the Mongol court in 1264, he placed Kim, who had just been appointed Direc- 
tor of the Supreme Directorate, kyojong pydlgam, in charge of state affairs 
{KS 26. 5a; KS 130. 14b). In 1265, Kim, who had previously received an hono- 
rary fief of 1 000 households and an actual fief (i.e., households whose taxes 
he consumed) of 100 households {KS 130. 14b), managed to be enfeoffed as 
Marquis of Haeyang ^ j?^ /j^ {KS 26. 7b; KS 130. 15a; TT 34. 93) and over 
the next few years grew increasingly arbitrary in his actions. 

In late 1267, Ch'ang the Duke of An'gyong had been sent to the Mongol 
Court to report that an envoy had been dispatched to Japan with the Mongol 
edict. While Duke Ch'ang was at court the next year, Qubilai told him that if 
Kory6 had sincerely submitted that they would raise an army and support the 
Mongolian troops, supply provisions, request the establishment of daru^aci, 
and take a census of their people. The Emperor reminded Duke Ch'ang that 
the capital had not yet been returned to the mainland and said Kangh Hwa- 
sang had reported that there was a decline in the amount of ramie cloth sub- 
mitted as tribute by Koryo and that it was of poor quality. Then he accused 
Kory6 of submitting a false memorial concerning KoryS's relations with Ja- 
pan {KS 24. 13a-14a). Shortly after Duke Ch'ang had returned to Kory6 with a 
report of this conversation, in the third month (April 3 - May 2) of 1269, a 
Bureau for Resettlement was established in the old capital of KaegyOng {KS 
26. 14b), and in the same month, the Mongol Governor, tsung-kuan, of Pei- 
ching Zm J|;^^^|.('province') administration arrived with an edict which out- 
lined Qubilai's conversation with Duke Ch'ang and which once again set fortli 
the requirements for surrendering states established by Cinggis. 

The Emperor had also instructed Kim, his sons, and his brother to come 
to the capital. Kim's faction was afraid and schemed to kill the envoy. They 
also told WSnjong that if he didn't go along with their plans they would make 
Kim Injun King. This was reported to the chief ministers of the civil and 
military departments by Om Suan 42)^ ^ju^ despite their alarm the ministers 
were afraid to speak out. 6m then managed to convince Kim Stingjun that it 
would be a mistake to kill the Mongol envoy. Fearing that the Mongols would 
accuse him, after learning that General Ch'a Songu had been talking of the 
scheme to kill the Mongol envoy, Kim did not go to the Mongol Court. This 
incident also served to increase Kim's determination to resist the Mongols 
(^"5 26. 15b; KS 106. 36b-37a; KS 130. 15b-16a). The result was that Yi Chang- 
yong ^^) was sent to the Mongol Coxirt with a petition outlining the KoryS re- 
sponse to the Mongol demands (/i'5 26. 16a-b). Beginning in mid-1268, 
Mongol envoys began arriving to inspect the warships being built in shipyards 


around Kory6, the army, and departure points for China like Huksan Island, 
T'amna Island, as well as the Japan route {KS 26. 16b; KS 26. 17b-18b). 

At this time, what appears to have been the final straw in Kim Injun's 
arbitrary actions occurred. In the winter of 1268, Kim sent the Night Patrol 
to seize two ships loaded with (regional) tributary provisions. The stores 
were brought to Kim's residence where they were divided with the soldiers of 
the Night Patrol. This brought about a confrontation between W6njong and Kim 
Injun {KS 130. 16a-b). Shortly thereafter, Wonjong supported Im Y6n, whose 
power rested in his control of the units of the Three Patrols, and who no 
longer supported Kim since the latter had attempted to exile his wife (KS 130. 
17a-b), in a rapid purge which lasted into early 1269 and which eliminated 
Kim Injun, his family and his supporters [KS 26. 19a-b; KS 82. 2a; KS 130. 
17b-20a). In early 1269, Im Y6n removed another possible contender in the 
power struggle by exiling Yu Kyong to distant Huksan Island {KS 26. 20b; TT 
35. 101). 

While these moves were backed by WSnjong who suspected that Yu Kyong's 
role in the elimination of the Ch'oe clan was a bid for personal power and 
whose opinion of Kim Injun had changed greatly {KS 130. 21a; TT 35. 101), 
they also eliminated what was evidently a power balance, although I believe 
that we may assume W6njong's own motive to have been to regain complete 
control himself. With the elimination of Kim Injun and Yu Ky6ng, there was 
little serious opposition to Im Y6n, who waited only four months before seiz- 
ing power himself, claiming that he had restored the monarch to power but 
now the monarch and the eunuch Kim Ky6ng ^ |£, (d. 1269; BTKP 61. 589) 
wanted to kill him {KS 130. 21b) which, in view of the preceding events, may 
have contained some truth. At any rate, on July 18 {jen-ch^en J^^ )v<- ^^y o^ 
the sixth month), 1269, "Im Yon, schemingly and rebelliously desiring to 
effect the Great Affair (i.e., depose the King) assembled the Ministers to de- 
liberate. Attendant, sijang, Yi Changyong, estimated they could not be stopped 
and believed abdication to be merely talk 44)/- Four days later, "[Im] Y6n, 
dressed in armour, led the Three Patrols and six units of the Guard Corps to 
the residence of Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyOng, [where] he assembled all the 
officials and petitioned Ch'ang to become King. Suddenly the wind and rain 
violently uprooted trees and sent rooftiles flying. [Im] Y6n sent men to com- 
pel the King to remove to a separate palace" {KS 26. 21a) 45). After deposing 
WSnjong and placing the latter' s younger brother Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gySng 
on the throne {KS 130. 22a), Im secured appointment as Director of the Su- 
preme Directorate, kyojong pyolgam {KS 26. 21a; KS 130. 22b) becoming the 
new military overlord. 

Im promptly celebrated by moving into Kim Injvm's former residence {KS 


130. 22b) and the following month dispatched an envoy to the Mongol court to 
inform them of the change. The excuse given the Mongols was that W6njong's 
failing health had forced his retirement in favor of his younger brother {KS 26. 
21b-22a; TT 35. 102) 46), 

Crown Prince Sim, who had gone to the Mongol Court prior to the depos- 
ing of W6njong (JiS 26. 20b) 47)^ ^^^s at this time enroute home and had reached 
P'o-so-fu ^^ ik-f^ ' ^^ *^^ other side of the Yalu twenty-five men of the 
Night Patrol were waiting at the border to seize him but he was warned of events 
by a government slave who slipped across the Yalu River. Prince Sim at first 
hesitated to believe the report. Then, learning that the envoy sent by Im Y6n 
to report the matter to the Mongol Court, a certain Kwak Y6p'il |^6 3'i^ 5*^3 ' 
had at this time reached the city of Y6ngju '^ jj-l near the Yalu, Prince Sim 
sent men to seize him and verified the report. After sending a messenger on 
to the Kory6 court with instructions that if the King was really ill, Chong, 
the Marquis of Sunan (W6njong's third son; Prince Sim's younger half-brother) 
should be put on the throne, he turned back to the Mongol Court to inform 
the Emperor. Appraised of events, Qubilai sent *Odos-buqa ^^ ^_ ^- ^y 
^^ and Li O -^ ^M with a letter of inquiry to the Kory6 court 48) . im Y6n 
countered by sending General Kim Panggy6ng with a second missive which 
offered the same reasons for WSnjong's abdication (XS 26. 24a-b). Qubilai then 
sentHei-tias envoy to investigate the matter {KS 26. 26a; YKC 16b-17a) and, 
in the eleventh month (Nov. 25 - Dec. 24) of 1269, he ordered Prince (ot 
the first rank), kuo-wang, T'ou-nien-ke ^| M" ^ , of the Tung-ching Mo- 
bile Bureau ^^) to assemble an army for the subjugation of Im Y6n {YKC 17b- 
18a; KS 26. 26b; KS 130. 23b-25a; YS 159. 16a; YS 208. 10a; TT 35. 103). 

Im Y6n, already worried by reports of Prince Sim's action {TT 35. 103), 
had been confronted by the Mongol envoy Hu-ti {KS 26. 26a-b; KS 130. 23b). 
Thus pressed, Im yielded and in the last of the eleventh month of 1269 he de- 
posed Ch'ang and restored Wfinjong {YKC 17b-20b; KS 26. 26b-27b; TT 35. 
104-105). WCnjong, accompanied byHei-ti, whom he secretly rewarded on the 
journey northward (KS 26. 29a), immediately departed for the Mongol Court 
in the twelfth month of 1269. He left his third son Chong, the Marquis of 
Sunan, in charge of state affairs {KS 26. 30a-31a; TT 35. 105). After reach- 
ing the Mongol Court W6njong was to conclude arrangements for the marriage 
of Prince Sim with a Mongol Princess, for the marriage had already been 
sanctioned by the emperor (cf. KS 26. 27a) and was no doubt a major factor in 
his restoration {KS 26. 30a-31a). The restoration of W6njong did not, how- 
ever, eliminate Im Yttn. 

In the tenth month of (Ocf. 27 - Nov. 26) 1269, just prior to the restora- 
tion of Wftnjong, a revolt led by Ch'oe T'an ^0) a functionary in the garrison 


of the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District, 
broke out in Sohae Province which used the deposing of WOnjong as a rallying 
call {KS 26. 24b-25a; KS 58. 30b) and which quickly spread through the entire 
KoryO northwest {KS 26. 25b-26a;/i:S 26. 27a). When Ch'oe T'an and his group 
submitted to the Mongols, Kory6 lost her entire northwest territory which 
they controlled. Ch'oe was made subordinate to the Mongol Court and the 
northwest portion of the peninsula was later made subordinate to the Western 
Capital which was redesignated TongnyOng-pu W^ ^ M^ (J<S 26. 28a-b;A'S 
130. 33b-36b; KS 7. lb; TT 35. 107; also see Part II) ^D. 

During WSnjong's absence, Im Y6n, although powerless to quell the revolt 
in the northwest ^^' , had begun preparations to withstand the Mongol assault 
which was certain to follow if he attempted to perpetuate his own power. 
W6njong was just as certainly determined to eliminate him. One of Im's 
preparations for safeguarding his own head had been to dispatch the Night 
Patrol to the southern provinces to enforce another mass movement to the 
coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge {KS 130. 24b; TT 35. 108). 

Assured of Mongol support by Qubilai, Wonjong departed Yen-tu with 
Prince Sim in the second month (Feb. 22 - Mar. 22, 1270) of his eleventh 
reign year {KS 26. 32b; TT 35. 107) and entered Kory6 accompanied by T'ou- 
nien-ke and the latter's forces {KS 26. 30a-31a; KS 26. 32a; KS 130. 25a; YS 
7. 2a; TT 35. 107). When they reached the Western Capital on May 27 (sixth 
day of the fifth month), thev sent an envoy ahead and upon his return they 
learned that Im Y6n had died on the twenty -fifth day of the second month 
(= March 19) while they were still enroute {YKC 21b; KS 130. 35a). Power, 
they learned, had been seized by Im Yumu j^vt t'fe f^ (^- ^^^^'' ^^^^ ^'^' 
460) one of Im Yon's sons. Immediately after his father's death, Im Yumu 
had received the appointment of Director of the Supreme Directorate from 
Chong, the Marquis of Sunan (KS 26. 32b; /CS 130. 25a), since both Wonjong 
and Prince Sim were at the Mongol court. The Guard Corps and the Civil 
Guard were being used by the Im clan to guard their houses and insure the 
transfer of power {JiS 26. 32b; TT 35. 107). 

At this time, the Mongols had already committed themselves to restor- 
ing W6njong and had even appointed a daruj(aci or resident commissioner for 
Kory6 {KS 26. 33a). In addition to the forces under T'ou-nien-ke were some 
2 000 Mongol troops commanded by Mongketii r^ ^ 4^ which arrived in the 
Western Capital in the next year as previously requested by Ch'oe T'an {KS 
26. 29b; KS 26. 32a; KS 104. 3a-4b). Wonjong had sent General Ch6ng Chay6 

^g 4- if! (d- 1216; BTKP 13. 122) and Yi Punhtii 53) on to Kanghwa to 
make preparations for moving 10 000 bushels of rice to the mainland as sup- 
plies for the Mongol forces as well as moving personnel back to the old capi- 


tal (JCS 26. 33si-\), KS 130. 25a). On June 15 (23rd day of the fifth month) the 
transfer of all ranks and organizations back to the old capital was ordered by 
the Ministers on Kanghwa in accordance with Wonjong's instructions {KS 26. 
34b). Wonjong himself did not reach Kaegy6ng until June 17 (27th day) at which 
time the Queen and royal concubines left Kanghwa to join him; a great many 
officials also left Kanghwa for Kaegy6ng to welcome the monarch back {KS 26. 
24b; TT 35. 109; YKC 21-22a). Im Yumu disregarded the orders and sent men 
to prepare the people to resist, thus continuing his father's plan to resist the 
Mongols, ignoring the general opposition to his move among the civil minis- 
ters {KS26. 32b; KS 106. 37a-b; KS 130. 25a-b). These efforts were short- 
lived when Song Songnye rf^ j^^ ^^ (d. 1289; BTKP 105. 987) and Hong 
Mun'gye 54)^ harangued the Three Patrols into action to sweep the Im clan and 
their supporters from power on June 7 (15th day of the fifth month) 1270. Im 
Yumu was killed as was Im Y6n's son-in-law Ch'oe Chongso y^ l^^ ^^ (a.w. 

^ ^ ig ; d. 1270; BTKP 23. 218); Im Yugon Mv]'kM ^^*"^^ °^ 
throat the next day; the remainder of Im Yon's sons, viz., Im Yugan Jv;]^ ^j''^ 
^^;^ , Im Yugo y|^ j'^ ^.^ , and Im Yuje J\^ ]'^ ^^ were sent to the Mon- 
gol court. The Civil guards, sdbang, were disbanded and members of the clan 
of Im Y6n's wife were banished to coastal islands {KS 26. 33b; 26.34a-b; KS 
106. 41a-b; KS 130. 26a-27a; YKC 21b; YS 208. 12a; TT 35. 109). On June 15 
(twenty-third day of the fifth month), the transfer of all ranks and organiza- 
tions back to the old capital was ordered by the Ministers on Kanghwa in ac- 
cordance with WSnjong's instructions {KS 26. 34b). The transfer of the capital 
back to Kaegyong signified, both in symbol and in fact, the transfer of power 
from the military government back to the monarch and Kory6's final submis- 
sion to the Mongols. There was only one obstacle. The powerful Kory6 mili- 
tary units, the Three Patrols, remained on Kanghwa Island and refused to 
obey the transfer order {KS 26. 34b-35a; KS 130. 31a; KS 208. 12b). 


Notes to Chapter V 

1. In the 'Monographs on Food and Money' in the Koryd-sa, a slightly differ- 
ent version is given: "They sent Crown Prince Chon to submit a petition to 
the Mongols. The civil and military officials of the fourth rank and above 
each produced one ^w of white gold; those of the fifth grade and below pro- 
duced cloth in accordance with their station in order to meet the expenses" 
{KS 79. 23a). 

2. For the precedent of Chin intervention in a Kory6 succession fraud, see 
Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', op. cit., passim. 

3. Wang Sim Jh. |^ , was born in 1236; he ascended the throne as the twen- 
ty-fifth monarch in 1274, died in 1308, and was awarded the posthumous 
appellation Ch'ungnyOl ]rj ^\ . He and all the other monarchs of KoryS 
who followed him, were not allowed a temple name, myoho j^ ^ , by 
the Yuan, but were given the honorary title of kuo-wahg )^ ^_ or Prince 
of the first rank. For biographical information see iiCS 28 and /CS 32; Ham- 
bis, "Notes sur I'histoire . . . ", pp. 178 ff; also see BTKP 34. 318. The 
BTKP entry b(orn) 1225 is in error (cf. KS 2S. la). 

4. Both Pak and Cho were made myriarchs, wan-hu, by Mongke and given a 
golden tally as symbol of their authority. KSC 17. 50b. 

5. jambi, chan-chHh %^ j^ , "service des relais postaux", cf. Pelliot, 
"Les mots mongols . . . ", p. 264. 

B. The most serious revolt of the moment was that of Kim Sus6n /^ m^ ^-^ 
at Paekchu Q ^j] who submitted to Yesiider and informed him that Koryo 
had no intention of returning to the mainland {KS 25. 5b). There were also 
other revolts and desertions to the Mongols, e.g., revolts on Sok Island 
^ ^ {KS 25. 5b) and a revolt at Anbuk r^ ^Y^ {KS 25. 6a). 

7. There are several versions of the cause of the death of Mongke; dysentery 
is often given as the cause. For the various accounts see Bretschneider, 
op. cit., p. 158 note 418. 

8. Mongke had three brothers: Hiilegii who was in Persia, Ari)(-boge, and 
Qubilai. See Ren6 Grousset, L^empire des steppes, Paris, 1939, pp. 352- 
353, pp. 367 ff, and Barthold, ''Four Studies . . . ", pp. 120-124 for the 
struggles between Qubilai and Ariy-boge which continued until 1264. 

9. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genko no shinkenkyu ^\^ ^j O ^^-^if ^ [New 
Research on the Mongol Invasions], published in 2 vols, as Toyo hunko 
ronso No. 15, Tokyo, 1931, Vol. I, p. 21. For the meeting between Qubi- 
lai and Prince Ch6n see KS 25. 8a-9b. 

10. For this T'ang expedition against the Korean-Manchurian state of Koguryo 
:^ ^-c] "j^ , see W. Bingham, The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty, Bal- 


timore, 1941. These speeches look suspiciously like a warning to would- 
be conquerors inserted in the record by the compilers of the Korean 
records, H.Franke, 'Could the Mongol Emperor Read and Write Chinese?" 
Asia Major, New Series 3 (19 J3), pp. 28-41, has concluded that while Qu- 
bilai could possibly read Ui^j-ur, he could not read Chinese. 

11. Chao Lang -pi ^^ ^^ j|j was a Jurten and well-known for his role as 
envoy to Japan. In 1270 he was first appu^nte*^ <-o take charge of the Mili- 
tary Colonies in Kory6 which w ^re making preparations for the Japan in- 
vasion. Chao declined the appointment and was then appointed envoy to 
Japan. For biographical information see YS 165. 9b ff. 

12. Hsilan-fu-shih '^ ^ /j^ or Pacification Commissioners, were estab- 
lished in the year 1260-1261 by the Mongols in each lu ('province') admin- 
istration and the matters they handled included supervision of agriculture, 
household registers, and household taxes. See Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 
43, 50, 57 note 6, and 98; Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 213. 

13. Kang Hwasang j^ ^,Q "^ was a Korean of Chinju .^ ^)^'\ (in mod. S. 
Kyongsang Province) who had been captured by the Mongols and who en- 
tered their service. He later changed his name to Suhy6ng ^i^ i^^f {KSC 
18. 4a) possibly because his former name, Hwasang, was a common term 
for a memoer of the Buddhist clergy. He died in 1289, -^f. BTKP51. 482; 
KS30. 16b; KSC 21, 12a. 

14. According to YS 4. 6a-b, Prince Ch6n remained 3 years; this is a scribal 
error for 2 years uud refers to the fact that he was present for a portion 
of 1259 and 1260, but he was actually away from Koryo only about one 
full year. 

15. Kim Panggy6ng /^ ;n (1212-1300) one of Koryo' s more noted gen- 
erals, traced his descent to Silla King Kyongsun ^^ )i)|) ^. He com- 
manded, the Koryo forces which, with Mongol support, quelled the rebel- 
lion of the Three Patrols. He also participated in the Japan campaigns. 
He was evidently inclined toward Buddhism for he dedicated a shrine 
for the Diamond Sutra at Kimju /^ -})] prior to embarking on the first 
Japan expedition {TYS 32. 548a). He was also recognized as a calligrapher 
of first rank. Following the establishment of tight Mongol control on Kory6 
he attempted to rebel but was captured and exiled {YKS 27b) For his role 
in the Japan campaigns he was given the honorary title of Duke of Sangnak 

J^ S^ ^ • For biographical information see KS 104. la-24a; also see 
BTKP 63. 604. 

16. Han^guk-sa sajdn, in a chart appended to the back cover, calculates a to- 
tal of 4 385 civil and military officials during the reign of Koryo Munjong 
(r. 1047-1082) but the number of officials is unknown for many of the 


offices so this should be regarded as a minimum figure. Yi, HarVguk-sa, 
Vol. 2, Chart IV, calculates 4 399 officials for the same period with the 
same qualification applying. These figures represent the government 
officials two centuries prior to this event. Certainly the government had 
grown and since many officials from the provinces had fled to Kanghwa, 
as had assuredly the entire royal clan, this figure is probably correct. 

17. The first shift is given as 16 ydng or 16 000 soldiers. Assuming equal 
shifts, this would put the Koryo troop strength on Kanghwa Island at 

48 000 men. The previous reference to 30 ydng being levied for the re- 
construction of Kaegy6ng {KS 25. 3-4) seems to support this figure. 

18. There were several delays on the return journey, viz., at Tung-ching 
where Yesiider held 100 men of W6njong's party — he later released them 
{KS 25. 12b-13a); at Kaegy6ng to inspect the progress of construction; 
and another at Sungch'6n-pu due to a fit of pique on the part of Shu-li-ta, 
But I have found no mention of a delay at the Western Capital. Howorth, 
op. cit., pp. 220-221, has an interesting interpretation concerning the 
missive cited in the text and the return of Wonjong: "The turbulent Co- 
reans at first refused to receive him (WSnjong, WEH) and were deter- 
mined to break the Mongol yoke, and it was only when Wangtien (W6n- 
jong, WEH) agreed to assist them in this that they would accept him." 
Howorth cites De Mailla, x 291-294 (i.e., Joseph-Anne Marie de Moyriac 
de Mailla's translation of the "Tong-Kieng-Kang-Mu", Paris 1779). This 
is an interesting view, but I have not found any evidence to support it. 
Wonjong himself does not appear to have been popular; how much of the 
opposition was general and how much was centered in the military is con- 
jectural at this point. The basis for Qubilai's suspicions may have been 
due to the actions of Yi tJng -^ j|;i£,> an official of the Koryo Department 
of Justice, hyongbu, who accompanied W6njong to the Mongol Court. Yi 
had told Sun, the Duke of Y6ngny6ng, that if he aspired to be king, he had 
only to say the word. Yi was exiled upon their return to KoryO (K'S 25. 

19. Prince Chon had been invested as monarch by Qubilai prior to his depar- 
ture from Chao-ching-fu (cf. YKC 9b), but a patent of investiture was ap- 
parently not conferred until after Prince ChSn's accession. See note 23 

20. See YKC 9a-10b; YS 208. 4b; KSC 18. 6b-7a; KS 25. 23a-b; there is also 
an account of this in Kiio-ch'ao iven-lei ]M]^-^X_^i. (also known as Yiian 
wen-lei) of Su T'ien-chiieh '^^ ^ |^ (1294-1352), incorporated in Ssu- 
pu ts'ung-k'an ^l^lp^fi] 2017-2036, Commercial Press Edition, Shang- 
hai, 1933, in chiian 41. 20b-22a, a section bearing the sub-title of '(Con- 


quest of) Koryfi' ( ^j£ ^^^ ) ^ Mj • "^^^^ section consists simply of a 
short summary which undoubtedly had the same origins as YKC. It adds 
no new information and I mention it at this point merely to note its exist^ 

21. This particular pledge, although often referred to by the Koreans as one 
of the principles underlying Yuan-Kory6 relations (e.g., cf. the documents 
dated 1321-1323 in /C 6. la-7a) was observed only until 1276 when many 
Mongol customs and dress were introduced by fiat. Mongol customs and 
clothing were observed from 1276 until the Hung-wu jj"^ ^ period (1368- 
1399) when they were prohibited for the first time. Cf. Sohwa oesa 

yjv ^ ^]. ^^, of O Ky6ngw6:n ^ )$_ fu (Yi Dynasty), kwon 1. la. 

22. The withdrawal of the Mongol forces began in the eighth month when Shu- 
li-ta departed Kanghwa {KS 25. 19b). These forces apparently withdrew 
to Tung-ching and the daru)(a6i Po-lu-ho-fan-erh Pa-tu-lu ^^ .^. /^ 

fl^ SL ik. ^% $ ^^^ ^^- ^^5 ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ P^^y "Neve, as the 
edict says, recalled. Also released at this time were some 100 Koreans 
who had been with W6njong's party on his return to Koryo and who had 
been detained by Yesiider at Tung-ching {}iSC 18. 6b). 

23. There was a general period of inactivity following the death of Mongke 
due largely to the succession dispute. See Grousset, Uempire mongol, 
Paris, 1941, Vol. I, p. 367 ff. 

24. According to YS 208. 4b, Ch6n sent his son Hui, the Duke of Yongan, to 
the Mongol Court. At this time the Emperor bestowed a patent of inves- 
titure, the seal of King and the tiger tally. When Duke Hui returned, in 
addition to the edict mentioned, he brought back a tiger tally, seal and 
seal ribbons of state, a bow and a sword conferred by the Emperor upon 
W6njong {KSC 18. 9a). Wang Hui ^ J^ was the son of S6 f^ , the Duke 
of Yangyang # }2S ^^^ (cf. BTKP 115- 1078); I am uncertain in this 
case if the entry calling him Wonjong's son is a scribal error or simply 
another Koryo ruse. 

25. Cf. Tsuda Sokichi, Chosen rekishi chiri. Vol. 2, p. Ib8; also see KS 58. 

26. I have been unable to identify these individuals. 

27. According to HY 20. 20b, "In the Kory6 system, the principal wife, chok 
J/'jl] [of the monarch], was called Queen, wanghu ^ y^ ; concubines, 
ch}6p ^ , were called Ladies, pain ^^ y*-^, [and had the grades of] 
Honored Princess, kwihi -p" ^^, Chaste Princess, sukpi 3^|ot J^^> 
Virtuous Princess, t6kpi J/^ J^^, and Sagacious Princess, hydnbi ^ 
-^l^. All were of the official grade of First Class primary." 

28. In the second month of 1244, the KyOngch'ang Princess j^- ^ 1^ ^ 
was made the consort, pi ^^, of the Crown Prince because the latter's 


first wife had died {KS 23. 37b). In 1260 she was invested as Queen, 
wang-hu. She was degraded to the status of a commoner in 1277, by her 
step-son, King Ch'ungnyftl. For biographical information see KS 88. 36- 

29. Wang T'ae ^ ^^ (d. 1266) was the eldest son of W6njong's second 
Queen. He was made Marquis of Siyang ^^ ^^ in 1263. For biographi- 
cal information see KS 91. 7a-b; also see BTKP 119. 1116. 

30. Wang Chong ^ ^$f^ (a.w. j';,^ ). In 1263 he was made Marquis of Sunan 
jlji ^j;^^. He was an active emissary to the Mongol Court, for which he 
was advanced to the grade of Duke. He was exiled to an island when his 
mother, the Kyongch'ang Princess, was degraded to the status of a com- 
moner in 1277. In 1285, he was summoned to return, For biographical 
information see KS 91. 7a-9a. 

31. Little is known of either the Ky6ngan Princess W, I^ ^'^ j_ or the 

•^ ^$, j^ beyond the mere fact of their exist- 

32. Queen Sun'gy6ng )l)| ^;|^was of the Kim clan of Ky6ngju^ jj-) and the 
daughter of Yaks6n ^ ^ , the Duke of Changik ^ ^ . She was first 
invested as Ky6ngmok hy6nbi ^x^yf^f- ^^[li I ^^^ became the consort 
of the Crown Prince in 1235 and bore one son, Prince Sim. She died in 
1237. For biographical information see KS 88. 36a-b; for a rather com- 
plete list of biographical references see BTKP 109. 1026. 

33. This, plus the tribute requirements, was probably behind the suggestion 
that the silver utensils of the government officials serving outside the 
capital ^\ 'g^ which were stored in the Sinhung Treasury ^ i^ -^ , 
be utilized for the national needs. KS 79. 23a. 

34. Thirteen earthquakes are recorded for the period 1216-1228, eight of 
which occurred in the period 1226-1228. 

35. The summons ordered WOnjong to practice shih-chien -^ ^ , i.e., to 
present himself at court on such occasions as the Emperor's birthday, etc. 

36. Cho I ^ ^ of Haman ^ X^ had the former name of Inyo ^ ^f] . He 
was a Buddhist bonze wno returned to secular life and submitted to the 
Mongols. He was made an interpreter due to his proficiency in languages 
and it was he who originally directed Qubilai's attention to Japan. For 
biographical information see KS 130. 27a-b; BTKP carries no entry. 

37. Hei-ti ^ ^-b ; in addition to the role he played in the restoration of 
Wonjong, he was active in Yuan-Japan relations and made one trip to 
Japan with Korean guides in 1268. In 1274 he was appointed daruyati for 
Kory6, A few of his activities in Kory6 are outlined in subsequent pages. 

38. There were two shih-lang a^ ^|5 in the Yiian Board of War; the title had 


the official grade of Fourth Class primary, cf. Ratchnevsky, op. cit., 
p. 130. 

39. Yin-Hung ^^ ^2\ was, with Hei-ti, active in Yuan-Japan affairs and a 
few of his activities are outlined in YS 208 Jih-pen cHuan. It is interest- 
ing to note that his name reverses the taboo name of Sung T'ai-tsu, 
Hung-Yin ^j, 'g^. 

40. Koje Island, a large island off the coast of the present South Kyongsang 
Province, gained attention as a POW camp during the recent war in Ko- 
rea. For topographical and historical information see TYS 32. 562b-566a. 

41. My concern in the present study is limited to Koryo's preparations for 
the Japan invasions and not with the invasions themselves nor the several 
envoys sent to Japan, although I do mention these en passant. There are 
several studies of various aspects of the Mongol invasions of Japan, the 
majority of them in Japanese. The best work I have seen in any language 
is Ikeuchi Hiroshi's Genko . . , , which covers all events in detail. In his 
second volume, Ikeuchi has plates of the illustrated Oyano-hon ^J^ )^ 
^'f A\-> ^ contemporary account of the invasions by the Oyano brothers. 

For the latter also see Frieda Fischer-Wieruszowski, 'Kriegerischer 
Einfall der Mongolen in Japan', Ostasiatische Zeitschrift, 1935, pp. 121- 
124. Howorth, op. cit., pp. 238-239 contains a translation of the first 
missive sent to Japan. Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic 
Mainland, 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940, contains a translation of the 
first missive in Vol. 1, Appendix 16, p. 245, and the second missive car- 
ried by Chao Lang -pi in 1271 in Vol. 1, Appendix 17. An account of the 
Mongol invasions of Japan is also contained in general histories of Ja- 
pan of which Sansom's recent two volume work, A History of Japan . . . , 
is probably the best in a western language. The best accovint in Korean is 
probably that in Yi Pyongdo's Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2. 

42. 6m Suan ^ ^ $■ (d- 1298) was of Y6ngw61 '^ ^ . He passed the 
exams in the reign of W6njong and was appointed Military Recorder to- 
bydngma noksa ^g Jc %, J^ ^ . He was active in the elimination of 
the Kim clan and in the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols. 
For biographical information see KS 106. 26b-28a; also see BTKP 89. 832, 

43. Yi Changyong -^ i^ J^ (1202-1272) was a descendant in the sixth gen- 
eration of Yi Chay6n A X :H5 (fl. 1024-1058; BTKP 121. 1177). His 
Style, cha, was Hyftnbo \m ]\] and he had the former name of In'gi /j^ 
^.^ . His father Ky6ng^^was good at judiciary matters 'and rose to be 
Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Changyong passed the 
exams in the reign of Kojong and subsequently held many government 
posts. He was one of the few who advised compliance with the Mongol de- 


mand that the Kory6 monarch appear in court in 1264, and he accom- 
panied W6njong on the journey. At the Mongol court he was confronted by 
Sun, the Duke of Y6ngny6ng who had said that Kory6 had a military force 
of thirty-eight thousand men which, Duke Sun, ventured, he could lead 
back for the use of the Court. Summoned to the Yiian Secretariat, chung- 
shu-sheng, Yi countered that due to the wars, y6ng or unit of 1 000, 
was such in name only, and analogous with the Yiian Myriarch or Chief of 
Ten Thousand who did not necessarily command 10 000. Then he won the 
argument with a bold stroke, suggesting that they go to Kory6 and inspect 
the army. "If what [Duke] Sun says is correct, behead me; if what I say is 
correct, behead Sun." Questioned as to the population of Kory6, Yi re- 
plied that he didn't know. When asked why he didn't know since he was a 
chief minister, Yi managed to dodge the obvious attempt to obtain a basic 
figure for taxation and corvee purposes by pointing to the window sill and 
asking the minister of the Secretariat how many there were of them (in 
the nation). When the minister replied that he didn't know, Yi offered 
that it was difficult to know all things, even for a chief minister. 
While in the Yiian capital Yi also met the well-known literatus Wang ^ 

^3 who entertained him in his home and admired Yi's knowledge of the 
rules of ryhming ^ J;^ despite the fact that Yi spoke no Chinese. 
Wang O, incidentally, appears to have had some connection with Kory6 
affairs at this time, for I note that he authored the edict accompanying 
the presentation of a calendar to Kory6 in 1264, which is preserved in 
Kuo-ch^ao wen-lei, chiian 9. 3b. 

Qubilai himself, when he learned that Yi had prepared the petition brought 
by the mission coined an interesting name for Yi, A-man mieh-erh-li kan 

p^ M ;J^ ;^ ^ -^ (? ? Amen-Mary Qan). Yi's brilliant perform- 
ance at Qubilai' s court saved KoryO, at least temporarily, from the stag- 
gering military and fiscal demands the Mongols were soon to impose. For 
this feat Yi was enfeoffed as Ky6ngw6n-kun ^- y^ ^^ Kaeguk-paek f^ 

]^ yj]^ or Distinguished Earl of Ky6ngw6n-kun. (The honorary prefix 
kaeguk was a title of respect bestowed for extraordinary merit to the na- 
tion; for some brief remarks see Han^guk-sa sajdn, p. 40). Yi was given 
the honorary fief of 1 000 households and the actual fief of 100 households 
(whose taxes he consumed). Yi later endeavored to convince the Mongols 
to abandon the idea of bringing Japan within their sphere. He also sup- 
ported moving back to the old capital over the opposition of the faction of 
Kim Injun. In 1270, he was tried for his role in the deposing incident and 
dismissed from office. Two years later he died at the age of seventy -two. 
None of his works are known to have survived. In 1275, atter W6njong's 


death, he was given the posthumous appellation of Munjin y^ ^ . For 
biographical information see KS 102. 23a-29a; also see BTKP 126. 1172. 

44. In the account of the deposing of W6njong given in HY 4. 28a we read: 
"[In] the sixth month [of 1269], Yi Changyong and Im Yon deposed the 
King and confined him." The following gloss points out that here Yi 
Changyong is regarded as the chief plotter. Yi's role is difficult to as- 
sess. He was a powerful and popular statesman who did his utmost to 
resist Mongol demands upon Kory6. W5njong hated him for his involve- 
ment in the deposing incident for which he was later tried by the Mongols 
{KS 102. 8a-b). It would appear from the KS 26. 21a account that Yi played 
a passive role but in KS 130. 22a he is said to have favored abdication. 
Some years later, one Yi Punhui ^^|^^,|. (d. 1278; BTKP 140. 1288) 
was accused of involvement with Im Y6n in the elimination of Kim Injun 
and in the deposing of Wftnjong. See the lengthy argument in KSC 20. 16b- 
18b; KS 123. lla-14b; also see KS 123. 7a and/CS 106. 41a-b; the last 
cited proves Yi innocent of the charge. 

45. For further details on the deposing also see CHSL 4. 37a; HTC lU, 6724. 
2.20 and 6724. 25-26; YKCT7b-18b; YKC 20b; KS 102. 28a-b; XS 104. 
3a-b; KS 123. 7a-b; KS 123. lla-14b; KS 130. 21b-22a; KS 130. 33b; and 
TK IIB 239-240, TT 35. 101-102. The deposing of W6njong has been ex- 
cellently summarized by Hambis, 'Notes sur I'histoire , . . , pp. 176-178 
and studied in detail by Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genko . . . , passim. 

46. For the precedent of fraudulent fraternal succession see Rogers, 'Stu- 
dies . . . ', passim. 

47. YKC 16 and YS 208 give the fourth and sixth month of 1269 respectively 
for Prince Sim's journey to the Mongol Court. Hambis, 'Notes sur I'his- 
toire. . . ', p. 175 has discussed this discrepancy and believes that the 
fourth month is more likely the correct date. 

48. Ci.KS 26. 2l2i-h; KS 26. 23a-24a; ifS 106. lla; KS 104. 3a; /CS 107. 10b- 
11a; i^S 130. 22b-23a; YKC 16b-17a; YS 208. 9b-10a; YS 208. 12b; TT 35. 
103; IC sdlchdn |;^ |^ 2. 7b-8a. Also see Hambis, 'Notes sur I'histoire 
. . . ', p. 176 ff for a summary of these events as well as for the recon- 
struction of the Mongolian name given here. 

49. I have followed Schurmann, op. cit,, passim in rendering hsing-sheng 
/{^ Jk , 2i.n zhhreviation oi hsing-chung-shu-sheng J/'^- rh -^ -ik , 
as 'mobile bureau'. The Mobile Bureaus were the provincial governments 
and were copied on the model of the central government. See Ratchnevs- 
ky, op. cit., p. 22. Also see Part II. The Yiian Eastern Capital, Tung- 
ching, refers to Liaoyang. 

50. Ch'oe T'an ^ 3-— was a scribe in the military headquarters of the Nor- 


them Frontier District and following his revolt against Kory6, he sub- 
mitted the Kory6 northwest to the Mongols. He was attached to the Court 
in 1270, presented with a golden plaque, chin-p'ai /^ ^^ , as symbol of 
his authority and appointed as Administrator, tsung-kuan, of the Kory6 
northwest which was redesignated Tongnyong-pu. 

51. For a detailed study of the subject see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Korai GensQ-cho 
no hairitsu jiken to Moko no KOrai seihokumen senryG ^^ ^^ ^\_, ]^-^ 

1^ O J;i !-# ?^ f ^ O li f, ^ ib ,S] ^ fl 

[The Deposing-Enthroning Incident in the Court of Koryo W6njong and the 
Mongol Seizure of Northwest Kory6], TdyOshi ronso ^ j-^ X- </^ ^ 
(Asiatic Studies in Honor of Dr. K.Shiratori on the Occasion of his 60th 
Birthday), Tokyo, 1925, pp. 133-156. This study is also incorporated in 
Ikeuchi, GenkD . . . , Vol. 1, pp. 49-70. While Ch'oe used the deposing in- 
cident as a pretext to revolt, there was a real attempt to restore W6njong 
by some army officers who attempted to overthrow Im at this time, but 
the plot failed {KS 130. 23a-24a). 

52. The revolt was at this time still limited to S6hae Province. Hy6n MunhySk 

■^ J(_ '% , the Civil Governor of the Northern Frontier-District, was 
given only 150 men to subdue the rebellion and an envoy was sent to the 
Mongol Court notifying them of the revolt (KS 26. 25a-b). The units of the 
Three Patrols were sent to several of the islands along the coast of Sohae 
Province to attempt to quell the revolt which encompassed the islands (KS 
104. 4a) which had been the military and administrative center for the 
Kory6 northwest since the evacuation of the Western Capital. Following 
his restoration, W6njong also petitioned the Mongol authorities for the 
suppression of Ch'oe T'an and the return of the territory {KS 26. 31a- 
32a). Koryo finally managed to regain a small section of Sohae Province, 
but not until 1290 was the entire area administratively restored to Koryo. 

53. Yi Punhui ^ j^ ^,|. (d. 1278) of Y6mju J^ f)^ was the son of Grand 
General Yi Song J^ j^J^ , a retainer, murigaek, of Ch'oe U. Punhui and 
his younger brother Stip^v^ both served Kim Injun. He was appointed 
General and found favor with WSnjong. Following the elimination of the 
Kim clan, Punhui was appointed Grand General and then rose to the rank 
of Supreme General. He was active in the overthrow of the Im clan and 
the suppression of a slave revolt in Ky6ngsang Province. For biographi- 
cal information see KS 123. lla-14a; also see BTKP 140. 1288. 

54. HongMun'gye ji- ^ ^^ (d. 1316) of Namyang ^ 6,^ later changed his 
name to Kyu :^ . He was the husband of the elder sister of Im Yumu 
who discussed all matters with him. Hong and Song Songnye were alarmed 
over the King's return from the Yiian court which Im Yumu wanted to re- 


sist and there was general consternation over Im's plans. The King sent 
General Ch6ng Chay6 and Yi Punhui ahead to Kanghwa and Yi secretly 
urged Hong to act against Im Yumu which resulted in the overthrow^! the 
Im clan. Hong was given the posthumous appellation of Kwangj6ng g^ 
yp He had one son Yung ^ and one daughter who became Queen dow- 
ag^'r My6ngd6k ti^ ^i- JT^ k (1298-1380; BTKP 84. 793). For biogra- 
phical information see KS 106. 41a-43a; also see BTKP 40. 369. 


Chapter VI 


The elimination of the Im clan was accomplished by members of the Ro- 
yalist faction who succeeded in convincing the Three Patrols, the strongest 
Kory6 military force, to overthrow Im Yumu. It would appear that the mili- 
tary were willing to accept restoration of full power to W6njong, but that they 
were unaware that Wonjong had completely submitted to the Mongols 1). 

When W6njong, backed by a strong Mongol army, learned that the Three 
Patrols had refused to obey the order to return to the old capital, he acted 
swiftly. On June 20th, 1270 (1270.5.29), he "sent General Kim Chij6 2) /i> 
;^ ^ to Kanghwa to disband the Three Patrols. [General Kim] seized the 
register of their names and returned. The Three Patrols were fearful lest 
the register of their names be made known to the Mongols which increased 
the opposition they harbored" (KS 130. 37b; also see KS 26. 34b; TT 35. 109). 
General Kim took the register of their names back to Kaegyong on the follow- 
ing day and on this same day, General Pae Chungson 3) and Commander, 
chiyu, Y6 YSnghui Jj^ J<^ i-;^ (a.w. No )^ ) rose to take the leadership of 
the Three Patrols and led them in open rebellion {KS 130. 38a) ^\ 

The chaos which the rebellion brought to Kanghwa is detailed in the bio- 
graphy of Pae Chungson where we read: "Men were sent to cry out in the 
streets, saying, 'The Mongol soldiers are arriving in great numbers and are 
massacring the people. All those desiring to help the nation meet at the ball 
field, kujdng Jj^ J^ .' In a short while, the people gathered in great num- 
bers. Some scattered in the four directions, fighting for boats to cross the 
river and many were drowned. The Three Patrols prohibited people from en- 
tering or leaving [the island] and patrolled the river, calling in loud voices, 
'All Civil and Military Officials, yangban, who do not leave the boats, know 
that you will be killed.' All hearing this were afraid and left the boats 4a). 

"Others, desiring to go to Kaegyong, launched boats. The rebels boarded 
skiffs and pursued, shooting arrows at them. No one dared move. In the city, 
the people were terrified and scattered to hide in the forests and marshes. 
The wailing of women and children filled the streets. 


"The rebels doled out stores from the KQmgang Warehouse /^ ^A m. 
distributing weapons among the soldiers and closed the city for defense. [Pae] 
Chungson and [Y6] Yonghui led the Three Patrols to meet at the city wall 
[where] they compelled On, the Marquis of Sunghwa ^) , to become King. They 
established offices with General Yu Chonhyok ^'J ;W- ^ and Secretary of 
State of the Left, sangsd chwasung^) ^^ ■% Jx. ^ , Yi Sinson ^\%^]i^^ 
as the Left and Right Ministers of State, sungsdn '^'> ^% ^ [respectively]" 
{KS 130. 38a-b; also see KS26. 34b; KS 90. 7a; TT 35. 109). 

There are some indications of advance planning for we read that "pre- 
viously, when the rebels first plotted to rebel, General Yi Paekki -^ -^ ^^ 
didn't go along with it. At this point (i.e., when they met at the wall), they be- 
headed [Yi] Paekki as well as the Moslems, hui-hui 8) ]^ ]-oj ^ whom the 
Mongols had sent, in the street" (KS 130. 38b). A further indication of ad- 
vanced planning is seen in the behavior of Chief of the Bureau of Diviners, 
pan-faesaguk-sa 9) ^ij :i^ j^ ^ $- , An Pangy61 10) r^ ^^ ,|.£. 
"When [An] was about to return to the capital (i.e., following the transfer or- 
der), he asked an omen of the image of T'aejo in Pongun Temple and obtained 
the prophecy 'Half alive; half dead*. Based upon this, he said the omen [meant] 
the dead portion had come to the mainland and the living portion had followed 
the Three Patrols out to sea. Then, he accompanied the rebels south and tried 
to persuade them saying, 'The descendants of the Dragon are exhausted at 
twelve. Go south and found the capital of the empire and the prophecy is ful- 
filled.' Consequently, he became the rebels', chief plotter" (A'S130. 39b). 

An took his prognostic at the temple prior to June 17 (1270. 5. 26) when the 
image of T'aejo was removed [KS 26. 34b), and thus, several days before the 
actual outbreak of the rebellion on June 21st. It should, however, be noted 
that the rebels of the Three Patrols had already broken into the warehouses at 
this time {KS 26. 34b). While it is difficult to assess the value of the prophecy 
as a stimulus in their move south, there is little doubt that it encouraged the 
men of the Three Patrols as well as justifying the rebellion as preordained. 

Following their seizure of Kanghwa, the Three Patrols prepared to eva- 
cuate the island and move south. On June 23rd (1270.6.3), "the rebels, esti- 
mating they were unable to defend [Kanghwa] collected ships and all loaded 
public and private property, the children and wives [of the officials] and went 
south. Their ships extended, stem to stern, from Kup^o yjjlj j^ to the Hangp'a 
River ^^X. ^^ l\~ without end; there were over 1 000 ships. 

"At that time, all the officials had gone to welcome the King [home from 
the Mongol court]. [When they learned] their wives and children had all been 
seized by the rebels, the sound of their bitter weeping rent heaven and earth" 
(/<'S130. 38b-39a). 


The primary reason for the flight south was fear of the Mongol forces. 
vVhen a force of slaves was collected to attack the rebel rear at the time of 
their flight south, "the rebels saw the glittering weapons [of the slave force] 
near the sea and were nervous and fearful believing the Mongol troops had 
already arrived" {KS 130. 39). It will be recalled that the fortifications on 
Kanghwa Island had been dismantled as one of the conditions of the peace ne- 
gotiations of 1259 (A'S24. 43b-44a). It will also be recalled that the Mongols 
had increased their activity in amphibious warfare and now had large .numbers 
of Koreans on their side, i.e., Ch'oe T'an, et al., and thus had no lack of 
either trained seamen or vessels. 

The flight south began on June 23; on this same day General HyQn Mun- 
hyfik 11) ^^ JC ^ ^^^ escaped from the island and informed the capital of 
the revolt. Two days later, T'ou-nien-ke sent To-la-tai J^ j^M ^ who en- 
tered Kanghwa with two thousand men on June 25 (1270.6. 5) {KS 26. 35a). 
Then, on July 3 (1270.6.13), General Kim Panggydng as Rebel Suppression 
Commissioner, ydkchdk-ch'ut^osa -^ 'Q^ |^ ^^^^ ' ^^^ sixty men, and 
Myriarch Sung with one thousand men, set out in pursuit of the rebels and 
reaching the sea they sighted the rebel ships at anchor at Y6nghung Island ^2) 
{KS 104. 5a). 

On August 2 (1270.7.13), T'ou-nien-ke sent Commander, tsung-kuan, 
Hong Tagu 13) to patrol Ch611a and Kyongsang Provinces, and the Eastern 
Frontier-District {KS 26. 35b). On August 9 (1270.7.20), the Mongol Marshal 
Aqai '■^i was appointed PacificationCommissioner, anmusa, and given a force 
of 1500 men (KK:C22a; /i'S26). Then, on August 19 (1270. 8. 1), Crown Prince 
Sim was sent to the Mongol Court as Birthday Felicitation Envoy, hajorilsa 

'^ 1^ ^A_ ^^*^ ^ memorial on the rebellion of the Three Patrols ( FS 7. 
SaJ/fS 26. 35b; TT 35. 110). 

Sailing south, the Three Patrols had raided various coastal islands, cir- 
cumspectly avoiding the Mongol-Kory6 forces on the mainland, and they en- 
tered Chin Island 15) on September 6 (1270. 8. 19), pillaging the chu and kun 
districts (^"5 26. 36b; TT 35. 110). After their entry into Chin Island, they 
erected a walled-city, Yongjang-s6ng 1^^ and then began to build halls and 
other buildings. Following their establishment on Chin Island, they began to 
raid the coastal districts {KS26. 36b-37a), and beginning with Ch'angs6n 
Island 1''), they were able to bring some thirty islands, including K6je Island 
and T'amna under their control {KS21. 12b; KS21. lOb-lla). 

In the interim, the Deputy Minister of State, ch^amjijdngsa ^ )^{] ^h 
^ , Sin Saj6n 1^' who had been dispatched as Ch611a Province Rebel Sup- 
pression Commissioner, heard that the rebels had crossed over to the main- 
land and, on September 19 (1270.9.2), he fled back to the capital and safety 


(^^"5 26. 36b; KS 104. 5a.; TT 35. 110). However, General Yang Tongmu yfsg 

p "j^ and General Ko Y6rim 19) took a fleet, chusa, to attack Chin Island 
on September 21 (1270.9.4) {KS 26. 37a), but on the same day the main force 
of the Three Patrols had crossed to the mainland where they raided the 
ChangyO-pu: administration 20) kidnapping the commander, torydng, Yun Man- 
jang ^ ^ ^ and pillaging the area {KS 26. 37a; TT 35. 111). 

After returning to the capital, Sin Saj6n was replaced by General Kim 
Panggyong and on September 24 (1270. 9. 7), General Kim, as Ch611a Province 
Rebel Suppression Commander, together with Marshal Aqai left the capital 
with one thousand men to attack Chin Island {KS 26. 37a; KS 104. 5b). At this 
time, the Three Patrols had attacked both Naju and Ch6nju. Hearing of the 
situation, General Kim divided his force as soon as he entered the area, 
sending one unit toward ChSnju while he advanced toward Naju where the 
fighting had been going on for seven days and nights {KS 103. 40a-b; TYS 35. 
620a). The rebels, hearing the rumor that General Kim was backed by ten 
thousand men, lifted the attack and withdrew {KS 104. 5b-6a; TT 35. 111). 

Next, the rebels turned their attention to T'amna, seizing the city of 
Cheju on December 19 (1270.11.4) {KS26. 37b; rT35. 111). Previously, the 
Circuit Inspector, anch'al-sa, Kwon Tan 21)^ dispatched the Vice-Commis- 
sioner of Y6ngam, Kim Su 22)^ ^f/ith two hundred men to defend Cheju; he was 
joined by General Ko Y6rim with seventy men 23), Both Kim Su and Ko Y6rim 
were later killed in the battle for Cheju {KS 103, 41a; TT 35. 111). 

Following the withdrawal of the rebels from Ch6nju and Naju, General 
Kim Panggy6ng and Aqai proceeded to Samgy6ngw6n 24) opposite Chin Island 
and garrisoned there {KS 104. 6a; TT 35. 111). At this time, two men who had 
escaped from the rebels, Hong Ch'an ^jL ^ and Hong Ki ^^ Jf-^ , slandered 
Kim PanggyOng, accusing him of being secretly in league with the rebels. Aqai 
arrested them and informed the darujj'aci 25) of the matter and the daruvaSi 
ordered Kim PanggySng to return to the capital with his accusers to face trial. 
Aqai then manacled General Kim and sent him to the capital with an escort of 
fifty guards {KS 104. 6a-b; TT 35. HI). General Kim was quickly absolved by 
the daruya^i and, at W6njong's request, on February 3, 1271 (1270. 11. 19), 
the daruyaci again appointed General Kim to subdue the rebels {KS 104. 6b). 
In this same month, Myriarch Kao-i-ma ^ ^L m< (?Kharma) was also dis- 
patched with two hundred men to patrol the southern coastal areas against the 
raids of the Three Patrols {KS 82. 6b; KS 26. 37b). 

And so the first year of the rebellion came to an end with General Kim 
garrisoned opposite Chin Island preventing an incursion into the mainland at 
that point, while the rebels continued to raid the coastal area. 

During the eleventh month of the eleventh year of the reign of WOnjong 


(Dec. 17, 1270 - Jan. 15, 1271), the Yiian Secretariat, chung-snu-sheng, had 
memorialized Qubilai, the Yiian Empei'or, requesting the establishment of a 
Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, tunjdn'gydngnyaksa i^ ]'^ iw, 
^|L ^ (KS 27. 2b) which was to result in the dispatch of Hindu 26) to Kory6. 
Aqai was relieved of his command hv Hindu and, on March 19 (1271. 1.5), 
Aqai returned to Kaegy6ng ^'K The first attempt to negotiate with the Thrpp 
Patrols was made at this time. On March 20 (1271.1.6), the Auxiliary Secre- 
tary, wdnoerang^^) ^ ^L ^6 , PakCh'onju ^|. ^l^\ arrived at Chin 
Island carrying two edicts: one edict was directed to the rebels by W6njong 
and the second was an edict from the Yiian Emperor to W6njong which the 
latter wished them to see, hoping that it might influence them to submit 29) 
(/fS26. 40b; TT 35. 112). The rebels met Pak and while they entertained him 
at Py6kp'aj6ng ^ -j^ ^ on Chin Island, they quietly dispatched twenty 
ships and attacked the Mongol-Kory6 forces on the mainland, killing ninety 
men and capturing one ship {KS21. la-b; TT 36. 114). Pak returned from 
Chin Island on April 5 (1271.1.22), with the rebels' answer. They had told 
him, "This edict is not directed to us. We do not dare receive the answer to 
a state letter" {KS 27. 4b). On the 25th day of the first month, Pak was sent 
to the Yiian court to report on the rebels activities {KS 27. 5a; TT 36. 114). 

When Hindu arrived in Kory6 in the spring of 1271, he carried an impe- 
rial edict from Qubilai directed to the Three Patrols. On April 23 (1271.2. 10), 
this edict was carried to the rebel leader Pae Chungson by Hu-tu-ta-f^^-h ^^ 

^6 ^ ^ • It would appear that this edict offered the Three Patrols Ch611a 
Province and direct subordination to the Yiian court ^0). The Three Patrols 
continuously postponed accepting the Mongol terms and made additional de- 
mands, e.g , the withdrawal of Mongol-Kory6 army garrisons in the south. 
This was, of course, unacceptable to the Mongols and Qubilai was informed 
of these delaying tactics. The Yiian reaction was to order the subjugation of 
Chin Island (FS7. 10a). 

Following their departure from Kanghwa, the Three Patrols had looted 
and plundered the southern coastal areas. They were especially active in 
1271, raiding from Changhung-pu in Ch611a Province (KS 27. 6b; TT 36. 115), 
eastward to Happ'o 31) {KS 27. 9a), Tongnae 32) {kS 27. 9b), and Kimju :^3) 
{KS21. lib) in Kyongsang Province. As their successes against the Mongol- 
Kory6 torces continued, their fame spread and this in turn stimulated others 
to revolt and join them 34)^ ^nd so their strength increased still more 35), 
And, as their strength increased, so did the range and extent of their incur- 
sions. Attacking Kimju on the eighth day of the fourth month of 1271, they not 
only raided the city but also, with the use of fire, successfully attackea the 
Defense Commander, pangwi nj^ J/X_< , General Pak Po Jfl yj^ who had taken 


his forces into the citadel of refuge overlooking the city {KS 27. lib; TT 36. 
115; 35. 116). 

On June 25 (1271. 4. 14J, following the refusal of Pae Chungson to submit 
to the terms offered, Hindu requested that he be allowed to divide ChOlla Pro- 
vince with Qurim6i 36) and Wang Kuo-ch'ang ^7) and attack the rebels {YS 7. 
10a; A'S 27. 12a; ii:S 27. lib). On June 30 (1271. 4. 19), Hui and On-j 38)^ two 
of the sons of Sun, the Duke of Y6ngny6ng, were ordered to proceed south 
from Liaotung with four hundred troops to aid Hindu in the attack on Chin 
Island {KS21. 12a; KS 90. 7a-b; TT 36. 116). On July 1 (1271.4.20), a Mongol 
envoy arrived with an edict to suppress the rebels on Chin Island before the 
hot weather and the rains set in {KS 27. 12a-b; TT 36. 116). This advice was 
a bit late, for we read in an entry dated the fifth month of 1271, in YKC: 

■'Previously, Hindu, Shih Shu ^ yfj^ , and Hong Tagu went to attack 
Chin Island. The rebels marshalled warships along: the northern coast of the 
island. [Shih] Shu said, 'The murderers are now running rampant and we do 
not yet have the strength to engage them. Moreover, the summer heat is now 
blazing and the steam rises from the sea. The power of the bows is retarded 
and the soldiers find them difficult to use because of the season. [Let us] di- 
vide the army into three groups and use many unfurled flags and banners as 
troops to decoy the enemy. I, and all the armies, will conceal units who will 
come out and directly blunt the vanguard [of the rebel force] in order [that we 
may] press on to Chin Islana and destroy them. 

"They sent a messenger to make [their plans] known [to the Emperor] and 
also to beg for 'flame-throwers' huo-ch^iang and fire-bombs kuo-p^ao, as 
well as all implements of assault" {YKC 24b-25a). 

And so, on July 11 (1271. 5. 1) the long postponed offensive was begun 
when Hong Tagu attacked Chin Island {KS 27. 14a). On July 20 (1271. 5. 10), a 
fleet of three hundred ships under General Py6n Yang jJo yjy^ and General 
Yi Susim ' ^ '^ ;5t^ attacked Chin Island {KS 27. 14a). Then, on July 25 
(1271. 5. 14), an all-out attack was begun. 

"[Kim] Panggy6ng and Hindu commanding the Army of the Center, en- 
tered [Chin Island] at Py6kp'aj6ng. Hiii and Ong, the sons of the Duke of 
Y6ngny6ng, as well as Hong Tagu, commanded the Army of the Left and en- 
teted at Changhang ^%_ ^^ . General Kim S6k -^ ^Jj and Myriarch Kao-i- 
ma commanded the Army of the Right and went in from the east in command 
of over 100 ships 39)^ 

"The rebels gathered at Pyfikp'ajSng with rne intention of repelling the 
Army of the Center. Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire ^^) , and attacked 
the flank. The rebels were alarmed and scattered. They advanced the Army 
of the Right [but] the Army of the Right was afraid and wanted to support the 


Army of the Center. The rebels seized two ships and they killed them all. 

"Prior to this, the government army had battled the rebels a number of 
times without a victory [so] the rebels were contemptuous of them and did 
not make preparations. [Therefore], when the government forces launched a 
heavy attack, the rebels all abandoned the wives and children [being held as 
hostages] and fled. The people and treasures which they had taken from 
Kangdo, as well as the people living on Chin Island, were all captured by the 

"PanggySng saw the rebels scattering and pursued them. Over 10 000 men 
and women and several tens of warships were captured. The remaining rebels 
went to T'amna. Panggy6ng entered Chin Island and captured 4 000 bushels 
{sdk) of rice, treasures, and military paraphernalia; all were transported to 
the capital. All 'freemen', yangmin ^ '^ , of those who had Submitted 
to the rebels were ordered to return to their occupation" (ATS 104. 7b-8a). 

Marquis On was killed ^^i and Pae Chungson apparently fell in battle. 
The rebels who escaped were led by Kim T'ongjSng ^"^i to the island of T'amna 
which the rebels held {KS 27. 15a). Hearing of the rebel defeat on Chin Island, 
their General Yu Chonhy6k, who was based in Namhae-hy6n ^ 3^ 41^ raid- 
ing the coastal areas, gathered his force of eighty ships and sailed to join 
them {KS 130. 39a-40a; TT 36. 116). While a major defeat had been sustained 
{KS 104. 7b-8a; YS 7. 12a; TK IIB 258-259; TT 36. 116), the rebel strength 
was still to be a source of concern to the Mongol- Kory6 forces, for from 
their base at Cheju ^^' they again turned to raiding the coastal areas {KS 104. 
8a) and they still controlled the southern waters (TT 36. 118). 

On May 10, 1272 (1272.3.9), Kum Hun ^^1 ^ was appointed Bearer of 
Instructions to the Cheju Rebels, Cheju ydkchdk ch'oyu-sa j^f^ j)^ ^ ^;^ 
■^S Itl 'ii {KS21. 27b) and he was proceeding to Cheju to negotiate with the 
rebels when he was captured and detained on the Ch'uja Islands ^^' by the re- 
bels. They killed his attendants, seized his ship, put him in a small boat, re- 
turned the edict, and sent him on his way back {KS 27. 30a; TYS 38. 664). He 
reached the capital on July 8 (1272. 5. 9), after being held on the island over a 
month. On July 19, he was dispatched to the Yiian court with a detailed mem- 
orial on the rebels' activities {KS21. 30a-31a; YS 7. 11a). 

On August 26 (1272.6.29), General Na Yu 45) with fifteen hundred men 
went to Ch611a Province to suppress the rebels. Perhaps it was against this 
threat that the Three Patrols began to construct an outer and an inner forti- 
fied wall at Cheju {KS21. 33b; KS 104. 8a; KS 130. 40a). The advance of Gen- 
eral Na Yu into ChSUa Province did not seem to suppress the spirit of the 
rebels, for on October 8 (1272. 8. 7) they seized eight hundred bushels {sdk) of 
Ch611a Province's tribute rice, provisioning themselves for the winter (^"5 27. 
24a; TT 36. 119-120). 


Then, they turned to destroying the ships which were being constructed 
primarily for the invasion of Japan, but which obviously could be used in an 
expedition to Cheju. On November 7 (1272, 9. 13), they raided Koran Island 
■^^A, y^ % , burned six warhips, killed the shipwrights and took the Com- 
missioner of Ship Construction, chosorC gwan j^ :^ 'g^ , captive {KS 27. 
34b; TT 36. 120). 

During the eleventh month, the rebels: raided the Southern Defense Com- 
mand taking as captives the District Commissioner, pusa vJ- ^^ , Kong 
Yu 46) ^^ Y^ ^ and his wife ifCS 27. 35a; TT 36. 120); raided Happ'o burning 
twenty warships and taking four Mongol fire-beacon soldiers captive (/i"S 27. 
35a); they also raided Koje-hyon Vj j^ i|i where they burned three war- 
ships and took the Hyftn Magistrate, hydllydng j|| /^^ , captive. Then they 
sailed back around the peninsula and north to anchor at Y6nghung Island. 
From there they proceeded to overrun the neighboring areas {KS 27. 35a-b; 
TT 36. 120). 

In the spring their raids commenced again with ten rebel ships raiding 
Nagan-kun 47) ^ $^ ^6 . They raided Happ'o again on March 21, 1273, 
the last day of the first month of Wonjong's fourteenth reign year, burning 
thirty-two warships and killing ten Mongol soldiers {KS 27. 36b; TT 36. 120). 
The Three Patrols were still a threat and Wonjong himself had even asked 
Hindu for fifty cavalry men to guard the palace as a precaution against their 
raids {TT 36. 120). In five months they had destroyed over sixty ships 48). 

Following the recommencement of the raids of the Three Patrols from 
T'amna, another attempt was made to negotiate with them rather than expend 
troops in a campaign against the island; this was in the eighth month of W6n- 
jong's thirteenth reign year. Hong Tagu went to Naju where at the same time 
that he supervised the construction of ships for the Japan expedition, he be- 
stowed kindnesses on several of Kim T'ongjong's relatives 49) ^nd then dis- 
patched them to Cheju with a missive for the rebels {KS 27. 34a; KS 130. 40a; 
YKC 26b). 

This failing. Hong went to the Yiian court to report the situation, return- 
ing in the second month of W6njong's fourteenth reign year (fCS 27. 36b). The 
repeated negotiations with the Three Patrols are testimony to the disruptive 
effect that their raids had on preparations for the Japan expedition. Their 
raids intensified an already precarious situation; Kory6 was no longer capa- 
ble of supplying Mongol logistical demands and at this time the situation was 
so bad that the Mongols were forced to ship in 20 000 bushels {sdk) of rice 
from Tung-ching to relieve the widespread famine {YSl. 17b) and to begin the 
T'amna campaign, for Kory6 had been unable to fulfill the Mongol order is- 
sued in early 1272 to prepare ships and supplies for the campaign {YS 7. 


15a) ^^^). With this, Li I ^0)^ the daruYa6i, ordered Hindu and Hong Tagu to 
quell the rebels (A'S 27. 36b; TT 36. 120). On March 31 (1273. 2. 9), the Com- 
missioner of Ships and Supervisor of Sea Lanes, surogamsdnsa ;7j< ^^ i|^ 
4^J \^^ , sailed south with a portion of the fleet [KS 27. 36b-37a). Then, on 
April 11 (1273-2.20), Kim Panggy6ng, who at this time held the rank of Mar- 
shal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison of the Army of the Center 51), 
set out from the capital with Hindu, leading eight hundred picked cavalrymen 
{KS 27. 37a; KS 104. 8b; TT 36. 120). 

The month preceding the campaign against T'amna concealed other diffi- 
culties. First, on April 29 (1273.3. 8), many warships of S6hae Province sunk, 
for which the Circuit Inspector U Ch'6ns6k ^ f^ ||i was imprisoned 52), 
And, on May 17 (1273.3.26), a storm sank twenty ships of S6hae Province 
which had rendezvoused at Kayaso Island /fjlO ^|5 ^ drowning one hundred 
and fifteen men; the same storm also sank twenty-seven of the warships of 
Ky6ngsang Province {KS 27. 38a; TT 36. 120). 

After leaving the capital. Hong Tagu and Hindu had garrisoned at P6nnam- 
hy6n ;^ ^^ ^j^^ 52) whence they dispatched the ill-fated warships i^S 104. 
8b; TT 36. 121). In a second effort with Kim Panggy6ng, they assembled one 
hundred and sixty ships of ChftUa Province (KS 27. 39a) and raised an army 
recorded as having from nine to twelve thousand men - Mongols, North Chi- 
nese, and Kory6 troops 54) _ including three thousand seamen 55). 

They set out for T'amna, only to encounter a storm off the Ch'uja Islands. 
Riding the storm through the night, they found themselves off T'amna at dawn 
but due to rough breakers caused by the wind, they were unable to effect a 
landing immediately. General Kim, we are told, then appealed to the heavens 
and the wind ceased - at any rate, a landing was made. The Army of the 
Center landed at Hamd6kp'o 56) ^ J^^^ ^^ where the rebels had concealed 
their men among the rocks. General Kim, with shouts of encouragement, 
gathered his forces and advanced, and the rebels were repulsed. General Na 
Yu led the point of the army with picked troops and continued his advance 
successfully {KS 27. 39a.; KS 104. 8b-9a; TYS 38. 664a-b; TT 36. 121). 

The army of the left with thirty warships, landed to the west of Cheju 
City at Piyang Island 57) <^ J;J. ^ and the two armies attacked the walls 
together. The rebels yielded the outer walJ and retired to the inner wall. The 
Mongol-Kory6 army then scaled the outer wall. Four volleys of fire arrows 
were fired, smoke rose from the city and the rebels submitted (K'S 104. 9a; 
TT 36. 121). 

Six of the captured leaders including Kim Wonyun /^ ^ ^ , were 
executed while thirty-five relatives of the leaders (later executed at Naju - 
TT 36. 121) and thirteen hundred prisoners were taken captive, loaded aboard 


ships and returned to the mainland {KS 27. 39a; KS 104. 9a-b; TT 36. 121). 
Those who were originally inhabitants of T'amna were settled to live peace- 
fully as before. With this, the rebels were all pacified. They ordered General 
Song Poy6n ^ ^ 3^ ^^^ others to remain in garrison on the island and 
they returned. For garrison troops, Hindu left five hundred Mongol soldiers 
and General Kim left one thousand men: eight hundred men of the Capital 
Army, kydnggun ^^ ^ and two hundred men of the regional patrols, oe- 
pyblch'o 37J. ^)J \)j {KS21. 39a; KS 104. 9b; TT 36. 121) 58). 

The rebel leader Kim T'ongj6ng escaped into the wilds of Mt. Halla j^ 
'^ ii] with a small group of seventy followers after the fall of Cheju {KS 
104. 9a; KS 130. 40a; TT 36. 121). Two months later on the sixth day of the in- 
tercalary sixth month it was reported that Kim T'ongj5ng was rumored dead 
but that the seventy men who had escaped with him had been captured and 
sent to Hong Tagu on the mainland who had them all put to death {KS 27. 40b; 
iCS 130. 40a; TT 36. 121). 

On the twenty -fourth day of the fifth month, the King in Kaegy6ng received 
the report that the Three Patrols had been subdued {KS 27. 39b) and, on the 
first day of the sixth month (July 19, 1273), this report was sent to the Yiian 
court. Thus, the rebellion of the Three Patrols came to an end {KS 27. 39b- 
40b; KS 104. 9b). 

Measured against the scale of the rebellions which often swept through 
Kory6's continental neighbors, the rebellion of the Three Patrols was a very 
limited action. The philosophy of the rebels, the simple values of the soldiers 
was, of course, mingled with the ambitions and fears of their leaders, which 
could be well described with an adaption from Gibbon's well-known remark 
about the Byzantine General Besilarius (505? -565) — their vices were a con- 
tagion of the times, their virtues were their own — or as the Korean historian 
Yi Py6ngdo has put it, "in coming to fight to the end against the Mongols . . . 
perhaps we can say that they manifested the spirit traditional of the Koryo 
military men" 59), 

Yet the rebellion did have some important consequences 60), First, the 
men who rose to lead the rebellion were formerly supporters of Im Y6n, the 
military strongman who had deposed W6njong, and W6njong's desire to escape 
from their control led him to readily accept Mongol backing 61). The recipro- 
cal of this — the knowledge of W6njong's hatred for them — was, of 
course, an important factor in initiating the rebellion. In continuing the strug- 
gle against the Mongols they gained considerable support 62). The Mongol re- 
action to the rebellion was to tighten control on Kory6 and there were comple- 
mentary factors in the establishment of Mongol offices in Kory6, The rebel- 
lion disastrously delayed launching the Japan expedition which proceeded the 


next year, although Wonjong himself was to die in the interim. With the re- 
bellion, ended an episode in Korean history for it marked the close of the 
period of military government ^3'. 

In 1274, the formal marriage of Crown Prince Sim, which had provided a 
solution for Wonjong' s dilemma, took place. While the marriage enabled vVon- 
jong to recover his independence from the military government, it was in- 
deed, as Hambis points out ". . . (une) solution pr^caire, car en fait ce fut la 
princesse mongole qui regna" ^^' . 

The marriage between the two families put relations on an entirely dif- 
ferent basis. From King Ch'ungny6l >^> ^^;1, ^ (r. 1275-1308) through King 
Kongmin :^ ^. ji, (r. 1352-1374), a period of almost a century, seven 
Mongol Princesses were married into the Kory6 Royal family. The offspring 
of three of these marriages held the throne. King Ch'ungny61 himself pursued 
a policy which sought to restore Kory6 sovereignty over her former territory 
and which succeeded to a surprising degree, but his efforts were reversed by 
his immediate descendants. His son W6n |^^ (C. Yiian homophonous with 
Yiian ^^) departed for Yen-tu, the Yiian capital in the same year he ascended 
the throne, where he remained. He was King Ch'ungsOn J^ ^ ^ (r. 1309- 
1313). He abdicated in the fifth year of his reign for his son (also by a Mongol 
Princess) To :^ (i.e., King Ch'ungsuk ^g. ^ ^ , r. 1314-1330 and r. 1331- 
1339) who was invested as Prince, kuo-ivang, of Kory6 while W6n himself re- 
ceived investment as Prince of Shen, Shen-wang ^^^' -^ ^ , although he 
was usually referred to in Koryo as Sangwang jl^ ^ or the Higher King. In 
the tenth year of his reign (1323), King Ch'ungsuk petitioned the Yiian Empe- 
ror to incorporate the country into the Yiian Empire as a province. The fail- 
ure was itself a turning point in Korean history but the incident is illustrative 
of the effect of the marriage alliance and adds weight to Hambis' observations. 

In the year 1274, Wonjong, the last KoryO monarch to be granted a temple 
name, myoho 65) j|g J^ ^ died. The period of resistance had ended and the 
period of alliance had begun — the Japan invasion fleet scattered in a dozen 
harbors neared completion and the main body of the Mongol expeditionary 
force had already crossed the Yalu. 


Notes to Chapter VI 

1. In all works giving accounts of the rebellion it is invariably linked to Im 
Y6n and his son Im Yumu. In YS 7. 3a, Pae Chungson, the leader of the 
rebellion, is described as one of Im Y6n's faction. The rebellion is linked 
to Im Yumu in IC sdlchdn %fij%] 2. 8, ZC 9 A lla-b, TMP 109. 6a-b, KS 
26. 23a-b. Representative is YKC 25a-b which remarks that "the Heir Ap- 
parent of Kory6, Wang Sim, states that the rash group which enabled Im 
Y6n to assume power, are using the Left and Right [patrols] as well, as the 
Sinuigun cavalry, that is, the Three Patrols ..." However, in YKC 22a, 
we read that "Sik (i.e., W6njong) has sent a man to report that one 'wing- 
army' ^ ^ which had previously escaped from the Court of Heaven 
(i.e., Mongols) and Kory6's two 'wing-armies' have rebelled. Now Sik's 
relative, the Duke of Sunghwa is using the rebellion of the Three Patrols." 
There is, however, no evidence to support the Duke of Sunghwa as a lea- 
der of the rebellion. In fact, the KS repeatedly states that he was compelled 
to become King; HY 20. 25b maintains the same. It is clear that the Duke 
was being used. Also active in the power struggle were Yi UngnySl and 
Song Kunbi. Im Yumu's KS 130 biography relates that he was going to step 
down in favor of them due to his age. Yi, Han^giik-sa, p. 592, believes 
they were the real leaders of the military faction, but their role in the re- 
bellion is unknown. 

2. I have been unable to identify Kim Chi jo. 

3. Pae Chungson |^ ^^ ^|, has a 'biography' in KS 130. 37a-40a, but it is 
simply an account of the rebellion and gives us little information on Pae 
himself other than to mention that he "accumulated rank in the court of 
W6njong until he became General". 

4. Under an entry in the 4th month of Chih-yiian 7th year (1271) in YS 7. 3a, 
there is a brief 'summary' of events from the death of Im Yon to the entry 
of the Three Patrols into Chin Island. The Kai-ming ed. of YS {YS 7. 2b) 
reads the same. This account would place all of these events much earlier 
than the outbreak of the rebellion and is obviously garbled and incorrectly 
dated. A fuller version found between entries dated the fourth and sixth 
months of 1270, is seen in YS 208. 12a. These passages are erroneous in 
that they present a r^sum^ of events which occurred from the 2nd to the 
8th month of 1270, viz., the death of Im Yon in the 2nd month until the en- 
try into Chin Island in the 8th month. Since these events are dealt with in 
the text, a recounting would be superfluous here; suffice it to say that to 
accept the passages in question so dated would be to ignore the remaining 
YKC, YS, KS and other accounts which otherwise agree. 


I have previously mentioned a few other passages of YS which are also er- 
roneous and this undoubtedly reflects the haste with which the Yiian history 
was compiled, concerning which Yang remarks ". . . the primary goal 
seems to have been a quick finish, and this was achieved." Cf. Yang Lien- 
sheng, 'The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography', in Historians 
of China and Japan, London, 1961, p. 48. 
4a Among the many who managed to escape from the island was An Hyang 'J^ 
^fa] (1242-1306) the founder of neo-Confucianism in Kory6. Cf. Doo Hun 
Kim (Kim Tuhun), 'The Rise of Neo-Confucianism Against Buddhism in 
Late Kory6', Bulletin 12 (1960), pp. 11-29, of The Korean Research Cen- 
ter, Seoul. 

5. For a brief biography of Wang On J^ ^^ , the Marquis of Sunghwa )j{^ 
J\\ijJ\^ see KS 90. 7a-b. He was the brother of Wang Sun and was killed 
in the Chin Island battle in the fifth month of 1271. 

6. There were two Ministers, siing y% , in the Koryo Secretariat, sangso 
tosdng )^ ^ ^p il . one of the Left and one of the Right. The title had 
the official grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an 
annual stipend of 233 bushels (sok) 5 pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6). 

7. These 'appointments' had the token value of elevating Yi by one rank and 
General Yu by two ranks and transferred them both to the Bureau of Mili- 
tary Affairs. The title sungsdn ^ ^ had the official grade of Third 
Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of from 240 to 
300 bushels {s6k) of rice (Yi, Table 6) in the Koryo system. \Vith the es- 
tablishment of these offices, the rebels had the full regalia of government 
and with their 'king' of royal blood, they now had all the prerequisites to 
claim recognition. 

8. Cf. KS 130. 38b. This occurred on the 3rd day of the 6th month (June 23), 
cf. TT 35. 109. References to Muslims in Koryo at this time are few, al- 
though there are many a bit later. There were large Muslim communities 
in China, of course, and a Muslim Bureau, Hiii-hiii-ssii ) j] )oj ^j was 
established just after this by the Mongols. Cf. YS 7. lib. Schurmann, op. 
cit., p. 214 says, "Much of the commerce of North China unquestionably 
was in the hands of the ortaq merchants, who were, for the most part 
Muslim Ui^curs ..." It is quite possible that they played some commercial 
role in Koryo. For some reference to Muslims in Kory6 see Ko Py6ngik 

5-, ^p^ ji]^ 'Korea's Contacts with "The Western Regions" in Pre-Modern 
Times', SK 2 (1958), pp. 55-73. 

9. P'ansa -^ij ^ or Chief of the T'aesaguk j;;^ ■^ j^ was the highest posi- 
tion in that bureau and carried the official grade of Third Class, primary 
(Yi, Table 4) and an annual stipend of 240 bushels {sok) of rice (Yi, Table 6). 


His actions reflect his position, for the T'aesaguk and the Sach'Ondae ^ 

-^ ^ were in charge of astrology, numerology, yin-yang and feng-sui 
studies. Cf. Yi, Han'guk-sa, vol. 2, p. 242. 

10. An Pang'ySl ij^ j-f) jj^ fl. 1270-1273. He managed to escape following 
the defeat of the rebels on Chin Island and was about to visit Kim Pang- 
gyong when some soldiers killed him. KS 130. 39. Little else is known of 

11. There is no biography for Hy6n in the KS but there is a brief 'biography' 
for his wife, for which see KS 121. 23a. BTKP 44. 417 reads Hyon Mun- 
j6k- I read Hy6n Munhydk and note that the name is rendered Hyon Mun- 
hyok ^ j{_ .ii^vK in IC solchon 2. 8b. 

12. Yonghung Island "^ j^ ^ is located off Kyonggi Province and was at 
that time attached administratively to Namyang )5i p^ . Cf. TYS 9. 159a. 

13. Hong Tagu ^J^ ^ jL. (fl. 1258-1281) was the son of the Koryo rebel 
Hong Pogwon who had allied himself with the Mongols during the invasion 
of Sartaq. For biographical information see YS 154; for some informa- 
tion on his activities in Kory6 see KS 29 and KS 130. Also see BTKP 41. 

14. ♦Aqai A-hai 6^ J>!^. For the reconstruction of this name see Hambis, 
Le chapitre CVII ... , p. 20 note 10, and p. 22; also see Pelliot, Notes 
sur le 'Turkestan' . . . , TP XXVII (1930) p. 49. 

Aqai relieved Mongketii r^ ^ ^ who had previously been appointed 
Kory6 Pacification Commissioner \yS 7. lb). It is a frequently encoun- 
tered name. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 25 mentions a certain Aqai who was 
a Myriarch and who confiscated civilian lands for the establishment of 
military colonies. Uyer's second son was named A -hae {YS 120. 15a); YS 
133. 2a also mentions a certain A -hae. 

15. Chin Island ^■'^ ^ is off the coast of the present South Ch611a Province 
and was at that time administratively attached to Naju. For topographical 
and historical information see TYS 37. 651b-654a. Located offshore of 
•Korea's granary', the island was distant from the political and military 
center of activities to the north. 

16. Yongjang-song || j^ij]j(, , a stone construction, was not intended 
merely as a temporary refuge but rather as a fortified capital, and great 
efforts were expended in the construction of buildings, probably with the 
example of Kanghwa in mind. Cf. TYS 37. 653b. 

17. I find no mention of this island in TYS, yet the numerous offshore islands, 
groups of which were often made kun^^ or hyon^j^^ were under the con- 
trol of the nearest chu Ijj administration and such was undoubtedly the 
case here. 


18. Sin Saj6n \^ )^ J/j^ d. 1289. For biographical references see BTKP 
101. 948. 

19. Ko Y6rim 4, :]}- r^-^ died in the intercalary tenth month of 1271, de- 
fending T'amna; he was, at one time, a Commander, chiyu, of the Night 
Patrol (cf. TT 34. 100) which points out the divided loyalties in the com- 
plicated background struggle involving the Three Patrols. For biographi- 
cal references see BTKP 72. 700. 

20. Changyo-pu ^ ^ jf^ was located in the present South Ch611a Province. 
For topographical and historical information see TYS 37. 

21. Kw6n Tan ;\-Jl k|l£ was born in 1228 and died in 1312. For biographical 
references see BTKP 78. 739. 

22. Kim Su /^ j| d. 1270. For biographical references see BTKP 65. 63. 

23. According to TK IIB 253, General Ko followed with 1 000 men. Upon 
reaching T'amna, he erected a stone fortification, changsong, whose 
circumference is given as 300 li ^ , in preparation against the rebels. 
Cf. 775 38. 668b. 

24. The location of Samgy6nw6n is uncertain, however, TK IIB remarks that 
there was a ". . . Samgiwon jL, )kjL f^h located 60 li west of the present 
(i.e., Yi Dynasty) Haenam-hy6n ;^ ^^ j||v^ and I suspect this is it." This 
hydn is currently a kun in Cholla Province. 

25. The daru^aci at this time was *Toqto'a /]j^ ^ y^ and the Vice-Daru)(aci 
was Chiao T'ien-i ^^ ^ "^ , both of whom arrived in 1270. Cf. YS 7. 
2a-b; TT 36. 108. 

26. Hindu hsin-tu ')'/j'^6 • For the reconstruction of this name see F. vV. 
Cleaves, 'The Sino -Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince 
Hindu', HJAS 12 (1949) 3 & 4, p. 93 note 4. Only the names are the same, 
not the persons involved. From 1274 Hindu used the name Hu-tun ,^ fx • 
As Commissioner of the Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, Hindu's 
mission was, together with Shih Shu and Kim PanggySng, to make prepa- 
rations for the expedition to Japan which included the construction of 
warships. See KSl. 6a;ii:S 27. 8; ATS 104. 7b; YKC 22a-b; TT 36. 113; 

TK UB 257. 

27. Aqai was recalled to the Yiian court in the 1st month of W6njong's 12th 
reign year {KS21. la; TK IIB 255; TT 36. 113; TT 36. 115). The reasons 
for his removal were his cowardice in battle in the first attempts by the 
Mongol-Koryo forces to take Chin Island. Ci.KS 104. 6b-7a; YS 7. 7a. 
This was probably also the reason behind the release of Kim Panggy6ng. 

28. From one to two Auxiliary Secretaries were assigned to each Board; the 
Board of War, pyongbu, for example, had two Auxiliary Secretaries as- 
signed. The title carried the official grade of Sixth Class, primary (Yi, 


Table 4) and an annual stipend of 86 bushels {s6k) 10 pecks {tu) of rice 
(Yi, Table 6). 

29. The repeated attempts made to negotiate with the rebels is an indication 
of their relative strength; their continued refusal also supports this. For 
the generally weak condition of the Mongol-Kory6 forces see YKC 24b-25a. 

30. The initial offer was presumably made at this time although the text, YS 
7, 8b, merely relates that ". . . Hu-tu-erh was sent to carry an edict to 
Pae Chungson." The offer is implied in the report of the rebel reaction 
made to Qubilai by a minister of the Imperial Secretariat who said, "I, 
[Your] Servant, say that the Koryo rebel Pae Chungson begs that all ar- 
mies withdraw their garrisons and that thereafter they be attached [di- 
rectly] to the Court. However, Hindu has not complied with their re- 
quest.' " {YS 7. 9a-b) 

31. Also see TT 36. 115. Happ'o /i^ :^ is the present Masan 1^ jj_| located 
in the modern S. Kyongsang Province. For topographical and historical 
information see TYS 33. 557a-558a under the entry Ch'angwon ^^ -)^^ , 
the name by which it was known in the Yi Dynasty. 

32. Tongnae w J^is located about five miles inland from the modern city 
of Pusan and was at the time the chief administrative center in the area. 
For topographical and historical information see TYS 23. 287a-390a. 

33. Kimju /i^ -jj-l is the present Kimhae /^ ^^ located on the delta of the 
Naktong River J^ -^ ^^ in South Kyongsang Province. Formerly known 
as Imhae ^^q jj^its name was changed to Kimju during the reign of Koryo 
Songjong (r. 982-997). For topographical and historical information see 
TYS 32. 548b-557b. 

34. The establishment of military colonies and the increased demands for 
supplies and manpower necessary to pacify the rebels and to make prep- 
arations for the Japan expedition, following some thirty years of Mongol 
depredations, had beggared the country. "... as a result of which the 
people are in reality eating grass and [the bark of] trees" {TT 36. 118). 
These conditions undoubtedly stimulated uprisings, especially in the 
southern provinces. See T7S 32. 548b: TFS 32. 556a, and T7S 26. 449b- 

35. See TYS 32. 556a; TK IIB 258. Many uprisings were stimulated by the 
rebellion of the Three Patrols, occurring at MilsOng ^/'v3 ;j:.^ the present 
Miryang ^^^^ ft^T^ in South KySngsang Province (J<S 27. 4b-5a), and also in 
the capital where the government slaves under the leadership of the slave 
Sunggyom yM i^ (d. 1211.2; BTKP 109. 1023) plotted to kill the daruyaci 
and then join the rebels on Chin Island {KS 27. 5a-b); this abortive upris- 
ing stimulated the people of Taebu Island :v %f) %, to turn on a group 


of Mongol soldiers who had gone to pillage the island, kill six of them, 
and revolt {KS 27. 6a). For the popular appeal of the Three Patrols, also 
see the biography of Kim tJngd6k /^ jfi. !^^. in KS 103. 

36. Hu-lin-ch'ih ^^(1 iylv .IK = Qurim6i. While it also occurs as a title, it 
appears here as a name. For the reconstruction of the name see K.Shi- 
ratori, Korai-shi ni mietaru M5ko-go no kaishaku ^ ^ ^P {' 

f^ /L ':. ^ '#C tb ^^ ^> A^ <i% [^" Interpretation of Mongolian 
Words Seen in the Kory6-sa], TG 18 (1929) 2, and the comments by P. 
Pelliot, 'Les mots mongols . . . ', p. 261. QurimCi had been sent in com- 
mand of forces to garrison at Happ'o {HY2%. 20a), the departure point 
for Japan. 

37. vVang Kuo-ch'ang J:^ ]?XJ -^ was from Chiao-chou ^j~. -))\ where he 
served as Chiliarch. In 1268 he was sent to Kory6 to inspect Hdksan Is- 
land for use as a departure point for the Sung. He subsequently partici- 
pated in the joint Mongol -Kory6 subjugation of the rebellion of the Three 
Patrols. He died in Kory6 in the tenth month of 1271. He had one son 
T'ung jj^. For biographical information see 7S 167. 12b-13a. For his 
activities as envoy to Japan see Ikeuchi, Genko . . . , and Aoyama KOryQ 

^ li\ ir It. ' Nigen-kan no Korai Q yL. ?i\ ^ ^% , 5Z 32 
(1921) 8, pp. 575-586 and 9, pp. 645-658. 

38. Wang Sun had six sons: Im^J^j;, Hwa^^Q , Che^^ , Htii )f £- , and Ong 

^ . 75 166 carries biographies for both Hui and Ong as well as a son 
listed under the Mongol name of Wu-ai )[_, yf3 . The former two later 
took the Mongol names of Koko Temiir ?,^ g^^ r)]^ ;^^and Tu-li 
Temiir f;^ ]£ ^^ ^ 5lj respectively (FS''l66. la). The name Koko 
Temiir was also the name of a well-known Mongol general, however, two 
different persons are involved. Ong drowned in the Japan expedition and 
Wu-ai went on to a rather successful career as a soldier. For biographi- 
cal information see YS 166. lb-2a. 

39. All those above the Fourth rank were required to furnish one slave from 
their home to be used as seamen. Cf. TT 36, 116. 

40. Since Kim Sanggi, 'Sam pyolch'o wa . . . , p. 191, and p. 203 note 87, has 
suggested that firearms were used at this time, the passage KS 104. 
7b7-8, is worth considering, and reads :^ iu ^ ^i'l/^y'viA ^^ 
"Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire, and attacked the flank." The 1958 
North Korean edition of the KSlll 104. 222b and the Kokusho kanko-kai 
edition of 1909. HI 104. 222b, read the same. CS Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 435, 
renders the passage in heavy statacco style: Saku, sento-(shi) hi wo hana- 
chite kyoko-su ^^{^ J^§: i i^ ) ^i ^ M~^ f fA ^^X^- • 

YC 14. 268. 13 (Japanese edition) reads: Saku tva fund noborite hi wo 


hanachi hasamisemu ;^^ J^ j jh ^ -^ .^^ 9 '^ )^ ^ ^^^ "^ i^^ 

5^ ^ HY 28. 3b5 readi: :^ if fc ^ i^ ;i^ ^ |: ^A ^3C 
^ jIj:. -:^ -^ . The minor variations are less important for the pur- 
pose in hand than the general concordance in the use of the term chonghwa 

ij^ y\L 'to Ist fly with fire', which occurs in the KS as early as the reign 
of Munjong (r. 1047-1082) see KS 9. 8a8, and refers to the use of various 
and sundry incendiary weapons. Kim, loc. cit., uses the YKC 24b-25a 
mention oi huo-ch'iang y^ jf-^^ and Jmo-p'ao j^ ^j.^, which I have given 
in the text, to support his thesis, suggesting that the huo-p'ao might be a 
reference to something like the hui-hiii-p'ao ^^ 1:^ >^^^ of I-ssu-ma-yin 

/,-f' ^jf \% yl" (Ismael), a Persian engineer who arrived in China in 
1271, for which see the latter's biography in YS 130. The huo-p^ao were 
bombs cast by catapults in use as early as the 10th century while the huo- 
ch'iang was a sort of flamethrower which did not fire a missile; both are 
distinct from the assault mortar hui-hui-p^ao. A good discussion of these 
weapons is contained on pp. 500-501 of Jung-pang Lo, 'The Emergence of 
China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yiian Periods', 
FEQ 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489-503. Also see L.C.Goodrich and Feng Chia- 
sheng, 'The Early Development of Firearms in China', Isis 36 (1946) 2 
and Wang Ling, 'On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms in 
China', Isis 37 (1947) 3 & 4; regrettably neither of the last two mentioned 
articles are available to me. 

If firearms were used, which is indeed conjectural, then they were cer- 
tainly supplied by the Mongol forces. The manufacture of firearms by 
Koreans began in the reign of King U (r. 1375-1388) when General Ch'oe 
Mus6n Jy^ ^ ^:^ manufactured hivaVong j^j^ zrid hwap'o y^ j^'^^ 
which he used to sink a large number of the ships of Japanese freebooters, 
ivako, attacking Chinp'o ^|^ ;[|j' at the mouth of the Kum River /^^ jj][_ . 
See Han^ guk-sa sajon, 371; also see Nihon chiri taikei ]A yf^^]yj t^ 

-^ J^^ , published in 12 vols., TGkyO, 1935, Vol. 12, p. 400. 

41. Wang On was the brother of Wang Sun and when the latter sent his two 
sons south with the army, he "... ordered [them] to capture On and spare 
him but Hong Tagu entered first and beheaded On" (//F 20. 26a). This was 
an action of revenge because Wang Sun had been responsible for the death 
of Hong Pogw6n, Hong Tagu's father {seeKS 130. 3-5). For the grudge 
see CHSL 4. 33b. 

42. BTKP61. 652 gives some source locations for Kim T'ongj6ng's activities 
although not much is known of him. The entry in BTKP died 1173-6' is an 
obvious typographical error for 1273-6'. I note that there was a Kim 
Hy6kch6ng ^ ^ j^t- who was a Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol 

(/CS26. 12a) who may have been a brother or a cousin. 


43. When they fled to Cheju from Chin Island, the Three Patrols constructed 
an inner and outer fortified wall {KS 104. 8a; KS 130. 40a). 

Probably in anticipation of the coming attack, they also constructed the 
following additional fortifications: Hangp'adu-s6ng J^'}^ ^JX. ^^ ^M,^^~ 
cated 40 It west of Cheju city; Aew6lmok-s6ng - j£ ^ J{\^ j-jj^ located 
42 li west of Cheju city; and an earthen-work, t'osdng J^ \^ , located 
36 li south-west of Cheju city. Cf. TYS 38. 668b-669a. 
Kim Ponghyon, op. cit., pp. 115-124, deals with the rebellion and its 
connections with Cheju, but his work is more valuable for its general 
observations on the extant ruins of the constructions built at this time. 

44. The Ch'uja Islands Ml ^ k are a small group of islands between 
T'amna and the mainland which contains both a Large Ch'uja Island and a 
Small Ch'uja Island. Which particular island is meant is unknown. For 
topographical and other information see TYS 38. 668a-b. 

45. General Na Yu "W l/j^ d. 1292. For biographical information see KS 104. 
39a-41b; also see BTKP 85. 799. 

46. Kong Yu ^L \M ^^ previously made the Chin Island expedition and had 
almost been beheaded by General Kim Panggyong for his temerity. The 
next year Wonjong shifted him to another post {KS 104. 7b). The Southern 
Defense Command of which he was Vice-Commissioner, was in the pres- 
ent ChoUa Province. Cf. TYS 33. 576a. ATS lists this raid in the 11th 
month and TT lists it in the 9th month. I believe /fS is correct. 

47. Cf. XS 27. 36b. Nagan-kun ^^ $^|3 was in C holla Province. For topo- 
graphical and historical information see TYS 40. 703b-705b. 

48. The raids of the Three Patrols were numerous but aside from one or two 
feints northward (e.g., KSll. 31a-b; TT 36. 119), their activities were 
restricted to the southern islands and the two southern provinces of ChOl- 
la and Ky6ngsang where the pattern of their incursions followed that of 
the Japanese freebooters, wako. Some of their other raids during this 
period are listed in Part II in the section on Shipbuilding. 

49. The number of persons involved is uncertain for the sources KS 27. 34a; 
^"5130. 40a, ^77 68. 12, TT 36. 119, all differ. At any rate, Kim T'ong- 
j6ng left Kim Chan /-^ ^^ alive and killed the others. Parenthetically, 

I note that there was a Kim Chan involved in some of the Yiian-KoryO- 
Japan relations but it does not appear to be the same person. 
49a Kory6 was also required to provide such support as she was able. As 
Ky6ngsang Province had already contributed two years' taxes in advance 
toward the expeiise of subduing the rebels, they levied from Ch611a Pro- 
vince for the T'amna campaign (/fS 27. 38b). 

50. Li I ^v./^^ arrived in Koryfi in the fourth month of the thirteenth year of 


the reign of W6njong (1272), following the death of the previous daruyadi 
Toqto'a. Cf. KS21. 28a; KS21. 23a; TT 36. 119. 

51. The title of Marshal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison, haengydng 
pydngma wonsu J/^ ^ j^ ^ ^^ gm , was established in 1047, the 
first year of the reign of Munjong. Cf. KS 11. 

52. Cf. KS 27. 37b. The details are not given and the text merely states that 
"Li imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch'6ns6k because many of the SShae 
Province warships sunk" which suggests inferior construction. 

53. P6nnam-hy6n ^^ -^ U% was located some 40 li south of Naju, the ad- 
ministrative center to which it was attached, in Ch611a Province. Cf. TYS 
35. 615b. 

54. The Mongol troops were designated by the term tunjon'gun x^ W '^ ', 
the North Chinese by the term handgun "^S '^' . For a discussion of the 
latter and parallel terms see F. \V. Cleaves, 'Qabqunas '^Qamqanas', 
HJAS 19 (1956) 3 & 4, p. 405 note 119; F. W. Cleaves, 'The Biography of 
Bayan . . . ', op. cit., p. 218 note 139; and Schurmann, op. cit., p. 105. 

55. The actual size of the force which made the expedition and its composi- 
tion are unclear for various figures are given, viz., TT 36. 120. 4 gives 
10 000 without a breakdown; KS21. 35b and TT 36. 120. 5-6 relate that 
in the 11th month of the 13th year of the reign of vVonjong "The Yiian or- 
dered the King to send an army of 6 000 and 3 000 seamen to suppress the 
Three Patrols"; prior to this Koryo had reported to the Yiian that there 
were between five and six thousand troops facing Chin Island '(TT 36. 118) 
and at this time we see that 3 000 seamen were levied for the Chin Island 
attack; yet the figure of 10 000 composed of soldiers and seamen is also 
given in KS 27. 39a and KS 104. 8b. Still, YS 7. 19b-20a gives a total of 
12 000 which it breaks down as follows: troops of the military colonies, 

2 000; North Chinese, 2 000; Koryo troops, 6 000; and 2 000 of those 
troops of the Muwigun ^ ^j- ^ which were formerly used. The latter 
probably refers to those troops under Hong Tagu and the two sons of 
iVang Sun. 

Then, following the battle on Cheju, 500 Mongol troops and 1 000 Koryo 
troops were left on the island. The YS account may contain a duplication 
in that the 2 000 troops of the Muwigun were probably already counted in 
the figure given for the Koryo troops. 

56. Hamd6kp'o ^ ^^ j^' was located 32 li to the east of Cheju city. Cf. 
TYS 38. 664b. 

57. Piyang Island ^ ^^ ^ is a small island - circumference 10 li — 
located 80 li west of Cheju city. Cf. TYS 38. 664b. 

58. Following the suppression of the rebellion, T'amna was turned into a 


pasturage and the Yiian established a daruya^i 'command' pu fy^^ on the 
island. See Part II, section on Mongol Military -Administration. 

59. Cf. Yi, Kuksa Vaegwan, p. 256. 

60. Nakakoji says that the rebellion also temporarily stopped the repatriation 
of Kory6 prisoners held by the Japanese, presumably meaning Koreans 
taken captive by the Japanese freebooters. Cf. Nakakoji Akira y]'^ ^]^ 

^-^fi , Genko X-iS [The Mongol Invasions], TOkyS, 1937, p. 173. 

61. Also see the remarks by Hambis, 'Notes sur I'histoire . . .', pp. 177-178 
concerning the Koryo dilemma and the resort to a solution by marriage. 
For the Yiian it offered the stabilization of the country while for the rulers 
of Kory6 it offered powerful backing for retention of their position against 
any future attempts of a revival of the military government. 

62. An indication of this is seen in KS 103. 41a where we read, "Thje Three 
Patrols had rebelled and were based on Chin Island. [Their forces] were 
extremely numerous and [the people of] the chu and kun districts watched 
the wind (i.e., looked for an opportunity) to welcome them and surrender 
to them; some went to Chin Island to visit them." 

63. It is difficult to resist the temptation to compare the KoryC military gov- 
ernment with Japan's Kamakura Bakufu. There are numerous analogies, 
i.e., the figurehead monarchs, the retention of the civil offices in the 
court and the shifting of actual functions to the military headquarters with 
the consequent emergence of new offices and a new administrative struc- 
ture. While the analogy and temporal coincidence are interesting, the 
dissimilarities are all too apparent. The retention of the monarch by each 
is an example. The Kory6 military regents did not eliminate the monarch 
because they feared the intervention of the reigning dynasty in China. A 
precedent had already been established when the Chin intervened in a 
succession fraud by the military regents. Cf. Rogers, 'Studies in Korean 
History', passim. The Japanese military retained the monarch also but it 
was certainly not due to fear of Chinese intervention. 

64. Cf. Hambis, 'Notes sur I'histoire ...', p. 178. Hambis, loc. cit., is the 
definitive work on the Kory6 royal family. The various works of M. Ro- 
gers supplement this to some extent. Also see Yu, loc. cit., and YS 108. 

2 which gives the Mongols princesses married into the Koryo royal family. 
64a I note that Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 432, lists a. fan-tvang 'M ^ which 
he describes as "prince royal gouvernant un pays". 

65. For some of the posthumous honorary appellations conferred upon Kory6 
rulers and their queens by the Yiian see Kuo-cU ao iven-lei 11. 17a-19b 
and 12. la-2b. 


Part II 

1. The Instructions for Surrendering States 

Mongol demands upon KoryS followed the instructions laid down by Cing- 
gis as one of the articles of his Yasa 1) or ordinances which were to apply to 
all surrendering states. These requirements were first stated to Kory6 in 
1232, the text of which has been translated previously. Clear reference is 
made to ". . . the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation" which Kory6 is 
charged with violating. The specific charges laid down cite Koryo with failure 
to: assist the Mongolian forces, present household registers, bring forth an 
army, and have the monarch present himself at court. These instructions, 
among which submission of annual tribute was also cited, were frequently 
repeated. In 1262, they were outlined by Qubilai in a decree to Kory6: 

"[Our] ancestors have already established the principle that all newly 
attached states, near and far, must send hostages, submit population 
registers, establish post -stations, and then raise an army, provide pro- 
visions, and support the [Mongolian] army" {KS 25. 26a-27b). 
In 1268, they were reiterated with the additional mention of the establishment 
of daru^aci or resident commissioners 2). 

Clearly, Cinggis' instructions for surrendering states acted as the funda- 
mental plan used by the Mongols in the economic exploitation of Koryo. To be 
sure, Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations changed 
and were often modified "^i, and these modifications and changes are them- 
selves useful indicators of changes in Mongol concepts. Yet, Mongol demands 
were to a surprising degree based upon the simple blueprint laid down by 
Cinggis as is evidenced by the remarkably few changes in the instructions 
cited above, which are repeatedly referred to as principles laid down by 
Cinggis (e.g., YKC 8a, 9a), which remained basically constant in content over 
half a century, and to which only minor modifications appear to have been 
made. All of which point to the existence of a codified version which was pro- 
bably incorporated in the only body of legal statutes known to have been or- 
dered drawn up by Cinggis, the Yasa. 

Consideration of these requirements and the extension of the Mongol 


military-administration into Kory6 during the period 1219-1270, form the 
subject of the pages which follow. 

2, Mongol Military -Administration in Koryd 

During the period 1219-1224, Kory6 was apparently considered to be an 
appanage of Temuge-otcigin, for he sent envoys to collect tribute in the years 
1219 {YKC 2a), 1220 {YKC 2b), and 1224 {YKC 2b). In all probability, the 
other Mongol embassies which arrived in Kory6 at that time were also sent 
by him since, as mentioned earlier, until the ill-fated envoy of 1224, all em- 
bassies came via the territory of P'u-hsien Wan-nu to avoid the Chin garri- 
sons in South Manchuria. And, as previously mentioned, Temuge-otcigin was 
given the lands of P'u-hsien Wan-nu as an appanage and his direct descen- 
dants, viz., his son Jibiigen, his grandson Ta6ar, and his great-grandson 
♦Ajul, all held the title of Prince of the first rank, kuo-ivang. vVhen his great- 
great-grandson Nayan revolted against Qubilai and was killed in 1287, these 
titles were taken away. However, Nayan's brother To[q]to was permitted to 
keep his title as Prince of Liao and this title was transmitted to his son 
YanaSiri 4). 

It is not surprising in view of the repeated invasions to find that until 
1270, Mongol administration in Kory6 was largely what could be described as 
'government in the saddle' 5). When the Mongol forces launched an offensive 
against Kory6, the first wave consisted of a large advance cavalry force, 
kou-chH 6) .j'l^ 1^ , Travelling at a more leisurely pace behind them was the 
main force which included the Mobile Garrison, hsing-ying, or headquarters 
of the Mongol field commander '7). The major administrative function of the 
Mobile Garrison, as far as I have been able to discern, was the handling of 
communication, and the tallying of war-booty and tribute. In brief, foraging 
in the widest sense and demands for goods represented the initial Mongol 
methods of extracting wealth from Koryo, and its 'administration' was lodged 
in the Mobile Garrison; Sartaq, for example, had 16 officials, kuan-jen '^ 
^v » beneath him {KSIZ. 12a). 

The first effort at a more systematic exploitation of Kory6 was the abor- 
tive attempt to establish daruyaci in the northwest in 1232. This was the first 
attempt by the Mongols to build an intermediate administrative structure be- 
tween Korean society and the ruling class of Mongols — the imperial family 
and the nobility 8). 

Permanent occupation of Koryo commenced in early 1258, when the Mon- 
gols walled the city of Uiju on the Yalu River. Later that year, with the aid of 
the Korean deserters Cho Hwi and T'ak Chong, they occupied the Koryo north- 
east, i.e., the area northward from Ch'ol-kwan. This area was subsequently 


lost to Kory6 for almost a century until, with the cooperation of a Jiircen 
chieftain, the Ssangsong area was retaken by force in 1356. 

The overthrow of the Ch'oe clan which also occurred in 1258, led to a 
peace settlement and the center of Mongol influence in Kory6 then shifted 
south to the Western Capital which was reconstructed in the same year to 
serve as a Mongol center, although Mongol forces were withdrawn from the 
Western Capital two years later in 1260. As relations warmed, there was a 
general acceleration in meeting Mongol demands. And, in 1269, the next ma- 
jor turning point was reached. From the deposing of Wonjong stemmed a se- 
ries of events: 

1) Koryo was forced to relinquish her northwest territory when the Kory6 re- 
bel Ch'oe T'an, et al., seized the area and submitted to the Yiian in 1270. 
In that year "[By] an Edict, the Western Capital was made subordinate to 
the Court, nei-shu ]'M M , [its designation] changed to Tongnyong-pu ^^ 
^ JfJ , and its boundary [with Koryo] set at Chabi Pass 9) ji. f^M " 
(ifS 208. Ua; also see KS2Q. 28a-b; ifS 26. 31a-32a; KS 130. 36b). Ch'oe 
T'an was placed in charge as Governor, tsung-kuan (J{S 130. 36b), although 
he evidently was demoted for he appears in the records in 1284 with the 
rank of Chiliarch {KSC 30. la). The Mongol representative there was 
Mongketii ^l',^ ^ ;^fj who had originally been sent at Ch'oe T'an's request 
to garrison the Western Capital in 1269 and who was later appointed Civil 
Administrator of the new district {YSCSPM 3. 13). In 1275, it was redesig- 
nated TongnyOng-no (C. lu). It should be noted that the border cities of Uiju, 
ChSngju ^-# jj\ , Inju, and Wiwon-chin j^ ^ 7^^ were subordinate to 
P 'o - so -fu until 1276 {YS 59. 3b-4a). In 1283, P'o-so-fu was abolished when 
Tung-ching was made Liaoyang-lu (YS 59. la-2a) and I assume that these 
cities were then subordinate to the latter. In 1283, the tsung-kuan or Gov- 
ernor of Tongny6ng-pu was Hong Chunghui ^^ -^ ^ , the eldest son of 
Hong Tagu [KS 29. 47b) while Ch'oe T'an had evidently been demoted, for 
in the next year his title was Chiliarch {KS 30. la). Some cities were re- 
turned in 1285 {KS 30. 4), and in 1290, following a petition by King Ch'ung- 
ny61, TongnyOng-no was abolished and administratively returned to Kory6 
(K'S 130. 37a). The abolishment of Tongny6ng-no did not immediately put 
the entire area back into Korean hands. Korean designations and control 
were re-established over the following cities in the years indicated: 1354, 
the cities of Unju, Muju, and Maengju; 1371, the cities of Tokchu, Kwakchu, 
Pakchu, and Unju; 1382, the city of Wiju 9a). The major problem following 
the fall of the Yiian was not so much regaining the territory, along the 
frontier especially, from the Mongols as it was a problem of retaking it 
from the Jiirien. 


lOdin Control ^v KofKyo- ^_^ A.^ 

ToMaM/Bfia -P" 


2) In order to break the KoryO military government which had deposed him, 
Wonjong submitted Kory6 to the Mongols on a basis of full alliance and co- 
operation, as a result of which: 

a) the KoryO and Yiian Imperial families were linked in marriage ^^i , 

b) the forces of the Kory6 military government, the Three Patrols, re- 

Thus, from 1270 onward, Kory6 became a full-fledged participant in the 
Mongol adventure of conquest and Mongol daruya6i 12) were appointed for 
the whole of Kory6. The following simplified chart shows the daru^aci sta- 
tioned in Koryo during the period 1258-1278 l^^: 






































DaruYa6i Vice-Daru]^aci Source 

72 individuals; 

unidentified KS 24. 39b 

Shu-li-ta KS 25. 7b-10a 

- vacant - - vacant - KS 26. 33a; also see 

YKC 10a -b 
Toqto'a ^"^h^^J^^Chizo T'ien-i,-#.^l YS 7. 2a-b; 

YKC 21a-b; Tr36.108 


- vacant 
Li I 4"^ 
Li I 

Hei-ti ^, ^5 

- vacant - 

Chiao T'ien-i 

Chiao T'ien-i 15) YKC 26a; 

KS 27. 28a 
Chou Shih-ch'ang YKC 26b 

Chou Shih-ch'ang YKC 27a 
(d. 1275.2) 
- vacant - 

vacant - 

YKC 27a 

Chang Kuo-kang Shih-mo TMen-ch'ii YKC 213. 



^j ik^. 

In late 1278, King Ch'ungny61 requested that the daruj^aci be withdrawn since 
they had fulfilled their duties and his request was granted {YKC 27b; KS 26. 
32a), but by that time Yiian control over Kory6 was so complete that the ab- 
sence of the daruj^adi did not matter much. 

A daru^aci command had also been set up on T'amna in 1273 following the 
suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols, although it appears that 


T'amna remained chiefly a military garrison until the daruya6i, Sun-t'anj3|_, 
^H^vas appointed in the sixth month of 1275 {YS 208) 16). The island was 
subsequently turned into a pasturage ^'^'. Upon the occasion of the accession 
of Ch'eng-tsung )^ ^ (i.e., Temur Oljeitii, r. 1295-1307), King Ch'ungny61 
petitioned the new Emperor to return T'amna toKory6 and this was done^^). 
Again, the 'return' of T'amna was done in name only; a Myriarch Command 
remained on the island and Kory6 did not regain control of it until the reign of 
King Kongmin. In addition to the Myriarch Command on T'amna, there were 
other Myriarch Commands in Koryo, for example, at Happ'o, in the Western 
Capital, one in ChSUa Province and there was even a mobile a.r my ,sun^ gun ^^> 

X^( ^^ . One of the major concerns of Yiian officials in Kory6 in the 1270's 
was ship construction and the provision of military supplies for the first inva- 
sion of Japan. In 1280, after the failure of the first Japan expedition of 1274, 
a Yuan Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan, cheng-jih-pen hsing-sheng 

^i ^^ y^y{'X^ ,was establislied in Kory6; in fact this particular Mobile 
Bureau was established and abolished several times, reflecting the on-again 
off -again decision to attempt further Japan expeditions. This bureau acted as 
the supreme Yiian administrative organ in Koryo and even gave civil service 
exams 19^) ^vhen the Mongols launched their invasion of Annam a third Japan 
expedition was given up ^0) temporarily and the Mobile Bureau for the Subju- 
gation of Japan which had been re-established in 1283, was abolished in the 
first month of 1284. It was re-established in 1299; abolished in 1300 and re- 
established in 1321 21); it lingered on, more in form than in substance, until 
1365 (/CSC 21. 36a; YSCSPMZ. 13; FS 208. 7a-b; 75 28. 5a). 

A consequence of the failures of the Japan campaigns was the swarm of 
Japanese freebooters, ivako, which descended upon Koryo during the late 13th 
and early 14th centuries. The favorite targets of these raiders were Kimju, 
located some miles up the Naktong River in the fertile Naktong delta region, 
and the seaport of Happ'o located on the coast to the south. Happ'o had been 
the Korean departure point for both Japan expeditions. In order to combat the 
Japanese freebooters, the Yiian established a Coast Guard Myriarch Com- 
mand, chen-pien wan-hu-fii /'^^ ;^ '^ p if^ , at Kimju in the tenth month 
of 1281 {KSC 20. 36b). The following year Tu-li Temiir f^ >£ f^M was 
stationed there with 500 troops {YSCSPM 3. 13). 

In the eleventh month of 1275, Kory6 was ordered to change the designa- 
tions of all officials to correspond to the Yiian system {KS 76. lb; YKC 27a) 
and the Koryo administrative structure was changed accordingly, with the ap- 
pointment of Myriarch and Chiliarch, etc. to fill provincial posts (e.g., KS 21. 
34a-b). In 1278, Kory6 began to follow even Mongol customs in clothing {KS 
72. 21b). 


After decades of relation by marriages with the Yiian imperial family, an 
interesting phenomenon occurred. When Kory6 King Ch'ungson abdicated in 
1313, he was invested as Shen-wang j^ ^ or Prince of Shen, by the Yiian. 
He was still nominally over his son who ascended the throne in Kory6, viz., 
King Ch'ungsuk, while he himself was held at the Mongol Court. He was later 
exiled to Tibet in i320, but this did not cut short the line of Princes of Shen 
who continued to be invested with the title and presented, as symbols of their 
authority, with a golden seal with animal design (cf. YS 107. 6a) 22), 

In summary it can be said that initial Mongol attempts to govern Koryo 
through the establishment of administrative organs in the country were un- 
successful vmtil 1269; prior to that time they controlled only what they could 
hold by force, although the services of Koryo rebels were of considerable 
aid. But from that turning point which we can pinpoint to the deposing of 
Wonjong, Kory6 came under the Yiian mantle willingly and the active estab- 
lishment of the Yiian military -administrative structure in Kory6 was carried 
out. The failure of the first Mongol attempt to control Kory6 in 1232, how- 
ever, had the interesting result of building a large and long-lasting Korean 
community in the Liaoyang area which was in desolation at the end of the 
Chin due to the repeated wars in the area. After the settlement of Hong Pog- 
w6n and his 1 500 households in the area between Liaoyang and Shenyang, 
Pogwon was placed in charge of all Koreans who submitted to the Mongols 
with the position of Myriarch of the Army and Peoples of Kory6, Kao-li chiin- 
min tcan-hu (KS 59. 5a). In 1261, three years after Pogw6n's death, the Yiian 
established a Governor's Command for the Administration of the Army and 
People of Kory6, An-fu Kao-li chiin-min tsung-kuan-fu {YS 59. 5a). In 1263, 
Wang Sun was given control of some 2 000 households and the administration 
of Shen-chou (= Shenyang) and made Governor of the People and Forces of 
Koryo. In 1296, the population of the Korean community in this area around 
Liaoyang exceeded 5 000 households; in the chih-shun era, 1330-1333, it was 
5183 households or roughly 25 915 persons (YS 59. 5a-b). Although Hong Pog- 
w6n was disgraced and killed in 1258, his son Hong Tagu was called up in 
1260, and appointed Commander, tsung-kuan — a military position under the 
Myriarch — when the succession fight broke out between Qubilai and Arii(Boge. 
Tagu, with the Korean army of Liaoyang, also helped to crush the revolt of 
Prince Nayan in 1287. In 1270, a Mobile Bureau, hsing-sheng 23) ^as estab- 
lished at Liaoyang and in 1288 Hong Tagu was appointed Minister of the Right, 
yu-ch^eng ^ _^]i_ , of the Mobile Bureau. vVhen he died in 1291, his younger 
brother Hong Kunsang 23a) ^ ^' ^ y^-'i- was given his position as Minister of 
the Right of the Liaoyang Mobile Bureau; he was later replaced by Hong Ta- 
gu' s eldest son, Hong Chunghui. 


The descendants of Wang Sun also flourished in Liaoyang. vVang's second 
son Koko Temiir (Korean name Hfli) was also given his father's position as 
tsung-kuan or governor while Wang's son Wu-ai who later aided in the sup- 
pression of the revolt of Prince Nayan was, in 1283, made Grand General, 
ta -Chiang -chiin . 

3. Tribute, Levies and Gifts 

Mongol demands upon Kory6 for products took the form of the scheduled 
annual tribute and unscheduled levies. To this must be added gifts both soli- 
cited and unsolicited. Levies of provisions for the Mongolian army are of a 
different nature and have been discussed separately. 

In the formal trade pattern of North Asia reciprocity and control were 
by-words and this aspect of Yuan-Kory6 relations is not lacking. When an en- 
voy arrived he brought gifts which were presented with his missive; he was 
then entertained and prior to departing given gifts which, in more normal 
times, could be expected to be about equal in value to the gifts he presented — 
which was probably one reason they were given after he made his presenta- 
tion. While the Mongol envoys reduced their gifts to a token, the symbol of 
reciprocity was retained. 

The few itemized accounts which we have of the demands and of the arti- 
cles supplied cannot be expected to tell us much but they do reveal some in- 
teresting points. Highly prized by the Mongols were Kory6 otter and marmot 
pelts and they were constantly demanded both by the throne and by the com- 
manders in the field. 

The majority of articles supplied by Koryo fall into a few general cate- 
gories: textiles, precious metals, pelts, and paper. On the basis of the quan- 
tities of various items recorded as having been presented by Kory6 (not all of 
which are detailed here) up until the year 1264, some approximate but inte- 
resting ratios are obtainable: 

silver to gold (excluding coins) 35 to 1 

gold products to un worked gold 2.5 to 1 

silver products to unworked silver 6 to 1 

ramie to silk 7 to 1 

The high ratio of worked silver to raw silver is interesting for it indi- 
cates not only a large silver -craft industry in Kory6 but also a preference for 
silver in the form of articles rather than in the form of bullion. The variety 
of textiles and of paper is particularly noticeable. 

The period under consideration falls, for the most part, in what might be 
called the period of the unorganized exploitation of wealth by the Moncrols; not 
until after the accession of Qubilai in 1260 was the Chinese bureaucratic ma- 


chinery fully utilized for taxation purposes and, in Kory6, full exploitation 
was not begun until the accession of Wonjong, while full Koryo cooperation 
dates from 1270. Nothing emphasizes this so much as the fact that during the 
31 years of the chih-yiian period, 1264-1294, Koryo submitted tribute 36 
times (YS 208, 7b). It should be mentioned that it would be hazardous to at- 
tempt to draw other than the most tentative of conclusions from such meagre 
data despite their obvious value as an indicator of productivity and preference 

Detailed lists of the articles submitted as tribute are lacking but a gen- 
eral idea is conveyed by the demands presented by Temiige-otcigin in 1221 
and the tribute and gifts given by Koryo as a result of the peace negotiations 
in 1231. The demands of 1221 were as follows: 

Si f 



otter pelts 

fine silk, hsi-ck'ou ijjlj ^^ 

fine ramie, hsi-chu < 

silk quilting, min-tzu 

Lung-t'uan ink %^ m\ ^ 

writing brushes 


groomwell, tzu-ts^ao^^^ ^^ 

safflower, hung-hua^^) ^/jUj 

indigo shoots, Ian -sun 26) ^ ^ 

cinnabar red, chu-hiing -^ ijX 

orpiment 27)^ tz^u-huang j)t^ -^ 

bright lacquer 28)^ kuang-chH Jq^^fe- 

tung oil, tung-yu y{^ '^^ 


IQQOQyongM (skins) 
ZQQQpHl ^OT bolts 
2 000 pHl 
10 000 ^o^ fl or bushels 
1 000 chong 'J or sticks/cakes 
100 000 Chang ^^OT sheets 
5 kok 
50 kok 
50 kok 
50 kok 
10 kok 
10 kok 
10 kok 

The Mongol gifts presented by the envoys who conveyed these demands were, 
the KoryO records inform us, cloth which had been given by Koryo the previous 
year and were merely symbols of the reciprocity implied in such exchanges. 
These same envoys also presented demands from the Mongol field commanders 
requesting unspecified amounts of otter pelts, silks, and silk quilting, and 
other items {KS 22. 19b-20b). 

Of particular interest are the demands for such large quantities of ink, 
writing brushes, and paper. Parenthetically, it should be noted that cotton 
was not among these demands, the opinion of Martin notwithstanding 29)^ All 
exchanges stopped when Chu-ku-yii, the chief of this delegation was slain in 
early 1225. 


The submission of tribute recommenced with the opening of the peace 
negotiations which took place in the winter of 1231, As compensation for the 
slaying of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yii, the Mongols demanded many hostages, 
20 000 otter pelts, 10 000 horses and lOOOO ponies and clothing for an army of 
one million men! {KS23. 5a-7b). Kory6 sent gifts to the Mongol field com- 
manders preceding the visit of Ch6ng, the Duke of Hoean, who himself took 
some local products to Sartaq. The gifts sent were: a pair of small gold wine 
bowls, a pair of large gold wine bowls, silver pyong coins, ottei pelts, cloth- 
ing, i;^ , silk, and ramie clotn, chu-pu^j,j^ ;k {KS 23. 5b). Some days later 
KoryS sent envoys to the camp of Tanqut, Ti-chii, and Sartaq's son to present: 
5 kun of silver, 10 p'il of ramie cloth, 2 000 p'il of coarse clothjts'u-pu ^ 
'^^ , saddle trappings, and bridle tassels QiS 23. 5b). The next Mongol envoy 
bore a dispatch which demanded enormous amounts of goods {KS 23. 5b-6b). 
Gifts were first sent to the camp of Tanqut consisting of: a wine-cup with 
fully engraved phoenix cover and stand, two p^il of fine ramie cloth-, one bay 
horse, a silver -trimmed and gold-adorned saddle, and full embroidered sad- 
dle trappings. 

Following the flurry of gifts outlined above, a substantial submission of 
tribute took place . 

(a) A Mongol envoy was presented with the National Gifts consisting of: 

70 kun of yellow gold 
1 300 ktm of white gold 

1 000 j^cketsju-i 30) ^^^^ ^,and, 
170 horses. 

(b) Then, Kory6 sent: 

(1) as gifts foi Sartaq himself: 

12 kun 2 yang y^^ of yellow gold 
7 kun by weight of numerous wine utensils of gold 

29 kun of white silver 
437 kun by weight of numerous drinking and eating utensils of silver 
116 silver pydng coins (each weighing one kun) 

16 pieces of clothing (made of chiffon.s^ iis}>, silk gauze, lo ^^ , silk 

'\ 6 ""' ■" 

brocade^ chin <^>f] , and embroidered materials, hsin) 

2 robes, ao ^i^ , of purple chiffou 

2 000 jackets of silk cloth 

75 marmot pelts, Va-p'i ;^| J^ 
1 horse equipped with a saddle ornamented with gold 
150 horses of varying types and, 

(2) for distribution to Sartaq's son and wife, and for the commanders and 
officials under his command: 


49 kim 5 yang of gold 

341 kun of silver 
1 780 kfin by weight of silver wine utensils 

120 silver pydng coins 

300 pHl of fine ramie cloth 

164 marmot pelts 

jackets of damask^ Zm^g^ i^^nd chiffon; and saddle-horses. 
{KS2Z. 7b- 8a) 

In the fourth month of 1232, gifts were again presented to the Mongol field 
commanders including 10 pHl of silk gauze; pongee, chiian 2f^@ ; damask; silk; 
and a variety of gold and silver wine utensils, decorated saddle trappings, and 
painted fans. A letter presented at this time also mentions that of 1 000 otter 
pelts demanded previously, some 977 pelts were being presented {KS 23. 12a). 

Following the peace negotiations, tribute missions were again sent but no 
enumeration of products is given. In general, it can be said that during the 

periods of respite, tribute was given which was also true during most of the 
periods while negotiations were going on even though the fighting continued on 
the mainland, while during all major engagements tribute stopped 31). The 
same is true of gifts to Mongol commanders in the field. 

In the winter of 1253, negotiations had reopened, and in addition to mis- 
sives from the Mongol commander Yekii, one of his officials presented de- 
mands for gold, silver, ramie cloth, and other products {KS 23, 11a). The 
Kory6 answer to this letter is particularly pertinent: 

"The necessary gold and silver have since ancient times not been produced in 
our small state; as regards their being presented as tribute, this is not easily 
managed. As for otter pelts and ramie cloth, since the beginning of the war, 
the people have all fled in alarm, so that it is difficult to provide [these things]. 
Now we have roughly prepared some [gifts] as proof of our good faith as set 
out in a separate list" {KS 24. lib). 

The general Korean bankruptcy is borne out by other accounts where we 
read that "because of the presentations as well as gifts sent to the Mongol of- 
ficials, the Duke of Y6ngy6ng, his consort, and his consort's mother, Hong 
PogwOn, et al., the gold, silver, and cloth [consumed] were incalculable and 
the treasuries and storehouses were all exhausted. [Therefore] they ordered 
the civil and military officials of the fourth grade in official rank and above to 
produce one kun of white silver; officials of the fifth grade, ^pHl of ramie 
cloth; officials of the sixth and seventh grades, kjvonsam (~ kwonch^ am) Jj^:^ 
^vL> 3 />'27 [of ramie cloth]; the officials of the eighth grade, one p'il (of 
rsunie cloth) in order to meet the expenses" {KS 79. 22b-23a). Levies of 20 
sung oX of white ramie cloth were made on the people of the southern pro- 


vinces which caused much dissension; one p HI of cloth cost one ^« of white 
silver while orders to confiscate the people's horses led many to kill the 
horses rather than give them up (KS 24. 12a). 

While a mere listing of all records of gifts, levies, and tribute presented 
by Kory6 would be of minor value since quantities are rarely mentioned, a 
few of these records deserve attention. 

As mentioned, otter and marmot pelts were particularly sought, to which 
we may add paper. The following presentations of paper are mentioned in the 
period 1262-1263: 540 sheets of paper {KS 25. 27a-28b); 100 sheets of yellow 
paper and 100 sheets of white paper (KS 25. 24b-25a); 500 sheets of piao J^ 
paper and 1 000 sheets of tsou ^ paper {KS 25. 29b-31a). 

A variety of hunting birds were also solicited from Koryo including: spar- 
row hawks, ;yao 22) <^)| ^ goshawks, ;ym^33) jYi- ^ and peregrine falcons, 
ku 34),^t! (i^S 25. 24b; KS25. 31b). In 1262, Kory6 was ordered to present 
hunting birds to the throne each year and this led to the establishment of a 
Falconry Office, ungbang ^^' Y^ J^ . The Falconry Office was headed by an 
Administrator, tsung-kuan and was supported by the taxes of 250 households 
{YS 101. 19a) 36). 

Textiles presented included varieties of chiffon, silk gauze, silk brocade, 
embroidered materials, damask, pongee, and ramie cloth which attest to the 
existence of a skilled textile industry in Kory6 37). 

There are only two records of possible ceramic items being presented, 
one of which has been mentioned; the other is a record of parrot (decorated) 
cups presented to a Mongol field commander in 1260 (KS 25. 8a), The kilns 
which produced the famed Kory6 celadon ware for the court were located near 
Kangjin in the extreme south 38)^ an area to which the Mongols in their inva- 
sions did not penetrate. It was however, precisely in this area that the rebel- 
lion of the Three Patrols centered. When it is also noted that the Mongols 
took all artisans they could capture, the general decline of the 'classical' 
Koryo celadon industry is explained 39). 

Another item of interest was a Mongol levy made in 1262, which demanded 
20 000 kun of brass, hao-fimg 4f4-/>^jo]. Some 612 kun were raised by a levy 
on officials down to the sixth grade but in a missive accompanying the brass, 
the Kory6 authorities pointed out that "This product is not produced within 
[Our] insignificant state's Yalu River [borders]. That which we have presented, 
we purchased in North China" {KS 25. 24b-25b). 

A few other items, more curiosities than anything else, like hats {KS 25. 
27a) and scabbards (inlaid with) tortoise shell (J<:S 25. 27a) are also recorded 
as having been presented. 

By far the strangest request made by the Mongols for a product arrived 


by special messenger in the autumn of 1267. Skins, of which 17 were pro- 
duced, of the a-chi-erh ho-meng-ho 9)^ -^ i^ ^^ W-4^ (?*a]ir-ifamong- 
\z) which a gloss explains as "the name of a fish which resembles a cow" 
(sea-cow??). They were to be used to make shoes for the Emperor as it was 
said that they would relieve his swollen feet when he stood up (iCS 26. 12b). 

There is no mention of either demands for or presentations of ginsaeng, 
insam J\__ ^<. , which was (and still is) highly prized by the Chinese and was 
often included in tribute given to Sung (e.g., Sung-shih 147. 17b). 

The large amounts of silver given as tribute by Koryo are interesting 
when it is noted that during the preceding two centuries there had been a 
shortage of silver in the Muslim world resulting in a near cessation of the is- 
suance of silver coins. Then, in 1260, vast quantities of silver suddenly re- 
appeared ^^1. 

It should also be mentioned that there was a brief interlude of trade. In 
the tenth month of 1261, the Mongol Court sent two envoys with an Imperial 
Edict to open monopoly markets, chio-ch^ang {YKC 10b) which has to lead to 
the establishment of markets on the Yalu ^1). This was apparently short- 
lived, for "in the first month of the third year of the reign (of Qubilai = 1262), 
foreign trade, hu-shih, was abolished. Prince Ta-cha-erh jij^2^5^ (Ta- 
tar) suggested that an iron smelter be established and this was carried out. It 
was suggested that foreign trade be set up but this was not allowed" (FS 208. 
6b). The absence of such markets made a place on the tribute missions valua- 
ble and we have at least one example of two men who made large profits on 
such a mission, for which they were fined and exiled {KS 25. 33a-b). 

4. Mongol Military Colonies in Koryd 

The establishment of military colonies t'un-t'ien, one type of government 
land under the Yiian ^2)^ in Koryo is well attested in both Yiian and Kory6 
records. And, if there is one thing upon which both agree, it is that there 
were no relations between the Mongols and Kory6 during the period 1225-1231. 
It comes then as somewhat of a surprise to find the following passage in the 
'Monograph on Food and Money' in the Koryd -sa dated the third month of 

'The princes as well as the ministers great and small and the people 
were all ordered to bring forth beans according to their station in order 
to support the Yiian military colonies with cattle feed" (KS 79. 22b). 
The passage is, of course, erroneously dated and refers to an event which 
occurred after 1259 or, more probably, after 1270. A similar levy was made 
again in 1277 (KS 79. 16) and perhaps this is simply an erroneously dated du- 


Each time military colonies were established in Koryfi, it was to accom- 
plish a specific task. The first military colonies were opened in the Western 
Capital area in the second month of 1259, for the distinct purpose of recon- 
structing the city and building warships Q<S 24. 40b); in 1260 they seem to 
have been abolished (JKS 26. 13b). 

Military colonies were established on a somewhat broader scale in 1270. 
In the eleventh month of that year, the Yiian Imperial Secretariat, chung-shu- 
sheng, suggested that a Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, t'un-t'ien ching- 
lueh-ssu ^ \£) jx^ ^1- ^ , be established in Kory6 (YKC 22a), "Subse- 
quently, they established military colonies in ten places [including] the capi- 
tal, Tongnyong-pu, and Pongju J|l, ')')] with 2 000 men of the households un- 
der the supervision of Wang Sun and Hong Tagu as well as 2 000 men of the 
guard SLTinyjivei-chiln ^3) xJ^j- ^^ and 1 000 men from P'o-so-fu ^ ^M 
and Hsien-p'ing-fu j^ ^ Jp\ • "^^ey set up a Supervisory Bureau, ching- 
lueh-ssu, in order to manage their affairs. Each military colony had 500 sol- 
diers" {YS 100. 19). The same source also gives the reason for their estab- 
lishment: to prepare for the Japan expedition. Hindu ^I'/f ^^ and Shih Shu '"^ 
h^d were appointed Administrators, A-la T'ieh-mu-erh ^^ ^i] ^^ AV^ 
(Ala[q] Temiir) was made Coadministrator, while the forces under *Aqai 
were disbanded. Hong Tagu was placed in command of the 2 000 men he and 
Wang Sun had raised (YKC 22a-b; YS 208. 12b). Other sources add that 
military colonies were also established at Kimju/^ jji and Hwangju -^ -))] 
at this time {YS 7. 6a; YS 208. 12b-13a; KS 27. 2b; CHSL 4. 41a; TK 11.258; 
TT 36. 115). Earlier events confirm military colonies at the Western Capital 
{KS 24. 40b) and later events indicate that Naju Jf j)] was probably another 
location {KS21. 38b). 

Koryo, of course, lost no time in requesting that they be abolished {KS 
27. 7a-b) but this was not to be. In the fourth month of 1271, "Special Super- 
visors of Agriculture were separately sent to all the provinces to hasten the 
delivery of farm oxen and farming implements to Hwangju and Pongju in order 
to prepare for the needs of the Yiian military colonies" {KS 79. 8b^. In the 
eighth month of the same year, Qurimti arrived in Kory6 and proceeded to 
garrison at Happ'o {YKC 25a). And, in 1272, inspectors were sent out to se- 
lect arable land to produce provisions for the army {KS 82. 37a). In this same 
year Kory6 established a chonham pyongnyang togam ^^ ^^^jf^^^ ^ 
or Supervisory Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision 
of] Army Supplies {KS 11. 27a). 

As the military colonies began their preparations for the Japan campaign, 
military operations against the Three Patrols then on Chin Island also re- 
quired support. Some five to six thousand cattle were sent from the Pongju 


military colony to the Yuan-Kory6 forces which numbered 6 000 men and 
18000 horses {TT 31. 118; CHSL 4. 42a). The large number of horses proved 
difficult to feed and frequent complaints that the horses were starving {TT 36. 
115; TT 36. 118) led the Yiian to send an envoy to order more diligence in 
agriculture and sericulture in order to provide provisions for the army. Hong 
Tagu was ordered to supervise agricultural affairs ifCS 79. 8b). 

These were the military colonies which supported the T'amna campaign 
which ended the rebellion of the Three Patrols in 1273, and which supported 
the first Japan campaign the next year. They were apparently abolished in 
1274, when the attack on Japan was made; following the failure of the expedi- 
tion they were evidently not revived. 

5. Ship Construction 

Ship construction in KoryS was originally intended for use against the 
Southern Sung. The first reference to actual ship construction is in 1259 when 
military colonies were established at the Western Capital charged with the 
dual task of reconstructing the city and building warships {KS 24. 40b) ^^' . In 
1268, an edict was issued instructing W6njong to prepare ships and foodstuffs 
to be used for the campaign against the Southern Sung ^5). Then, after the 
missions to Japan repeatedly returned empty-handed, thought was given to 
using them to enforce Mongol demands on Japan (cf. KS 26. 18al-15)o 

The original demand was for Kory6 to prepare 1 000 ships of 3 to 4 000 
bushel {s6k) capacity capable of crossing a great sea {YKC 13b-15a; FS 208. 
8b-9a). Koryo had reported that she was building 1 000 ships and raising an 
army of 10 000 men and the Mongols dispatched Toqto'a, T'o-to-erh, to in- 
spect the army and supervise the construction of warships (FS 208. 9a)). 
Reaching KoryS, he made journeys to inspect Huksan Island M-- M '^ » 
the departure point for the China trade, and the Japan route - the latter pro- 
bably referring to the Kimju area {YKC 15a-16a). Huksan Island had since 
ancient times been a way-station for vessels going to China and a hostel and 
Buddhist temple were maintained there for travellers, many of them mem- 
bers of the Buddhist clergy, going to China. Sung ships sailing from Ming- 
chou "00 j)] could reach HOksan Island in five days with a favorable wind; 
from Hiiksan Island they would proceed past the many coastal islands to 
Yes6ng River which wound past the Koryo capital at Kaegyong (see Sung-shih 
487). The possibility of using T'amna as a departure point against either Ja- 
pan or the Southern Sung was first raised in the first month of 1269, and 
Toqto'a was sent back to inspect T'amna {YKC 15a-b; YS 208. 9b) 46). 

The rebellion of the Three Patrols who seized T'amna Island interrupted 
this plan temporarily and evidently Qubilai intended to go ahead with the Japan 


Ships Destroyed 



KS 27. 29b 


KS 27. 34b 


KS 27. 34b 


KS 27. 35a 


KS 27. 35a-b 


KS 27. 36b 

invasion after chasing the rebels from Chin Island to their final stronghold on 
T'amna. This must have caused some concern, for we find the ministers of 
both the Yiian Imperial Secretariat and the Bureau of Military Affairs suggest- 
ing that T'amna be taken first and then the Japan campaign looked into {YS 208. 

This same rebellion aids in detecting sites where ships were being as- 
sembled. Since the same ships were to be used for the T'amna campaign 
against the rebels, the latter naturally raided these sites and burnt the ships. 
While ships and stores were being accumulated in Kimju as early as the win- 
ter of 1270 (YKC 24a), raids on the shipyards did not commence until the per- 
iod 1272-1273. A report sent to the Yiian Court at this time mentions 20 ships 
destroyed, 12 men killed, and 8 200 bushels {sok) of rice captured {KS 27. 31b) 
Subsequent rebel raids in 1272-1273 included: 




Koran Island 




To the shipbuilders woes were added natural disasters. A storm sunk 20 ships 
of S6hae Province and 27 ships of Ky6ngsang Province being rendezvoused for 
the T'amna campaign in 1273 {KS 27. 38b). The Japanese, who were then ac- 
tively engaged in voyages to the Southern Sung, described the ships used by 
the first Mongol envoys to Japan as 'large ships' 47)^ ^nd perhaps their size 
led to faulty construction. An indication of this is seen when, in 1273, the 
daru|(aci Li I imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch'onsok ^ ^ ^Ji because 
many of the Sohae Province warships sunk {KS 27. 37b). During 1272-1273 
there was a loss of 132 ships, 85 due to the raids of the Three Patrols and 47 
sunk by storms. For the T'amna campaign in 1273, the Yiian-Koryo forces 
were to use 160 ships from ChoUa Province {KS 27. 39a). 

With the rebellion in Koryo subdued, the invasion of Japan could begin. 
Probably the most reliable estimate of the ships involved in the Japan expe- 
ditions is that of Ikeuchi Hiroshi 48) ^^o estimates 770 ships for the first in- 
vasion. Although these were constructed under the control of the Supervisory 
Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision of] Army Sup- 
plies established in 1272 {KS 77. 27a), preparations for the second invasion of 
Japan which was launched in 1281, were under the control of the Mobile Bu- 
reau for the Subjugation of Japan. Undoubtedly the construction sites for the 
estimated 900 ships constructed in Koryo were the same ^^'. 


The disastrous failure of the two Japan expeditions did not deter the 
Mongol Emperor who planned a third invasion. The former pirates Chu Ch'ing 
and Chang Hsiian were to transport one million piculs of rice to Happ'o by the 
spring of 1286 to support the invasion scheduled for September of that year. 
The third invasion of Japan was cancelled when the invasion of Annam was un- 
dertaken ^^> . Following a request by King Ch'ungnyol, the special bureaus for 
ship construction were abolished in 1295 {KSC 21. 36a) although the idea of 
conquering Japan lingered on as is evidenced by the repeated re -establish- 
ment of the Bureau for the Conquest of Japan. 

6. Post-Stations 

At the beginning of the Mongol invasions Koryo had a well-established 
network of post -stations. A total of 525 stations were divided into 22 to j^or 
lines, the administration of which was under the Board of War {KS 82). The 
extent to which this system survived the invasions is unknown but some sug- 
gestion of their state is seen in a Mongol order of the 8th month of 1259, 
which ordered Kory6 to establish fully equipped and manned relay stations 
south of the Western Capital; the relay stations to the north of the Western 
Capital (presumably established by the Mongols) were to be used jointly {KS 
25. 3a). In 1272, officials were sent to each province to check the post-sta- 
tions {KS 82. 18a) and the following year levies of horses for the post-stations 
were made on all Kory6 officials (KS 82, 18a). In 1279, a sweeping change in 
the Koryo system remodelled it on the Yiian system in which groups of house- 
holds were made responsible for the support of the post-stations and drawn 
on to man the stations for periods of five years {KS 82. 18b- 19b). Apparently 
it was not until the next year that the stations were operative {YSCSPM 3. 12). 
To what extent this system was modified or changed thereafter is unknown. 

I believe we may assume that the horses from the various pasturages 
were used for the postal system. KoryO herself had long had a system of pas- 
turages {KS 82. 2 4a -2 7a) and under the Yiian, T'amna Island became the most 
important pasturage. Levies of horses seem to have been chiefly for the army 
(cf. KS 82. 26a; KS 88. 27) rather than for the post-stations. 

In brief, the Mongols had Kory6 refurbish the existing network of post- 
stations which were then incorporated into the Yiian network with provisions 
for their support along Yiian lines 50a) ^ 

7. Military Support 

In spite of the repeated Mongol demands that Kory6 render military as- 
sistance, it is clear that not until 1270, that is, until after the restoration of 
vVonjong, was the support demanded forthcoming. From this point Kory6-Yiian 


military operations flow together and Kory6 furnished both men and supplies 
freely. The two Japan campaigns and the suppression of the revolt of Prince 
Nayan are examples of this cooperation. At the same time, Mongol forces 
were largely responsible for the suppression of the rebellion of the Three 
Patrols and supplied both troops and supplies to that end. Ship construction 
and supplies for the military colonies have been treated separately and will 
not be duplicated here. The actual assistance rendered is perhaps best illus- 
trated with a few examples. 

In late 1270, levies were made on members of the royal household and 
the officials for silk and pongee in order to supply army clothing (fCS 79. 23b) 
and, a month later, levies of rice for army provisions were made (J{S 82. 
37a). Early the following year, 1 000 bushels (sdk) of rice, 500 bushels of 
other grains, and 100 bushels of salt were supplied to the Mongol forces at 
the Western Capital from the S6k Island Granary ^ % ^^ . At this same 
time, there were demands from the Mongol forces in the Western Capital for 
summer clothing and tents {KS 26. 32a-b). Upon his return from the Yiian 
Court in 1270, W6njong ordered 10 000 bushels of rice be transported by ship 
from the Sinhung Granary in order to supply the Mongolian army with provi- 
sions {KS 26. 33a-b). In 1277, there was a general levy of rice on everyone 
from Ministers to the common people for provisions for Hong Tagu's army 
{KS 82. 37b) and the following year the tax rice of Sohae Province for the pre- 
ceding year was also used for this purpose (KS 82. 37b). 

In 1272, a famine in Kory6 resulted in 20 000 bushels {soli) of rice being 
shipped in from Tung-ching as a relief measure (ys 7. 17b). Some years la- 
ter, in 1289, Koryo reciprocated by supplying 100 000 bushels of rice to re- 
lieve a famine in Liaotung (/fS 79. 25b). Then, three years later, 100 000 
bushels of rice were again sent into Kory6 to relieve the famine there 
{YSCSPM 3. 13). 

For their joint military undertakings during this period, KoryS raised 
6 000 men for the Chin Island assault iJKC 24a), seamen for the T'amna cam- 
paign (TT 36. 116), an estimated 5 000 men for the first Japan expedition; and 
10 000 men for the second Japan invasion. 

These few examples, I believe, make the point; after 1270, the Yiian 
authorities were able to freely levy supplies and men from Kory6 in the same 
manner as any other area under their control, with the assurance that every 
effort would be expended to meet the Jemands. 

8. Hostages 

The Mongol demands for hostages from Koryd reflect an ancient practice 
in North Asia. In China, "A fourth century tradition dates the institution as 


far back as the Warring States" ^^'. The institution of hostages in China is 
well-known and needs no further elaboration here, except perhaps to point out 
that its guiding principle was to hold the closest male descendant(s) of the 
monarch or chieftain (external hostages) or provincial overlord (internal hos- 
tages) as pledges for their conduct. The system was well-known to Korea who 
had sent hostages to T'ang in Silla times and who in the Kory6 period had also 
maintained a system of internal hostages called kiin ^2) -^ J^^ . 

While the Mongols had followed the practice of requiring hostages since 
the days of Cinggis, their demands for hostages also had distinctions of their 
own apart from the traditionally stated Chinese practices. The essence of 
these distinctions were that they made a stated formal institution of an ancient, 
vmwritten practice in North Asia. The hostage institution of the Mongols may 
be seen to incorporate and blend Chinese influence on the one hand and Muslim 
influence on the other ^^> with other distinctions which were either their own 
or which they shared with the other nomadic peoples of Central and North Asia. 
The contrasts reflect the differences of sedentary and nomadic societies. 

When the Mongols captured a city they regarded everything and everyone 
in it as their absolute chattels, an idea which appears to be closer associated 
with the Muslim East than with China 54), When they conquered a nation, the 
same principle applied. 

On the Mongol side, the demands for hostages from Kory6 fall into the 
following categories: 
I. Non-service hostages 

a. Royal male relatives 

b. Relatives of high officials 
II. Service hostages 

a. Male hostages utilized in the Mongol Military and Administrative sys- 

b. Women 

c. Male and female children 

d. Artisans 

The latter three types of hostages were equivalent to the provision of slaves 
although they were usually not taken from the slave strata of Koryo society. 

On the Kory6 side we can make the distinction of 'voluntary' hostages or 
those Kory6 produced^ and 'involuntary' hostages or those whom the Mongols 
captured. By this it can be seen that the distinctions between hostage and 
captive are not simply blurred but rather blend together because, as pointed 
out previously, captured or conquered peoples were regarded as absolute 

If a distinction can be made at all here, we could perhaps say that those 


listed under I were 'true' hostages, while those listed under II were 'hostages' 
as a result of being captured or of being given in the manner of a levy. Thus, 
I have classified those under I as non-service hostages since their main func- 
tion was to act as a pledge for the conduct of others; the performance of ser- 
vice was the function of the second group. 

I. Non-Service Hostages 

In addition to goods demanded as compensation for the slaying of the Mon- 
gol envoy Chu-ku-yii in the 12th month of 1231, the Mongols demanded 1 000 
young male relatives of the royal family, 1 000 young male relatives of the 
families of the high officials, and 1 000 young female relatives of the above 
families, to be presented to the Emperor (KS 23. 5a-7b). 

The Kory6 response to these demands was negative and a Kory6 delega- 
tion sent to the Mongol camp conveyed a letter in which they said that they 
could not supply the young boys or the young girls requested; nor could they 
supply the artisans or the seamstresses the Mongols had demanded {KS 23. 
12a; TYSC 28. 7b-9a). The first non-service hostages were produced by Kory6 
in 1241 when Sun, the Duke of Y6ngny6ng and 10 others were sent to the Mon- 
gol Court as hostages QCS 23. 35a-b; YS 120. 15a). Then, in early 1259, Wang 
Ch6n, the Crown Prince, was sent to the Mongol Court as a hostage {KS 24. 
41b-42b) ^^'. In 1271, the Heir Apparent, Wang Sim and 18 members of the 
royal family were sent to the Yuan Court as hostages {YS 208; IC 9A13a). In 
mid-1275, a system was instituted to encourage the sons of high officials to 
come forward as hostages. Those selected as hostages were promoted three 
grades in rank. This apparently had results for six months later Wang Ching 

_i. sMC> Dxike of Taebang ^ }l ^A > escorted the sons of 10 high offi- 
cials, recruited in this manner to the Yiian Court as hostages. They were de- 
clared unacceptable by the Yiian and they sent the group back in the third 
month of the following year ; probably because of their age — some were not 
yet twenty ^^> . In early 1277, Wang Ching, again escorted 25 sons of high of- 
ficials who had also been recruited by offering promotions, to the Yiian Court 
as hostages {KSC 20. 19b). Then, in 1283, Wang Ching himself 'jvas sent to 
the Yiian Court as a hostage (KS 29. 47b). Thereafter, there are few records 
of hostages of this type being sent 57). Hostages were apparently no longer 
required by the Yiian due to the joining of the royal families in marriage, 
which meant that they would be holding their own relatives as hostages. The 
large number of Mongol forces and officials in KoryO, and the fact that they 
could and did, force Korean rulers off the throne and into exile 58) were also 
reasons why the hostage requirements of this category were dropped. 

II. Service Hostages 

Involuntary hostages or captives taken by the Mongols were kept as 


slaves, utilized in the Mongol military -administration 59)^ and formed into 
hostage-armies 60)^ Artisans, women and children were usually taken captive 
upon the fall of a city while the rest of the population was quite often slaugh- 
tered 61). In the city of Yangsan Jj^^ ^ ^j^ which fell after a fierce Mongol 
attack using catapults and fire-arrows, all males over the age of ten years 
were killed. The women and children were then divided among the soldiers. 
Some 4 700 are related to have died in the city {KS 101. 23b-24a). After cap- 
turing the mountain citadel of refuge of Tongju ^ jj] , the Mongols killed 
all the officials and took all women and young boys away as captives (J(S 101. 
24a). The number of prisoners taken by the Mongols at the end of 1254 was 
estimated at 206 800 persons (K'S 24. 20a-b). This often resulted in some hor- 
rible incidents. At the time of the fall of a stronghold in Tanch'ang-hyon ^^ 
^ 3>k , the Koryo officials in charge put all the women and children in the 
government storehouse which they burnt and then killed themselves to evade 
capture. It is interesting to note that not until 1273 were Mongol soldiers in 
Kory6 ordered to stop taking girls of 'free' families as slaves {KS 27. 37a). 

The Yiian demands for artisans and women to do embroidery work dates 
to 1232, but the Koryft response to such demands, especially in the presenta- 
tion of women to the Yiian throne, did not begin until 1275. In that year, 10 
maidens were presented to the throne and this practice continued until 1353 
or the second year of the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1352-1374). 

These girls probably gave rise to the legend of the beautiful Qulan, Ko- 
rean bride of Cinggis, who rode with him into battle. 

The story appears in the 17th century work, found in 1926, known as the 
Altan tohcioi bLo-bzan bstan'jin and has been translated by Bawden; the per- 
tinent passage opens with the remark that Cinggis gave his daughter Altan- 
yur^ultai to Arin, the King of Koryo and continues that "When the Holy Lord 
(Cinggis) went making an expedition against the country of Solongjfud (Korea) 
. . . Bu^a Cay an Qa)(an of the Solongyud furtively offered his own daughter, by 
name Qulan, and brought her by boat ..., with tiger(skin) houses" 62). Cinggis 
is said to have remained in Korea three years. Then it is related when Cinggis 
went on a campaign against the Muslims, he took Qulan on the campaign 63)^ 

Like most legends of its type it combines truth with half-truth and fiction. 
Cinggis had a wife named Qulan -^/^j fS (cf. YS 106. lb) who was renowned for 
her beauty. There is, however, little doubt that she was of the Merkit, name- 
ly, the daughter of Dayir-Usiin, the ruler of the Uhaz -Merkit 64). The iden- 
tification of Qulan with Korea undoubtedly stems in large part from the inter- 
marriage between the Yiian and Koryo royal families and from the KoryS 
tribute girls. As far as is known, Cinggis himself never set foot in Korea, 
never gave any of his daughters to a Korean ruler, nor were any of his Em- 
presses Korean. 

Certainly no legend was the daughter of Ki Chao ^ ^ ^'^ by far the 
most important of all the girls sent to the imperial harem. She entered the 
harem of Emperor Shun )l|| ^ (r. 1333-1368), the last emperor of the 
Yuan, and in 1341 became his second Empress. Her family in Koryo naturally 
benefited from her position. Her brother Ki Ch'ol ^' |^^^ (d. 1356; BTKP 52. 
491) became, almost over -night, a real power in the land and leader of the 
strong pro-Mongol faction which included men like Kw6n Ky6m ^%^ WL^^- 
1356; BTKP 77. 731) and No Ch'aek )£' ,ti| (d. 1356; BTKP 86. 806) who also 
had daughters in the imperial harem. Empress Ki soon attempted'to have the 
Emperor replace the Kory6 ruler King Kongmin with one of her relatives. In 
the ensuing revolt led by the King against the Yiian in 1356, Ki Ch'61, Kw6n 
Ky6m, and No Ch'aek were killed ^^^ . A Mongol force of 10 000 sent to put 
down the revolt was practically annihilated; only seventeen escaped ^6). This 
marked the beginning of the end of Mongol power in Kory6. 


Notes to Part II 

Yasa meaning 'ordinance* or 'law', from the Persian or Turkish (Mo. 
jasaq), began with recordings by scribes of the instructions of Cinggis 
who, as is well known, was himself illiterate, Vernadsky suggests that 
these instructions were probably codified at the Quriltai of 1206, with a 
revision completed in 1225, and he says (p. 338) that "There can ... be no 
doubt that the Yasa as a written document actually existed". Cf. Vernads- 
ky, 'The Scope and Contents . . . ', p. 338. This conclusion was also reached 
by Riasanovsky who would place publication around 1218, Riasanovsky, V.A. 
Fundamental Principles of Mongol Laiv, Tientsin, 1937, p. 199. 
Vernadsky op. cit., p. 360, maintains that ". . . the Yasa seems to have had 
as its main objective not to codify customary law but to supplement it in 
accordance with the needs of the empire superimposed on the former tribal 
state." This, however, is in direct contrast to the views of Riasanovsky 
who holds the traditional legal position that law is an outgrowth of custom 
and that the Yasa is merely Mongolian customary law which was codified 
and which applied only to the Mongols and other nomadic peoples under 
their control but not to sedentary societies like Russia or China which were 
of a different and higher cultural level. Riasanovsky has defined his limits 
quite narrowly, i.e., the law of Mongolia, although he has a good point. Yet 
he appears to be grinding an axe, viz., that Mongol influence on Russian 
law an<i other features of Russian life was negligible. Vernadsky has taken 
a somewhat broader view and in referring to the Yasa here I refer to the 
interpretation of Vernadsky. Under Riasanovsky' s interpretation the in- 
structions for surrendering states would not be included in either the Yasa 
of tinggis nor in his hilig or 'maxims' but would be merely supplementary 

Perhaps the standardization of the instructions for surrendering states 
which I believe were incorporated in the Yasa was influenced by Yeh-lii 
Ch'u-ts'ai ^|3 :f#' ^ Jxi ^ principal adviser to Cinggis and later to his 
son Ogodei, since he played a primary role in the moulding of Mongol ad- 

The pertinent YKC 13a-b passage has been translated by Lien-sheng Yang, 
'Hostages in Chinese History'; this passage is also found in FS208. 8a-b 
where daru]fa6i is rendered chang-kuan i^ '^ . 

For some Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations also 
see Schurmann, Economic Structure . . . , op. cit., and Barthold, Turke- 
stan . . . , op. cit., passim. 
See Hambis, 'Le chapitre . . . ', pp. 43-45; 150-151. According to YSHP 16. 


lA-B the appanage of Temiige-otcigin was by the Kerulen River and he 
held the title of Liao-wang -M- -c . Yanai, Yuan-Tax . . . , p. 70, would 
place the appanage of Temiige-otcigin east of Hsing-an-ling 9^ ^ ^jh ■ 
Marco Polo related that Prince Nayan held the territories of Manchuria, 
Kory6, Barscal, and Sinkintinju. Palladius earlier expressed the view 
that Polo's reference may have been to the KoryS northwest, i.e., Tong- 
ny(3ng-pu, but that even that was doubtful. See Pelliot, Notes on Marco 
Polo, pp. 343 and 387. 

5. A similar remark is often attributed to Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai, bvit originates 
with Lu Chia jji ^g' (3-2c. BC), cf. Shih-chi ^J^ ^^^ 97. 7b, see p. 6 and 
note 74, D.R. Jonker, unpublished doctoraal scriptie, Het leven van Yeh- 
lU Ch^u-ts^ai, Sino logical Institute, Leiden. 

6. These are the praecursores of Pian de Carpine who says of them, ". . . 
(they) take nothing with them save their felts, horses, and weapons. They 
plunder nothing, burn no houses, kill no animals; they wound people, kill 
them or at least drive them to flight, but they do the first far more wil- 
lingly than the last." See W. Barthold, Turkestan . . . , p. 423. 

7. Koreans often referred to the hsing-ying /"j- 0, in notations on official 
correspondence as the military headquarters, ^mo-^sza ^^ <. {TYSC 28. 
1) or mo-fu ^;^'| (TYSC 28. 7a). 

8. See H.F.Schurmann, 'Mongolian Tributary Practices of the 13th Century', 
HJAS 19 (1956) 3&4, pp. 306-307, for a description of this practice in 

9. It is interesting to note that this was precisely the area that General Cho 
Wiyong offered to submit to the Chin a century earlier. See Chin-shih 

7. 7b. The mountain ranges of Korea have long provided natural geogra- 
phic boundaries and the selection of Chabi Pass as the southern boundary 
of Tongny6ng-pu is an example of this. For discussion of the physical 
basis for the internal boundaries of Korean provinces which clarifies this 
point, see S.McCune, 'Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries', FEQ 4 
(1946) 3, pp. 272-288. 
9a. See Tsuda Sokichi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 194. 

10. The sources for this map included Nikon chiri taikei, p. 398. 

11. An excellent study of this exists in L.Hambis, 'Notes sur I'histoire . . . ', 
pp. 151-294, esp. pp. 178 ff. Hambis has reconstructed the names of all 
the Mongolian Princesses involved and his study carries a detailed genea- 
logical chart showing the Yiian-Koryo marriages, i.e., those of the royal 

12. According to Nikon chiri taikei, p. 399, a Mobile Bureau was established 
in KoryO at this time and the chief of this Mobile Bureau was T'ou-nien-ke. 


This appears to be in error. In 1270.2, T'ou-nien-ke was ordered to es- 
cort W6njong back to Koryo and to garrison at the Western Capital (YKC 
21a-b) and a few months later in 1270. 11 he was appointed head of the 
Mobile Bureau {YKC 22b), The Mobile Bureau referred to is the Liao- 
yang Mobile Bureau. 

13. The basis for this chart was Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Korai ni chuzai shita Gen 
no tatsurokaseki ni tsuite ^f, f£ [ : .|t ;^ [ fz jL ^ ^i±, :§ X .i K 

[Z -o '- '' X [Concerning the Yiian Daru)(aci Stationed in Koryo], TG 18 
(1929) 1, pp. 277-283, to which I have added supplemental information. 

14. To[q]to'a was appointed in 1270.2.16, arrived in Kory6 in 1270.5, and 
died in 1271. 10 {YKC 25; KS 27. 23a-24b). A descendant of Temiige-otci- 
gin had a similar name. 

15. Chiao returned to the Yiian court in 1273 {YKC 26b) and his post remained 
vacant until the arrival of Chou Shih-ch'ang in the twelfth month of 1273. 

16. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra ^ ^ ^^^ t J^jft "^ [Yiian 
Shih-tsu and T'amna Island], TG 16 (1926), pp. 136-142. Ikeuchi is con- 
vinced that the original reference to the establishment of a daru^aci com- 
mand on T'amna was not carried out until later and that initially it exist- 
ed as a ivan-hii-fu since no daruyaci was appointed until 1275. 

17. The Mongols were not, in this respect, setting a precedent so much as 
following one. Cheju, i.e., the c^m -administration on T'amna had pre- 
sented horses as regional tribute for years {CHSL 4. 35a). The island 
was not used for the raising of horses alone but also for camels, mules, 
and sheep. Cf. Yi T6kpong -^ ^'^- i|L/, Han'guk saengmurhak lii sajok 
koch'al ^1^ )i| ^ju^il]f^ ojj ^ \3^ ^ ^ ["Biology in the Ko- 
ryeo Dynasty"], AY 2 (1959) 2, pp. 65-105. For the Yiian utilization of 
T'amna as a pasturage see Ta-Yilan ma-ckeng y^ -7^ 1^ 'P^ incorpo- 
rated in K'uang-ts^ang-hsUeh-chiin tsHingshu, Ts'ang-sheng-ming-chih 
ta-hsiieh-ch'iin ts'ung-shu edition. 

18. See Ikeuchi, 'Yiian Shih-tsu . . . ', p. 141. Upon the accession of Emperor 
Ch'eng-tsung in 1294, King Ch'ungny51 went to the Mongol Court for the 
ceremony and at that time requested the return of T'amna and the release 
of Koryo captives held by the Yiian and it was granted. KSC 21. 36. 

19. Cf. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 654 ff. 

19a See Cho Chwaho ^t/ J^)^ J^^^ , Yodae ui kwago chedo, YH 10 (1958) p. 143 

20. Cf. Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance . . • ', p. 282. 

21. See Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Korai ni okeru Gen no kOshD ^^ J^' j_ j^^ \-) 

b fCj ^ 4 J ^ [Yuan Mobile Bureaus in Koryo]', TG 20 (1932-33), 
pp. 301-350. 

22. See H.Okada )^ \y} ^ ^/^ , Gen no Shino to Ryoyo KoshO -.|_^ O 


^^ ^ ^ :^ 6^ /{'] !^ [The Shen-wang of the Yiian and the Liaoyang 
Mobile Bureau], CG 14 (1959). 

23. For the Mobile Bureau see Ch. V, note 46. The position of the Tung-ching 
Mobile Bureau and its relation to Korea is clarified by the study of the 
Mobile Bureaus and their officials by Wu T'ing-hsieh ^i^^^l Yiian 
hsing-sheng ch^eng-hsiang pHng-chang cheng-shih nien-piao j^ ^< i^ 

£<L '-)j ^1^ ^_ rt3C $ ^4- }.<. » incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8253- 
8295 of the Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pHen. Also see HYS 32-33. Ko Pyongik, 
in his excellent and detailed study, YOdae ch6ngdong haengs6ng Qi y6n'gu 

% 'ft ft Jt ^f ^ ^1 M i; ' Part I in YH 14 and Part II in 
YH 19, points out that the higher positions in this bureau were usually 
Mongols or Chinese appointed by the Yiian, while Koreans were given the 
lower ranking positions. 
23a Hong Kunsang was also in charge of Koreans digging a canal at T'ung- 
chou jj|^ -jjj . See 75 154. 

24. Groomwell [Lithospermum officinale) , a plant yielding a purple dye, cf. 
Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p-221. 

25. hung-hiia |,'j_ ^^ . Both safflower (Car^/zamws ^mctorzMs) and saffron 
{Crocus sativiis) were styled hiing-hua 4l ^ , cf. B.Laufer, Sino- 
Iranica, 1919, p. 310, nevertheless, both Laufer, p. 324 note 4 and Scha- 
fer and Wallacker op. cit., p. 218, render it as safflower. It is used in 
cosmetics and dyeing. Also see ts'ao-mu ^^Tfv 3. 22b of the San-ts'ai 
Vu-hui - ^ "^ '^ . 

26. Lan is identified by Laufer, op. cit., p. 325 as Indigofera. 

27. Orpiment or sulphate of arsenic (AS2S3), a pigment widely used in deco- 
ration and in medicine. Cf. Schafer, Edward H., 'Orpiment and Realgar 
in Chinese Technology and Tradition', JAOS 75 (1955), p. 75. 

28. chH J^^ (more commonly written chH 3^ ), identified by Schafer and 
\Vallacker, op. cit., p. 220 as from Rhus vemicifera. I am uncertain of 
the implication of kuang )[_, which could seem to mean clear lacquer or 
bright/sparkling lacquer. 

29. See H.D.Martin, op. cit., p. 217. It is generally said that cotton was not 
grown in Korea until cotton seeds were secretly brought back from the 
Yiian by Mun IkchSm ^ ^J^^T in 1363. Hong W6n fjA^^l who returned 
from India at this time was familiar with methods of cultivation and usage 
and within a decade cultivation had spread throughout the peninsula, Cf. 
Han^giik-sa sajdn, pp. 117-118. P.Pelliot, Notes to Marco Polo, p. 456, 
says ". . . it seems highly doubtful that . . . cotton cloth should have been 
generally used in Corea and Japan in the first quarter of the 13th century." 

30. These were met on the Koryo side by a levy. In the 12th month of 1231, 


"[They] ordered all the officials to bring forth clothing, i ^<, according 
to their station in order to support the national gifts. Each [to produce] 
one suit, yong ^^'^ , [as follows]: princes and ministers rolled silk bro- 
cade and silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the third rank and fourth rank, 
silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the fifth rank and the sixth and seventh 
ranks, kivonsam (~ kivoncJi'am) j\)g_ pjL greenish-black bombycine,ri- 
ch'm ij j,]i) ." {KS 79. 22b). 

31. There is some difficulty in differentiating between tribute and gifts to the 
Mongol field commanders due to the vague wording which merely says 
that envoys were sent 'to the Mongols', ;m meng-ku -^f] -^ -^ . This 
means that the movement of the envoys must be checked to see whether 
they actually went to the Mongol court (directly or via the camp of the 
commanders in the field) or whether they went only to the local comman- 
der. The various subtleties are too lengthy to pursue here; suffice it to 
say that I have verified the following tribute missions to the Mongol 
court in addition to those already listed. Enumeration of products is not 
given; 1239, 12th month (FKC 6b6-7); 1240, 3rd month (Fi^C 6b7-8); 
1240, 12th month (F/fC 8a3-4); 1243, 1st month (/^S 23. 36a); 1255, 1st 
month (A'S 24. 20b) ; 1260, 4th month (iCS 25. 12b); 1262, 4th month (/CS 
25. 23b); 1265, 1st month (^5 26. 6a-b). As mentioned in the text, during 
the period 1264-1294, Koryo presented tribute 36 times. 

32. yao t}k identified as a sparrowhawk (Accipiter nisus/A. virgatus) by 
Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 226. 

33. ying l^tr identified as a goshawk by E.H, Schafer, 'Falconry in T'ang 
Times',' TP XLVI (1958) pp. 291-338. 

34. ^•-f'^ identified by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 244 as Falco 
peregrinus . 

35. See S.Naito, Chosen-shi kenkyu, pp. 308-333, for a lengthy study of the 
Falconry Office in the Koryo period. 

36. The text has ^')^ 'p , lit. 'seized the households' which I understand as 
meaning 'seized (the taxes of) the households'. 

37. Some localities known to have been producing textiles which they pre- 
sented as regional tribute during this period were Ch'ongju which pro- 
duced snowy silk quilting 1 1^^ i% Jp ; Andong t^ ^ which produced 
silk thread (?) ^ j;^ ; Tongsan-pu ^ ji) jf^ which produced yellow 
hempen cloth -^ ^ -^ ; and Haeyang '^^{^ p^ which produced white 
ramie y] i^ (JKSC 16. 39b). 1 find the term J^ /^t a bit strange and I 
am uncertain of the meaning; perhaps chinsa ^ j^L , a type of 'sum- 
mer silk'? 

38. See G.St.G.M.Gompertz, 'A Royal Pavillion Roofed with Celadon Tiles', 


Oriental Art, New Series, 3 (1957), pp. 104-106. Other kilns were lo- 
cated in Tanj6n-ni in Ch611a Province, near Mokp'o, and on Kanghwa 
Island. SeeE.McCune, The Arts of Korea ^ T5ky0, 1962, p. 175. 

39. G.St.G.M.Gompertz, 'KoreanArt', Orzen/«/ Ar/, New Series 7 (1961) 1, 
pp. 13-22, 7 (1961) 3, pp. 119-125 remarks in the latter, pp. 120-121, 
that the Kory6 celadon industry was ruined in the Mongol period. The 
Kory6 ceramics industry revived however and Gompertz notes a "sudden 
popularity of celadons painted with designs . . . which reached its height 
during the reign of Genso (AD 1260-1274) and Churetsu (AD 1275-1308) 
and continued thereafter into the early Yi period." By 'celadon' in the 
latter case, the green 'classical' Koryo celadon is not meant; Genso = 
Wonjong, and Churetsu = Ch'ungnyol Wang. See G.St.G.M.Gompertz, 
'Black Kory6 Ware', Oriental Arts , New Series 3 (1957) 2, pp. 61-66. 
Also see E.McCune, op. cit., p. 182; G.Henderson's valuable articles on 
Koryo celadon are unavailable to me. 

40. See R.P. Blake, 'The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East Down to 
the Mongol Epoch', HJAS 2 (1937), pp. 291-328. Kokchu J;'^^ '))] and Su- 
dok yf:0i J'J^- in SOhae Province were producing silver at this time. Cf. 
KSC 16. 35a. 

41. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 223. Markets on the Yalu did not begin with the 
Yiian but were a relatively old establishment. Chong Yagyong, Chdng 
Tasan chon-chip, chip 1, kwon 15. 9a-b, has also noticed this in his r^- 
sum^ of Korean trade relations and mentions that the markets were to be 
set up on the west bank of the Yalu River, 

42. Cf. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29. Koryo had, of course, used the system 
herself, chiefly to provide troop provisions and to transport grain to 
government granaries. Ci.KS 82. 36b-43b. 

43. The wei-chiin or guard-army might possibly refer to a hostage army 
commonly called tur^a\-chHn '^ . In Mongolian tiir'^ai means 'guards'. 
Yet they probably refer to the 2 000 troops under Mongketii which had 
been stationed in the Koryo Western Capital in 1270. 

44. In a Kory6 missive sent to the Mongols in 1232, the Koreans gave as one 
reason for their transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island that they were 
informed that a Mongol envoy had arrived at Uiju and ordered the con- 
struction of 1 000 large ships {KS 23). Perhaps the Mongols had realized 
the possibility of using Koryo as a departure point against the Sung at that 
time; it is also possible that in this way the Koreans themselves stimu- 
lated the idea. At any rate, Qubilai's first thoughts of Japan were due to 
the Korean Cho I who, in 1261, stirred his interest in Japan (FS 208. 20b). 

45. Ci.HTC II 67. 2. 18-19. Although we arrived at the conclusion indepen- 


dently, Lo was the first to note this and cites (p. 490 note 5) YS 6. 11 and 
YS 167. 9. According to Lo's calculations (p. 491), in 1237, the navy of 
the Southern Sung was composed of 20 squadrons with a total complement 
of 52 000 men based principally at Hsii-p'u '^^ -^ guarding the entrance 
to the Yangtze, and in the Chusan Island group protecting the capital at 
Hang-chou, See Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power 
During the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods', FEQ 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489- 
503. Ikeuchi, Genko . . . , p. 46, points out that the Mongols wanted ships 
to attack Hsiang-yang-ch'eng ^ ]5^ ;ii^and that Mongol forces were 
facing Sung forces along the Han River. Liu Cheng %'J ,%^ had submitted 
a plan for attacking the Sung in 1267. 11. The five hi ('province') adminis- 
trations of Shen-hsi and the Szu-ch'uan Mobile Bureau were ordered to 
build 500 ships to be given to Liu. The attack failed and Liu returned with 
plans to build 5 000 ships. In 1270.3 an attack by water was again contem- 
plated. For Liu's activities see his YS 161 biography; also see Ikeuchi, 
loc. cit. 

46. Ikeuchi, 'Yiian Shih-tsu and T'amna Island', believes that duplication is 
involved here and that T'o-to-erh made only the one trip in 1269. Ikeuchi's 
point is that it is improbable that the same person made essentially the 
same trip in such a short period of time. But I am not so sure, therefore 

I am leaving it as it is. 

47. Cf. 2.946, Azuma kagami (Vol. 4, p. 946). The short passage, which sim- 
ply states that Mongol and Korean envoys arrived in three large ships, is 
dated the fifth month of the sixth year of Bunei j^ JC (= 1266). At this 
time, the vVestern Capital was the only place where ships are known to be 
under construction. The Western Capital was located on the Taedong River 

^^ J/^J iX and supervised both the military colonies later established at 
Hwangju and the ship construction in SOhae Province whence came the ill- 
fated ships whose sinking led to the imprisonment of Circuit Inspector U. 
Qubilai's order to build ships of 3 to 4 thousand bushel {sok) capacity may 
have led to the construction of ships which were larger than usual and 
possibly, as a result, technically of inferior construction. The size of the 
early Ming ships has been estimated at 500 tons. Cf. Jung-Pang Lo, op. 
cit., p. 493 note 18. Undoubtedly with all the shipbuilding done in the reign 
of Qubilai, techniques improved but the program of large transports was 
only begun in Korea at this time and the loss of two large groups of ships 
in storms plus the imprisoning of the Circuit Inspector leads me to sus- 
pect faulty construction. 

48. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genko . . . , p. 127. Sansom estimates the involvement 
of 7 000 Korean seamen, 8 000 Korean troops, 300 large vessels and 3 to 


4 hundred small craft, for the first invasion. See G.Sansom, A History 
of Japan to 1334 (vol. 1 of a 2 vol, history of Japan), London, 1958, p. 
442. Jung -Pang Lo, op. cit., p. 493, note 17, remarks that of the ships 
for the Japan invasions, 1/3 were large transport ships, 1/3 were com- 
bat vessels and landing-craft, while 1/3 were tenders. Lo cites Takeuchi 
Eiki J^ \k\ ^^ , Genkono kenkyu, Tokyo, 1931, pp. 30 and 129. 
Lo also mentions that while the Mongols became a seapower by taking 
over the navies of Korea and the Southern Sung, they also embarked on a 
large shipbuilding program of their own for their invasions of Japan (1274 
& 1281), Champa and Tongking (1283-1288), and Java (1293), ordering 
1 500 ships in 1279, 3 000 in 1281, and 4 000 in 1283 to be built in ship- 
yards from Canton to Korea with lumber from T'amna and Jehol while 
captured Sung naval officers were assigned to the shipyards in both China 
and Korea. Cf. Lo, op. cit., pp. 492-493. 

49. Although the two Mongol invasions of Japan are detailed in other works 
and need not be repeated here, perhaps mention should be made of the 
Korean force involved. For the first invasion, Ikeuchi, Genko . . . , p. 
126-127, estimates the Mongol-Chinese forces to have numbered about 
20 000 (the Korean records say 25 000) and the Korean force at about 5 300 
(the Korean records say 8 000). Of the ships, apparently all constructed 
in KoryO, there were 126 large ships. Kory6 also furnished the seamen 
for the expedition. The Korean forces in the first expedition were com- 
manded by Kim Panggyftng who was Supreme Commander of the Kory6 
forces, Kim Son J^ /[^ (drowned 1274.10.3; BTKP 65. 628) who was 
Commander of the Korean Army of the Left, and Kim Munbi ^^ jL^PLt 
who was Commander of the Korean Army of the Right. It should be noted 
that a Korean, Hong Tagu, was Marshal of the Army of the Right of the 
Mongol -Chinese Army. For the second invasion of 1281, it is estimated 
that Kory6 furnished some 10 000 men and 900 ships. These activities are 
detailed in Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and Yi, Han' guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 603 ff. 

50. See Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Controversy . . .', pp. 281-282. 

50a For the Yuan postal relay system see P.Olbricht, Das Postwesen in China 
unter der Mongolenherrschaft in 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden, 
1954, and the references contained therein. Also see TMP 157. la ff for 
Koryb poststations. 

51. Yang Lien-sheng, 'Hostages in Chinese History', p. 515. 

52. See Kim S6ngjun ^ ML Oxl , Kiin ui songgyok e tae-han koch'al, 

-^ yv H i'Ayil^ ^ ^ t!' J" ^ ["Studies on Ki-in"], YH 10 (1958), 
pp. 197-220. The Korean institution of internal hostages also dates to the 
Silla period. Cf. Han'guk-sa saj6n, 66B. The term kiin is defined in 


CHSL 4. 32b, "Formerly, the nation selected the male relatives, chaje 
-J- J^ , of the provincial officials, hyangni ^K^ ^ to be hostages, chil 
^ , in the capital and called them kiin ^ J^ ." This system is also 

outlined in KS 76. lb. 

53. For examples of the Central Asian states keeping hostage rulers see 
Barthold, Turkestan . . . , p. 430. 

54. See Barthold, Turkestan . . . , p. 461, for the practices of the Muslim 
states of Central Asia and the idea of people as absolute chattels . For the 
practice among the nomadic peoples of the steppes, see Schurmann, op. 
cit., pp. 2-3. 

55. Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gy6ng, had been sent to the Mongol camp in the 
12th month of 1257 {KS 24. 32b); he went again and returned in the 9th 
month of 1258 {KS 24. 28). It is not stated that he went as a hostage, but 
the sending of a royal kinsman - he was Wonjong's younger brother — 
even in the capacity of chief of a delegation, probably was interpreted as 
willingness to submit a hostage. Normally a royal kinsman played the 
role of mission- chief during the many negotiations with the Mongols. For 
a poem on Wang Sun's departure as a hostage, see TYSC hujip y\^ -;^[^z^ 
10. 4a-b. 

56. Cf. Yu, 'Presentation of Women . . . ', p. 32. 

57. Yu Hongnyol, op. cit., p. 32, says hostages were not sent after 1283. 
This is incorrect. During the reign of King Ch'ungs6n (r. 1309-1313) Kim 
Munydn J^ SL i>f (d. 1314; BTKP62. 596) led a group of hostages to 
the Yiian, cf. ^5103. 20b-21a. 

58. The exiled monarch was King Ch'ungson (r. 1309-1313); for pleas re- 
questing his return see ICQ. la-3b; 6. 3b-5a, and 6. 5a-7a. 

59. For example, Kang Hwasang j^ -^JQ y^ who was captured as ? boy and 
later returned in Mongol service {KS 25. 7a-b). 

60. For this practice see Yang Lien-sheng, Studies in Chinese Institutional 
History, Cambridge, 1961, p. 49. 

61. Barthold, Turkestan . . . , p. 417, mentions similar Mongol practices in 
Central Asia. At the fall of the Turkish garrison of Banakath, the arti- 
sans and a body of youths were carried off for siege works. 

62. This remark of tiger-skin houses is quite interesting. In 1876, a Korean 
mission was sent to Japan and the chief of the delegation was carried on 
"a platform covered with tiger skins", see Sohn Pow-key, 'The Opening 
of Korea ...', p. 101. 

63. See C.R. Bawden, The Mongol Chronicle Allan Tohci, Gottinger Asiati- 
sche Forschungen, Bd. 5, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 132, 133, and 136 note 
84. Bawden suggests (pp. 9-10) that the text was compiled ca. 1604-1634. 


One text with a foreword by F.W. Cleaves and an introduction by Rev. A. 
Mostaert has been published as Scripta Mongolical, by the Harvard - 
Yenching Institute, Cambridge, 1952, pp. XVI (text 46:12-50:13) and XVII 
(text 25:7-13) pertaining to the subject in hand. This work has also been 
discussed at some length by C.Z.l^amcarano, whose comments have been 
translated by R. Loewenthal, The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth 
Century, Bd. 3, Gottinger Asiatische Forschungen, vViesbaden, 1955, pp. 
55-88 and esp. p. 75. W.Heissig, Bolur Erike, published as Vol. X of 
Monumenta Serica, Peking, 1946, also discusses this at length, see pp. 
36-37 esp. 

64. Juvaini (Boyle, I. 180 note 4). Also see B.Vladimirtsov, Gengis-Khan, 
translated by M.Carsow, Paris, 1948; Bawden, op. cit., p. 133 note 2; 
Heissig, op. cit., p. 35 and p. 37 note 13; Poucha, op. cit., p. 158; and 
Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII . . . , pp. 53, 124-126. This identification of 
Qulan as Korean is also found in other works including the Meng-ku yiian- 
liu chien-cheng ^ -%. ^Ji^ Jj^ ^ |^ (the Meng-ku yuan-liu being a 
translation of Sayang-secen's Erdeni-yin tobci), annotated by Shen Tseng- 
chih ^^^^Jf-^ (1850-1922), published in 2 pen by the Chung-kuo shu- 
tien ching-shou \^ ]^ ^ jh il. ^ » Peking, 1962, in chUanZ. 14a. 
The error in the Meng-ku yiian-liu was pointed out in a gloss by \Vang 
Kuo-wei in 45b of the Sheng-ivu chin-cheng-lu chiao-chu ^ ^ ^J^ 
-^ih ^'^JfX. -^i incorporated in Hai-ning Wang Chung-chHao kung yi- 
shu ji^ ^ ^ ;'^' M ^ it ^ ['^^^ Collected Works of Wang Kuo- 
wei )g| ^ 4^ ], Kuan-t'ang i-shu kan-hsing-hui fi, '^ '^^ ^'J 
Ji^ ^ edition, 1927; parenthetically, it might be noted that 66a, 68a-b, 
69a, and 70b of this work contain passages w}iich support, but do not sup- 
pi pment, YKC. 

65. Her machinations and the revolt they engendered in KoryO are outlined in 
YS 104. 10b-13a, the longest biography given an Empress in the Yuan 
shih. Also of interest is YS 91. 3b ff, the biography of Pak Buqa ^L ^^ 

^t. , a Korean in the service of the Yiian who came from the same vil- 
lage as Empress Ki. Also see Nihon chiri taikei, p. 400. 

66. Cf. Howorth, op. cit., p. 325. 


^,1 4;.) 1) 

APPENDIX. Patrols, Pyolch'o ;gi] ^J; 

1. The origins of the Three Patrols, Sam pydlch^ o,a.n(i the Horse Patrol, Ma 
pydlch'o __^ ^^i] ^/J; . 
The 'Military Monographs' of the Koryo-sa give the following account of 

the origin and composition of the Three Patrols: 

"Formerly, Ch'oe U-^ J^^, concerned by numerous bandits in the na- 
tion, assembled valiant soldiers [who] patrolled nightly restricting vio- 
lence. For this reason they were called Ya pydlch^o or Night Patrol. 
\Vhen bandits arose in the provinces he separately sent pydlch'o or patrols 
to apprehend them. This force became very numerous and, consequently, 
it was divided into the Left and Right and, in addition they took men who 
had escaped and returned from the Mongols, whose designation was Sin- 
uigun, to be one part; this is the Sam pyolch'o, or Three Patrols" {KS 
81. 15b). 
This is certainly a simple and straightforward account, however, some 

controversy has arisen due to a somewhat different version which is given as 

a gloss in the Ydgong p' aesol yf^l || ^| J^u of Yi ChehySn ^ ^^ ^ 

(1287-1367) which relates: 

'The powerful officials levied brave and skillful soldiers whom they 
raised for their own protection. They were the Sinuigun, the Ma pyolch'o 
and the Ya pyOlch'o who were called the Sam pydlch'o'' (IC solchon ^)tj 
^ 2.8b2-3). 

This discrepancy is accentuated by a paucity of information on the Ma pydlch'o 

to which I have found only a few references: 

(1) In the 10th month of 1229, i.e., the 16th year of the reign of Kojong, 
the Ma pydlch'o appear with the Tobang or Guards playing polo, tossing 
spears, and practicing mounted archery for the entertainment of Ch'oe U and 
his guests (KS 129. 35b; TT 31. 41). 

(2) In the 11th month of 1239, "Ch'oe U inspected the saddle horses, 
clothing, bows, swords, and armor of his house army the Tobang and the Ma 
pydlch'o" (KS 129. 35b; TT 31. 41). 

(3) In the 3rd month of 1254, the Ma pyolch'o appear playing polo for the 
amusement of Ch'oe Hang and his guests, the chief ministers (KS 129. 49b; 
TT 32. 69). 


The apparent contradiction is resolved if it is assumed that the Ma 
pydlch'o were incorporated into the ranks of the Sinuigun or the Ya pyOlch^o 
prior to the formation of the Sam pydlch^o, which is the view of Ikeuchi Hi- 
roshi ^'. Such a conclusion is suggested by negative circumstances, viz., the 
disappearance of the Ma pydlch'o from the records just prior to both the ap- 
pearance of the Sinuigun and the division of the Ya pydlch'o, which in turn 
coincides directly with the formation of the Sam pydlch'o. 

An alternative is that the gloss is in error, which is the view of Kim 
Sanggi ^', who points out that there is a clear reference to the Ma pydlch'o as 
part of the house army of Ch'oe U while the Sam pydlch'o were a government 
rather than a private army, although some argument could be made here 
since the Ch'oe clan controlled the government. 

It should be admitted at this point that nothing in the few records of the 
existence of the Ma pydlch'o indicates that they influenced events in the least, 
while their connection with polo may well be their most important contribution 
by allowing us an insight into the military athletic events of the times as well 
as the personalities of the Ch'oe clan who sponsored them. 

Parenthetically, it might also be mentioned that Kw6n Munhae ^^ jC^ 
^^ (d. 1591) in his Taedong Unbu Kunok -^ ^ f | J^ ^p ^^ [Korean 
Rhyming Dictionary] lists both the Sam pydlch'o (16. 32a6-9) and its origins 
and the Sirmigun (4. 31a .7-9) - both accounts following KS 81 - yet no men- 
tion is made of the Ma pydlch'o. 

Although the evidence is circumstantial, it warrants, I feel, acceptance 
of the Koryd-sa account in this instance, as far as the composition of the 
Three Patrols is concerned. The final disposition of the Ma pydlch'o is, like 
the Tobang with whom they are associated, unknown; the records pass over 
them in silence. 

2. Patrols, pydlch'o 3^1) \,]j . 

The account of the origin of Ch'oe U's Ya pydlch^o in the 'Military Mono- 
graphs' clarifies their original function as a night patrol to suppress banditry, 
yet Ya pydlch'o existed in the provinces long before Ch'oe organized his Ya 
pydlch'o and are, in turn, connected with development of the various pydlch'o. 

The first appearance of a pydlch^o per se in the records occurs in 1174, 
the 4th year of the reign of My6ngjong (1171-1197), when a pydlch'o was used 
to suppress the rebellion of Cho Wich'ong {KS 129. la7-8). This record is also 
contained on the grave inscription ^^ of Ch'oe Ch'ungh6n where it remarks 
that, at the time of the rebellion, they selected the brave who thought little of 
life and formed them into a chdnbong pydlch' o ^^-^'^J^'li-l" i"^ order to 
suppress the bandits to -5^ who had arisen at the Western Capital. It should 


be observed that if we read Ch'oe Ch^unghon in lieu of Ch'oe U in the KS 81 
account then the latter accords with the first appearance of zpyolch^o in the 

During the reign of Myongjong it was suggested that shock troops be se- 
lected from each army and this was done; 300 men were selected from each 
1 000 to serve as shock troops [KS 81 . 7) 5) . it seems more than coincidence 
to note that the first pyolch^o appear in the records precisely at this time. 

In 1216 when a Kory6 army was battling Ch'i-tan invaders in the north- 
west, we read that ". . . the three armies each dispatched a 100-man/>ydZc/?'o 
and a 40-man sin'gi ;f^ .|f • • • " i^S 103. 8b3; TT 30. 18). In a record of this 
same encounter in Yi Chehyon's narigo 6. 8bl-2, which is dated the 22nd day 
of the 8th month of 1216, we read that ". . . the three armies each selected a 
chongye fA ^^ to ward them (i.e., the Ch'i-tan) off" and it continues with the 
account of the battle mentioning the singi or cavalry units repeatedly. 

Pyolch^o, 'those who were especially selected', was initially merely an- 
other designation for the various 'shock troops' or 'dare-death squads' which 
arose from the Koryfi military structure and appeared briefly under such 
names as chdngjol ^^ ^ , yejol ^[i'j^if- {KS 25. 3a-b), chongye, etc. The 
term chdngjol is undoubtedly a Koryo counterpart of chongbyong (C. ching- 
pi^^ jt^^J^ a- term which appears in Shih-chih ^ ^^ 110, llblO. It is not 
surprising to see the similarity in these units, for such elite groups are pro- 
bably as old as the organization of military units themselves; nor is it par- 
ticularly astonishing to find new appellations applied to old forms, a process 
of similar antiquity. 

Two pertinent components of the Kory6 garrisons along the Northern 
Frontier-District were the sin^gi and the chdngyong ^^ J^ ; other units in- 
cluded regular infantry, crossbowmen, etc. While both of these units are 
lacking in the Eastern Frontier-District garrisons, the chdngyong are also 
found as units of the provincial to j|[ military and both types of units were in- 
cluded in the capital garrisons. The parallel of the sittgi or cavalry and the 
pydlch'o or select infantry groups is especially interesting and the chdngyong 
may indeed have been renamed pyolch^o. It would be easy to speculate on 
which of the various units of the Kory6 military, if any, emerged as pydlch'o 
but this would require a deeper study of the Kory6 military than is my inten- 
tion here. It should be pointed out that the ch^ogiin '\}-\h or selected army 
was one of the mainstays of the regional forces {KS 83. 10-25) and that the 
term ch^ojdngyong ^'y^^^ or 'selected valiants' is seen used in lieu of 
ch'ogiin (cf. KS 83. 12a) while again the term chdngyong often appears alone. 
These are especially suggestive terms, more so since they appear with fre- 
quency prior to the reign of Kojong and then tend to disappear from the rec- 


ords temporarily to emerge later in the Yi Dynasty Period; in the later Yi 
period, the guard unit of the Songgyun'gwan (Confucian Academy) in Seoul was 
called pydlch 'ogun ^^ ij ^,\^ ^ . 

A general survey of the appearance of the pydlch 'o shows that they were 
organized by individual military commands or administrative centers through- 
out the peninsula to cope with invasions and internal disorders; units which 
disappear from the records when the crisis is past simply because they are 

In the winter of 1216, a force of Ch'i-tan rebels swept into northern Ko- 
ry6 and ranging south, menaced the capital. At this time pydlch^o began to 
appear in the northern frontier garrisons in action against the Ch'i-tan (KS 
103. 8b; TT 30. 18). 

Pydlch} o were also sent against the Eastern JiirCen {KS22. 29b-30a; KS 
23. 41a) and there was a widespread rise oipydlch^o with the beginning of the 
Mongol invasions ifiS 103, 27a). Following this pydlch'o appear with fre- 
quency in the records. They disappear following the submission to the Mon- 
gols in 1273. We also find that a Korean force used in the first Japan invasion 
is referred to as the sonbong pydlch^ o (KS 2S. lb). There were no major up- 
rusings or invasions until the Qadan ^J^ -}-4- rebels swarmed into the penin- 
sula in the spring of the 16th year of the reign of King Ch'ungnySl (r. 1275- 
1308) at which time the pydlch 'o reappear in the Wonju J^^ )•)■] pyolch'o {KS 
30. 24a8-9; KS 104. 42b7) and the Ssangsdng chinsu pydlch'o ^^^^^^^ 
^]Pj {KS 82. 38b6). 

In addition to regionzl pydlch^ o identified by geographic designation, 
there are many references to units identified merely a.s pydlch^o {KS 24, TT 
32, TT 33), e.g., in the 4th month of 1256, "The Northwest Commissioner of 
Men and Horse sdbuk pydngmasa -^ ^\^ -5^^^ ^^_ sent a 300-man/)yd/c/i'o 
to attack 1 000 Mongol troops at Uiju J4 -)j-| " {KS 24. 25b-26a). The majority 

of these unidentified />>'5Zc/z 'o were undoubtedly regional /^yoZc/z'o. Ikeuchi has 
suggested that when the character kydn V^ 'send' is used then the pydlch'o 
involved were the Ya pydlch^o or the Sam pydlch^o, while the character sa 
/j^ 'send' indicates that a regional /)3'dZc/i 'o is involved; the theory is inte- 
resting but not totally convincing. 

A consideration of the activities of the pydlch'o not only confirms their 
origins from an existing regional military structure but further indicates they 
were often spontaneously and hastily organized groups, many of which deve- 
loped into highly professional military units and which became a permanent 
part of the military system fighting extremely effective, though limited, ac- 
tions against numerous invaders throughout the peninsula. Again, many of the 
pydlch^o were clearly temporary drafts of men which disbanded when the 
emergency passed. 


The records oipyolch^o activities are too voluminous to adumbrate in 
their entirity and, a few examples of their activities will, I believe, suffice to 
show their characteristics. 

(1) In late 1236, Ch6n Kongnyol /^ >^^ ^'J , a graduate physician of the 
Punyong ^^"^ (in mod. ChoUa Province) pyolch^o placed troops in ambush 
in Koran ^ '^_^ guarding the mountain road. They intercepted and attacked 
twenty Mongol cavalrymen killing two of them. The soldiers' weapons as well 
as twenty horses seized were awarded to Kongnyol and he was allowed to en- 
ter government service in his original profession {TT 32. 54). 

(2) In the spring of 1237, Kim KySngson was in Naju for the purpose of 
suppressing a local uprising. When the rebel group heard of Kim's arrival, 
they surroxinded the city. When the people of the city were hesitant to take 
action against the numerous rebel band, Kim told them: "Although the rebels 
are numerous, they are only straw- sandaled villagers." Then he raised over 
30 men who were able to be pydlck^o (KS 103. 28a). 

(3) In the eighth month of 1253, "Captain, kyoivi, TaeKumch'wi '^'^^^ 
^JP led the 30-man,Ubong ii-)l|^ pydlch^o to fight the Mongol soldiers be- 
tween Kumgyo andHungui. They took several heads and captured horses, bows 
and arrows, felt and fur garments, and other items" {KS 24. 7a). 

(4) In late 1253 "the Kyodong ^ ):y^ pydlch'o (an island off Hwanghae 
Province) hid soldiers outside the walled city of P'y6ngju j4^ ^)i and entered 
the Mongol camp at night killing many of them. Captain, kyowi, Chang Cha- 
bang ^J^ -^ ^5 grasped a shot't sword in his hand and killed, [including] the 
Chief of the Encampment, over twenty men" {TT 32. 68). 

(5) In the 8th month of 1254, "Mongol soldiers and cavalry camped at 
Koeju Jf-'S^ jM . Major , sanwdn, Chang Chabang led O-pyolch^o which routed 
and crushed them" {TT 33. 70). 

(6) In early 1255, "Mongol troops camped at Ch'ollySng A^ M\ • The 

Tungju pyOlch'o attacked them from both sides and destroyed them" {TT 33. 

As an effective organized force based in the regional administrative cen- 
ters, the pydlch^o were also used in quelling small local uprisings. They 
were the one means to maintain order available to the regional authorities 
who appear, for the most part, to have been left to shift for themselves as a 
result of the Koryo defense policy of seeking refuge in the mountain citadels 
and coastal islands. 

This policy, originated by Ch'oe U, was implemented upon the transfer of 
the capital to Kanghwa in 1232, the year following the first Mongol invasions 
(TT31. 48-49). The Ya pyolch'o were also used to enforce this evacuation 
when it was periodically carried out, occasionally with great violence {KS 122. 


28a-b). The evacuation policy had one terrible consequence: the food shortage 
which followed when the peasants left the land. The great dearth of food un- 
doubtedly further encouraged the numerous slave revolts and swelled the ranks 
of bandit groups or rebel factions like the Sam pydlch^o following their rebel- 
lion. And these were the conditions, the 'Military Monographs' of the Koryd-sa 
tell us, which led Ch'oe U to form his pydlch^o which, because it patrolled at 
night came to be called the Ya pydlch'o or Night Patrol. 

3. The Yapydlch'o ;^ ;gi] )^,\- 

In the 5th year of the reign of Sinjong (r. 1198-1204), some twenty-six 
years after the appearance of the first pydlch^o we see the first mention of a 
Ya pydlch'o in the rebellion of the KySngju pydlch o {KS21. 14; TT 29. 5) 
which are referred to in the 'Monographs on Geography' of the Koryo-sa as 
the 'Ya pydlch'o of the Eastern Capital' (= Ky6ngju) (KS 57. 2b) 6). 

One other reference to a regional Ya pydlch'o occurs in the eighth month 
of 1254, when Ky6ngsang and ChOUa Provinces each sent an 80-man Ya 
pydlch'o to serve as guards at the capital on Kanghwa Island {KS 24. 15a). 

These records clearly show that Ya pydlch'o were organized in the re- 
gional administrative centers long before Ch'oe U assumed power and that 
they continued in the regions even after the organization of a Ya pydlcH a by 
Ch'oe U. 

The first reference to the organization of a Ya pydlch'o by Ch'oe U oc- 
curs in the previously cited account from the 'Military Monographs'. The 
first dated reference occurs in 1232, the year following the first Mongol in- 
vasions, when Ch'oe U called the officials together to tell them of his inten- 
tion of transferring the capital from KaegyOng to Kanghwa Island (TT 31. 

From this, it would appear that the Ya pydlch 'o were organized some- 
time between Ch'oe U's assumption of power in 1219 and the first mention of 
them on Kanghwa in 1232, in which case the Ya pydlch'o referred to earlier 
in the records would then appear to have been regional Ya pydlch'o. 

One of the major points raised in each of the studies preceding this, is 
the question of whether the Ya pydlch'o and Sam pydlch'o in turn, were pub- 
lic or private in character. That is, were they the private army of the Ch'oe 
clan or were they government forces. The question has arisen because the 
activities of the Ya pydlch'o appear to be chiefly linked with the Ch'oe clan 
who are credited with establishing them. Naito argues that they were essen- 
tially a private force while Kim Sanggi argues forcefully that they were gov- 
ernment forces. It is my own belief that the Ya pydlch'o and the Sam pydlch'o 
in turn, were the forces of the military government, not of the Court. As 


such, they were used by the Ch'oe clan and by the other military governors 
for their own ends, while they also acted in the capacity of 'government forces' 
since the military government ivas the de facto power of the land. 

Their involvement in the power struggle is revealed in the following pas- 
sage: "The powerful officials regarded [the Sam Py6lch^o'\ as their servants 
and were generous with their emoluments or else granted them personal bene- 
fits. Moreover, they confiscated the property of criminals and doled it out '^'. 
Consequently, the powerful officials ordered them about freely. In their 
struggle for power, Kim Chun killed Ch'oe tji, Im Yon killed Kim Chun, [Song] 
Songnye killed [Im] Yumu; they all relied on the power [of the Sam pydlch^o]" 
{KS 81. 15b-16a). 

4. The Sinuigun 

The first mention of the Sinuigin occurs in early 1257, when the Sinuigun, 
the Ya pydlch^o, three units of the Civil Guards, and thirty-six units of the 
Guard Corps were assembled to insure the transfer of power to Ch'oe Ui upon 
the death of Ch'oe Hang {KS 129. 52a; TT 33. 74). They appear again in the 
third month of 1258, and this time the units seen together are the Left and 
B-ightpydlch^Oj the Sinuigun, and the Guard Corps {TT 33. 77), and it is at 
this time that the first mention is made of the Sam pyolch'o {TT 33. 77). 

The actual organization of the Sam pydlch^o may reasonably be conjec- 
tured to have taken place prior to this since these individual units retained 
their identity from 1258 until the rebellion in 1270. In the fourth month of 
1258, for instance, the Sinliigun and the Ya pyolclVo are seen together with- 
out reference to the division of the Ya pydlch^o or the organization of the Sam 
pydlch'o {.TT 33. 78). 

A reference to the Sinuigun as a 'wing army' ^ i^ (i.e., subordinate 
unit) which had escaped from the Mongols {YKC 22a) provides a valuable 
point d^appui for considering their origins as it links them with the Sin^gi 
i^ ^q , a general term used by the Koryo army for cavalry units. Exclud- 
ing the capital garrisons, the Kory6 cavalry units or Sin^gi were concentrated 
along the Northern Frontier; not one such unit is listed for the Eastern Fron- 
tier or for the provincial garrisons (cf. KS 83. 10a-25a). These were the 
small cavalry units which the Mongol armies overran on each of their inva- 
sions. It seems logical to conclude that remnants of these units were reor- 
ganized into the SinUigiin. 

5. Kydng pydlch'o Sind Kyongoe pydlch^o 

The designations Kydng pyolch'o \^^^ >j'] f\- , Kyongoe pydlch'o <^^ ^\- 
^)| 4r)- , and Oepyolch^o Jpl Vi] \y- also warrant brief consideration. 


Both Ikeuchi and Kim Sanggi have arrived at the same conclusion, and in 
Kim's words, "The pyolch'o oi the chu and feyiJw [districts], i.e., the regional 
pyolch^o, were called Kydngoe pydlch^o or Oe pyOlch^o and this is in contra- 
distinction to the designation Kydng pydlch^o (the Sam pydlch'oY' ^) . 

This conclusion appears to be justified by several instances where the 
units of the Sam pydlch^o are found in the same area at the same time that the 
Kyong pydlch^o appear. For example, when Ch'oe T'an revolted in 1269, the 
Sam pyolch^o were dispatched to deal with him; the Ya pydlch'o garrisoned at 
Hwangju and the Sinuigun garrisoned on Ch'o Island ^^^ ^ {KS 104. 4a). 
This was because the officials of the Western Capital had fled to these islands 
from the Mongols {KS 130. 33b). At this time, Ch'oe T'an and his followers 
entered Ch'o Island at night and killed several officials and men of the KyOng 
pydlch'o {KS 25. 24b-25a). 

The Kydngoe pydlch^o is significant in that it further indicates the rise of 
the pyolch^o from the regional military structure. In an entry dated the 3rd 
month of 1189 in the 'Monographs on Food and Money' of the Koryo-sa, we 
read, "[In] the subordinate (i.e., regional) structure, all the c/zwand hy&n have 
Kydngoe yangban armies {KS 78. 14b). 

The development of the regiona.1 pydlch'o from this structure is suggested 
by the example of Ch'ungju: 

(1) in 1232, a Yangban pydlch^o, a Slave Army, and a Chamnyu pydlck^o 
^i ^ JS') .)v^ made their appearance at Ch'ungju (TT 31. 46). 

(2) During a Mongol attack on Ch'ungju in 1254, men in the city were 
formed into a ch&ngye jf^^ ^^^jti^o attack the Mongols {KS 24. 23b). 

(3) In 1255, Ch'ungju again sent out a chdngye against the Mongols {KS 24. 

(4) In 1258, a Ch'ungju />3'd/c/i'o appeared in action against the Mongols 
{TT 33. 81). 

The regionsd pydlch^o beginning in the reign of Kojong, were often called 
Kyongoe pydlch^o, probably to distinguish them from the Ya pydlch'o and later 
the Sam pydlch^o, who were often referred to as the Kyong pyolch^o. In this is 
also suggested a reversion to terminologies previously used, i.e., Kydngoe 
yangban armies, etc. That the regiona.1 pydlch^o not only continued to survive, 
but were institutionalized is seen in the 'Monographs on Penal Law' in the Ko- 
ryd-sa, when, in a reorganization of the regional corvee system, the pydlch^o 
of each hydn were ordered to standardize the corvee, which occurs as late as 
the reign of the boy monarch King Ch'ungmok ^- j^ jL (r. 1345-1348) {KS 
85. 19a). 

Thus, the pydlch^o, destined to play an important role in the military 
structure throughout the Koryo period (cf. KS 82. 7a-b), provide, in a limited 


sense, an excellent illustration of an often overlooked phenomenon: the insti- 
tutionalization of the non-institutional. 

Notes to the Appendix 

1. Three lengthy studies of the controversial />yoZc^'o have preceded this, 
viz., Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Korai no sambessho ni tsuite ^^ i^ (f) J^ 

^1 4'7 i'- ^ ^ ^ '^ [On the Sam pydlch 'o of Koryo], SZ 37 (1926) 9, pp. 
809-848; Naito Shumpo, Korai heisei kanken rS]%,yk I'] 'd' jL [^ 
Survey of the Koryd Military System], SG 15 (1934), pp. 69-94, and cor- 
rections to this article which appeared in Korai heisei kanken hoi -^ ^_^ 

-^ W ^ )L ^'ll it [Supplement to 'A Survey of the Koryd Military 
System'], SG 18 (1934), pp. 105-111; and finally, Kim Sanggi, Sam pyol- 
ch'o wa . . . , loc. cit. The subject is also treated at length in Yi, Han^guk- 
sa, Vol. 2, passim. It might also be mentioned that the Sam pyolch'o or 
Three Patrols and their rebellion occupy a somewhat romantic place in 
Korean history. Fictionalized treatments include Pak Yonggu's r^L j^ 

yi, lengthy 'Sam pyolch'o' incorporated in Vol. 29 of Han^giik munhak 
chdnjip ^ ]^ S^r^ ^ ^^ > published in 36 vols., by Minjung s6- 
gwan l\^^ ^ ^"^ , Seoul, 1959-1961. 

2. Cf. Ikeuchi, Korai no sambessho ..., loc. cit.; the 'standard' interpreta- 
tion is that Ch'oe U modelled his house force, the ma pyolch'o after the 
existing /»3'5Zc^'o forces. See ToyO reikishi daijiten, Vol. 3, p. 413.1. 

3. Cf. Kim Sanggi, Sam pySlch'o wa . . . , p. 104. 

4. Ch'oe Ch'unghon's grave inscription is contained in the Chosen kinseki 
soran ^^-^^"^Ja 4^S.^ [General Survey of Korean Inscriptions on 
Stone and.Metal], Vol. 1, p. 442, cited Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 92; simi- 
lar information is given in a gloss in CHSL 4. 16b which, incidentally, 
provides an idea of the value of CHSL. 

5. Naito, op. cit., p. 80, discusses the selection of 200 men in each of the 
yugwi -f^ i|-j or Six Guard Units to be sdnjon^gun )J^ ^jf ^-^ in the year 
Munjong ascended the throne; the selection of 300 men from each 1 000 to 
be shock troops in the first year of the reign of Munjong, and the record of 
sdnjOng mabydng ^^^^^j^-^ in Munjong' s 40th reign year. I do not 
quite understand this, and suspect it contains some error. Munjong's 40th 
reign year, for example, is impossible since the monarch in question 
reigned only 37 years (cf. KS 9. 37a), while the selection of 200 men from 
each of the Six Guard Units to be a sonjon^gun occurred in 1046, i.e., in 
the last year of the reign of ChOngjong S-'t 'jyi (r- 1035-1046) or a year 
earlier than Naito says. 


6. Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 535 note 1, also notes this; in his reference 
read paekkwan-ji ^ ^ ,'eJ i" lieu of chiri-ji j^^ ^j£ -^ . 

7. The role of the military in connection with law enforcement and in bringing 
criminals to trial in the Koryo period is outside the scope of this study, 
however, the inclusion of such duties in the activities of the Sam pydlch^o 
or Three Patrols, affords an interesting view of the Kory6 penal system. 
It appears that they were not only charged with arresting criminals, but 
may also have been involved to some extent in their detention, trial, and 
punishment. An example of this is seen when, a few days after Kim Sus6n 
y^ ^^ -^jk had gone to the Mongol Commander Yesiider and informed 
him that KoryO did not really intend to transfer the capital back to its 
former site on the mainland as the Mongols desired (ft^S 25. 5b). Due to 
this, the Kanghwa authorities, "imprisoned the Deputy Commissioner of 
the Western Capital Kim Sik /^ 4iJ( , the father of the traitor Kim Sus6n, 
in the Yapyolch'o 'station', so yj< " (fCS 25. 6a; also see KS 122.'28a-b). 
The combination of military and judicial matters has ancient precedent in 
China. This, Hulsewd points out, led Pan Ku, one of the compilers of the 
Han shu, to combine his survey of penal rules with a history of military 
organization {Han Shu 23); ". . . Pan Ku in this case was not so much at- 
tempting to create a new precedent as that he followed an ancient associa- 
tion of ideas", A. F.P.Hulsew^, Remnants of Han Law, Vol. 1, Leiden, 
1955, p. 314. 

8. Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 114. 









Moke hong 


















King Ch'ungnyOl 

King Ch'ungsOn 

King Ch'ungsuk 

King Ch'unghye 

King Ch'ungsuk 

King Ch'unghye 

King Ch'ungmok 

King Ch'ungjOng 

King Kongmin 

King U 

King Ch'ang 

King Kongyang 

918 - 943 

944 - 945 

946 - 949 

950 - 975 

976 - 981 

982 - 997 

998 - 1009 

1010 - 1031 

1032 - 1034 

1035 - 1046 

1047 - 1082 

1084 - 1094 

1096 - 1105 
1106 - 1122 
1123 - 1146 
1147 - 1170 
1171 - 1197 
1198 - 1204 
1205 - 1211 
1212 - 1213 
1214 - 1259 
1260 - 1274 
1275 - 1308 
1309 - 1313 
1314 - 1330 (initial reign) 

1331 (initial reign) 
1332 - 1339 (second reign) 
1340 - 1344 (second reign) 
1345 - 1348 
1349 - 1351 
1352 - 1374 
1375 - 1388 

1390 - 1392 



a. w. 

also written 






















indicates a tentative reconstruction 

+ preceding the title of a work indicates that I have been unable to see the work in ques- 
tion but have mentioned it en passant. 

All references to the dynastic histories are to the Po-na edition unless otherwise indicated. 

Aoyama KOryO, Nigen-kan no KOrai [Kory6 between the Yiian and Japan], SZ 

32 (1921) 8, 32 (1921) 9. 
Asiatic Research Center Bulletin (Kory6 University, Seoul), Vol. 4, No. 3, 

June 1961; contains an excellent bibliographical article on the Koryd-sa 

Aubin, F. , Index de 'Un Code des Yuan', Paris, 1960. 
AY Asea ydn'gii ("The Journal of Asiatic Studies") issued by Koryo University, 

Seoul, since 1959. 
Azuma kagami, incorporated in vols. 4 and 5 of the 15 vol. Zokiikokushi 

taikei, published by the Keizai zasshi-sha, TOkyO, 1902-1904. 
Bacon, W.D., 'Fortresses of Kyonggi -do', T/iTSiMS XXXVII (1961). 
Barthold, W., Turkestan Doum to the Mongol Invasions (H.A.R.Gibbs, 

translator), 2nd ed., London, 1958. 

Pour studies on the History of Central Asia, 2 vols., Leiden, 1956 

(translated by V. and T.Minorsky). 

Bawden, C.R., The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobci, Gottinger Asiatische 
Forschungen, Bd. 5, Wiesbaden, 1955. 

Bibliography of Korean Studies, The Asiatic Research Center, Kory6 Univer- 
sity, Seoul, 1961; reviewed by Y.Suematsu, CG 25 (1962), pp. 158-159. 

Blake, R. P., 'The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East Down to the Mon- 
gol Epoch', HJAS 2 (1937). 
BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 

Boyle, J. A., The History of the World-Conqueror of 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik 
Juvaini, 2 vols., London, 1958. 

Bretschneider, E., Mediaeval Researches, 2 vols., London, 1910. 

Brown, D.M., Money Economy in Medieval Japan, Far Eastern Association, 
New Haven, Conn., 1951. 
BTKP Biographical Tables of the Koryo Period, Pow-key Sohn (Son Pogi) compilor, 

Berkeley, California, 1958; must be used with caution as no list of errata 
is included; reviewed by E. Wagner, HJAS 22 (1959), pp. 316-319. 
CAJ Central Asiatic Jourfuil 

Chin Shih by T'o-t'o (1313-1355) in 135 chuan. 

Ch'ien Ta-hsien (1728-1804), Yiian-shih shih-tsu-piao, completed in 3 chiian 
in 1780; incorporated in Erh-shih-uni-shih pu-pien. Vol. 6. 

Cho Chwaho, YOdae ui kwak6 chedo, F/^ 10 (1958). 

Ch'oe Namsdn, Chosen sangsik, Seoul, 1948. 

Ch6ng Yagyong (1762-1836), Chdng Tasan chdnjip, 3 vols., MunhOn p'yOnch'an 
uiw6nhoe, Seoul, 1960. 


CG Chosen gakuho, issued by the ChOsen Gakkai, Tenri University, Kyoto, since 

Chosen jimtnei jisho [Korean Biographical Dictionary], ChOsen Sotokufu, KeijO 

(Seoul), 1937-1939. 
+ Chosen kinseki sDran [General Survey of Korean Inscriptions on Stone and 

Metal], 2 vols., CheJsen Sotokufu, KeijO (Seoul), 1919. 
CHSL Chao-hsien shih-lueh incorporated in Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan Shan-pen 

ts'ung-shu, ts'e 64-66. 
Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien, by Tsang Li-ho, et al., Commercial 

Press, 2nd ed., Shanghai, 1933. 
Clauson G., 'A propos du manuscrit Pelliot Tib^tain 1283*', JA CCXLV (1957). 
Cleaves, F. W., 'The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince 

Hindu', HJAS 12 (1949) 3 & 4. 

'Qabqunas - Qamqanas', HJAS 19 (1956) 3&4. 

'The Biography of Bayan of the Barin in the Yiian Shih', HJAS 19 (1956) 

Courant, M., Bibliographie coreenne, Paris, 4 vols., 1894-1904. 
CS Chosen-shi. ChOsen Sotokufu, Keijo (Seoul), 1932-1940, 37 vols. 

Dai Kamva jiten, by Morohashi Tetsuji, et al., 13 vols., Daishukan shoten, 

Tokyo, 1945-1950. 
Dawson, C, The Mongol Mission, London, 1955; reviewed by D.Sinor, Bul- 
letin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XVII (1956), pp. 390-391. 
Demi6ville,P., 'Les Versions Cliinoises du Milidapanha', Bulletin de I'Ecole 

Frangaise d' Extreme -Orient XXTV (1924). 
Duyvendak, J.J.L., The Book of Lord Shang, London, 1928; reviewed by 

H.Maspero, JA CCXXII (1933), pp. 48-59. 
Erh-shih vni-shih pu-pien, 6 vols., K'ai-ming shu-tien ed., 1935. 
FEQ Far Eastern Quarterly , published since 1941 by the Far Eastern Association, 

Lancaster, Penn. 
Fischer-Wieruszowski, Frieda, 'Kriegerischer Einfall der Mongolen in Ja- 
pan', Ostasiatische Zeitschrift, 1935. 
Franke, H., Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft, 

Leipzig, 1949. 
'Could the Mongol Emperors Read and Write Chinese?', Asia Major, 

New Series 3 (1953). 
Franke, O., Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, Berlin, 1952. 
'Ein handschriftliches chine si sch-koreanisches Geschichtswerk von 

1451', TP 13 (1912). 
Fujita Ryosaku, KOrai sho meibun ['Inscriptions on Koryo Bells"], CG 14 

Gale, E.M., Discourses on Salt and Iron, Leiden, 1931; reviewed by H.Mas- 
pero, JA CCXXVI (1935). 
+ Gardner, C.T., 'The Coinage of Corea', JNCBRAS XXVH (1897). 
Giles, H.A., A Chinese Biographical Dictionary, London, 1898. 
Grousset, H., L^Empire des steppes, Pzris, 1939. 

L^ Empire mongol, Paris, 1941. 

Gompertz, G.St.G.M., 'Black Kory6 Ware', Oriental Art, New Series, 3 

'A Royal Pavillion Roofed with Celadon Tiles', Oriental Art, New 

Series 3 (1957) 3. 

'Korean Art', Oriental Art, New Series, 7 (1961) 1, 7 (1961) 3. 

Goodrich, L.C., 'Korean Interference with Chinese Historical Records', 

JNCBRAS LXVII (1937); an extremely valuable work for evaluating the 

+ Goodrich, L.C, and Feng Chia-shene, 'The Early Development of Firearms 

in China, ISIS 36 (1946) 2. 


Haenisch, E., Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, Leipzig, 1948. 

Haguenauer, M.C., 'Encore la question des Gores', JA CCXXVI (1935). 

Hambis, L., Le Chapitre CVII du /iian Che, with supplementary notes by 
Paul Pelliot, issued as a supplement ^o TP XXXVIII, 1945. 

'Notes sur I'histoire de Cor^e a I'Epoque mongole', TP XLV (1957). 

Han^guk-sa saj5n, Tonga ch'ulp'an-sa, Seoul, 1959. 

Hatada Takashi, KOrai jidai no hyakuchO [" PaekchOng in the Kory6 Period"], 
CG 14 (1959). 
HDYS Haeddng ydksa of Han Ch'iyun (1765-1814), 6 fascicles, ChOsen Kobunkai ed., 

Tokyo, 1913. 

Hazard, B.H.Jr., Japanese Marauders and Medieval Korea, unpublished M^. 
thesis, Berkeley, Calif., June 1958. 

Henthorn, W.E., 'Some Notes on Kory6 Military Units', TKBRAS XXXV (1959). 

'Some Notes on Parhae', TKBRAS XXXVH (1961). 

Heissig, W., Bolur Erike, published as Vol. X of Monumenta Serica, Peking, 
HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, issued by the Harvard -Yenching Institute, 

Cambridge, Mass., since 1936. 

Honda, M., and E. B.Ceadel, 'Post- War Japanese Research on the Far East 
(Excluding Japan)', Asia Major, New Series IV (1954) 1. 

'A Survey of Japanese Contributions to Manchurian Studies', Asia Major, 

New Series V (1955) 1. 

Howorth, H.H., History of the Mongols , 3 vols., London, 1876. 
HTC Hsu -thing -chih by Ch'ing Tao-tsung, 3 vols., Commercial Press edition. 

Huang Ta-hua, Yiian fen-fan chu-wang shih-piao incorporated in Vol. 6 of the 
Erh -shih -urn -shih pu -pien . 

Hulbert, H.B., History of Korea, 2 vols., London, 1962; editor C.N. Weems 
has included a valuable section on Hulbert' s life; first published in book 
form in 1905 by The Methodist Publishing House, Seoul. 

Hulsew6, A.F.P., Remnants of Han Law, Leiden, 1955. 

Hummel, A., Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 2 vols., U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1943. 

Hung, W., 'The Transmission of the Book Known as The Secret History of 
the Mongols', HJAS 14 (1951). 
HY Htvich'qn yOsa by Hong Y6ha (1620-1674) in 48 kwon; 18th century edition in 

the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. This is an 
abridgement of Hong's Mokchae kasuk hivich'an yosa (Mokchae is Hong's 
ho or literary appellation) compiled in the 17th century. 

Hyakurenso , incorporated in Vol. 14 of the 17 vol. Kokiishi taikei, TOkyO, 

Hyon Sangyun, 'ChosOn sasang-sa'. Part I, AY 3 (1960) 2 and Part H, AY ^ 
(1961) 1. 
HYS Hsin Yiian Shih by K'o Shao-min (1850-1933), 257 chiian, issued as a dynastic 

history in 1921-1922. 
IC Ikchae-chip, containing the surviving works of Yi Chehyon (1287-1367) in 14 

kivdn, incorporated in the Yogye my6nghydn-chip, Sfinggyun'gwan Taehak- 
kyo, Seoul, 1959, and consisting of: (1) Ikchae nan'go in 10 kudn, con- 
taining his poetry and, in kivdn 9, historical eulogies on various KoryO 
monarchs, and records of important events. Collected by his son Yi 
Changno and grandson Yi Porim, the work garnered the title of nan'go or 
scattered papers. (2) Ydgong p'aesdl or The Petty Reports of the Old Man 
of the Chestnut Grove, in 4 ktvOn, which contains a collection of writings 
on a variety of topics: tales of valour, unusual occurrences, discourses 
and criticisms, some poetry, and bits of a chronological history of the 
Koryd period to his own time. At the end, collected remnants, subyu, 
grave records, myoji, and a genealogy, yCnibo, have been attached. The 
S6nggyun'gwan text is a photolithographic copy of the 1814 edition. 


Ikeuchi Hiroshi (1878-1952), Korai Gens5-cho no hairitsu jiken to Moko no 
Korai seihokumen senryO (The Deposing and Enthroning incident in the 
Court of Kory6 Wonjong and the Mongol Seizure of Northwest Kory6], 
ToyOshi ronsif (Asiatic Studies in Honor of Dr. K.Shiratori on the Occa- 
sion of his 60th Birthday), Tokyo, 1925. 

Korai no sambessho ni tsuite [On the Sam pyolch^o of Koryo], SZ 37 

(1926) 9. 

Gen Seiso to Tanra-to [Yiian Shih-tsu and T'amna Island], TG 16(1926). 

Korai ni chuzai shita Gen no tatsurokaseki ni tsuite [Concernii^ the 

Yiian Daruj^aci Stationed in Koryo], TG 18 (1929) 1. 

Genko no shinkenkyu [New Research on the Mongol Invasions], 2 vols., 

Toyo bunko ronso No. 15, Tokyo, 1931. 

Korai ni okeru Gen no kOshO [Yiian Mobile Bureaus in Koryo], TG 20 


Mansen-shi kenkyu, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1933 & 1937; a third volume was 

planned but the manuscript was lost in an air-raid on Tokyo in 1945; a 
fragment appeared in CG Vol. 1 under the title 'Hokukan-shi'. See the re- 
view by Yi Hongjik, AY 3 (1960) 2. 

Imamura Tomo, Chosen fuzoku shiryo shusetsii : Sen, hidarinawa, dakyu, 
pakachi [A Collection of Materials on Korean Customs: Fans, Ropes, 
Polo, and Gourds], Ch5sen Sotokufu, Keijo (Seoul), 1937. 

Imanishi Ryu, Chosen hakutei ko [A Study of the Korean Paekchdng\, Geibun 
IX, 4 (Kyoto, 1918). 

Ishihara, M., Wak5 to Chosenjin furyo no sokan mondai ["Woegu, Japanese 
Marauders and the Problem of Repatriation of Korean Captives"), CG 9 
(1955) and 10 (1956). 
JA Journal Asiatique 

JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society 

JNCBRAS Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 

Jonker, D.R., 'Het Leven van Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai, 'unpublished doctoraal 
scriptie, Sinological Institute, Leiden. 

Kalgren, B., 'Grammata Serica Recensa', BMFEA 29 (1957). 

Kameda Keiji, Korai no nubi ni tsuite [Slavery in Koryo], SG 26 (1936) and 28 

Keizaigaku jiten, Iwanami shoten, 6 vols., Tokyo, 1931. 

Kim Chaejin, Chon'gyolche ySn'gu ["A Study of the Kyol System"], Nonmun- 
chip 2 (1959), Ky5ngbuk University, Taegu, Korea. 

Kim Chongguk (Gim Jong-gug), Korai bushin seiken no tokushitsu ni kan-suru 
ichi kosatsu ["Inquiry into the Characteristics of the Military Government 
of Goryeo"], CG 17 (1960). 

Korai jidai no kyori ni tsuite ["On the Provincial Government Officials 

in the Goryeo Dynasty"], CG 25 (1962). 

Kim PonghyOn, Cheju-do yoksa-ji, Seoul, 1960. 

Kim Sanggi, Y6-Song muyok-ko [R^sumd of Sung-Koryo Trade Relations], in- 
corporated in Tongbang munhtva kyoryu-sa non^go No. 8 of Han'guk munhwa 
ch'ongso, Seoul, 2nd ed., 1954. 

Sam pyolch'o wa iii ku iii nan e tae hayo [The Sam Pydlch^o and Their 

Rebellion], incorporated in Tongbang munJitva kyoryu-sa non'go. 

Kory6 muin chongch'i kigu ko [References to the Structure of the Kory6 

Military Government], incorporated in Tongbang munJitva kyoryu-sa non^go. 

T'an'gu wa iii hangjang [The Ch'i-tan Incursions and Resistance Offered], 

Kuksasang Ui chemunje ["The Problems of Korean History"], 2 (1960). 

Kim SOngjun, Kiin Cii s6nggy0k e taehan koch'al ["Studies on Ki-in"], YH 10 

Kim Tuhun (Kim Doo Hun), 'The Rise of Neo-Confucianism Against Buddhism 
in Late KoryC, Bulletin 12 (1960), The Korean Research Center, Seoul. 


Kim Tujong (Kim Doochong), 'Hyang Yak Ku Kup Pang', Bulletin 12 (1960), 
The Korean Research Center, Seoul. 

Kg Pydngik, 'Korea's Contacts with "The Western Regions" in Pre-Modern 
Times', SK 2 (1958). 

YOdae ch6ngdong haengs6ng ui yfin'gu [A Study of the Mobile Bureau 

for the Conquest of the East in the Kory6 Period], Part I in YH 14; Part II 
in YH 19; offprints provided by courtesy of the author. 

Korean Studies Guide, B.H. Hazard, et al., edited by R.Marcus, Institute of 
East Asiatic Studies, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1954; review and sup- 
plement, F.Vos, TPXLIII (1955). 

'Korean Weights and Measures', Seoul, 1901. 

Koseki chosa hokoku [Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites - for 1919], 
Chosen koseki kenkyukai, TokyQ, 1922. 

Koseki chosa tokubetsu hokoku [Special Report on Investigation of Ancient 
Sites], ChSsen koseki kenkyukai, Tokyo, 1929; this is No. 6 of six special 
reports published in 1919-1929. 
KS Koryd-sa, Yonsei Univ. edition, Seoul, 3 vols., 1956. Compilation was first 

begun in the first month of 1395. The task of editing and compiling was 
placed under the supervision of ChOng Tojon (d. 1398) and Ch6ng Ch'ong 
(late 14c.) and the result was the so-called KoryO kuksa or National His- 
tory of Koryfi, a chronological work in 37 kwon, which has not survived. 
A number of revisions were undertaken during the reign of Yi Sejong (r. 
1419-1450). The first of these revisions was made in the third year of the 
reign of Sejong under the editor-ship of Yu Kwan (early 15 c.) and Py6n 
Kyeryang (1369-1430) and the final product was the so-called Sugyo KoryO- 
sa or History of Kory6 [Based on a] Comparison of Documents, which is 
not longer extent. A second revision was undertaken in 1438 by Kw6n Che 
(1387-1445) and Sin Kae (early 15 c.) under the supervision of Yang Songji 
(early 15 c). The final work was printed in a metallic type edition but 
authorization for the issuance of the work was denied. Again, no known 
text survives. In 1449, Sejong suggested that the history of KoryO be re- 
compiled and the scholars of the Ch'unch'ugwan or Historiographical Bu- 
reau were ordered to carry out a revision based upon existing texts which 
included the Veritable Records, sillok. The compilation ran into difficulty 
over scholarly disagreement on emphasis and methodology; one group fa- 
voring the chronological arrangement and the other favoring the annals - 
biography style and both were begun. However, it was finally decided to 
favor the annals -biography arrangement and the final revision was com- 
pleted and presented to the throne in the first year of the reign of Yi Mun- 
jong (r. 1451-1452), Sejong himself having died while the work was still in 
progress. This, the extent text of the Koryd-sa or History of Kory6, was 
prepared under the supervision of Kim Chongdan (1390-1453) and ChOng 
Inji (1397-1478), the latter being in charge of the project at its completion 
and making the presentation to the throne. The work is in 139 kw6n, viz.: 
Annals, 46 krvdn; Monographs, 39 kivon, Chronological Tables, 2 ku&n, 
Biographies, 50 kivdn; and Index, 2 kwon. 
KSC Koryd-sa choryo, Toyo bunka kenkyujo edition, Tokyo, 1960; compiled by 

Nam Sumun (15 c.), et al., in 1451-1452 and first published in a metallic 
type edition in 1453-1454. 

Koji Ruien, published in 60 vols, by the Koji Ruien kankO-kai, 2nd ed., 
Tokyo, 1931-1936. 

Kokiisho kaidai, published in 2 vols, by the Kuni-kan, Tokyo, 3rd printing, 

Kotowicz, W., 'Formules initiales des documents Mongols aux Xllle et Xle 
slides', Rocznik Orientalistyczny , 19 (1954). 

Kuno, Y.S., Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Mainland, 2 vols., Berkeley, 
California, 1937 and 1940. 


Kuo-ck^ao wen-lei of Su T'ien-chieh (1294-1352), incorporated in Ssu-pu 
ts'iing-k'an 2017-2036, Commercial Press edition, Shanghai, 1933. 

Laufer, B., Sino-lranica, Chicago, 1919. 

Lautensach, H., Korea - Eine Landeskunde auf Grand eigener Reisen und der 
Literatur, Leipzig, 1945. 

Ledyard, G., + 'The Mongol Invasions of Korea and the Date of the Secret 
History', CAJ, forthcoming issue. 

+A translation of Mongol documents to appear in a future issue oiJAOS. 

+ Unpublished MA thesis. University of California, Berkeley, which 

contains translations of documents in TYSC 28. 

Lee, P.H. (Yi Haksu), 'Introduction to the Chang'ga: The Long Poem', 
Oriens Extremus, 3 (1956). 

Legge, J., The Chinese Classics, 7 vols., Hongkong, 1861. 

Loewenthal, R., The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth Century, Bd. 3, 
Gottinger Asiatische Forschungen, Wiesbaden. 

Lo, Jung-Pang, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance During the Reign 
of Qubilai Qaqan, 1260-1294', FEQ 13 (1954) 3. 

'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and 

Early Yuan Periods', FEQ 14 (1954) 1. 

Lobnov-Rostovsky, 'A Forgotten Battle - Chemulpo', AY I (1958) 2. 
+ de Mailla, J.A.M.deM., Tong-Kieng-Kang-Mu, Paris, 1779. 

Martin, H.D., The Rise of Chingis KJtan and His Conquest of North China, 
Baltimore, 1950, 

Martin, S.E., Korean Morphophonemics, Baltimore, 1954. 

McCune, E., The Arts of Korea, Tokyo, 1962. 

McCune, S., 'Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries', FEQ 4 (1946) 3. 

Mori Katsumi, Nisso to Korai to no shiken boeki ["Private Tributary Trade 
of Japan and KoryS with Sung"], CG 14 (1956). 

'International Relations between the 10th and 16th Century and the Dev- 
elopment of the Japanese International Consciousness', Acta Asiatica (of 
the Toho Gakkai, Tokyo), 2 (1961). 

NissO-tsu to Tanra ["Quelpart Island and Marine Transporation between 

Japan and Sung China"], CG 21 &22 (1961). 

Meng-ku yuan-liu chien-chang, annotated by Shen Tsang-chih (1850-1922), 2 
pen, Chung-kuo shu-tien ching-shou edition, Peking, 1962. 

Ming-Yiian-Ch' ing hsi-t'ung-chi. Commercial Press edition, 1934. 

Mochizuki, Shinko, Bukkyo daijiten, 8 vols., Tokyo, 1931. 
+ Money of Korea, The Research Department of the Bank of Korea, Seoul (1960?) 

Murakami Shoji, Moko raicho no honyaku ["Translation of Mongolian Creden- 
tials in the Goryeo-sa"], CG 17 (1960). 

Nachin, L., Sun Tzu et les Anciens Chinois Ou Tse et Se Ma Fa, Paris, 1948. 

Naito Shunpo, Korai heisei kanken [A Survey of the Kory6 Military System], 
SG 15 (1934); also incorporated in Chosen-shi kenkyu, ToyOshi kenkyu-kai 
of Kyoto Univ., 1961. 

Korai heisei kanken hoi [A Supplement to 'A Survey of the Kory6 Mili- 
tary System'], SG 18 (1934); also incorporated in ChOsen-shi kenkyn. 

Korai jidai no Jubo oyobi Seibo ni tsuite [Concerning the Chiingbang 

and the ChOngbang of the Kory6 Period], incorporated in Ch5sen-shi ken- 

Nakakoji Akira, Gen^ff [The Mongol Invasions], Tokyo, 1937. 

Nelson, F., Korea and the Old Orders in East Asia, Baton Rouge, La., 1946; 
reviewed by A.C. Bunce, FEQ 4 (1946) 3. 

Nihon chiri taikei, 12 vols., plus supplements, KaizSsha, Tokyo, 1930. 

Ninomiya Keinin, Korai no saikai ni tsuite [The KoryO Chaehoe], CG 21 &22 


d'Ohsson, Baron C, Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchingis-Khan jusqu'a Ti- 

mour Beg ou Tamerlane, Paris, 1852 '2nd ed.?); previously published 

The Hague-Amsterdam, 1834-1835. 
Okada,H., Gen no ShinO to RyOyS kOsho [The Shen-wang of the Yiian and the 

Liaoyang Mobile Bureau], CG 14 (1959). 
Olbricht, P., Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft in 13. 

imd 14. Jahrhunderl, Gottinger Asiatische Forschungen, Bd. 1, Wiesbaden, 

Paik, L.G. (Paek Nakchun), 'Tripitaka Koreana', TKB/MS XXXII (1951). 
Passin, H., 'Untouchability in the Far East', Monumenta Nipponica.Xl (1955). 
'The Paekch6ng of Korea: a brief social history', Monumenta Nipponica 

XII (1956-1957). 
Poucha, P., Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, Supplement to the A rchiv 

OrientSlnf, Vol. IV, Prague, 1956. 
Pelliot, P. (1878-1945), 'Notes sur le "Turkestan" de M. vV. Barthold', TP 

XXVII (1930). 

'Les Mots Mongols dans le Korye sa', JA 217 (1930). 

Notes sur I'histoire de la horde d'or, Paris, 1949. 

Histoire secrete des mongols, Paris, 1949; restitution and translation 

of chapters 1-6. 

Notes on Marco Polo Paris, 1959. 

and L.Hambis, Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan, Leiden, 1951; 

annotated translation of the Sheng-wu chin-cheng-lu. 
Prawdin, M., The Mongol Empire, New York, 1953. 
Pulleyblank, E.G., The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan, London, 

Py6n T'aesop, Koryo-jo ui munban kwa muban [Civil and Military Officials of 

the Koryo Period], SY 2 (1961). 
Ramstedt, G. J., 'Koreanisch kgs 'Ding, Stiick', Journal de la Societe Finno- 

ougriemie, LXVIII, 1945. 
Studies in Korean Etymology, M6moires de la Soci^t^ Finno-ougrienne, 

XCV, Helsinki, 1949. 
Ratchnevsky, P., Un Code des Yuan, Paris, 1937. 
RGK Rekishigaku kenkyu, issued at Tokyo since 1933. 

Riasanovsky, V.A., Fundamental Principles of Mongol Laiv, Tientsin, 1937. 
Rockhill, W. W., The Journey of William of Rubnick to The Eastern Parts of 

The World 1253-55, London, 1900; Peking reprint of 1941. 
China's Intercourse ivith Korea from the XVth Century to 1895, London, 

and F.Hirth, Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade 

in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fav-chi, St. Peters- 
burg, 1911. 
Rogers, M.C., 'Factionalism and KoryO Policy under the Northern Sung', 

JA OS 79 (1959). 

'Sung-KoryO Relations; Some Inhibiting Factors', Oriens 11 (1959). 

'Studies in Korean History', TP LCVII (1959) 1 &2. 

'Some Kings of KoryO as Registered in Chinese Works', JAOS 81 (1961) 


'The Regularization of Koryo-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', CAJ6(1961). 

des Rotours, R., Traits des Functionnaires et Traite de I'Arm^e traduits de 

la nouvelle Histoire des Tang, 2 vols., Leiden, 1947. 
Samguk yusa, Ch'oe Namson edition, Keijo (Seoul), 1946. 
Sansom, Sir G., A History of Japan to 1334, 2 vols., London, 1958. 
San-ts'ai Vu-hui of 1607 by Wang Ch'i in 73 pen. 
Schafer, E.H., 'Orpiment and Realgar in Chinese Technology and Tradition', 

JAOS 75 (1955). 


Schafer, E.H., 'Falconry in T'ang Times', TP XLVI (1958). 

and B.E. Wallacker, 'Local Tribute Products of the T'ang Dynasty, 

Tung-fan iven-hua ["Journal of Oriental Studies of Hongkong University"], 
4 (1957-1958) 1&2. 

Schurmann, H.F., Economic Structure of the Yiian Dynasty , Cambridge, 

'Mongolian Tributary Practices of the 13th Century', HJAS 19 (1956) 


Sekino Tadashi, Korai no k5to (Kaijo) oyobi Okyu ishi (Mangetsu-dai) [The Old 
Koryd Capital and Palace Remains], Rekishi chiri, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1904). 
SG Seikyu gakuso, issued by the Seikyu Gakkai, Keijo (Seoul), 1930-1939. 

Sheng-wu chin-cheng-lu edited and annotated by Wang Kuo-wei and incorpo- 
rated in Hai-ning \Vang Chung-ch'iao kung i-shu [The Collected Works of 
Wang Kuo-wei]. 

Shidehara Taira, Chosen no sanjo [Korea's Mountain Citadels], Rekishi chiri 
15 (1910) 5 and 15 (1910) 6. 

Shiratori Kurakichi (1865-1942), Siragi no kokugo ni tsuite [Concerning the 
National Designations for Silla], Rekishi chiri, 8 (1902) 5. 

Korai-shi ni mietaru Moko-go no kaishaku [An Interpretation of Mon- 
golian Words Seen in the Kory6-sa], TG 18 (1929) 2. 

Onyaka mobun genchU hishi, T5yo Bunko, Seriei. C, Vol. VHI, TOkyO, 


Sigeda, T., Korai no KOto [The Old Capital of Koryo], Rekishi chiri, 16 
(1910) 6. 

Sinjawdn, Saso ch'ulp'an-sa, Seoul, 1950; unfortunately contains many er- 
rors, yet still useful. 

Sin Kis6k, Koryo malgi Hi tae-Il kwan'gye ["Relations with Japan at the End 
of the KoryO Dynasty"], SK 1 (1957). 
SK Sahoe kwahak, issued by The Korean Research Center, Seoul, 1957-1959. 

Sohn Pow-key (Son Pogi), 'The Opening of Korea; a Conflict of Traditions', 
TKBRASXXXVl (1960). 

Schwa oesa by O Ky6ngw6n (Yi Dynasty), first published in 1830 and re-pub- 
lished in 1868; references are to the latter edition in 6 pen. 

SudO Yoshikose, KOrai makki yori ChQsen shoki ni itaru nubi no kenkyu [Re- 
search on Slavery from the End of the Kory6 Period to the Beginning of the 
Yi Dynasty], RGK 9 (1939), Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

Suematsu Yasukazu, Korai no shoki no ryOban ni tsuite [Concerning the Yang- 
ban of the Early Kory6 Period], TG 36 (1946) 2. 

'Introduction to the Ri Dynasty Annals', Memoirs of the Research De- 
partment of the TOyO Bunko, No. 17, TOkyO, 1958; pp. 193-109 pertain to the 
Koryo -sa. 

KOrai yonjyOni tofu kOryaku [A Brief Note on the Forty-two Tofm of 

Kory6], CG 14 (1959). 

Review and comments on the recent editions of the Koryd-sa ch&ryo, 

CG 19 (1961). 

Sung Shih of 1345 in 496 chiian. 

Susa, K., Gen no ni-daishiseki [Two Historical Sites of the Yiian], TokyO, 1937. 

Swann, N.L., Food and Money in Ancient China, Princeton, 1950; review by 
Lien-sheng Yang incorporated in Studies . . . 
SY Sahak ydn'gu, issued by the Han'guk sahak-hoe [The Historical Society of Ko- 

rea], Seoul, since 1958 (?). 
SZ Shigaku zasshi, issued by the Shigakkai of TOkyO Imperial Univ., since 1889. 

Takahashi Toru, Saishu-to meiko [Names for Cheju Island], CG 9 (1950). 

Ta-YUan ma-cheng, incorporated in ICuang-ts' ang-hsUeh-chUn ts'ung-shu. 
TG Toys gakuho issued at TokyO since 1911. 

TKBRAS Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, issued by the 
Society since 1900 (suspended 1941-1948 due to the war). 


TMP Tongguk munkdn pigo of 1770 by Han Ponghan, et al., revised in 1782 by Yi 

Manun, et al.; a second revision was begun in 1903. The 2nd revised edi- 
tion, first published in 1907, is generally known as CMngbo munhdn pigo 
and it is thi s supplemented worlc in 3 vols., Koj6n kanhaeng-hoe edition, 
Seoul, 1957, to which all references are made. 
Tonga saegugO sajdn, Seoul, 1959; edited by Yang Chudong, it is especially 
valuable for reading texts written in 'middle Korean' as well as in modern 
TK Tongsa kangmok of An Chongbok (1712-1786), Chosen kosho kankO-kai edi- 

tion, Keijo (Seoul), 1915, 4 fascicles. 
TP T oung Pao published at Leiden since 1890. 

Toyo rekishi daijiten, published in 9 vols., by the Heibonsha, TOkyO, 1937-39. 
Tsuda Sokichi, Chosen rekishi chiri, published in 2 vols, by the former South 
Manchurian Railway Corp., TOkyO, 1913. 
TT Tongguk ronggam of 1484-1485 by S6 K6jong (1420-1492), et al.. Chosen 

kenkyu-kai edition, Keijo (Seoul), 1915, 6 vols. 
+ T'uChi, Meng-wu-erh shih-chih. 
TUK Taedong iinbu kunok in 12 kivdn by Kw6n Munhae (d. 1591) was compiled dur- 

ing the reign of Yi S6njo (r. 1568-1608) and modelled after the YUn-fu 
ch'iin-yii of the Yiian scholar Yin Shih-fu. Subjects, which include history, 
belles-lettres, plant and animal life, are arranged according to the tradi- 
tional tonal categories. Its primary value is in its references to works of 
the pre-Imjin (= 1592) period. The work itself was a private undertaking 
which was brought to the attention of SOnjo by the well-known New-Confu- 
cianist Kim SQngil (1538-1593). Plans to publish the work were dropped 
with the Japanese invasion of the 16th century and for some two centuries- 
the work remained unknown. Then, in 1798, a woodblock edition was pub- 
lished by Kw6n's 7th lineal descendent. An edition in metallic type was be- 
gun during the period of the Japanese occupation (1910-1946) by Ch'oe 
Nams6n but it was never completed. The text cited here is a photolitho- 
graphed copy of the original publication in the library of Ch'iam Sin S6kho. 
The value of the work has been enhanced by the addition of an alphabetical 
index. All references are to the Sin S6kho edition, Seoul, 1959. 
TYS Tongguk ydji sungnam, Koj6n kanhaeng-hoe edition, Seoul, 1958. This work 

was begun in 1445 by Yang Songji and completed in 1481 by No Sajin, et al. 
revisions were made in 1486, 1499, and 1530. The 1530 revision is gener- 
ally known as Sinjung tongguk ydji sungnam and it is to this, in the one vol. 
Koj6n kanhaeng-hoe edition of 1958 that all references are made. 
TYSC Tongguk Yi Sangguk -chip , Kojon kanhaeng-hoe edition, Seoul, 1958, 1 vol.; 

contains the collected works of Yi Kyubo (1177-1241). 
Tzii-hai by Shu Hsin-ch'eng, et al., Chung-hua shu-rhii yin-hsing edition, 

Shanghai, 1958. 
Vernadsky, G., 'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa\ HJAS3 
(1938) 1. 

and M.Karpovich, The Mongols and Russia, being vol. 3 of 'A History 

of Russia', New Haven, 1953; reviewed by B.Spuler, Oriens YU (1954) . 
Viesman, W., 'Ondol - Radiant Heat in Korea', TKBRASXXXl (1948-1949). 
Vladimirtsov, B., Geng^s -iiTzow (translated by M. Car sow), Paris, 1948. 
Vos, F., 'Kim Yusin, Personlichkeit und Mjrthos - Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis 
der altkoreanischen Geschlchte', Oriens Extremus, I, 1 (1954) 1 and II, 2 
(1954) 1. 

'La letterature coreana', La Civiltct deWOriente I, Rome, 1957. 

and H.Hammitzsch, Die Religionen Japans und Koreas , Stuttgart, 1963. 

Wada Sei, TOashi kenkyn (Manshu-hen), ToyO bunko ronsD, Series A., No. 37, 

TOkyo, 1959; reviewed by Yi Hongjik, AY 3 (1960) 1. 
Waley, A., 'Notes on the Yiian-dV ao pi-shih' , Bulletin of the School of Orien- 
tal and African Studies, 23 (1960). 


+ Wang Ling, 'On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms in China', 
ISIS 31 (1947) 3&4. 

Wittfogel, K.A., and C.S.Feng, History of Chinese Society: Lzao (907-1125), 
various reprints from the Transactions of the American Philosophical So- 
ciety, reviewed by Woodbridge Bingham, FEQ 9 (1950) 3. 

vVuT'ing-hsieh, Yiian hsing-sheng ch'eng-hsiang pHng-chang cheng-shih, 
incorporated in Vol. 6 of the Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien. 

Chin fang- chen nien-piao, incorporated in Vol. 6 of the Erh-shih-tvu- 

shih pu-pien. 

Yanai Watari (1875-1926), Meng-ku-shih yen-chiu (being the Chinese trans- 
lation of articles published in Japanese in TG), Commercial Press, 1932. 

Yiian-tai ching-liieh tung-pei k'ao (being the Chinese translation of three 

studies which originally appeared in Japanese journals), Commercial 
Press, 1944. 

Yang Lien-sheng, 'Numbers and U:uts in Chinese Economic History', HJAS 
12 (1949) 1. 

'Hostages in Chinese History', HJAS 15 (1952); also incorporated in 

Studies in Chinese Institutional History. 

'The Form of the Paper Note Hui-tzu of the Southern Sung Dynasty, 

HJAS 16 (1953). 

'Marginalia to the Yiian tien-chang\ HJAS 19 (1956). 

'The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography', in Historians of 

China and Japan, London, 1961. 

Studies in Chinese Institutional History, Camondge, 1961. 

YC Yosa chemang, a 23 kwM work by Yu Kye (1607-1664); Chosen Kenkyu-kai 

edition, Keij5 (Seoul), 1916; this work was probably first published in 1667. 

Yi Kibaek, KoryO ch'ogi pyOngje e kwan-han hudae ches61 ui k6mt'o ["On the 
Military Institutions of the Early Ko-ryeo Period"], AY I (1958) 2. 

Yi Kimun, Chungse y6jin-6 unnon yon'gu, Nonum-chip ["Seoul University 
Journal, Humanities and Social Sciences"], 7 (1958). 

Yi Pyongdo, Kuksa taegivan, rev. ed., Seoul, 1958. 

Han'guk-sa, Vol. H, Seoul, 1961. 

Koryo sidae Ui ydrCgu [Research on the KoryO Period], Seoul, 1954. 

Yi, Table 6, 'A Table of Stipends' contained in Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2. 

Yi, Table 4, 'A Table of the Central Bureaucratic Structure of the Koryo 
Period', contained in Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2. 

Yi, Table 7, Various charts of lands alloted to Koryo officials, contained in 
Yi, Han^guk-sa, Vol. 2. 

Yi PyCngdo and Kim Chaew6n, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 1, Seoul, 1960. 

Yi Tokpong, Han'guk saengmurhak ui saj5k koch'al ["Biology in the Ko-ryeo 
Dynasty"], AY 2 (1959) 2. 

Yi Uch'61, Kory6 sidae ui hwan'gwan e tae hayo, SY 1 (1958). 
YH Yoksa hakpo, issued by the Yoksa Hakhoe (The Korean Historical Society, 

Seoul) since 1952; the first issues were from Pusan. 
YKC Yiian Kao-li chi-shih, incorporated in the IC uang-ts' ang-hsileh -chiin ts'ung- 

shu, ts'e 16, Ts'ang-sheng-ming-chih ta-hsiieh k'an-hsing edition. 

Yoshida, K., Chosen suisangyo no kaihatsu katei ["The Process cf the Deve- 
lopment of Fisheries in Corea in the Middle of the Li Dynasty"], TSJiD 
gakuhD of Kyoto University, 20 (1951). 
YS Yuan Shih of Sung Lien (1310-1381), et al., 210 chUan, completed in 1369- 

YSCSPM YUan-shih chi-shih pen-mo, compiled by Ch'en Fang-chen (Ming) and anno- 
tated by Chang P'o, Chung-hua shu-chii-ch'u-pan edition, Peking, 1955. 
YSHP YUan-shih hsin-pien, by Wei Yiian (1794-1856); 95 chiian, published in 1905. 

Yule, H., and H.Cordier, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, 2 vols., 3rd ed., 
London, 1929. 


Yun MubySng, Koju-s6ng kwa Konghom-chin, YH 1958. 

KoryO pukkye chiri-go, YH 1 (1953) 4 and 2 (1953). 

Han'guk-sa, volume of Chronological Tables, ydnp'yo Seoul, 1959. 

Yun Yonggyun, KOrai KisD-cho ni okeru Tei ChO-fu ran no soin to sono eikyC, 

SG 2 (1930). 
Yung-lo ta-tien of Hsieh Chin (1369-1415), et al., Chung-hua shu-chii edition, 

Peking, 1960. 



Ajul 195 
Alton tobci 214 
Altan-)fur(ultai 214 
A-mu-k'an 106, 112-113 
Annam 199, 210 
An Pangyol 174 
Aqai 175-177, 207 
Arijf-boge 152, 154 
Arin 214 
artisans 213-214 
astrologers 103 
A-tlu 64, 69 

Black Ch'i-tan 64 

brass 205 

Buddhist clergy 22, 74, 127, 153, 157, 

Buddhist Tripitaka 103 

Captain 133 

Capital Patrol - see kyOng pyolch 'o 

captives - see hostages 

census 75. 77, 104 

ceramics 205 

Chabi Pass 62, 196 

chaehoe 103 

chaesang 62 

Cha-la 14, 76, 24 

Chang HsUan 210 

Chang Kuo-kang 198 

Chao Chung-hsiang 14 

Chao Lang-pi 152 

Chep'o 131 

Chiao T'ien-i 198 

Chi-nu 5, 13 

Chi tJisin 67, 75 

Chin 1, 4, 5, 6, 23-25, 27, 75, 102, 151 

Chin-shih 13 

Chin-shan 13 

Chin Yonggap 29 

Ching-shih ta-tien 71-73 

Cho Ch'ung 14 f 

Cho Hwi 137-138, 195 

Cho Hy6nsup 104 

Cho I 157 

Ch6 Island, as refuge 73, 137 

Cho Munju 133, 151 

Cho Sukch'ang 61, 68-77 

Ch6n Chong 135 

Ch6n Kan 61, 65 

Ch6ng Chayo 161 

Chongbang 110 

Ch6ng Ci 77 

Chou Shih-ch'ang 198 

Chu Ch'ing 210 

Chu Suk 108 

Chu Yonggyu 115 

Chu-ku-yU 24 f, 64, 74, 202-203, 213 

Chungbang 109, 152 

Ch'a Songu 132 

Ch'e-ko 25 

Ch'eng-tsung 199 

Ch'-tan 1, 4, 5, 6, 77 

Ch'i-tan sites 19 

Ch'oe Chaon 73 

Ch'oe Ch6ngbun 21 

Ch'oe Chongso 162 

Ch'oe Ch'unghon 2, 10, 22, 109, 110 

Ch'oe Chungsu 110 

Ch'oe clan 22, 132, 196 

Ch'oe clan wealth 134-135 

Ch'oe Ch'unmy6ng 67-68 

Ch'oe Hang 2, 107-108, 112, 115, 127, 

129, 131-136 
Ch'oe Hyang 22 
Ch'oe mansion 107-108 
Ch'oe Munbon 133 
Ch'oe On 132-134, 136 
Ch'oe S6ndan 21 
Ch'oe T'an 160-161, 175, 195 
Ch'oe U 2, 10, 62 ff, 107-108 
Ch'oe Ui, 2, 132, 138 
Ch'oe Yangbaek 132-133 
Ch'6in-s6ng 74 

Ch'6lchu, fall of in 1231, 61-62 
Ch'ungju, Mongol assaults on 113, 127, 

Ch'ungnyol Wang (King) - see Wang Sim 
Ch'ungson Wang (King) 183, 200 
Ch'ungsuk Wang (King) 183, 200 
6inggis 4, 5, 12, 28-29, 194, 212, 214 
Civil Council, see Chdngbang 
Civil Guards, see sdbang 
civil officials, purge of 2 
clothing, Koryo follows Mongol customs 

coins 28 
Confucianism 7 


Confucianists 136 

cotton 202 

'crimes' of Kory6 76 

daruyaCi 65, 70, 73, 114, 137, 153, 

161, 176, 195, 198 
diviners 113, 115, 174 
drought 128, 135, 156 

earthquakes 156 

Eastern JUr6en 6, 12, 63, 75, 106, 111- 

112, 127, 128, 130, 137, 138 
envoys, Mongol 

murder of 4, 29 

frequency of 24 
eunuchs 2, 8, 159 
evacuation to islands 103, 106-107, 112, 

127, 129 
evacuation of northwest 154 

Falconry Office 205 

famine 128, 130, 132, 135, 151, 180, 211 

Feng-ching 5 

General 10 

gold 201-206 

Great Shrine 28 

Guard Corps, see tobang 

GOyUk 102, 106 

Ha -Chen 14 ff 

Hambis, L. 183 

Han Chonggwe 133 

Han-she 13, 19 

hawks - see hunting birds 

Hei-ti 156, 160, 198 

Hindu 177-183, 207 

Hong Ch'an 176 

Hong Chunghui 196, 200 

Hong Ki 176 

Hong Kunsan 200 

Hong Kyun 72 

Hong Mun'gye 162 

Hong Paeksu 77 

Hong Pogwon 10, 61, 64, 72-78, 102, 105- 

106, 112-113, 127, 130, 151, 200, 204 
Hong Taesun 77 
Hong Tagu 151, 175-183, 196, 200, 207, 

208, 211 
Hostages 68, 75, 104, 128, 131, 132, 

138, 211-215 
house armies (kabydng) 2, 10, 22, 134 
Hsiao-wei-sheng 65 
Hsien-p'ing-lu 5, 12 
Hu-tu-ta-erh 177 
Huijong 4, 11 

human fat, Mongol use of 66 
Hunghwa postal relay station 21 

hunting birds 205 
Hy6n Munhy6k 175 
HyOnjong 12 

Ikeuchi Hiroshi 209 

Im Y6n 2, 111, 132, 133, 135, 136, 159- 

162, 182 
Im Yugan 162 
Im Yug6 162 
Im Yugon 162 
Im Yuje 162 
infanticide 128 
instructions for surrendering states 

157-158, 194 
interpreters 21-22, 157 
invasions of Japan - see Japan 

Jalairtai 115, 127-137, 150 

jam6i 151 

Japan 157-158, 180, 182-183, 199, 207- 
211; also see Wako; trade 

Jibtfgen 195 

John of Piano Carpini: see Pian de Car- 

JUr6en 1, 5, 7, 62, 69, 74, 77; also see 
Eastern <JUr6en; Chin 

Kang Hwasang 153, 158 
Kang Uch'ang 67 
Kangdo 107 
Kangdong 6, 13, 16 ff 
Kanghwa Island 4, 103 

transfer of capital to 69 

fortifications 107 

buildings 107-108 

destruction of defenses 150 
Kao-i-ma 176, 178 
Kaegy6ng 4, 11 
Ke-pu-ai 74 
Ki Chao 215 
Ki Ch'61 215 
kiin 212 
Kim Chidae 17 
Kim Chij6 173 
Kim Chunggu 27 
Kim Chungon 65 
Kim Ch'wiry6 14 ff 
Kim Hongch'wi 132 
Kim Huije 26 
Kim In'gy6ng 16 ff, 70 ff 
Kim Injun 2, 132-136, 150-151, 154-159 
Kim Kyong 159 
Kim Ky6ngson 61 ff, 108 
Kim Panggy6ng 153, 175-183 
Kim Taejae 132-133 
Kim T'ongj6ng 179-182 
Kim Tugyong 155 
Kim Sech'ung 69 


Kim Sik 131 

Kim Sikchae 132 

Kim S6k 178 

Kim Su 176 

Kim Sugang 130-131 

Kim Sungjun 132, 135, 155, 158 

Kim Wdnyun 181 

Kim Yongjae 132 

Kim Yunhu 70, 113 

Koryd-sa 72 

kundika 29 

Kuju 62, 65 

KyojOng togam 109, 158, 159, 161 

Kydl 135 

Kydng pydlch'o 137, appendix 

Ky6ng Taesung 2, 10, 110 

Ky6ng W611ok 155 

Ky6ngju 9 

Kory6 Army - defeat of in 1231, 63 

Ko Y6rim 176 

Kojong 4, 11, dies 150 

Koko temtlr - see Wang Hii 

Kong Yu 180 

Kongmin Wang (King) 183, 199, 214, 215 

Kum Hun 179 

Kwak Y6p'il 160 

Kw6n Ky6n 215 

Kw6n Pu 73 

Kw6n Tan 176 


left idle 127 

distributed in lieu of salaries 128 
levies - see tribute 
Liao 1, 5, 7, 9 
Liaotung 5, 6, 77, 103 
Liaoyang 5, 77 
Liaoyang Korean commimity 196, 200, 

Liaoyang Mobile Bureau 200 
Lieutenant 132 
Li I 181, 198 
Li O 160 

Major 133 
Mangyudai 114, 137 
Manjong 135 
maritime transport 

of grain 129, 210 

of troops 129, 131 
marriages between Koryo and YUan 

Royal families 160, 183, 200, 214, 

Military Colony Supervisory Bureau 

177, 207 
Military Council, see Chungbang 
military government 1, 2, 4, 8 
military officials 2, 109 
military support for Mongols 210-211 

Min Chi 73 

Min Hui 63, 64, 68, 73, 105, 108 

Ming 1, 7 

Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of 
Japan 199 


forces withdraw in 1232 70 
forces withdraw in 1253 114 
forces withdraw in 1255 128 
forces withdraw in 1256 130 
forces withdraw in 1257 132 
forces withdraw in 1239 104 
attempt amphibious warfare 114, 129, 

131, 175 
custom of shaving the head 127 
wall Uiju 132, 137 
military colonies in Koryo, 138, 177, 

mil itary-administration in Koryd 

myriarch commands in Kory6 199 

MSngke 105, 111, 152-152 

MongketU 161, 196 

Moslems 174, -212, 214 

Mun Tae 61-62 

Munjong 9 

Muqali 5, 6, 12, 28 

My6ngjong 2, 8, 9 

naesang (guards ?) 16 

National Academy 107 

Na Yu 179, 181 

Nayan 195, 200, 201 

Night Patrol see ya pyolch^o 

No Ch'aek 215 

No T'an 63 

Nii-chen - see JttrCen 

O Susan 133 
Odos-buqa 160 
oe -pydlch'o 182; appendix 
officials - Kory6 changes to Yilan de- 
signations 199 
bgodei 29, 105 
6m Suan 158 
otter pelts 68, 70, 201 ff 

Pae Chungson 173-174, 177, 179 

paekchong 113 

Pak Ch'6nju 177 

Pak Ch'onsik 132, 151 

Pak Huisil 132, 133, 135-136, 151 

Pak Munch 'ang 66 

Pak Nokch'6n 77 

Pak Po 177 

Pak Siyun 20 

Pak S6 65 ff 

Pak Son 133 

Pak Songbi 132-135 


Pak S6ngsin 133 

Pak Sunggae 135 

Pak Y6ngj6ng 133 

Pan Pu 157 

paper 201-206 

Parhae - see P'ohai 

patrols see pydlch'o 

peace negotiations 64, 104, 105, 113-115, 

131, 138, 139 
pelts 201-206 
Pian de Carpine 18 
P'il Hy6nbo 77 
pirates 114, 156, 210 

also see wakd 
Poju (= tJiju) 5 
polo 108 

Ponjo p'ydnnydn kangmok 73 
postal relay stations 151, 157, 210 
P'ohai 1 
P'o-su-lu 6 
P'o-so-fu 196, 207 
precious metals 201-206 
private armies 10 
P'u-hsien Wan-nu 5, 6, 14, 23, 29, 62, 

74-77, 102, 195 
P'u-po-ta 131 
pydlch'o 65, 102, 112, 129, 134, 138, 

Py6n Yang 178 
Py6ngju, razed 64 

Qara-Khitay 5, 64 
Qara-qorum 105 
Qubilai 5, 152 ff 
Qulan 214 
Qurimci 178, 207 

resettlement of northwest 154 
return to mainland 162-162 

of Ch'oe Hyang 22 

of Han Sun 22-23 

of slaves at Ch'ungju 70 

at Wonju 130 

in northeast 137-138 

of local officials 138 

increase in number 152 

of Ch'oe T'an 160 

of the Three Patrols 172-183 

sam pydlch'o 133, 159-183, 198, 205, 207, 

208, 209, 211; appendix 
Sartaq 61-74, 203 
seamstresses 213 
Sedae p'y6nny6n chbryo 73 
Senior Colonel 133 
Shen-wang 183, 200 
Shenyang 77 
Shih Shu 178, 207 

Shih-lo-wen 151 

Shlh-mo T'ien-ch'U 198 

ships and shipbuilding 138, 157-159, 

181, 183, 199, 207-210 
Shu-li-ta 153,154, 198 
Shun-ti 215 

silks 202 ff; also see textiles 
Silla 1 

silver 201-206 
Sin Chipp'y6ng 137 
Sin Island, as refuge 65 
Sin Saj6n 175 
sin'gi (cavalry) 16, 108 
sinuigun cavalry, 132-136; appendix 
slaves 113, 130, 135, 175, 212, 214 
S6 Ch6ng 133 
S6 Kyunhan 133 
sdbang 111,161 162 
S6gy6ng - see Western Capital 
Solong^d 214 (also see Tongguk) 
Song Ipch'ang 75 
Song Kiryu 132 
Song Kukch'om 64, 67 
Song Kunbi 129 
Song Poyon 182 
Song Songnye 162 
S6ng W6nbal 134 
S6nGi Gate 20 
Ssangs6ng Governor's Command 137-138, 

starvation - see famine 
stipends of Kory6 officials 9 
Sun-t'an 199 
Sung 1, 7, 9, 25-26, 29, 102, 151, 153, 

156, 208, 209 
Sung-chi 112, 150 
Siingch'6n-pu 105, 115 
SungSan 130, 158 
Supreme Directorate, see Kyojong togam 

Ta6ar 195, 205 

Ta-chen 5 

Tae ChipsSng 67, 70 

taegak (crossbow unit) 16 

Taegwan Hall 21 

tae up'o 67 

Ta-fu-ying 6 

T'ak Ch6ng 137-138, 195 

T'amna 26 

T'amna under YUan control 198-199 

Tanqut 64, 102, 203 

Teke-qor6i 74 

TemOge-oteigin 24, 28, 195, 202 

textiles 24, 68, 114, 138, 156, 158 

Three Armies, defeat of 63-64 

Three Patrols, see sam pydlch'o 

Tibet 200 

titles of Kory6 officials 9 


tohang 10, 11, 107, 108, 110, 129, 134, 

150, 161 
To-la-tai 175 
Tongguk 115 
Tonghwa 23 

Tongju - slaughter of the city 214 
Tongnyong-pu 161, 196 
Tong-mun-sdn 12 
Toqto'a 195, 198, 207, 208 
T'ou-nien-ke 160, 175 

with Sung 25-26 

with Japan 26 

with Eastern Jlircen 28 

under Mongols 206 
transfer of capital 69, 70 
tribute 4, 18, 22, 29, 68, 70, 75, 104, 112, 

114, 127, 150, 154, 156, 157, 158, 195, 

Tripitaka 103, 107 
Tu-liTemur 199 
Tului 29 

Tung-chen 6, 12 
Tung-ching 5, 77-78 
Tung-ching Mobile Bureau 160 
Tung-hsia 6, 12 
Tu-tan 72 

U Ch'6ns6k 181 
U Tukkyu 155 
tlijong 2, 8, 9 
Uiju 5 
tjyer 105 
tjngyang guards 133 

wakd 26, 156, 199 

Wang Ch'ang, Duke of An'gyong, 112, 

115, 127, 150, 158-160 
Wang Ch'61 8, 11 

Wang Ch6n = W6njong 4, 11, 12, 105, 

150, 153-183, 213 
Wang Chon; Duke of Sinan 104, 106, 155 
Wang Ch6ng, Duke of Hoean, 64, 67, 69, 

Wang Chong, Duke of Sunan, 155, 160, 

Wan-chia-nu 25 

Wang Ching, Duke of Taebang 213 
Wang Chun - see Wang Sun 
Wang Hao-fei 74 
Wang Hui, Earl of Y6ngan 113-114, 131, 

136, 154 
Wang Hui (KOkb TemUr) 178, 201 
Wang Kuo-ch'ang 178 
Wang Kuo-wei 71 

Wang On, Marquis of Sunghwa 174, 179 
Wang Ong 178 
Wang Sim - King Ch'ungny61 151, 154, 

160-183, 196, 198, 199, 210, 213 

Wang T'ae, Marquis of Siyang 155 

Wang To = King Ch'ungsuk 183 

Wang W6n = King Chungs 6n 183 

Wen Yen-shih 71 

Western Capital (Koryo) 6, 9, 10, 77, 13^ 

W6njong - see Wang Ch6n 

Wu-ai 201 

yapydlch'o 69, 108, 114, 132-136, 

159, 161; appendix 
Yanasiri 195 
yangban 106 
Yang Hwa 155 

Yangsan - slaughter of city 214 
Yang Tongmu 176 
Yasa 194 
Yeh-lu Liu-ke 6 
Yeh-ssu-pu 5 
Yeka 112-114, 204 
YesUder 137, 150-151, 153 
Yi Changyong 158-159 
Yi Chas6ng 62-63 
Yi Che 133 
Yi Chehyon 71-73 
Yi Ch6k 17 ff 
Yi Chu 133 
Yi Huij6k 62 
Yi Irhyu 133-134 
Yi Kongju 135 
Yi Kunsik 104 
Yi Kwang 129 
Yi One-Thousand 131 
Yi Paekki 174 
Yi Punhui 161 
Ui Py6ngdo 1, 72, 182 
Yi Sinson 174 
Yi Susim 178 
Yi Uimin 1 
Yi IJng 131, 138 
Yi Ungny6I 115 
Yi Wonu 104 

Yi Y6nso 132-133, 135-136 
Yin Hung 157 
Y6 Y6nghui 173 
ydnggotig 68, 133 
Yu Chonhyok 174, 179 
Yu Ky6ng 110, 115, 132, 150, 155, 159 
Yu NCing 132-134 
Yu T'ae 133 
YUan - see Mongols 
Yiian Kao-li chi-shih 4, 71-73 
Yuan Shih 71 

YU-ke-hsia 23 ff, 62-63, 74 
Yun Ch'un 138 
Yun In 69 
Yun Kwan 27 
Yun Manjong 176 
Yung-lo ta-tien 71 


University of California Library 
Los Angeles 

This U^^«m^o;^A^}S^^2SS£^^^ 



, JML 

Form L9-50jn-4,'6 

3 11 

58 00544 9193